Tag: Israel/Palestine
Stevenson’s army, November 26
Charlie writes for Black Friday, an entirely unrelated consideration:
Like many Americans, I grew to admire Winston Churchill as I learned more about him. Early on, I bought a recording of some of his most famous speeches and marveled at his stirring words. I happened to be in London at the time of his funeral and felt that I was part of a great historic moment. I have often quoted some of his witty sayings, even though many now seem to be apocryphal. I was thrilled to visit the Churchill War Rooms and see the actual place where so many consequential policies were formulated.
I have just read Geoffrey Wheatcroft’s critical and revisionist biography, Churchill’s Shadow, which adds a lot of negative facts to the ledger assessing Churchill’s legacy. Wheatcroft savages Churchill’s reputation by quoting from letters and diaries by contemporaries, who point out his flaws — inconsistency, hypocrisy, frequent inebriation, social isolation, and so forth. He also repeats many statements which Churchill later disavowed or pretended he never said. [And he quotes Churchill as saying of war cabinet meetings, “All I wanted was compliance with my wishes after a reasonable period of discussion.”]
There has been too much hagiography about Churchill. It’s time for a fuller picture of his human qualities, including his failings, as well as his political accomplishments, including their blemishes. Like most successful politicians, he was vain, ambitious, and self-centered, better at tactical adjustments than consistency or strategy. He was a loving though patriarchal husband, but a poor parent. He drank too much and stayed in power too long.
And he was a racist, demeaning all but white, Protestant, English-speaking people much of the time. Sadly, so were many if not most of his Victorian era contemporaries. Nevertheless, I am not ready to pull his statues down or shatter the busts simply because of those abhorrent views. His political accomplishments were world-historical and worthy of honor despite their flaws.
The most useful correctives I found in Wheatcroft’s books were on lesser points.
– He was a defender of the Empire to the bitter end.
– His own history books were group-written and fabricated to enhance his roles.
– He had some surprising and consistent policy views, including support for a national health service and other social programs and support for Zionism.
– He exaggerated his friendship with FDR and his areas of agreements with the Americans.
– Many of his wartime strategy proposals were profoundly unwise [Gallipoli, Norway, Greece, Singapore].
– He strongly favored terror bombing in World War II, despite earlier and later misgivings.
And yet…in 1940 especially he rallied a defeated force and a demoralized nation — and onlookers in America — to fight back and join together in common cause. He did that, and it’s unlikely anyone else could have.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
US withdrawal makes everyone in the Middle East recalibrate
I have long believed the US is overcommitted in the Middle East, given its declining interests in the region, and needed to draw down. I confess I did not anticipate how clumsily we would manage to do it. I also did not fully anticipate how others would react. The American withdrawal has set off a cascade of efforts at improving relations both within the region and with external powers, mainly China and Russia. Not all the improvements are in the US interest, but several are interesting.
First example: the Abrahamic accords. The Saudis, Emiratis, and Bahrainis have understood for some time that the American commitment to their autocracies was weakening. The failure of Washington to react to the drone attack on Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019 confirmed that perception. They needed to think about replacing Washington’s security guarantees, which in any event were aimed at external enemies, while the main threat is in these three countries increasingly internal. They have turned to Israel for the technology required to guarantee that their monarchies remain stable.
But, you may object, Saudi Arabia hasn’t yet recognized Israel, as the UAE and Bahrain have. On that, I only have anecdata, but it is compelling. Sitting in a business class lounge in Riyadh some 2+years ago, I found myself surrounded by 40-something males speaking Hebrew. They carried an unusual number of hard-sided cases. When I asked the Israeli next to me why I was hearing so much Hebrew in Riyadh, he smiled coldly and said: “If I told you, I would have to kill you.” I concluded they were techies carrying lots of electronics after providing assistance to Saudi internal intelligence agencies. I suspect Israel’s improving relations with Egypt have a lot to do with internal security as well, inaddition to President Sissi’s attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.
Second I would cite the response to Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter plane in 2015. It initially caused tension in the bilateral relationship, but Turkey had a problem: the US and NATO were not backing Ankara up and instead the Americans were beginning to ally with Kurds, whom President Erdogan regards as terrorists and mortal enemies. Soon Ankara was apologizing, relations between Ankara and Moscow were improving and Turkey was participating in the Russian-sponsored Astana process for ceasefire/surrenders of the Syrian opposition to the Assad regime. Russian and Turkish troops have even patrolled together in both Idlib and northern Syria, though the relationship remains parlous.
Third are the tentative efforts by Saudi Arabia and Iran to come to some sort of modus vivendi. This has included high-level meetings in Baghdad as well as trips to Tehran and Riyadh. The Saudis and Iranians have no territorial dispute and many symmetrical interests, including not allowing an adversary to rile their respective Shia and Sunni minorities and maintaining their theologically-based and increasingly nationalist autocracies. A mutual stand-down from bilateral tensions could benefit both.
Fourth is the at least partial resolution of a conflict internal to the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Saudis and Emiratis have essentially given up on their latest effort to bring Qatar to heel. Doha weathered the embargo and other sanctions better than the Kingdom and the Emirates anticipated, with assistance from Turkey, Iran, and the US, which wasn’t (yet) interested in abandoning its largest base in the region, Al Udeid. There was no point in continuing a fruitless campaign whose only real impact was to weaken the Gulf Arabs.
Fifth example: OPEC+. After a price war in 2020, the Saudis and Russians found common cause in maintaining higher oil prices, which are essential to both their national budgets. Riyadh and Moscow would prefer prices around $100/barrel, but they can’t push much above $70 or so because that would bring on unconventional sources in the US and elsewhere, especially in a low-interest-rate environment. So they are more or less content to leave prices where they have lingered for much of the epidemic, hoping that stronger growth later will bump up both interest rates and oil prices.
There are other examples: rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE, the UAE push for reconciliation with Syria, and Turkey’s sometime courting of Iran. The point is that US withdrawal is causing everyone to recalibrate and look for alternatives to American support that seems increasingly unlikely. I might like recalibration to push Israel into a more positive attitude toward Palestine, but that seems a bridge too far. Still, US withdrawal is getting the Middle East pregnant with possibilities.
Turkey and Israel need to compartmentalize disagreements and cooperate
Not too long ago, Turkey and Israel had a good working relationship. That changed with the rise of Erdogan in Turkey and the increasing focus on Turkey’s intended leadership of the Islamic world. After 2010, the two countries no longer have diplomatic relations, and recently discussions of Eastern Mediterranean gas pipelines became a new potential stumbling block. However, these two countries are key US allies. The importance of their cooperation only increases now that the US is slowly withdrawing from the Middle East. A recent call between Israeli president Herzog and Turkey’s Erdogan could signal a new opening.
The Atlantic Council convened a panel of diplomats and academics to discuss these issues and their implications for the future. The experts saw potential for future cooperation, but this will depend on the states’ ability to understand each others security red lines, and to compartmentalize their relationship.
The speakers were:
Jonathan H. Ferziger
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Programs
Atlantic Council
Former Middle East Correspondent
Bloomberg
Amb. Mithat Rende
Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Turkey to the OECD
Prof. Brenda Shaffer
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center
Atlantic Council
Amb. Matthew J. Bryza (moderator)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council in Turkey; Global Energy Center & Eurasia Center,
Atlantic Council
Defne Arslan (introduction)
Director, Atlantic Council in Turkey
Atlantic Council
How we got here
Bryza explained that Israel and Turkey had what amounted to a strategic partnership until relatively recently. He and co-panelist Rende lobbied at that time to realize an Israeli-Turkish gas pipeline. With the rise of Erdogan to power this all changed. His increased focus on Islamic solidarity drew him away from Israel, which he criticized for its treatment of Palestinian rights. The relationship reached a low point with the ‘Mavi Marmara Incident’ also known as the Gaza Flotilla Raid in 2010. Turkey was attempting to break the Israeli blockade on Gaza in Ferziger‘s words, by sending a shipment with aid to the enclave by boat. Israel responded by raiding the boat, leading to the deaths of nine Turkish nationals. Afterwards, Erdogan severed diplomatic relations.
In recent times, there have been cautious signs of improvements. Most notable is the call between Erdogan and Herzog on July 12. Ferziger reminded that Herzog’s role is largely ceremonial in Israeli politics, meaning that this shouldn’t be seen as a call on the highest level. Nonetheless, it does signal willingness on both sides for some level of communication.
Current disagreements
At the core of the bilateral strife are the Palestinians. Erdogan attacks Israel frequently and supports Hamas, whose leaders are often present in Turkey itself. This support for Hamas is an absolute red line to Israel. Shaffer believes that diplomatic initiatives are infeasible if a military presence of Hamas in Turkey remains. Some sort of civilian representation might be feasible, but no more than that. Furthermore, Bryza explained that Turkey’s rhetoric angers Israelis. Erdogan has moderated his comments recently, but with (potentially early) elections coming up, Bryza questioned if he will he be able to avoid nationalist rhetoric in his battle against right-wing rivals.
Israeli domestic politics also complicate the matter. Ferziger said that it is certain that Netanyahu will do whatever he can to paint reconnection with Turkey as a bad choice, while he privately is convinced that it is a good thing. The opposition will use Turkey’s ties to Hamas to make this diplomatic development very difficult.
Ferziger explained that the Hamas connection does help Erdogan, although not as much as one might think. He is popular in Gaza. But in the West Bank he is ‘banned’ and support for him is repressed by the Palestinian Authority. In East Jerusalem, PA control is not universal, meaning that this repression is less total. Nonetheless, Erdogan isn’t the only leader attempting to woo the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia is also engaging in humanitarian and development projects in Palestine. Alongside streets adorned with images of Erdogan, there are streets with those of Mohammed bin Salman. Moreover, Turkish attempts to become involved with the al-Aqsa mosque are met with resistance from Jordan, who currently operates it.
Rende underlined an issue from the Turkish perspective. There is a perception in Turkey that Israel supports the YPG and the establishment of an autonomous territory for the Kurds in Syria. Turkey rejects this as it considers the YPG a terrorist organization linked to the PKK. Shaffer believes that Turkish support for Hamas appears similar to Israel as Israel’s support to the YPG appears to Turkey. There is a need to understand from both sides that support for the Palestinians doesn’t have to equal support for Hamas and that support for the Kurds doesn’t have to equal support for the PKK.
The potential for future cooperation
Despite these issues, the panel generally appeared optimistic on the prospect of cooperation in other fields. The potential for establishing a natural gas pipeline was often mentioned in this regard. Turkey is the region’s only growing market for natural gas according to Rende. As Shaffer opined, connecting Israeli gas to Europe is most logical by attaching to the existing pipelines in Turkey. She explained that Israel is in doubt whether to attempt a gas pipeline through Greece or through Turkey. As Shaffer put it, there is an idea in Israel that it’s either good relations with Greece or with Turkey. But Turkey and Greece have more functional relationships with one another than Israel and Turkey. “There is no reason to be more Greek than the Greeks.”
The prospect of compartmentalizing their relationship was something some panelists were enthusiastic about. Shaffer suggested Turkey should deal with Israel as it does with China. The suppression of Uyghurs in China is completely unpalatable to the Turkish population, and yet Turkey is able to compartmentalize the relationship and engages with China extensively. Iran and Turkey too have tensions surrounding the Azeri population of Iran, which Erdogan has hinted in the past should be united with Azerbaijan. Despite these tensions, Turkey engages with Iran where necessary. Rende added that Turkey has huge differences with the US as well, but that doesn’t stop from cooperating fruitfully.
Shaffer hoped the US might attempt to steer Israel and Turkey more in that direction. The role of a superpower is not only to fight its enemies but to manage its allies. Obama and Trump have done a bad job at this according to her. Having Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, etcetera bickering is not good for the US.
Rende summarized his perspective neatly. Common grounds:
- Trade
- Tourism
- Energy/natural gas
- Defense industry/technology
- Agriculture/water
But the countries countries suffer from a lack of trust and confidence in one another. They must build these up slowly again.
Good steps towards this would be:
- Re-establish ambassadors
- Stop harsh rhetoric through the media
- Establish (ad-hoc) working groups and establish an agenda for cooperation
Watch the recording of the event here:
Independence is relative and takes a long time
The Continental Congress voted a resolution of independence on July 2, 1776, the day John Adams thought should be celebrated, but the Declaration in its final form was not presented until July 4. Adams and his rival Thomas Jefferson both died on that day 50 years later, so I suppose Adams would have to be content with losing that round. July 4 is the date we celebrate, even if we do it by taking off from work July 5 when the 4th falls on a weekend.
But independence doesn’t come just because you declare it. The British Crown nominally accepted it 7 years later in the Treaty of Paris, but even then things weren’t settled. The war of 1812(-15) witnessed the British burning of Washington DC. During the Civil War (1861-65) the British, fearful of growing Union industrial might, remained formally neutral but sympathized with the Confederacy. After the war, the Brits and Americans quarreled over fishing and tariffs. It was only with the arbitration of a British Guyana/Venezuela (backed by America) boundary dispute in the 1890s that a more friendly relationship between Britain and America emerged, boosted by America’s growing naval power. The “special relationship” often referenced today was a product of World War II.
Post-World War II decolonization, which created dozens of newly independent states within a few decades, may appear an exception, but it isn’t. Many of Europe’s colonies had fought long and hard for independence, and few have entirely severed their ties to their former metropoles. At the very least, language and culture often remain strong links, as they did for the United States. German was the second most commonly spoken language in the thirteen colonies, but it was the pre-independence colonial power, not Berlin, that prevailed in the newly independent United States. Francophone and anglophone Africa show similar patterns: no matter the loathing towards the former imperial power, its culture and language often remain dominant.
So do other ties: education, trade, investment, politics, and diplomacy. Many former colonies export people and products to the former metropole, which provides investment and often diplomatic support. The export of people becomes a political factor: witness African francophones in France and South Asian anglophones in the United Kingdom. Latinx, Filipinos, and Vietnamese have likewise become political factors in the US, even if some of their countries of origin were not formally colonies. But there is no denying the close ties that come from prolonged US political involvement and military presence.
Here is where Kosovo differs substantially from other newly independent states. There is no risk of an influx of Kosovo Albanians into Serbia. Many young Kosovars are choosing to learn English rather than Serbian as a second language. While some aspects of Albanan and Serbian culture are similar (cuisine and music, in my view), Kosovo looks more to Tirana and the United States than it does to Belgrade for cultural and political guidance. This is not attributable a more general Albanian/Slavic divide. Albanians in Macedonia have made their peace with a Slavic majority and most speak Macedonian. In Albania, there are Orthodox Albanians.
The most important potentially independent state on earth today is Taiwan, which is a sovereign, democratic state that does not claim independence, fearing the consequences of China’s possible military response. Taiwan has intense economic relations with the People’s Republic and most Taiwanese speak Mandarin, but few Taiwanese would welcome the repressive treatment to which Beijing has subjected Hong Kong. China is ratcheting up the pressure on Taiwan and shows no sign whatsoever of willingness to accept its independence.
Another important potentially independent state is Tigray, which has successfully fought off the Ethiopian Army in recent weeks but still faces occupation of part of its territory by Eritrea and by fighters from the neighboring Ethiopian state of Amhara. It is unclear whether the Tigrayans are looking for independence. They say they want the violence to be ended with a political settlement consistent with the Ethiopian constitution, which however includes provisions for secession. The political leadership of Tigray is resentful of neighboring Eritrea, an autocracy with which Ethiopia fought a devastating boundary war 1998/2001. But the most widely spoken language in Eritrea and in Tigray is Tigrinya. If Tigray were to secede from Ethiopia, Eritrea could certainly be at risk. A state that includes both Tigray and Eritrea would have a far better chance of survival than either state on its own.
There are other potentially independent states out there: Western Sahara (claimed and partially occupied by Morocco), northern Mali (scene of rebellions by several different groups), Israeli-occupied Palestine of course, Balochistan, Kurdistan in one form or another, and others I’ve missed. All have seen longstanding struggles that, even if they succeed, will entail continuing interaction with their current rulers, if only because the geography dictates it. Independence is relative and takes a long time.
Hamas’ position improved, but Palestinians need unity
Violence once again erupted between Israel and Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in May. A tenuous ceasefire emerged after 11 days of fighting that left hundreds of Palestinians, as well as dozens of Israelis, dead and many more injured. The Palestinian Authority has become increasingly unpopular, and Palestinians have come out in protest against the PA and its leader Mahmoud Abbas since the conflict. Meanwhile, Hamas’ legitimacy has only increased with its handling of the recent crisis. Negotiations to unite the PA’s Fatah and Hamas and to organize new elections in all Palestinian territories ended when Abbas refused to go forward over Israel denied permission for elections in East Jerusalem.
The Middle East Institute organized a panel to take account of Hamas and Gaza’s current situation. How should we see the most recent war? What are perspectives for future peace and stabilization in Gaza and Israel-Palestine in general? How, if at all, can the West, the PA, and Israel engage Hamas in a more constructive way? The panel agreed that a new impetus is needed for the Palestinian national movement to move forward again.
The speakers were:
Aaron David Miller
Senior fellow
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Mouin Rabbani
Co-editor
Jadaliyya
Celine Touboul
Co-executive director
Economic Cooperation Foundation
Khaled Elgindy (moderator)
Senior fellow and director, Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs
MEI
Taking stock of the most recent conflict
Rabbani summarized the events of May. He thinks this conflict was significantly different from previous bouts. Palestinians had become increasingly divided territorially and especially politically, with different factions concerned with their own local interests. This time Palestinians from different groups came together for issues that weren’t necessarily local. The initial outbreak started because of Israeli Palestinians protesting expropriations in Sheikh Jarrah. Islamic Jihad and Hamas were the first to engage Israel, but not over issues related to Gaza, for the first time since 2006. Then, in response to the Gaza violence, a mass mobilization emerged in the West Bank focused on a national agenda. That has not happened for a long time.
Miller, disagreed. Without downplaying the suffering in the most recent conflict, he remarked that it was remarkably similar to the three previous rounds of fighting. Nor does he believe that it will transform the Palestinian-Israeli conflict going forward, despite the largest incidence of racial violence in Israel since its inception.
External powers
As for the role of the US, Miller indicated that the Biden administration has one priority: domestic economic and political recovery. Biden’s efforts in Israel-Palestine are minimal. During the conflict he took three steps:
- avoided placing the US in the center of the conflict;
- supported Israel, at least initially;
- then applied limited pressure for a ceasefire.
Among the Arab states, Egypt remains the main interlocutor. The Abraham Accords might seem significant, but Egypt’s geographical proximity continues to place it front and center. The primary Gulf state involved is Qatar, because of its extensive financial support for Hamas.
Both Miller and Rabbani emphasized that third parties tend to engage with Israel and/or Palestine mainly because of US incentives. Egyptian President Sisi hopes to prove his importance as a US partner as he has come under increasing criticism from the Biden administration for domestic repression. The normalization treaties between Israel and several Arab states were primarily deals with the US, with Israeli normalization as one of the bargaining chips.
Miller lamented that there is no international ownership of Gaza right now. No one is currently willing to take ownership of this issue and coordinate its solution. As long as this remains so, he is skeptical of the chances for progress.
Perspectives for lasting peace?
Moderator Elgindy remarked that none of the underlying issues have been resolved, making the current ceasefire highly unstable, as witnessed by recent renewed attacks between Gaza and Israel. Rabbani hesitated to make a definite statement. “Last time, in 2014, nothing changed and we were warned that a new confrontation would erupt quickly, but the ceasefire held for seven years.” It’s possible that Hamas’ role will now change and it will become a leader of the Palestinian cause, because of Mahmoud Abbas’ unpopularity. Alternatively, the current actors could muddle through indefinitely. Or the conflict could erupt again next week. It’s very hard to predict.
Touboul remarked that the new Israeli government could provide an opportunity for further peace talks. The former government focused on the separation of Gaza and the West Bank. It had a schizophrenic policy towards Hamas, on the on hand not acknowledging it and aiming to weaken it military, but on the other fearful that weakening it too much would lead to a power vacuum and end Hamas’ ability to continue the ceasefire. Israel essentially vetoed the reunification of Fatah and Hamas by blocking elections in East Jerusalem. New Israeli policy could make a unified Palestinian government possible. For this to happen, she believes the Israeli government should be challenged to formulate a transparent and coherent policy towards Gaza, rather than leaning on the ‘zero risk-tolerance’ policy previous governments have employed.
Rabbani warned that “initiatives that try to achieve something while remaining under occupation are futile”. The same is true for reconstruction in Gaza while the blockade continues. “You’re basically talking about humanitarian band-aids being put on a very serious hemorrhage.”
Engaging Hamas and bringing the PA into Gaza
Meanwhile, the issue of Palestinian political unification remains fraught. Touboul outlined three key characteristics that any effort should have:
- The PA cannot accept steps that will only benefit Gaza without benefiting the situation in West Bank and Jerusalem.
- It needs to be gradual and supported by a broad coalition, including the US and Israel.
- Hamas as well as Fatah need to see benefits in cooperating with the other. Their cooperation cannot focus on deterrence alone. Key to this will be the gradual transformation of Hamas into an unarmed political entity in the long term.
However, Miller clarified that US engagement with Hamas through official channels remains entirely impossible legally and politically. As long as Hamas has a terrorist wing, it will have to engage through back doors. Israel does engage with Hamas in its own way (prisoner swaps, ceasefires), as Netanyahu needed Hamas to continue the de-facto ‘three-state solution‘.
A future for the Palestinian national movement?
Miller ended by emphasizing the need for unification of the Palestinian national movement, without which it will be impossible for the Palestinians to argue their case. Rabbani concurred. He believes it is time for a revival. The core requirement for this is that Palestinians need to start setting aims that further Palestinian interests, rather than appeal to outside parties, who have shown they do not have Palestine’s best interests at heart.
Rabbani doesn’t believe that strengthening the PA is necessary. Perhaps the PA should be weakened further after its failures and unpopularity. Strengthening the PA in favor of Hamas or others is in the US and EU’s interest, but not that of the Palestinians. Thirty years afer Oslo, Palestinians should start putting their own interests and rights first. If the Palestinians establish a unity government that includes Fatah and Hamas, Rabbani believes that the world would quickly adapt to the only game in town.
Watch the recording of this event here:
Stevenson’s army, May 25
-WaPo has story of how Joe Biden spends his day.
– SecState Blinken is in the Middle East.
-Iran talks back on.
– Look at the many defense and foreign policy hearings this week.
FT.com has good roundup of European defense activities.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).