Tag: Israel/Palestine
Peace Picks | April 19 – April 23, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
1. The crisis in Ukraine: How to solve the Minsk conundrum | April 19, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM CEST | European Council on Foreign Relations | Register Here
Speakers
Iryna Solonenko: Senior Fellow, LibMod, Berlin
Maxim Samorukov: Policy Fellow, Carnegie Center, Moscow
Gustav Gressel: Senior Policy Fellow, Wider Europe programme, ECFR
Joanna Hosa (moderator): Deputy Director, Wider Europe programme, ECFR
Since the end of March, Russia has been building up military forces alongside its border with Ukraine. Disagreements between Moscow and Kyiv (and the West) about the end-state and a way to implement the Minsk-agreement have existed since the very signing of the treaty. Yet, tensions between the two sides have grown over the past three months. What are the perceptions of the situation in Moscow, Kyiv and in the EU? What are the intentions behind the military build-up? How likely are the chances of escalation beyond the Donbas? How should the EU respond? And finally, how to solve the Minsk-conundrum: an agreement that is both un-implementable (because of its vagueness) but also indispensable (because the post-hot war status quo rests on it)?
2. Defense Project Series: A Talk with HR McMaster on Global Security | April 19, 2021 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM ET | Belfer Center | Register Here
Speakers
Lieutenant General (ret.) H. R. McMaster: Former National Security Advisor
Major General (ret.) Bill Rapp (moderator): Lecturer in Military Affairs, Harvard University
Please join MG(Ret) Bill Rapp in a lively talk with HR McMaster, former National Security Advisor and retired Lieutenant General, as McMaster discusses global security challenges for the United States and its allies in the coming decade. McMaster calls for cleared eyed recognition of major threats facing the U.S. and to avoid the hubris that has marked much of the last thirty years of foreign policy.
3. Online influence in Georgia: A geopolitical crossroads | April 19, 2021 | 9:30 AM – 10:30 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Speakers
Peter Wiebler: Mission Director, Georgia, USAID
Diana Chachua: Program and Communications Manager, Georgia, National Democratic Institute
David Stulik: Head of Eastern European Program, European Values Center for Security Policy
Eto Buziashvili: Research Associate, Caucases, Digital Forensic Research Lab
Givi Gigitashvili: Research Assistant, Caucases, Digital Forensic Research Lab
Ia Meurmishvili (moderator): Senior Editor, TV Anchor, Journalist, Voice of America
The pre-election period in Georgia was characterized by a high degree of societal polarization, which was largely reflected in the country’s information environment. Domestic political actors undertook multiple inauthentic activities on Facebook to advance their political goals and mislead people. Beyond the domestic operations, the strategic public release of stolen documents ahead of elections by external actors was a new phenomenon for Georgia, as was the release generated widespread controversy and confusion. Georgian elections were also the target of Kremlin-led disruptions online whose primary objective was to instill a sense of vulnerability and demoralize Georgian voters.
Foreign interference and influence efforts remain a driving issue in the country of Georgia. In the DFRLab’s latest report, Fighting for the Hearts and Minds of Sakartvelo: The Georgian information environment during the 2020 parliamentary election, our regional experts provided primary source and technical analysis of how various actors – foreign and domestic – attempted to manipulate public opinion and influence recent election results, especially online. This conversation will begin with an overview of Georgians’ the national information environment, and panelists will explore the perceptions about, evidence of, and interplay between foreign and domestic attempts at influence operations in the recent 2020 elections.
4. Sustainable US presence in the Middle East: Balancing short and long-term needs | April 19, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Daniel L. Magruder Jr. (moderator): Federal Executive Fellow, Brookings Institution
Emma Ashford: Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Michael E. O’Hanlon: Co-Director, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Robert Pape: Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago
Becca Wasser: Fellow, Center for a New American Security
The president’s Interim National Security Guidance states that in the Middle East, “we will right-size our military presence to the level required to disrupt international terrorist networks, deter Iranian aggression, and protect other vital U.S. interests.” Against this backdrop are many questions concerning how the U.S. can balance its military commitments in the Middle East while also prioritizing longer-term progress. Is the current force posture necessary to support a more limited view of U.S. interests in the region, and are these commitments sustainable? Do current commitments in the region create unnecessary risks and constrain strategic choices to prepare for the future? What are the long-term trade-offs of more, or less, U.S. presence in the Middle East? On April 19, Foreign Policy at Brookings will convene a panel of practitioners, academics, and policy experts to address these key questions and discuss what a sustainable military presence in the Middle East looks like.
5. A New U.S. Approach to Israel-Palestine | April 20, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
Speakers
Salih Booker: President and CEO, the Center for International Policy
Khaled Elgindy: Senior Fellow, the Middle East Institute
Lara Friedman: President, the Foundation for Middle East Peace
Marwan Muasher: Vice President for studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Zaha Hassan: Visiting Fellow, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Daniel Levy: President of the U.S. / Middle East Project
Ishaan Tharoor (moderator): Columnist, Washington Post
After three decades of an Israel-Palestine peace process that has entrenched occupation and seen settler numbers in the West Bank quadruple, it is time for a U.S. policy reset on conflict resolution. How can this U.S. administration help shift political calculations of Palestinians and Israelis, alter the negative trajectory of realities on the ground, and rebuild prospects for a durable peace? Please join co-authors Marwan Muasher, Zaha Hassan, and Daniel Levy for the launch of a paper calling for a new U.S. approach to the conflict that prioritizes the rights and human security of Palestinians and Israelis.
6. Civil Resistance Transitions: Dialogue, Trust and Democracy | April 20, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Speakers
Zied Boussen: Tunisian Activist and Researcher
Veronique Dudouet: Senior Research Advisor, Berghof Foundation
Zahra Hayder: Sudanese Activist and Organizer
Roman-Gabriel Olar: Assistant Professor, Trinity College Dublin
Jonathan Pinckney: Senior Researcher, Nonviolent Action, U.S. Institute of Peace
Lise Grande (moderator): President and CEO, U.S. Institute of Peace
Political transitions initiated through nonviolent action are more than three times as likely to end in peace and democracy than any other form of transition. Yet prominent cases such as the “Arab Spring” revolutions in Egypt and Syria — in which nonviolent action resulted in returns to authoritarianism or devastating civil war — show that this relationship is far from easy or direct. And even when some form of democracy is achieved, many young democracies struggle to gain the trust necessary for long-term peace and stability. How can movements navigate this uncertain road from a breakthrough against authoritarianism to long-term sustainable democracy? To better understand the intersection of nonviolent action and peace processes, join USIP and the Berghof Foundation for the third in a series of four events on people power, peace and democracy. The event series will highlight multiple groundbreaking research projects and feature insights from activists, international practitioners and policymakers that provide viewers with actionable takeaways.
7. Business As Usual or Time for Change? Revisiting U.S. Strategy in the Middle East | April 21, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
Dalia Dassa Kaye: Fellow, RAND Corporation
Ilan Goldenberg: Director, Middle East Security Program, Center for a New American Security
Michele Dunn: Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
James F. Jeffrey (moderator): Chair of the Middle East Program, Wilson Center
This roundtable will feature experts representing a variety of think tanks who have recently issued reports on U.S. Middle East strategy. With the start of a new Administration, this is an opportune moment for Washington to rethink some of the fundamental premises underlying American policymaking in the Middle East and to review how America engages the region. The experts will compare ideas and approaches, exploring whether new policy directions are possible for a region still mired in conflict.
8. Afghanistan’s Next Chapter: What Happens as U.S. Troops Leave? | April 21, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Speakers
Haseeb Humayoon: Partner, Qara Consulting, LLC
Laurel Miller: Program Director, Asia, International Crisis Group
Dipali Mukhopadhyay: Senior Expert on Afghanistan Peace Processes, U.S Institute of Peace
Nader Nadery: Afghan Government Negotiation Team Member; Chairman of the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
Muqaddesa Yourish: Country Director, Lapis Communications
Scott Worden (moderator): Director, Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs, U.S Institute of Peace
President Biden has announced that the United States will withdraw all remaining military forces from Afghanistan before September 11, 2021 — likely marking a definitive end to America’s longest war just months before its two-decade anniversary. The decision fundamentally changes the dynamics of the Afghan peace process, as the Taliban have defined their insurgency by opposition to perceived occupation by foreign troops. With those troops leaving, will the Taliban negotiate with fellow Afghans or seek an outright military victory? And will U.S. troop withdrawal push Afghans to unify around preserving the current democratic constitution, or to seek deals that give the Taliban more power in a political settlement to the conflict? Join USIP for a discussion with leading experts on the immediate implications of these developments, as well as a look at what the future of the Afghan conflict and peace process might look like as U.S. troops begin a final withdrawal from the country.
9. COVID-19 and Political Systems – Insights and Lessons One Year In | April 22, 2021 | 8:00 AM – 9:15 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
Speakers
Sandra Breka: Member, the Board of Management at the Robert Bosch Stiftung
Thomas Caruthers: Interim President, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Chan Heng Chee: Ambassador-at-Large, the Singapore Foreign Ministry
Ivan Krastev: Permanent Fellow, the Institute for Human Sciences, IWM Vienna
Ngaire Woods: Founding Dean of the Blavatnik School of Government and professor of Global Economic Governance, Oxford University
COVID-19 has put pressure on political systems everywhere to deliver effective governance on an emergency basis. Within months of the pandemic’s arrival, it became clear the key determinant for meeting this challenge was not whether a political system was authoritarian or democratic, but whether a system had an adequate degree of state capacity, preparedness, and public trust.
Now a year into the pandemic, new political challenges have emerged. For democracies, what lessons and reforms will they address following the crisis? For authoritarians, will their many power-grabs from the start of the pandemic become permanent? Also in question is whether populist political forces will benefit or suffer from their leadership, given rising public discontent spurred by pandemic restrictions and mismanagement and yet the greater appreciation for scientific advancements. Finally, the relatively good performance of Asian nations—democratic and authoritarian—relative to Western nations and supranational bodies, suggests a shifting landscape of global power.
10. The Arctic as Emerging Geopolitical Flashpoint | April 23, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Robert Huebert (moderator): Associate Professor, University of Calgary
Michael Byers: Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, University of British Columbia
Rear Admiral Martin La Cour-Andersen: Defense Attaché to the United States and Canada, Embassy of Denmark in the United States, Danish Department of Defense
Rebecca Pincus: Assistant Professor at the United States Naval War College
Jonathon Quinn: Director General of Continental Defence, Department of National Defence, Government of Canada
The Arctic feels the impact of climate change more intensely than the rest of the globe. Regardless of national and international efforts to mitigate the emissions that drive climate change, much of the ongoing change in the Arctic is already established and will continue to accelerate. These changes will dramatically affect not only the Arctic’s environment, but also its security, defense, and ability to be exploited for its resources and used for transportation. This year’s annual conference will delve into these emerging issues in the Arctic from the perspective of trans-border impact, initiatives and need for cooperation. Our expert panelists and distinguished lecturers will cover issues ranging from the concrete change taking place, to emerging national security issues, to economic growth and regulation, to the impact on and role of indigenous peoples. Our guests and presenters from government, academia, and industry will review these topics from their national and sector viewpoints and engage the audience in much-needed dialogue on the issues.
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Stevenson’s army, March 19
– Grandstanding in Anchorage: both sides [US & China] prolonged the photo op to make their talking points
– Administration plans to reach out to Palestinians and already is talking to Israel about Iran.
– WSJ says China will ban Tesla use by officials as a security measure.
– Sen. Cruz lifts holds on State nominees after getting promises on Nordstream 2.
Politico has more background on the project.
Even NYT goes for clickbait.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Foreign policy is also made by omission
Secretary of State Blinken outlined Biden Administration foreign policy yesterday. Here is the short version:
- End the pandemic
- Rebuild the economy
- Protect democracy
- Treat immigrants humanely but reduce incentives for migration
- Revitalize relations with friends
- Slow climate change
- Lead in hi tech
- Manage the rise of China
All of this is to be done with two things in mind: benefiting Americans and mobilizing other countries to carry part of the burden.
Tony is also at pains to underline that all these foreign policy issues have important domestic dimensions and that diplomacy will come before military action. The former is not new and underlay Trump’s “America First” slogan, especially on trade issues. The latter isn’t new either, but it is diametrically the opposite of what Trump was inclined to do. He thought cruise missiles and drones could get the US out of Syria without any need for talking with anyone. He tried talks with the Taliban, but did not wait for them to succeed before withdrawing half the troops.
It’s hard for me to quarrel with much of what Tony said. But there are things missing, as Tony acknowledges. Often in international affairs, as in domestic politics, what is not said is as significant as what is said.
Apart from the mention of China and some other geopolitical threats (Russia, Iran North Korea), there is no mention at all of specific regions and little of specific countries. My friends in the Middle East and the Balkans should take note. You are not going to get all the attention you crave. This is a major change from the traditional diplomatic “tour d’horizon” and suggests a shift from the State Department’s traditional emphasis on bilateral relations, as represented in its “geographic” bureaus and accentuated in the transactional Trump Administration, to “transnational” issues represented in State’s “functional” bureaus.
Among the “transnational” issues, one important one is omitted: nuclear non-proliferation. This may reflect a realistic recognition that with respect at least to North Korea and perhaps even Iran the cat is out of the bag: we are not going to be able to convince them to give up their nuclear ambitions entirely. It may also reflect a desire to leave room for some of our friends and allies to respond in kind. We’ve long exercised a tacit double standard with respect to Israel’s nuclear weapons. We might be willing to do so for other countries like Japan or South Korea whose neighbors threaten them with nukes. Trump famously uttered this heresy out loud, but his departure doesn’t make the issue evaporate. Confidence in the American nuclear umbrella fades as Pyongyang acquires the capacity to nuke Los Angeles.
Of course the urgent in foreign policy often comes before the merely important. Tony knows he won’t be able to ignore Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Palestinians, democratic backsliding in the Balkans, the coup in Burma, or the agreed withdrawal from Afghanistan, which the Administration needs to either confirm or postpone. This Administration’s minds and hearts are in the right place. But that does not guarantee success. They face a challenging global environment, not least from all the omissions.
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Bid farewell to the treasons of Trump
It’s been hard, but we’ve almost made it to the other side. Now comes a time for rebuilding, or in Biden terms building back better.
Domestic issues will take first priority: the epidemic, the economy, social cleavages. Biden will need to get a lot more needles into arms, a lot more jobs returned and created, a lot of injustices to black and brown people, immigrants, women, college students, and LGBTQ people rectified. Trump’s white supremacist and 2nd Amendment supporters need to know that LAW AND ORDER applies to them as well as to everyone else. Successful prosecution of the January 6 insurrectionists is critical, including an eventual conviction of Trump in the Senate.
Current Majority Leader McConnell is not only open to that possibility but has blamed Trump for provoking the January 6 insurrection:
The mob was fed lies.
This is important, as it opens the a possibility of purging Trumpism from the Republican Party and eventually also from the Senate and House. Remnants will persist, but American politics will return to a much better place if Republicans and Democrats once again come to share a common factual basis rather than being distracted constantly by Trump’s lies.
International issues will be in capable hands at the State Department, National Security Council, and the Defense Department. But they can’t do everything at once. The early moves have been telegraphed: re-entry into the Iran nuclear deal (hard) and the Paris climate agreement (easy) as well as an effort to negotiate with Russia extended limits on strategic nuclear weapons. But the enemy also gets a vote on priorities. Surprise challenges could come from North Korea, China, or Islamist extremists. Those should not distract the Bidenists from their chosen path: to restore American leadership on a multilateral basis and make the world order more rules-based than it has been for the last four years.
My own focus is on what this means for the Balkans and the Middle East.
In the Balkans it is clear: Washington needs to develop a common vision with the European Union and its member states, then implement it with vigor to stem the tide of Russian and Chinese influence and hasten the day when the countries of the region will all qualify for accession to the EU.
In the Middle East, the way forward is far less clear, because the region lacks a clear direction and American interest has declined. I might prefer that the US favor democracy and human rights, but the fact is there are few Middle East countries in which we’ll find much prospect of either. The trick will be cooperating with autocratic friends (read Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and others) without encouraging their human rights abuses. Biden is already committed, as I understand it, to ending US support for the war in Yemen, which will displease Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
The Israel/Palestine equation will be particularly difficult to solve, as Trump has intentionally lessened the prospects for the two-state solution America has favored. Biden won’t want to reverse the move of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the so-called Abrahamic accords between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain he welcomed. But he could tilt in favor of the Palestinians by renewing US contributions to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and re-establishing a consulate in East Jerusalem, making it clear it will become an embassy once a Palestinian state is formed and recognized.
The world will be watching. Expectations of Biden are high. Disappointments and failures are inevitable, but I do hope America can return to its proper role as a leader in the democratic world!
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Biden’s Middle East won’t look like Trump’s
If Biden wins, what difference will that make in the Middle East?
- Iran: Biden will have the same goal as Trump: an expanded and extended agreement that prevents Tehran from getting nuclear weapons, limits its missile ambitions, and gets it to pull back from interference in the region, especially in Yemen and Syria. But the two candidates differ on means. Trump used only “maximum pressure” through sanctions, gray zone warfare, and threats of military action. Biden will add incentives through some sanctions relief and possibly security assurances, but he will be critical of Iranian human rights abuses.
- Israel/Palestine: Trump has sought, with his right-wing Israeli friends, to prevent the formation of a viable Palestinian state. Biden will differ on this goal and try to restore the prospect of a two-state solution by limiting Israeli settlement expansion on the West Bank while ensuring Israel’s security. Biden will not reverse Trump’s move of the US embassy from Jerusalem. He may consider renewed American contributions to Palestinian relief through the UN.
- The Arab Gulf states: Biden will differ from Trump on both goals and means. He will be prepared to raise human rights issues and will not shield the Saudis from international criticism, as Trump has done. Acting on the basis of a growing bipartisan consensus in Congress, Biden will seek to end the Trump/Obama policy of support for the Yemen war. Wanting to phase out fossil fuels, Biden will not intervene as Trump did to raise oil prices (when Moscow and Riyadh engaged in a price war last spring). Biden will be supportive of the “Abrahamic” agreements for recognition of Israel by the UAE and Bahrain (as well as Sudan).
Biden shares with Trump the conviction that the US needs to draw down in the Middle East and will look for opportunities to do so. But he won’t do it capriciously or unilaterally, as Trump did in Syria and threatened to do in Iraq. Biden will deliberate carefully in making decisions and consult with allies and partners before making dramatic moves. That is a far better way, as abrupt withdrawal could lead to a perilous nuclear arms race among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey that would be difficult to stop.
Here are two additional propositions for Biden to consider:
1. Cooperation with the Gulf’s biggest oil and gas customer, China, in providing security for the Gulf. The US takes little oil through the strait of Hormuz and no gas, so all of the Gulf’s Asian partners (including Japan and South Korea as well as India and China) are free-loading on gigantic US defense expenditures (12% or so of the Pentagon’s budget). It would be much smarter to get China and India to cooperate in a multilateral naval effort, as well as to join the IEA in holding 90 days of strategic stocks. China already patrols (for pirates) just outside the Gulf. Tehran will not be interested in menacing a multilateral effort to protect Hormuz that includes its main oil customers.
2. A regional security arrangement that includes the Gulf Arabs, Turkey, and Iran. Intervention in the Middle East hasn’t worked well for the US. Neither has withdrawal. We need to prepare the region diplomatically to ensure its own stability by helping its states to construct a regional security arrangement like those that exist in virtually ever other corner of the world. This diplomatic effort could be much more cost-effective than the last two decades of successful military interventions followed by governance failures.
The Middle East faces a daunting array of issues: unfinished civil wars, sectarian strife, youth bulges, climate change, water shortages, the oil curse, autocracy, state fragility, unemployment, economic underperformance, and growing geopolitical rivalry among China, Russia, and the US. No one should minimize the difficulties, but Biden can make a difference if he eschews unilateralism, seeks to consult all the countries of the region, and tries to get a minimum of agreement among the great powers on a course forward while encouraging the states of the region to stabilize their own neighborhood.
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Trouble in the Gulf will require more than arms
Here are the speaking notes I used yesterday at the Third Annual Conference of the Gulf International Forum:
- The Gulf today is engulfed with multiple dimensions of conflict and instability.
- Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are still at odds with Qatar as well as with Turkey and Iran about leadership in the region and the role of political Islam in the Muslim world.
- The US is pursuing a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran that has repercussions throughout the Gulf and the Levant, especially Iran and Iraq.
- Iran is responding with “maximum resistance,” which includes continued support for the wars on their own people by Bashar al Assad and the Houthis as well as shifting Iranian foreign policy in the direction of Beijing and Moscow.
- Global warming, declining oil prices, youth bulges, sectarian resentments, and COVID-19 are challenging the ability of Gulf states to maintain their social contract: authoritarian stability and material prosperity in exchange for political quiescence.
US Interests and Disinterest in the Region - US priorities in the Gulf have shifted. Oil is far less important economically and politically than it once was, and America’s main terrorism threat is domestic, not international.
- Higher priority in Washington now goes to countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction and limiting the influence of rival powers in the Middle East.
- The problem for the United States is that none of its interests in the Gulf are well-served by coercion, but neither are they well-served by withdrawal, which hurts partners and allies, even giving them incentives to develop nuclear weapons, while opening new opportunities for rivals.
- Whoever is elected President next month, the US interest in reducing its commitment to the Gulf will continue, but it needs to be done without endangering friends and encouraging adversaries or unleashing a regional arms race.
- Biden and Trump should be expected to behave differently in pursuing US goals.
- President Trump is impatient and transactional. He will likely pull the plug on US troops in places not prepared to protect or pay for them (Iraq and Syria). The “Abrahamic” agreements are transactional: Israel gets recognition in exchange for its help in sustaining Gulf autocracies.
- Biden did not invent this idea, but he isn’t opposed to it.
- Where the candidates differ is on Palestine and on governance in the Arab world. Biden continues to favor a two-state outcome for Israel and Palestine, whereas Trump and his Israeli partners seek to eliminate any possibility of creating a viable Palestinian state.
- While safeguarding Israel’s security, Biden would push for a better deal for the Palestinians than the one Trump has offered. He would also be less tolerant of Gulf human rights abuses.
- Biden and Trump also differ on the value of the Iran nuclear deal, but it is important to recognize that they share the same goal: to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
- Trump’s approach is “maximum pressure,” mainly through unilateral sanctions but also including the threat of kinetic action. He aims to force Iran back to the negotiating table to negotiate a “better deal” that would include regional issues, missiles, and extending and expanding the nuclear agreement.
- Biden wants to negotiate with Iran on the same issues but is prepared to lift some sanctions to incentivize a return to the status quo ante: Iranian and US compliance with the nuclear deal. Whichever candidate wins, Iran is unlikely to change course before its June election, if then.
A Much-Needed Regional Security Framework
- Neither Trump nor Biden rules out war with Iran, which would be catastrophic for the Gulf states. Doha has the most to lose.
- But war is not an attractive proposition for Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Manama either. Israel and the Gulf states don’t want Iran to get nuclear weapons and will cooperate to prevent it, but the Arabs will not want to risk joining Israel and the US in an overt conventional war with Iran whose winner may be predictable but whose consequences could be catastrophic for the Gulf.
- President Trump has been a welcome figure in the Arab Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia. He has shielded the Kingdom and its Crown Prince from accountability for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and continued the Obama Administration’s support for the Yemen war, despite growing bipartisan discomfort in the US.
- Because of his human rights commitments, Biden will be less favored in the Gulf. He will not be sword dancing in Riyadh or cheering the war in Yemen.
- But the differences should not obscure the similarities. The two candidates share the desire to reduce US commitments in the Gulf and the interest in preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Several of their predecessors also had these goals and failed to achieve them.
- The reason is all too clear: the Americans have relied too heavily on coercion and too little on diplomacy.
- The United States has enormous destructive military, political, and economic power. But that alone cannot build what is needed: a regional security network that will reduce threat perceptions in all the Gulf states, Iran included, decrease incentives to develop nuclear weapons, and prevent encroachments by rival powers.
- This framework will require a stronger diplomatic nexus of mutual understanding, restraint, and respect. Continued low-intensity and gray zone conflict, or a real war, will make that much more difficult to achieve. The Gulf is not a military challenge, but rather a diplomatic one.
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