Tag: Israel/Palestine
The day after should not be Iran’s
While Americans have opined, Israel has so far said little about the “day after” in Gaza. This interview with retired Israeli Brigadier General Amir Avivi provides a hint of at least some of the thinking near the Israeli government. He says essentially that Israeli security the day after will require two things: closing off Gaza from arms supplies shipped through Egypt and allowing Israel to raid as it wants inside Gaza.
Prime Minister Netanyahu has also suggested that Israel will need to provide security for a long time to come, which would mean in essence reoccupation of Gaza (or some portion of it). The Americans are opposing that.
The open air prison
The Israeli proposition amounts to a heightened version of the outdoor prison approach that failed on October 7 to protect Israeli security. It is not clear whether the Israelis are thinking the Egyptians will agree to tighten security at Gaza’s southern border or if they have something else in mind. Nor is it clear why the Israelis think their raiding would be any more effective after the war than it was before October 7. Israeli ground incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank have not been successful in curbing militancy there.
There are other problems with this option. Reconstruction in Gaza will require tens of billions of dollars. Why would any Gulf country ante up if Israel is reserving to itself the privilege of destroying whatever is rebuilt? If the rebuilding doesn’t occur, Gaza’s inhabitants will be living in even greater misery than before the war. Why would that not lead to more resentment and extremism rather than less?
An international intervention
Another option would be an international intervention. This could be like the ones executed with a measure of success (at least in re-establishing security) in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Gaza, with a population of about 2 million, is small enough to be comparable, even if the conflict there is far more intense.
Using RAND’s data for “heavy peace enforcement,” a similar operation in Gaza would require about 23,000 international troops and 3000 international police. This would be on top of 6000 local troops and 4500 local police. Annual costs would run over $6 billion. You can quarrel with these numbers. But given the dire situation in Gaza they are more likely too low than too high.
Troops and police will not be readily available
The Gulfies could ante up the money, but the troops and police are a serious problem for them. Peacekeeping troops might be available from the more usual UN suspects, but it would be the biggest UN peacekeeping operation in the world today. Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Rwanda, and Pakistan are now the main UN troop contributing countries. India, now more than ever allied with Israel, might be a problem for the Gazans, but the others are possible.
The international police however would have to be Arab speakers. Which Arab countries have thousands of excess police they would be willing to contribute? Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Syria can be counted out due to their own civil wars. Egypt will resist, as it has spent decades trying to avoid responsibility for Gaza or Gazans. Jordan will likewise hesitate. The King has his hands full at home. The Gulf countries may be willing to foot the bill, but they won’t provide the personnel.
Even the local troops and police are an issue. All the readily available Gazans will have served in the Hamas brigades and police. Israel won’t want them re-empowered. The Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank has only 10,000 police of its own. Neither Israel nor the PA will want half of them transferred to Gaza. The Gazans might not welcome them given the long contention between the PA and Hamas.
The local option
This forces us to consider the local option. Perhaps we can do without troops on the assumption that the Israelis won’t allow re-armament, even of people not previously affiliated with Hamas. UNRWA, the PLO, and nongovernmental organizations they cooperate with in Gaza should have a pretty good idea of who is who and what they are capable of. At least in the immediate aftermath of a ceasefire, they could provide relief and begin the process of rebuilding education and health care. They could also start to reconstitute a Gazan police force.
The Israelis will be suspicious of UNRWA, the PLO, and their colllaborators. This issue might be alleviated if a good deal of the humanitarian supplies were provided by Israeli nongovernmental organizations committed to coexistence and ready to collaborate with legitimate, non-Hamas, Gazan counterparts. That would complement the usual flow of humaniarian goods from Egypt through the Rafah crossing. Gazans would understandably be hesitant at first about humanitarian supplies from Israel. But the idea would be to flood the zone with clean water (much of Gaza’s water already comes from Israel), food, medical and sanitary supplies, temporary shelters and other vital commodities. That would be hard to resist.
None of this can happen, until…
None of this will happen soon. The war is still raging. There is no sign of the mutually hurting stalemate or the mutually enticing way out that are the classic conflict management conditions for a successful negotiation, starting presumably with a ceasefire.
Israeli goals are clear: to obliterate Hamas’ capacity to attack Israel and compel Hamas to give up the more than 200 hostages it still holds. Some Israeli officials cite even broader objectives: to destroy Hamas’ governing capacity and to eliminate its ideology. But I doubt Israel is willing to lose its own citizens in pursuit of those broader objecdtives.
Hamas’ objectives are less clear. Some of its leaders are telling the New York Times that it wants to create a permanent state of war with Israel. If that is true, we won’t have to worry about the day after for a long time. Others believe the near-term objective is release of all Palestinians in prison in Israel. A hostage/prisoner exchange is certainly within the realm of possibility within months, if not weeks.
Consider the alternative
None of this is edifying. But consider the alternative. If the war ends with no clear plan for reconstruction, the Iranians and Russians will be glad to pitch in. Their resources are limited. But Iran will be glad to let loose the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to help resuscitate something much like Hamas, Hizbollah, or the Houthis. The Wagner remnants would be glad to help arm and train them.
Far better than that would be a Gaza that could join the West Bank in negotiating statehood with Israel. Reconstruction should proceed with that goal in mind. Netanyahu aimed to split the Palestinans between the West Bank and Gaza. That strategy to postpone the Palestinian state is at the end of its useful life. It is time for those who support the Jewish state to welcome Palestinian aspirations for one of their own.
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Stevenson’s army, November 6
– Blinken and CIA Director Burns are in the Middle East.
– WSJ notes threats to US forces in the region
– NYT says State concerned assault rifles may be given to Israeli settlers
– New IC budget numbers declassified. ODNI table
– Will US need a draft? [This issue will come up in mock conference exercise]
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, November 4
– WSJ on how Hamas has modernized its weaponry.
– Reuters assesses Hamas tactics.
– NYT says evacuations of wounded Hamas fighters led to disputes
– Writers call for US intelligence review following 10/7
– NYT explains US suspension of countries from AGOA.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
– Two sides of AI: the administration guru and the lobbyists
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Stevenson’s army, November 3
– Matt Yglesias says Israel is fighting a just war in Gaza and an unjust war in the West Bank.
– T.X. Hammes revisits his analysis of Israeli tactics in Gaza.
– WSJ says Wagner group is sending air defenses to Hezbollah
– NPR has photos and analysis of Israeli actions in Gaza.
– US & China have arms control talks
– CSIS has new report on export controls
– RAND has new report on eroding US power
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Pie in the sky is no “day after” solution
Tom Warrick, a respected former colleague at the State Department, has offered a thoughtful formula for the “day after” in Gaza. But it is also an impossible formula far from the reality of what is likely to happen.
Before turning to Tom’s specific points, we need to imagine what kind of international presence will be required in Gaza after this war to secure the peace, assuming Israel succeeds in defeating Hamas. Experience suggests this will be a “heavy peace enforcement” mission for a population around 2.5 million. That would require upwards of 30,000 international troops and 4000 police, the latter Arabic-speaking. In addition it will need 7500 Gazan military and 5500 Gazan police. I know nowhere you could get even a fraction of that personnel. The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank has fewer than 10,000 police.
Corruption
First priority, Tom says, is to end Hamas culture of economic corruption. But what he refers to as “culture” is in fact Hamas’ authoritarian rule in Gaza. Like other authoritarians, Hamas used the resources of the state to maintain monopolistic control. Any new leadership taking over will want to preserve that system, not destroy it. The root-and-branch reforms Tom advocates would be at best the outcome of a decade-long international presence.
Listening
Most of us who have been involved in international interventions think we should have listened more to “ordinary” people. But it is not easy to do. Assessing what the locals really want is inherently difficult in a post-war environment, when people will often tell you only what they think you want to hear. And what they want most–food, shelter, jobs, and a “normal” life are often top of the list–may be difficult to provide. Most certainly won’t be talking about public integrity and civil service hiring.
Educational curriculum
No question. This needs changing as Gaza education inculcates not only hatred of Israel but of Jews, with whom Gazans are going to need to get along if peace is to last. But the non-Gazan “experts” Tom thinks can do this will find it impossible to reconcile his aim of “lasting coexistence” with the view of the world of the Gazans who have suffered through this and previous wars. The US tried to use “experts” to reform the history curriculum in Iraq. It failed. What the experts want will clash with Gazan experience.
A democratic constitution
I agree with Tom that “Israel needs to demonstrate that it is committed to a two-state solution.” But that doesn’t mean the Gazans are going to write the kind of democratic constitution he wants. Sure Gazans want their own state, but they have no reason to believe that peace or democracy will get them there. They need only look at the Palestinian Authority to conclude the opposite.
Economic rebuilding
The resources to rebuild the economy could well become available, mainly from the Gulf. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are the prime candidates. We are talking a few tens of billions of dollars, which is chicken feed if the political will exists. But the Gulfies won’t ante up unless they can sell what they do as leading to the Palestinian state the Israelis are unlikely to permit, at least in the immediate post-war period.
Border security
Tom suggests “Israel will want to ensure for at least three decades, as unobtrusively as possible, that neither Iran not anyone else has the ability to smuggle into Gaza the means of waging war.” If this were possible, the Israelis would already have done it. They are no long able even to prevent the smuggling of small arms into the West Bank. There they control not only the borders but also occupy essentially the entire territory.
Bottom line
Hope is not a plan. Nor is despair, but it seems to me more justified at present than hope. Pie in the sky is no “day after” solution.
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Stevenson’s army, November 1
– WaPo says House GOP Israel bill will add $90 billion to the debt over 10 years.
– Yale prof warns against bombing Mexico
– Consistent with War Powers law and past precedent, Biden informed Congress of the recent US attacks in Iraq and Syria.
– I’ve often told the story that LBJ asked a prospective White House counsel if he was “a Yes lawyer or a No lawyer.” NYT says Trump would want only Yes lawyers in a new administration.
– SecState Blinken expects a “revitalized Palestinian Authority” will rule postwar Gaza.
Trade-offs [from D Brief]
Chinese-drone ban gains pace: Later today, bipartisan members of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party plan to introduce the American Security Drone Act of 2023, the latest attempt to stop the U.S. government from buying drones built in China and other countries labeled as national security threats. It follows several failed attempts to extend the current ban on DOD purchases of Chinese drones to the rest of the government, including a companion to a Senate bill that was re-introduced in February after failing to pass in 2021.
Here’s a case for such a ban, from former INDOPACOM ops director Mark Montgomery, now with FDD. Essentially, he argues at D1, Chinese-made drones could spy on U.S. citizens and infrastructure.
Here’s a case against it, from drone expert Faine Greenwood, writing at Foreign Policy. The FP piece is paywalled, but she limns it here: “There’s one big, fat problem: there is no non-Chinese consumer drone company that does what DJI does. Much less does it at such a low price-point, which is a vital consideration for the vast swaths of modern drone users who don’t have unlimited cash to throw around. And building a DJI-killer is a lot harder than you might assume: although a number of Western competitors tried to knock DJI off the pedestal over the last decade, they all failed…Eventually, they largely stopped trying. This is also why both Ukrainians and Russians are continuing to chew through vast quantities of DJI drones on the battlefield, despite massive misgivings about their reliance on Chinese tech.”
DOD’s current bans: The Pentagon stopped buying drones from China’s DJI in 2017, and most off-the-shelf drones in 2018; that same year, Congress generally but not totally forbade the military to buy any Chinese-made drones.
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