Tag: Israel/Palestine
Stevenson’s army, October 14
Bloomberg says Trump plans to pull US troops from Somalia.
FP says Israel is expanding settlements.
WTO says Europe can impose $4 Billion in tariffs because of Boeing subsidies.
NYT has table showing when absentee ballots will be counted by states.
FP says China’s money didn’t buy love in Australia.
Wired has big piece on Gen. Nakasone.
Some crazies in Portland pulled down a statue of Abraham Lincoln on Monday, David Van Drehle explains how uncalled for that was.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
No Nobel Prize
Amy Hawthorne, who knows more about the Middle East than Jared Kushner will ever learn, tweeted yesterday:
Amy W. Hawthorne@awhawthTo state the obvious, the “peace in the Middle East” theme touted by Trump and Kushner re UAE-Israel agreement is disconnected from reality given that the 2 countries never fought a war and the agreement does nothing to end today’s actual Middle East wars
just details I guess
But maybe a bit more explication is required, especially in response to the right-wing hoopla about getting a Nobel Prize for their dear leader.
As Amy suggests, the agreement between Israel and the Emirates has nothing to do directly with any past or current conflict in the Middle East. There is no history between them of bombardment, invasion, expulsion, displacement, or occupation.* The UAE has participated directly or through proxies in wars in Yemen, Syria, and Libya, but those have little or nothing to do with Israel.
Kushner, who designed Trump’s still-born proposal for peace with the Palestinians, likes to pretend that the agreement with the UAE will advance that prospect. It is more likely to dim it. It weakens and divides Palestinian support in the Arab world at a time when Israel is already so strong it feels no real pressure to negotiate. While the UAE extracted suspension of Israel’s plans to annex Palestinian land, that provision is temporary. Kushner, a strong supporter of Israelis settlements in the West Bank intended to block formation of a contiguous and viable Palestinian state, is interested in Palestinian surrender to a one-state solution with unequal rights. That won’t do anything for Middle East peace.
Trump’s presidency has significantly worsened prospects not only for peace between Israelis and Palestinians but also between Arab states and Iran. His withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal allowed Iran to enrich much more uranium, putting it within far less than a year of having the fissile materials required to build a nuclear weapon. Saudi Arabia is likewise moving towards nuclear weapons, as is Turkey. We face the real prospect of a nuclear arms race among the three most powerful countries in the Middle East, unleashed by a President who thought he could bring the Iranians to heel with sanctions. That effort has failed.
We could review a few more non-contributions to peace in the Middle East:
- arms sold to both the Emirates and Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen,
- withdrawal of US troops from eastern Syria that undermined America’s Kurdish allies,
- greenlighting of Turkey’s expansion across its southern border to create a buffer zone in northern Syria,
- support for the most brutal military dictatorship Egypt has ever seen,
- flirting with would-be autocrat General Haftar in Libya and providing only erratic rhetorical support to the internationally recognized government.
President Trump’s best bid for contributing to peace is in Afghanistan, which I suppose is “greater” Middle East. Unable to defeat the Taliban, the Trump Administration gave Special Envoy Khalilzad the job of getting the US out. He reached an agreement with the Taliban for US withdrawal as well as a commitment to intra-Afghan talks between the Taliban and the Kabul government. Trump may well boast about the US withdrawal, but he has to be careful not to draw attention to the fact that it is only vaguely conditions-based and constitutes a retreat from America’s longest war without anything like victory. Zal has made lemonade from lemons, but there is not much sweetener available and the intra-Afghan talks, as well as the fighting, are likely to go on for a long time.
President Obama left the Middle East in bad shape. President Trump has managed to make things worse. As of a year ago, he had actually increased the number of US troops deployed in the region. It is certainly arguable that the former didn’t deserve the Nobel Prize he got. The latter would deserve it far less. Of course the Norwegian prize committee knows that and won’t be tempted. Trump’s egotistical neediness to match the achievements of the black president is pitiful, not praiseworthy.
*PS: the same goes for Bahrain.
20 Years of Backward Progress
In July of 2000, Israelis and Palestinans met at Camp David. Their goal was to negotiate a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Predictably, the negotiations failed to produce a settlement. Twenty years later, on June 21, 2020, the Carnegie Endowment convened a panel to evaluate the Camp David Summit’s legacy and determine what the future holds for U.S.-mediated negotiations. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below.
Aaron David Miller: Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Shlomo Ben Ami: Former Foreign Minister of Israel
Nabil Shaath: Former Foreign Minister of Palestine
Tamara Cofman Wittes: Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution
Where Did It All Go Wrong?
The panelists began by debating the summit’s legacy. Miller was quick to deem the negotiation a failure, as it obviously did not end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his view, Ehud Barak’s expectations were too high and Yasser Arafat was never genuinely interested in the negotiations.
Ben Ami cast doubt on Miller’s prescriptions. The former Foreign Minister argued that, even in the absence of a negotiated settlement, the Camp David Summit was a crucial step in the peace process. It emphasized the importance of multilateralism and equity in the negotiating process, and it notably provided a framework for the Clinton Peace Parameters. The Clinton Peace Parameters, in turn, served as the basis for Ehud Olmert’s famous 2008 peace offer.
A Bleak Present (& Equally Bleak Future)
Twenty years later, however, Ben Ami lamented that “the two state solution has never been so far.” By his own admission, the peace camp in Israel is dwindling, and the electorate has shifted farther right. Against this backdrop, and under the direction of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli government expanded its West Bank settlements, doggedly avoided negotiations, and largely ignored the Palestinian question. The sincerity of Israel’s commitment to a two state solution is doubtful at best. Shaath, for one, believes that it is impossible to earnestly support a two-state solution while expanding settlements and threatening annexation. In brief, neither side feels confident that the other is a true partner for peace.
According to Cofman Wittes, the collapse of the Oslo Process is at least partially responsible for this phenomenon. Oslo’s gradualism, intended to bolster prospects for coexistence, actually undermined them. Over time, Palestinians grew suspicious and began to wonder whether gradualism was simply an excuse for Israeli inaction.
In the post-Oslo and Camp David world, Cofman Wittes believes that the United States must drastically alter its approach to mediation. Rather than force policies and summits upon the Israelis and Palestinians, whom she believes are not prepared to negotiate, the US must re-enter the pre-negotiation phase. Only after the United States understands each side’s position, its goals and red lines, can it even attempt to resolve the conflict. It is also worth noting that Cofman Wittes and Shaath each recommended that future negotiations involve multiple regional and international stakeholders.
Cofman Wittes’ suggestions unlikely to change the current administration’s course, which seems intent on destroying the United States’ credibility as a mediator. To quote veteran American diplomat Aaron David Miller, “no one has ever lost money betting against success in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.”
To watch the event in full, click here.
Two issues portend
Yesterday, I welcomed the UAE/Israel normalization of relations. I have no regrets about that.
But, as in all announcements of agreements still to be formally drafted and signed, there are question marks:
- Where will the UAE Embassy be located?
- Will Israel’s territory be defined, either explicitly or implicitly, in the formal agreements?
Israel says Jerusalem is its capital, and the Trump Administration moved the US Embassy there from Tel Aviv. If the UAE follows suit, that would be bigger news than the normalization of relations. I doubt Abu Dhabi will do that, but Israel will likely insist. How will that circle be squared?
The official statement says Israel is suspending its annexation plans, not ending them. This implies that it can in the future again threaten annexation and even do it, or back off again in exchange for another Arab country normalizing relations.
I would expect the UAE to try to avoid that by incorporating somewhere in the many agreements to be signed implicit or explicit reference to Israel’s 1967 borders, which have been the widely accepted basis for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. That way the UAE could claim that it has not departed in principle from support for the Palestinians and the Arab Peace Initiative, which foresaw normalizing relations with Israel once the territorial issue with Palestine was resolved.
These are two of the final status issues that have to be solved before the Israel/Palestine conflict can be considered settled: the status of Jerusalem and the extent of Israel’s sovereign territory. They are among the issues that have stymied peace efforts in the past. It will be difficult to avoid them entirely in establishing normal relations between the UAE and Israel. How they are resolved could have a big impact on prospects for peace in the future.
Good but…
The deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates on its face does good things. It prevents Israeli annexation of a big piece of the West Bank and will establish normal diplomatic relations and other ties between the two countries. Hard to object to any of that.
But in diplomacy the devil is in the details, especially the details of implementation. There are a lot of still unanswered questions. Is the bar on annexation permanent, or are the Israelis going to be able to threaten it over and over again in order to gain recognition by Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and maybe Qatar?* Or will those countries raise the ante and get further concessions for Palestinian interests in return for normalization?
On implementation, skepticism is in order. Egypt and Jordan have normal diplomatic relations with Israel, but their peace is not a uniformly warm one. Security cooperation is embraced, but economic and commercial relations are far from maximized. Even travel among the three countries presents serious bureaucratic barriers, not to mention the cultural inhibitions against Arabs going to Israel (and Israel’s Jews going to Arab countries).
There are three strong factors favoring UAE/Israel rapprochement.
First is Israeli security assistance. The UAE is concerned about homegrown Islamists, especially those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. You only need sit for an hour in a business class lounge in Riyadh or Dubai to meet Israeli males with square jaws and muscular physiques, along with a group of nerds. When I asked one in Riyadh why there were so many Israelis in the lounge, he replied with an icy smile, “If I told you I would have to kill you.” My impression is that Israel has bought a lot of good will in the Gulf by helping its autocratic regimes to ensure that nothing like the Arab Spring can succeed there.
Second is a lack of bad blood at the personal level. While the UAE has recognized and support Palestine, there is no decades-long history of war with Israel and subsequent occupation, as there was with Jordan and Egypt. Nor is there a history of Jews being expelled from the Emirates, so far as I can tell. There has been a synagogue in Dubai for decades that is now officially recognized. Ordinary Emiratis may not like the deal, but mass dissent inside the UAE is unlikely, as both its citizens and non-citizens are under tight control. Your traffic ticket arrives by text message within minutes of a violation. Any negative reaction in the “Arab street” will not be in Dubai or Abu Dhabi.
Third is the common enemy: Iran. The Israelis will no doubt want and get intelligence and military cooperation with the UAE, which is conveniently located just on the other side of the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Israel will presumably be glad to provide missile defense and other high tech weaponry. The UAE was never going to be able to stand aside if war happens between Iran and Israel, so it makes sense for Abu Dhabi to get what it can to defend itself, especially after the Iranian attacks on its tankers in 2019.
The Palestinians are objecting vigorously to the UAE/Israel deal, because it rewards Israel for not doing something it should never have threatened to do and gains nothing substantial for Palestine. But the Arab world has mostly been ignoring the Palestinians lately. Certainly the Trump Administration will be uninterested in their complaints. The Palestinians will need to hope that the next Arab country to recognize Israel drives a harder bargain.
*PS: I failed to notice yesterday when drafting this that the Israelis have only suspended their annexation, which means they will try to sell that concession again to the next Arab country wanting to establish normal relations.
Biden will have his hands full
Time for a summer update on President Trump’s diplomatic initiatives, more or less in his priority order:
- Trade with China: importing less than half of what is called for in the “first phase” agreement.
- Re-initiating nuclear talks with Iran: Trump said more than a year ago he would talk with no pre-conditions. Tehran won’t, despite “maximum pressure.” Iran wants sanctions eased first.
- Getting rid of North Korea’s nuclear weapons: Kim Jong-un has in effect said “no.”
- Ending the war in Afghanistan: The withdrawal is proceeding, but progress in intra-Afghan talks is minimal.
- Removal of Venezuelan President Maduro: He has weathered the challenge and remains firmly in power.
- South China Sea: The US has rejected China’s sovereignty claim but is doing nothing about its military outposts.
- Helping Ukraine force the Russians out of Donbas: The Administration has provided lethal weapons to no avail.
- Reducing Saudi oil production to jack up world prices: Saudi production is down, but world prices are still in a trough.
- Initiating a democratic transition in Syria: Congress has beefed up sanctions, but Trump can’t even begin to get Assad out.
- “Deal of the century”: Not going anywhere but into the shredder. Even Israeli annexation of part of the West Bank is blocked.
This skips a lot. For example:
- the President telling Chinese President Xi that it was fine to put (Muslim) Uighurs into concentration camps,
- withdrawing from the Paris Climate accord, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and several favorable arms control agreements with Russia,
- moving US troops out of Germany to the delight of Moscow,
- failing to counter Russian bounties for Taliban who kill US soldiers in Afghanistan,
- saying the right things about Hong Kong and withdrawing its trade preferences, but with not discernible impact,
- not responding to foreign initiatives to undermine the US elections, and
- withdrawing from the World Health Organization in the midst of a pandemic.
American foreign policy has rarely been so ineffectual, never mind whether the priorities are right. The Administration doesn’t think past its own next move. The President is incapable of it and won’t let others do it for him. He behaves as if the adversary has no options. Much of what the Administration does is for show, without considering however how most of the rest of the world sees the situation. The only customers for this foreign policy are the domestic audience of China hawks, Russia doves, oil and coal producers, and evangelical Christians, along with President Putin, Prime Minister Netanyahu and a few other would-be autocrats around the world.
Getting out of the foreign policy hole Trump has dug will be a big challenge. President Biden, if there ever is one, will have his hands full even if he pays attention only to the first three of the items above. Let’s hope he can somehow save us from the consequences of four dreadful years.