Tag: Israel/Palestine
Stevenson’s army, May 24
Axios has its own tick-tock on Biden and Israel/Palestine.
RollCall says in-person fundraisers have returned.
WSJ says intelligence report found early illness in Wuhan lab.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
One state, two states, three states, four are all possible
Friends ask: what does the latest Gaza war portend for the two-state solution? Is it dead? Is a one-state solution now inevitable? Are there other possibilities?
It is clearer than ever that Prime Minister Netanyahu is an opponent of the two-state solution. The West Bank settlements and related infrastructure, evictions of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, and unequal treatment of Palestinian citizens of Israel make his preference clear: one state with more rights for Jews than for Arabs. Some call this “apartheid,” which was the more formalized South African system of segregation. Call it what you will, it is not democratic. The days when Israel could be regarded as the only democracy in the Middle East are long gone.
One state with equal rights is conceivable, but in practice impossible. Arabs and Jews are already pretty much equal in numbers between Jordan and the Mediterranean. Even secular Israeli Jews want their state to be Jewish. It can’t be Jewish if there is only one state. Nor are the Palestinians likely to afford Jews equal rights in a one-state Palestine after having been deprived of them for 75 years in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.
There is another version of the one-state solution that Netanyahu and other Israeli Jewish leaders like. They would be happy to see Egypt take Gaza back and Jordan take the West Bank back. The problem is neither Cairo nor Amman wants the Palestinians or the territory they occupy. Egypt has enough trouble in the Sinai peninsula with Islamist extremists. It has no interest in hosting Hamas, which originates in the Muslim Brotherhood. The Jordanian monarchy figures it already has enough Palestinians, who make up about 50% of the population. Governing the Palestinians in their enclaves on the West Bank would be an enormous challenge for Amman.
There is of course the possibility of a three state solution: Gaza, Israel, and the West Bank. Gaza’s political development for more than a decade has been independent of the Palestinian Authority, whose writ is largely limited to the West Bank. The two Palestinian proto-states are very different: Gaza is a contiguous, crowded, territory without Israeli on-the-ground presence while the West Bank is a Swiss cheese of Palestinian communities surrounded by armed Israeli settlements and the Israeli army. The current situation is close to this model, which in many respects is difficult to distinguish from the one-state solution with unequal rights.
Four states? That would be Gaza, Jewish Israel and West Bank, Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, and West Bank Palestinians. This, too, bears some resemblance to the current situation, because Palestinians with Israeli citizenship are not afforded equal rights or benefits, but they lack their own governing structures. Creating such structures with executive and legislative authority would be a gigantic problem for Israel, but it is the natural course of action now that the latest Gaza war has awakened the political consciousness of Palestinians who live in Israel proper. Judging from my conversations over the years with them, they would not accept governance by Hamas or the Palestinian Authority.
Anyone can have their preferences among these options, and there may be more. I favor the simpler of solutions over the more complicated ones, because life is already complicated. Equal rights is a simple solution. One state won’t work. That makes me conclude two states with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians in both. But I admit it is getting harder than ever to picture the route to this outcome.
Stevenson’s army, May 21
– The administration seems to be trying to take a victory lap with the cease-fire in Gaza. Insiders are giving partial tick-tocks to AP and Politico. AP also notes the Biden pattern of public support for Israel and private scolds. NYT says Biden wants to give US aid to Gaza.
In other news, WaPo reports Russian and Iranian rivalry for influence in Syria.
FP says Philippine basing deal coming.
DOD says China wants a base on west coast of Africa.
Senate Foreign Relations and Banking are fighting over CFIUS role in foreign grants to US universities.
And look at this: new searchable data base of LBJ phone calls.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Israel may win the war but lose strategic high ground
It’s been hard to write more about Gaza, both because I’ve been busy with professorial responsibilities this week and because so much has already been said. But a few points merit reiteration:
- The fighting is not really about Gaza. Israeli moves against Palestinians in East Jerusalem and on the Haram al Sharif triggered the Hamas rocket barrages. Hamas gains by claiming the mantle of resistance in Jerusalem. Netanyahu gains by creating an emergency situation that may give him another lease on the prime ministry.
- American influence is marginal. Biden doesn’t want to leave his right flank open to Republican criticism. Washington doesn’t talk with Hamas but may exert some pressure via Qatar or Egypt. Having paid a price in international opinion, Israel will want to meet its military objectives before stopping.
- Israeli measures to minimize civilian casualties are grossly insufficient. Some think they target civilians. I can’t really say they don’t, but it is also possible the damage is collateral. They do warn before bombing civilian structures, but Gaza is such a densely populated place even the best-intentioned belligerent would likely kill civilians. The bombing of Hamas’ underground tunnels in populated areas ensures that above-ground structures will collapse.
- The fighting inside Israel between Arab and Jewish citizens is new and important. The center of gravity of this conflict has moved from Gaza and the West Bank to Israel inside the Green Line and East Jerusalem. The successful Israeli efforts to mitigate threat by fencing off the former cannot be applied to the latter. Only ethnic cleansing will rid Israel of its own Palestinian population. That is precisely what Netanyahu and his extremist supporters want to do.
- The Palestinian Authority and the Gulf States are more irrelevant than ever. Mahmoud Abbas disappointed Palestinians by postponing long-postponed elections. Pleased to see Hamas hammered, the Gulf states have failed to use their new-found relations with Israel to protect Palestinians. Iran will gain sway with Palestinians for its support of resistance.
- The fighting has undermined American support for Israel. Already in trouble with Democrats because of his blatant preference for the Republicans, Netanyahu has managed to provoke even stalwart backers to object to what Israel is doing in Gaza. Biden gave Netanyahu lots of room to maneuver, but even he is now insisting on a ceasefire.
- Liberal American Jews (that’s most of us) are fed up. They don’t like Hamas but also do not want to support an Israel that causes dozens of civilian casualties in Gaza every day, treats Jewish and Arab citizens differently, attacks worshippers on the Temple Mount, and coddles right-wing Jewish supremacist thugs.
Israel will benefit from destroying Hamas leadership, infrastructure, and hardware in Gaza, but most of the points above suggest that the political terrain is shifting against Netanyahu, if not Israel per se. Things will not be the same after this war: Palestinian citizens of Israel, liberal Jews in the US, Democratic leadership in the White House and congress, Gulf states, and others will have shifted their sympathies noticeably in the Palestinian direction, even if not towards Hamas.
There is no sign of a similar shift inside Israel. Netanyahu’s buildup of siege mentality among its Jewish citizens has worked well in his favor. Hamas’ rockets help. The gulf between Israeli Jewish public opinion and the rest of the world is widening. Israel may win the war but lose strategic high ground.
What it’s not about, and what it is about
Framing is important, both at home and abroad.
At home, the Republicans are trying to focus on voter fraud. They all know that is not even remotely a problem. There is no evidence that fraud affected the outcome of the 2020 election in any state. But defining voter fraud as a major issue provides the excuse Republicans need to limit voting in hope of favoring their own candidates. Making voting harder, they think, will reduce the numbers of minority citizens, especially Blacks, who bother to turn out. Liz Cheney was voted out of her House leadership position because she refused to go along with the Big Lie about voter fraud, which is the ultimate test of loyalty to Donald Trump and the objectives of the January 6 insurrection on Capitol Hill.
Abroad, the Israeli government is focusing on Hamas rocket fire from Gaza, ignoring the evictions of Palestinians from their homes in East Jerusalem and the brutal repression of Muslim demonstrators on the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif that initiated the current frictions between Palestinians and Jews. The former Netanyahu would prefer to define as “real estate” disputes; the latter he defines as law enforcement against militants. Having lost his bid to form still another government, Netanyahu hopes to prevent Yair Lapid, the current holder of the mandate, from doing so. War with Hamas is a convenient amplification of a pre-existing crisis, one that might bring Netanyahu the support he was lacking, extend his caretaker status, or precipitate still another, likely inconclusive, Israeli election.
So where do real solutions lie?
At home, the Republican Party has shrunk to 25% of the electorate. Most of what remains is loyal to Trump and the Big Lie. This will guarantee that most of its candidates in 2022 come from his white supremacist corner. That is not the worst thing that can happen for Democrats, who have a good chance of going in to the next Congressional election with the epidemic under control and the economy restored at least to its prior 2% or so growth path. Predicting the outcome of elections is a fool’s errand, but even if Republican-majority state legislatures succeed in limiting minority voting, Democratic prospects could still be good. Control of the House and Senate will come down to a very few seats in even fewer states. A focused, unified effort could produce continued Democratic majorities in both Houses.
In the Middle East, prospects are not so good. Hamas is figuring it will gain political support from its “resistance” rocket fire, at least in the West Bank if not in Gaza. The bombardment will move Israelis in a more militant direction, especially as it appears to have ignited strife between Jews and Arabs inside Israel proper. Insecurity is a powerful political incentive that does not favor moderation. The only realistic alternative to a right-wing government in Israel is one with Arab support, but that has never happened and isn’t likely in the aftermath of the current fighting. Netanyahu may not survive, but his siege politics will, especially if the current covert war with Iran continues.
Ilan Goldenberg suggests the US has a supporting, not primary, role to play in ending the current fighting between Hamas and Israel. The UN and Egyptians he says should lead. That may well be so, but I still think it good that Secretary Blinken said today:
Israelis and Palestinians need to be able to live in safety and security, as well as enjoy equal measures of freedom, security, prosperity, and democracy.
This points clearly in the direction of equal rights, whether in one state or two. That is what the Israeli government needs to understand: its current policy of “mowing the grass” and maintaining a regime of unequal rights, both inside Israel and in the West Bank (not to mention Gaza!) is not sustainable. Israel cannot be both democratic and Jewish without allowing creation of a Palestinian state. Netanyahu doesn’t care, because he isn’t a democrat. He is as much a Jewish supremacist as Trump is a white supremacist. But Israel is rapidly losing support among Democrats in the United States, most of whom are committed to equal rights at home and abroad. That is what it is really all about.
Peace Picks | May 3 – May 7, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
1. Rebalancing security and governance in the Sahel: Possible avenues for German intervention | May 3, 2021 | 9:30 AM – 10:30 AM ET | European Council on Foreign Relations | Register Here
Speakers
Andrew Lebovich: Policy Fellow, ECFR
Heike Thiele: Director, Civilian Crisis Prevention and Stabilisation, Federal Foreign Office (TBC)
Denis Tull: Africa and Middle East Fellow, SWP
Theodore Murphy (moderator): Africa Programme Director, ECFR
In the past several years, Germany has repeatedly expressed its strong commitment to stabilisation in the Sahel, and pushed for approaches encouraging political reform and improvements in governance and in internal security provision in the region. However, ongoing insecurity and international critiques of European approaches in the region show the need for continued rebalancing in international approaches. This panel will examine Germany’s approaches to stabilisation in the Sahel and how new approaches and policies could help improve the region’s tumultuous conflicts and political uncertainty.
2. Report launch—The impact of Western sanctions on Russia | May 3, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Speakers
Anders Aslund: Resident Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center
Maria Snegovaya: Nonresident Fellow, Eurasia Center
Sergey Aleksashenko: former deputy chairman, Central Bank of Russia
Elina Ribakova: deputy chief economist, the Institute of International Finance
Ambassador Daniel Fried (moderator): Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council
Since 2014, the US and its allies have countered the Kremlin’s growing “hybrid warfare” with sanctions. Moscow’s malign activities have included military aggression in Ukraine, election interference, cyberattacks, assassinations, and disinformation. Western sanctions have imposed serious costs on the Russian economy and President Vladimir Putin’s cronies, though the Kremlin and some others question the efficacy of sanctions on Russia. How successful have the sanctions been in altering Putin’s actions? How can future sanctions become more effective in imposing costs on the Kremlin?
3. New START: The Future of Arms Control Diplomacy and U.S.-Russian Relations | May 3, 2021 | 4:00 PM – 5:00 PM ET | Belfer Center | Register Here
Speakers
Rose Goettemoeller: Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer, Stanford University
Matthew Bunn: Professor, Harvard University
Ambassador Paula Dobriansky: Senior Fellow, Future of Diplomacy Project
Ambassador Doug Lute: Senior Fellow, Future of Diplomacy Project
Nicholas Burns: Professor, Harvard University
The extension of New START – the last remaining treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear forces — sustains verifiable limits on Russian nuclear weapons that can reach the United States for the next five years. Can that time be used to negotiate a follow-on accord that serves both sides interests? With the collapse of the INF Treaty following Russian cheating and U.S. withdrawal, what can be done to address threats to U.S. and Russian security posed by INF-range missiles? What other key issues need to be addressed in strategic stability talks – with Russia, with China, or with others? How can the world community best address the danger of nuclear proliferation – especially when ongoing nuclear modernization in all of the nuclear-armed states is adding to long-standing tensions between nuclear haves and have-nots? Could the United States and Russia revive their past cooperation to control proliferation and prevent nuclear terrorism? Given the challenging relationship between Russia and the United States, Russia’s violations of some arms control agreements, its annexation of Crimea and military and cyber incursions and provocations along its border and beyond – and Russia’s equally long list of complaints about the United States – what might strategic arms diplomacy look like in the future? How can the proposed U.S.-Russia Summit advance arms control, nonproliferation, and a broader working relationship between the two countries?
4. Negotiating New START | May 4, 2021 | 3:00 PM – 4:00 PM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
Speakers
Rose Gottemoeller: nonresident senior fellow, Nuclear Policy Program
Peter Baker (moderator): chief White House correspondent, New York Times
In February, the Biden administration extended the New START treaty with Russia for another five years, buying time and space for future arms control with Russia. Secretary of State Blinken promised to use future arms control efforts to address all of Russia’s nuclear weapons and reduce dangers from China’s modern and growing nuclear arsenal. As the United States embarks on this new arms control approach, what can we learn from the negotiations of the last remaining strategic arms control treaty?
Join us for the launch of Rose Gottemoeller’s new book, Negotiating the New START Treaty, and a discussion with Peter Baker on the New START negotiations with Russia and the biggest hurdles, challenges, and insights that can serve as a window to the future of U.S.-Russia arms control.
5. They call it diplomacy: A conversation on the broader Middle East and the critical role of diplomats | May 5, 2021 | 2:00 PM – 3:15 PM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Suzanne Maloney (moderator): Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy
Bruce Riedel: Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy
Sir Peter Westmacott: Former British Ambassador to the US
In his new memoir “They Call it Diplomacy,” former British Ambassador to the United States Peter Westmacott looks back on 40-years of service as a diplomat for the United Kingdom. Over the course of his distinguished career, Ambassador Westmacott served in many important roles, including as ambassador to Turkey, ambassador to France, and most recently, as ambassador to the United States. His career spanned the end of the Cold War to the post-9/11 era. And as second secretary in Tehran, Ambassador Westmacott spent four years as a diplomat in Iran in the lead up to the 1979 revolution. As the Biden administration develops its strategy for U.S. foreign policy and charts a way forward in arms control and nuclear policy, it is a critical time to evaluate the importance of diplomats and the role they play in engaging on the ground with communities in key regions across the globe.
6. Report Launch | Russia in the Middle East: National Security Challenges for the United States and Israel in the Biden Era | May 5, 2021 | 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
Major General Amos Gilead: Executive Director, Institute for Policy and Strategy
James F. Jeffrey: Chair, Middle East Program
Matthew Rojansky: Director, Kennan Institute
Udi Evental: Senior Researcher, Institute for Policy and Strategy
Ksenia Svetlova: Senior Researcher, Institute for Policy and Strategy
Michael Kimmage: Professor, Catholic University of America
Susan Glasser (mooderator): Founding Editor, Politico Magazine
As U.S.-Russian tensions continue to escalate, Russia’s role in the Middle East is of urgent concern both to Israel and the United States. Potential flashpoints include Syria and Iran, new spheres of Russian engagement from Afghanistan to North Africa, and sensitive cybersecurity issues. Russia is also moving in tandem with China to push back against U.S. dominance, including in the Middle East. Leading experts from Israel and the United States address these challenges in a new report published by the Kennan Institute and the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. In an upcoming discussion moderated by Susan Glasser, the report’s contributors will address the challenges Russia poses in the region and the decisions that policymakers in the U.S. and Israel face.
7. Transatlantic relations after President Joe Biden’s first 100 days in office | May 5, 2021 | 8:00 AM – 8:45 AM ET | European Council on Foreign Relations | Register Here
Speakers
Jeppe Kofod: Minister for Foreign Affairs, Denmark
Mark Leonard: Director, ECFR
Lykke Friis (moderator): Director, Think Tank Europa
President Joe Biden has come into office with the promise of restoring alliances and having the US reengage in global issues like climate, tax and fighting the covid-19 pandemic. At the top of the new administration’s agenda is also the approach to China. Where does this leave the EU and transatlantic relations? How central is the EU to the US and its interests in Europe?
8. The Post-Cold War Middle East: Iran, Iraq and International Politics in the 1980s | May 6, 2021 | 11:00 AM – 12:30 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
Timothy Nunan: Freigeist Fellow, Center for Global History
Katelyn Tietzen: Military Historian, US Army Center for Military History
Samuel J. Hirst (moderator): Associate Director, Bilkent CRS
Barin Kayaoglu: Professor, American University of Iraq
The fourth event of the Global Middle East Seminar Series, organized in partnership with the Center for Russian Studies at Bilkent University, features Timothy Nunan and Katelyn Tietzen. They will be joined by Barin Kayaoğlu, who will act as discussant. The panelists will discuss Iranian and Iraqi foreign policies in the 1980s, and they will look beyond the Iran-Iraq War to questions about the transformation of the international politics of the Middle East in a formative decade. Among other issues, they will examine the Iranian and Iraqi pursuit of influence abroad, including through the activities of transnational actors in Lebanon and Libya. Situating Iranian and Iraqi politics in these terms highlights a moment that transcended Cold War divisions and reshaped regional politics in ways that remain significant today.
9. What’s Next for U.S.-Taiwan Economic Relations? | May 6, 2021 | 7:00 PM ET | Hoover Institute | Register Here
Speakers
Evan A. Feigenbaum: vice president for studies, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Kharis Templeman: Research Fellow, Hoover Institute
Innovation has been a source of comparative advantage for Taiwan—and an important basis for American firms, investors, and government to support Taiwan’s development while expanding mutually beneficial linkages. Yet Taiwan’s innovation advantage is eroding in the face of technological change and strategic risk. What should the next phase of U.S.-Taiwan economic cooperation look like? And how can the new U.S. administration work with Taiwan not just to build on legacy advantages, like in semiconductors, but also to invest in the emerging fields that are rapidly reshaping the future of work, industry, service delivery, and defense?
10. Fragility in Chad and counterterrorism strategies in West Africa | May 7, 2021 | 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Kamissa Camara: Senior Visiting Expert for the Sahel, United States Institute of Peace
John Mukum Mbaku: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development
Joseph Siegle: Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Vanda Felbab-Brown (moderator): Director, Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors
The April 20 death of the President of Chad, Idriss Déby, and the subsequent military coup have profoundly destabilized the country and other parts of West Africa. Likewise, over the past year, the security situation has deteriorated significantly in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and northern Nigeria. The region is facing many severe challenges from climate change and desertification, poverty, and inequality to poor governance, militancy, and terrorism, precipitated by a diverse set of local militants and international terrorist groups. During President Déby’s three decades of authoritarian rule, Chad came to be seen as a crucial lynchpin of counterterrorism in the region and a key ally of the United States and France. Yet President Déby’s death once again highlights the dangers of building counterterrorism strategies around authoritarian leaders and the struggle to find effective policy alternatives.
On May 7, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host a panel of experts to examine the latest developments in Chad, as well as the regional implications and deeper policy dilemmas of counterterrorism, stabilization, and good governance.