Tag: Middle East
Bid farewell to the treasons of Trump
It’s been hard, but we’ve almost made it to the other side. Now comes a time for rebuilding, or in Biden terms building back better.
Domestic issues will take first priority: the epidemic, the economy, social cleavages. Biden will need to get a lot more needles into arms, a lot more jobs returned and created, a lot of injustices to black and brown people, immigrants, women, college students, and LGBTQ people rectified. Trump’s white supremacist and 2nd Amendment supporters need to know that LAW AND ORDER applies to them as well as to everyone else. Successful prosecution of the January 6 insurrectionists is critical, including an eventual conviction of Trump in the Senate.
Current Majority Leader McConnell is not only open to that possibility but has blamed Trump for provoking the January 6 insurrection:
The mob was fed lies.
This is important, as it opens the a possibility of purging Trumpism from the Republican Party and eventually also from the Senate and House. Remnants will persist, but American politics will return to a much better place if Republicans and Democrats once again come to share a common factual basis rather than being distracted constantly by Trump’s lies.
International issues will be in capable hands at the State Department, National Security Council, and the Defense Department. But they can’t do everything at once. The early moves have been telegraphed: re-entry into the Iran nuclear deal (hard) and the Paris climate agreement (easy) as well as an effort to negotiate with Russia extended limits on strategic nuclear weapons. But the enemy also gets a vote on priorities. Surprise challenges could come from North Korea, China, or Islamist extremists. Those should not distract the Bidenists from their chosen path: to restore American leadership on a multilateral basis and make the world order more rules-based than it has been for the last four years.
My own focus is on what this means for the Balkans and the Middle East.
In the Balkans it is clear: Washington needs to develop a common vision with the European Union and its member states, then implement it with vigor to stem the tide of Russian and Chinese influence and hasten the day when the countries of the region will all qualify for accession to the EU.
In the Middle East, the way forward is far less clear, because the region lacks a clear direction and American interest has declined. I might prefer that the US favor democracy and human rights, but the fact is there are few Middle East countries in which we’ll find much prospect of either. The trick will be cooperating with autocratic friends (read Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and others) without encouraging their human rights abuses. Biden is already committed, as I understand it, to ending US support for the war in Yemen, which will displease Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
The Israel/Palestine equation will be particularly difficult to solve, as Trump has intentionally lessened the prospects for the two-state solution America has favored. Biden won’t want to reverse the move of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the so-called Abrahamic accords between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain he welcomed. But he could tilt in favor of the Palestinians by renewing US contributions to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and re-establishing a consulate in East Jerusalem, making it clear it will become an embassy once a Palestinian state is formed and recognized.
The world will be watching. Expectations of Biden are high. Disappointments and failures are inevitable, but I do hope America can return to its proper role as a leader in the democratic world!
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Good grief: problems with friends and adversaries
Anyone who thinks there is no risk of US military action in the Middle East before January 20 hasn’t been paying attention to
- President Trump’s efforts to block reversal of his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement and to reassert his declining political relevance at home;
- The refusal of the Defense Department to brief fully the incoming Biden transition team and the reversal of its decision to withdraw an aircraft carrier from the Gulf;
- The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp’s interest in continuing Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons, Tehran’s decision to enrich uranium to 20%, and Iran’s desire to avenge the assassinations of Generals Qassem Soleimani and (nuclear physicist) Mohsen Fakhrizadeh;
- The Tonkin Gulf and Iraq war precedents, the former an intentionally manufactured excuse for escalation and the latter a fabulous miscalculation, at best.
Flying B52s around the Gulf is not in itself particularly dangerous. Nor is the passage of an Israeli submarine through the Suez Canal or patrolling by the USS Nimitz. But their maneuvers were deliberately publicized, supposedly as deterrence against Iranian attacks. That may be their intention–hard to tell. But even minor or incidental responses by Iran or its surrogates could drive an erratic president to take retaliatory action aimed at shoring up his own image and political relevance as well as hampering re-entry into the nuclear deal.
Fortunately, Tehran seems determined not to give Trump an excuse for military action. They seem anxious to deal with Biden. His National Security Adviser is signaling willingness to return to the status quo ante, but he wants Iran to be willing to engage on missile issues in a regional context. That means America and its allies in the region would also need to be willing to discuss missiles. That isn’t going to be an easy sell.
After January 20, Biden is going to face a cool reception in the Middle East from America’s friends. Trump’s strongest supporters–Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia–will not welcome Biden, as he will be critical of their human rights abuses. Turkey is also on the outs with the US, mainly right now over its purchase of the S400 air defenses from Russia. Iranian proxy forces imperil US troops in otherwise friendly Iraq. The war in Yemen has tilted heavily in the direction of Iran’s favorites, the Houthis, while the US Congress wants the US to stop supporting the Saudi and Emirati intervention there. The war in Libya has tilted towards the Turkish-supported government in Tripoli, leaving the Emiratis on the losing side and the Egyptians scurrying to reach a modus vivendi with the UN-supported government in Tripoli.
Just about the only unalloyed welcome for Biden will be from Jordan and the Palestinians, two of the weakest reeds in the Middle East, as well as Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. There will be early decisions required on the Palestinians, in particular whether to re-initiate aid to them through the UN Refugees Works Agency. Biden will happily inherit the “Abrahamic accords,” which exchanged American goodies for Emirati and Bahraini normalization of relations with Israel. But the supposed normalization with Morocco entails American acceptance of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, which Biden may well want to reconsider and possibly reverse.
Biden will have as many problems with America’s friends as with its adversaries. He will want to be critical of Saudi imprisonment of women activists as well as the Kingdom-ordered murder of Jamal Khashoggi, Israeli settlements and annexation of the Golan Heights, Iraq’s failure to rein in paramilitary forces that threaten US troops, Turkish attacks on US-allied Kurdish forces in Syria, and Emirati as well as Turkish violations of the UN arms embargo on Libya. But each of those moves will risk undermining US influence in a region where it is already waning. As the US seeks to withdraw from Middle East commitments, Russia, China, autocrats, extremists, and other undesirables will move to fill the vacuum.
These challenges above all require skilled diplomacy. But the State Department is a shambles and the Defense Department is close behind. The Biden appointments so far in both places are superb people with deep experience. They’ll need it. They won’t want to spend time and energy on the Middle East, which is a region of declining US interest. But it is a region where a lot can be lost, even if little can be gained.
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Stevenson’s army, January 4
Prof. Edelman and Dean Cohen organized the statement signed by all living former Secretaries of Defense calling for acceptance of the election results and keeping the military out of elections. Here’s the statement.
Pres. Trump pressured Georgia officials to “find” enough votes to give him the election. Here’s the transcript and audio.
DOD reversed course and now says the Nimitz will stay in the Middle East.
China’s new law transfers war powers from the cabinet to the military commission.
Jim Golby & Peter Feaver suggest Biden tackle civil-military relations.
In parliamentary systems cabinets expand to reward partners with special portfolios. I think Speaker Pelosi secured her 4-vote victory by creating some special committees, including Select Committee on Economic Disparity and Fairness in Growth and the renewed Select Committee on the Climate Crisis. See at the end of the new House rules.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, January 2
After 8 successful vetoes, President Trump lost on his 9th as Congress overrode his veto of the NDAA, thus allowing the measure to become law for the 60th year in a row.
The new 117th Congress begins Sunday at noon. Assuming that Nancy Pelosi gets enough votes to become Speaker again, House Democrats plan major changes in the rules.
Meanwhile, the Senate has trouble organizing until the Georgia runoff results are clear.
NYT says acting SecDef Miller surprised senior officers and rejected their advice by ordering the carrier Nimitz to return home from the Middle East.
NYT has new article posted this AM detailing impact of the Russian hack.
Tevi Troy, author of a good book on White House staff intrigue over the decades, has WSJ article giving examples from his book.
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My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Peace Picks | December 21 – December 25, 2020
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
1. The Islamic Defenders Front and Political Polarization in Indonesia | December 20, 2020 | 9:00 – 10:015 PM ET | Yusof Ishak Institute | Register Here
Amid growing religious polarization since 2019, the return from self-exile of Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) leader Rizieq Shihab to Indonesia in November has revitalized the opposition movement against President Joko Widodo. Islamic populism is set to be a major force at the 2024 presidential election. In the near term, however, Rizieq Shihab’s fate is uncertain as the government seeks to curtail his activities and prevent mass mobilizations in the capital. On December 7 a clash between security services and a convoy in which Rizieq was travelling left six of his followers dead. In this webinar, Dr Quinton Temby analyses these recent developments, drawing on social media data to illustrate how Rizieq’s return has played into online polarization between government and opposition activists. With physical mobilization restricted due to the pandemic, and the details of the recent clash disputed, Twitter has been an arena for hashtag battles between different actors seeking to control the narrative. Dr Temby concludes by reflecting on the prospects for Islamic populism in Indonesia and why social media is likely to be critical to any populist success.
Speakers
Dr Quinton Temby: Visiting Fellow, Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
2. Political Fallout: Nuclear Weapons Testing and the Making of a Global Environmental Crisis | December 21, 2020 | 4:00 – 5:30 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 is typically viewed as marking a first step toward nuclear arms control. But Toshihiro Higuchi argues that it was also one of the first international agreements that addressed a truly global, human-induced environmental problem. By tracing a worldwide struggle to determine the biological effects, social acceptability, and policy implications of radioactive fallout, Higuchi reexamines the Cold War in the context of the Anthropocene – an era in which humans are confronting environmental changes of their own making.
Speakers
Toshihiro Higuchi: Assistant Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Christian F. Ostermann, moderator: Director, History and Public Policy Program; Cold War International History Project; North Korea Documentation Project; Nuclear Proliferation International History Project; Woodrow Wilson Center
Eric Arnesen, moderator: Former Fellow; Professor of History, The George Washington University. Director, National History Center of the American Historical Association.
3. Cyber War and Cyber Peace: Past and Future Cyber Clashes in the Middle East | December 22, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Although the cyber domain is an emerging field of conflict, it is no longer a new frontier – many battles in cyberspace have been fought and it is imperative they be understood to begin imagining how the future of warfare online may look.
As the United States, the Middle East, and policy community globally begin to consider how a Biden administration will approach conflict and cyber conflict in the region, this panel is an opportunity to study the history of cyber warfare in the Middle East as context for the policy challenges that will arise in the next four years. This panel is sponsored by SentinelOne, a cybersecurity solution encompassing AI-powered prevention, detection, response and hunting in a single autonomous platform.
Speakers
Selena Larson: Senior cyber threat analyst, Dragos, Inc.
James Shires: Assistant professor, Institute for Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University
Thom Langford, moderator: Security advocate, SentinelOne
Additional speakers TBD
4. Putin’s playbook: Lessons from the operation to kill Alexei Navalny | December 22, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Bellingcat, CNN, the Insider, and der Spiegel have produced an explosive investigative report on the elaborate FSB efforts to poison Alexei Navalny with a Novichok nerve agent. Navalny survived and has resumed his role as an active player, amplifying the identities of the team that allegedly worked to kill him and laying responsibility for the operation at Russian President Vladimir Putin’s feet—all while promising to return to Russia. All of this raises the question: Why does the Kremlin regard Navalny as so large a threat, and when was the line crossed to start plotting his death? What does a recovered and newly active Navalny mean for Russia’s politics, and how will Russia’s relationship change with key states such as Germany, where Navalny has been recuperating? Russia has long struggled to see a viable alternative to Vladimir Putin—is Navalny that alternative?
Speakers
Christo Grozev: Lead Russia Investigator, Bellingcat
Irina Borogan: investigative journalist and Deputy Editor, Agentura.ru
John Sipher: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center; CEO & Co-Founder, Spycraft Entertainment
Ambassador John Herbst, moderator: director of the Eurasia Center
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The nightmare is over, now the hard work begins
I spent an hour this morning on Zoom with Italian colleagues at the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) talking about the American election and its consequences for foreign policy. Here are the points I prepared for them,
most of them all too obvious I’m afraid:
- While Biden is better informed and experienced on foreign policy than any president in decades, his most immediate priorities will be domestic: first and foremost stopping Covid-19 infections and moving as quickly as possible to revive the American economy, which is still in bad shape, and fix our social cleavages, which are severe.
- That said, he is putting in place a formidable foreign policy team: Tony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, Avril Haines and Linda Thomas-Greenfield are among our finest. Janet Yellen at Treasury will make an excellent counterpart on the economic side.
- Jake and Tony are both strongly committed to a revived domestic economy and solutions to America’s social challenges as prerequisites for a strong international role. You can expect them to be less transactional but just as aggressive as Trump on trade and investment issues, where America will need to satisfy more of the demands of its domestic producers.
- Missing so far from the Biden team is the Secretary of Defense. I’d still bet on Michele Fluornoy, but I admit I have little idea why she hasn’t been named yet. Defense industry ties may be the reason.
- Whoever gets Defense, Biden will seek to reinvigorate trans-Atlantic ties. He has a basically positive attitude towards NATO and America’s allies, whom he views as force multipliers whose basic values are aligned with ours.
- He is not opposed, as Trump was, to the European Union. I doubt he will prioritize a free trade agreement with the UK and might even try to revive the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe, or something like it.
- Willingness of the US to return to the JCPOA will help his effort to renew the Alliance, but it will require reciprocal Iranian willingness to return to the status quo ante. I’m not convinced Tehran will be willing before the June presidential election, and maybe not even after.
- Biden will want to cooperate quickly with Europe in responding to Russia’s regional challenges in the Baltics, the Balkans, and especially Ukraine, though he will be hampered on Ukraine by the allegations against his son Hunter.
- The US will return, likely on Day 1, to the Paris Climate Change Agreement, which I trust will be a welcome move in Europe.
- The big looming problem for both the US and Europe is how to meet China’s global economic and political challenge. Biden will want to pursue both cooperation and competition with China.
- He is not interested in a new cold war, but he will be far more committed globally to democratic values and human rights than Trump has been. He will not be sword dancing in Riyadh, encouraging President Xi to imprison Uighurs, or staying silent about repression in Hong Kong.
- Renewed American support for human rights and democracy will unsettle relations not only with China but also with the Gulf, Israel, Brazil, and possibly with Hungary and Poland.
- Biden will not be able to restore everything to where things stood four years ago. He’ll need to prioritize.
- But I think all those who want to see American global leadership based on a rational assessment of both values and interests will feel a lot better about things on January 21 than they did on November 2. The nightmare is over, but the hard work is just beginning.
In addition to foreign policy, the Italians pressed me on the future of the Republican Party and reports that black men and Hispanics shifted towards Trump. I responded more or less this way:
- The numbers are still iffy, but at least some of the shift among Hispanics was due to mostly white Venezuelans and Cubans who fled socialist countries and were frightened when Trump told them Biden was a socialist. Some Latinos in Texas appear to have shifted as well, possibly due to the employment impact of border wall construction.
- The Republican Party now has a choice to make between continuing as a right-wing extremist and racist party or reverting to right-of-center social and economic conservatism. Trump will try to keep the party on the former track and can boast of an enormous turnout of voters, and relative victories in the House races, to help him. So far, only Senator Romney seems courageous enough to point in the direction of more conventional conservatism. We’ll have to wait and see which direction Republicans choose.
On the domestic side, I also emphasized the importance of the January 5 Senate run-off elections in Georgia, which will determine how far Biden can go on the legislative front.
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