Tag: Israel/Palestine
Trouble in the Gulf will require more than arms
Here are the speaking notes I used yesterday at the Third Annual Conference of the Gulf International Forum:
- The Gulf today is engulfed with multiple dimensions of conflict and instability.
- Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are still at odds with Qatar as well as with Turkey and Iran about leadership in the region and the role of political Islam in the Muslim world.
- The US is pursuing a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran that has repercussions throughout the Gulf and the Levant, especially Iran and Iraq.
- Iran is responding with “maximum resistance,” which includes continued support for the wars on their own people by Bashar al Assad and the Houthis as well as shifting Iranian foreign policy in the direction of Beijing and Moscow.
- Global warming, declining oil prices, youth bulges, sectarian resentments, and COVID-19 are challenging the ability of Gulf states to maintain their social contract: authoritarian stability and material prosperity in exchange for political quiescence.
US Interests and Disinterest in the Region - US priorities in the Gulf have shifted. Oil is far less important economically and politically than it once was, and America’s main terrorism threat is domestic, not international.
- Higher priority in Washington now goes to countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction and limiting the influence of rival powers in the Middle East.
- The problem for the United States is that none of its interests in the Gulf are well-served by coercion, but neither are they well-served by withdrawal, which hurts partners and allies, even giving them incentives to develop nuclear weapons, while opening new opportunities for rivals.
- Whoever is elected President next month, the US interest in reducing its commitment to the Gulf will continue, but it needs to be done without endangering friends and encouraging adversaries or unleashing a regional arms race.
- Biden and Trump should be expected to behave differently in pursuing US goals.
- President Trump is impatient and transactional. He will likely pull the plug on US troops in places not prepared to protect or pay for them (Iraq and Syria). The “Abrahamic” agreements are transactional: Israel gets recognition in exchange for its help in sustaining Gulf autocracies.
- Biden did not invent this idea, but he isn’t opposed to it.
- Where the candidates differ is on Palestine and on governance in the Arab world. Biden continues to favor a two-state outcome for Israel and Palestine, whereas Trump and his Israeli partners seek to eliminate any possibility of creating a viable Palestinian state.
- While safeguarding Israel’s security, Biden would push for a better deal for the Palestinians than the one Trump has offered. He would also be less tolerant of Gulf human rights abuses.
- Biden and Trump also differ on the value of the Iran nuclear deal, but it is important to recognize that they share the same goal: to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
- Trump’s approach is “maximum pressure,” mainly through unilateral sanctions but also including the threat of kinetic action. He aims to force Iran back to the negotiating table to negotiate a “better deal” that would include regional issues, missiles, and extending and expanding the nuclear agreement.
- Biden wants to negotiate with Iran on the same issues but is prepared to lift some sanctions to incentivize a return to the status quo ante: Iranian and US compliance with the nuclear deal. Whichever candidate wins, Iran is unlikely to change course before its June election, if then.
A Much-Needed Regional Security Framework
- Neither Trump nor Biden rules out war with Iran, which would be catastrophic for the Gulf states. Doha has the most to lose.
- But war is not an attractive proposition for Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Manama either. Israel and the Gulf states don’t want Iran to get nuclear weapons and will cooperate to prevent it, but the Arabs will not want to risk joining Israel and the US in an overt conventional war with Iran whose winner may be predictable but whose consequences could be catastrophic for the Gulf.
- President Trump has been a welcome figure in the Arab Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia. He has shielded the Kingdom and its Crown Prince from accountability for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and continued the Obama Administration’s support for the Yemen war, despite growing bipartisan discomfort in the US.
- Because of his human rights commitments, Biden will be less favored in the Gulf. He will not be sword dancing in Riyadh or cheering the war in Yemen.
- But the differences should not obscure the similarities. The two candidates share the desire to reduce US commitments in the Gulf and the interest in preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Several of their predecessors also had these goals and failed to achieve them.
- The reason is all too clear: the Americans have relied too heavily on coercion and too little on diplomacy.
- The United States has enormous destructive military, political, and economic power. But that alone cannot build what is needed: a regional security network that will reduce threat perceptions in all the Gulf states, Iran included, decrease incentives to develop nuclear weapons, and prevent encroachments by rival powers.
- This framework will require a stronger diplomatic nexus of mutual understanding, restraint, and respect. Continued low-intensity and gray zone conflict, or a real war, will make that much more difficult to achieve. The Gulf is not a military challenge, but rather a diplomatic one.
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Stevenson’s army, October 14
Bloomberg says Trump plans to pull US troops from Somalia.
FP says Israel is expanding settlements.
WTO says Europe can impose $4 Billion in tariffs because of Boeing subsidies.
NYT has table showing when absentee ballots will be counted by states.
FP says China’s money didn’t buy love in Australia.
Wired has big piece on Gen. Nakasone.
Some crazies in Portland pulled down a statue of Abraham Lincoln on Monday, David Van Drehle explains how uncalled for that was.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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No Nobel Prize
Amy Hawthorne, who knows more about the Middle East than Jared Kushner will ever learn, tweeted yesterday:
Amy W. Hawthorne@awhawthTo state the obvious, the “peace in the Middle East” theme touted by Trump and Kushner re UAE-Israel agreement is disconnected from reality given that the 2 countries never fought a war and the agreement does nothing to end today’s actual Middle East wars
just details I guess
But maybe a bit more explication is required, especially in response to the right-wing hoopla about getting a Nobel Prize for their dear leader.
As Amy suggests, the agreement between Israel and the Emirates has nothing to do directly with any past or current conflict in the Middle East. There is no history between them of bombardment, invasion, expulsion, displacement, or occupation.* The UAE has participated directly or through proxies in wars in Yemen, Syria, and Libya, but those have little or nothing to do with Israel.
Kushner, who designed Trump’s still-born proposal for peace with the Palestinians, likes to pretend that the agreement with the UAE will advance that prospect. It is more likely to dim it. It weakens and divides Palestinian support in the Arab world at a time when Israel is already so strong it feels no real pressure to negotiate. While the UAE extracted suspension of Israel’s plans to annex Palestinian land, that provision is temporary. Kushner, a strong supporter of Israelis settlements in the West Bank intended to block formation of a contiguous and viable Palestinian state, is interested in Palestinian surrender to a one-state solution with unequal rights. That won’t do anything for Middle East peace.
Trump’s presidency has significantly worsened prospects not only for peace between Israelis and Palestinians but also between Arab states and Iran. His withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal allowed Iran to enrich much more uranium, putting it within far less than a year of having the fissile materials required to build a nuclear weapon. Saudi Arabia is likewise moving towards nuclear weapons, as is Turkey. We face the real prospect of a nuclear arms race among the three most powerful countries in the Middle East, unleashed by a President who thought he could bring the Iranians to heel with sanctions. That effort has failed.
We could review a few more non-contributions to peace in the Middle East:
- arms sold to both the Emirates and Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen,
- withdrawal of US troops from eastern Syria that undermined America’s Kurdish allies,
- greenlighting of Turkey’s expansion across its southern border to create a buffer zone in northern Syria,
- support for the most brutal military dictatorship Egypt has ever seen,
- flirting with would-be autocrat General Haftar in Libya and providing only erratic rhetorical support to the internationally recognized government.
President Trump’s best bid for contributing to peace is in Afghanistan, which I suppose is “greater” Middle East. Unable to defeat the Taliban, the Trump Administration gave Special Envoy Khalilzad the job of getting the US out. He reached an agreement with the Taliban for US withdrawal as well as a commitment to intra-Afghan talks between the Taliban and the Kabul government. Trump may well boast about the US withdrawal, but he has to be careful not to draw attention to the fact that it is only vaguely conditions-based and constitutes a retreat from America’s longest war without anything like victory. Zal has made lemonade from lemons, but there is not much sweetener available and the intra-Afghan talks, as well as the fighting, are likely to go on for a long time.
President Obama left the Middle East in bad shape. President Trump has managed to make things worse. As of a year ago, he had actually increased the number of US troops deployed in the region. It is certainly arguable that the former didn’t deserve the Nobel Prize he got. The latter would deserve it far less. Of course the Norwegian prize committee knows that and won’t be tempted. Trump’s egotistical neediness to match the achievements of the black president is pitiful, not praiseworthy.
*PS: the same goes for Bahrain.
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20 Years of Backward Progress
In July of 2000, Israelis and Palestinans met at Camp David. Their goal was to negotiate a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Predictably, the negotiations failed to produce a settlement. Twenty years later, on June 21, 2020, the Carnegie Endowment convened a panel to evaluate the Camp David Summit’s legacy and determine what the future holds for U.S.-mediated negotiations. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below.
Aaron David Miller: Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Shlomo Ben Ami: Former Foreign Minister of Israel
Nabil Shaath: Former Foreign Minister of Palestine
Tamara Cofman Wittes: Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution
Where Did It All Go Wrong?
The panelists began by debating the summit’s legacy. Miller was quick to deem the negotiation a failure, as it obviously did not end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his view, Ehud Barak’s expectations were too high and Yasser Arafat was never genuinely interested in the negotiations.
Ben Ami cast doubt on Miller’s prescriptions. The former Foreign Minister argued that, even in the absence of a negotiated settlement, the Camp David Summit was a crucial step in the peace process. It emphasized the importance of multilateralism and equity in the negotiating process, and it notably provided a framework for the Clinton Peace Parameters. The Clinton Peace Parameters, in turn, served as the basis for Ehud Olmert’s famous 2008 peace offer.
A Bleak Present (& Equally Bleak Future)
Twenty years later, however, Ben Ami lamented that “the two state solution has never been so far.” By his own admission, the peace camp in Israel is dwindling, and the electorate has shifted farther right. Against this backdrop, and under the direction of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli government expanded its West Bank settlements, doggedly avoided negotiations, and largely ignored the Palestinian question. The sincerity of Israel’s commitment to a two state solution is doubtful at best. Shaath, for one, believes that it is impossible to earnestly support a two-state solution while expanding settlements and threatening annexation. In brief, neither side feels confident that the other is a true partner for peace.
According to Cofman Wittes, the collapse of the Oslo Process is at least partially responsible for this phenomenon. Oslo’s gradualism, intended to bolster prospects for coexistence, actually undermined them. Over time, Palestinians grew suspicious and began to wonder whether gradualism was simply an excuse for Israeli inaction.
In the post-Oslo and Camp David world, Cofman Wittes believes that the United States must drastically alter its approach to mediation. Rather than force policies and summits upon the Israelis and Palestinians, whom she believes are not prepared to negotiate, the US must re-enter the pre-negotiation phase. Only after the United States understands each side’s position, its goals and red lines, can it even attempt to resolve the conflict. It is also worth noting that Cofman Wittes and Shaath each recommended that future negotiations involve multiple regional and international stakeholders.
Cofman Wittes’ suggestions unlikely to change the current administration’s course, which seems intent on destroying the United States’ credibility as a mediator. To quote veteran American diplomat Aaron David Miller, “no one has ever lost money betting against success in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.”
To watch the event in full, click here.
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Two issues portend
Yesterday, I welcomed the UAE/Israel normalization of relations. I have no regrets about that.
But, as in all announcements of agreements still to be formally drafted and signed, there are question marks:
- Where will the UAE Embassy be located?
- Will Israel’s territory be defined, either explicitly or implicitly, in the formal agreements?
Israel says Jerusalem is its capital, and the Trump Administration moved the US Embassy there from Tel Aviv. If the UAE follows suit, that would be bigger news than the normalization of relations. I doubt Abu Dhabi will do that, but Israel will likely insist. How will that circle be squared?
The official statement says Israel is suspending its annexation plans, not ending them. This implies that it can in the future again threaten annexation and even do it, or back off again in exchange for another Arab country normalizing relations.
I would expect the UAE to try to avoid that by incorporating somewhere in the many agreements to be signed implicit or explicit reference to Israel’s 1967 borders, which have been the widely accepted basis for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. That way the UAE could claim that it has not departed in principle from support for the Palestinians and the Arab Peace Initiative, which foresaw normalizing relations with Israel once the territorial issue with Palestine was resolved.
These are two of the final status issues that have to be solved before the Israel/Palestine conflict can be considered settled: the status of Jerusalem and the extent of Israel’s sovereign territory. They are among the issues that have stymied peace efforts in the past. It will be difficult to avoid them entirely in establishing normal relations between the UAE and Israel. How they are resolved could have a big impact on prospects for peace in the future.
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Good but…
The deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates on its face does good things. It prevents Israeli annexation of a big piece of the West Bank and will establish normal diplomatic relations and other ties between the two countries. Hard to object to any of that.
But in diplomacy the devil is in the details, especially the details of implementation. There are a lot of still unanswered questions. Is the bar on annexation permanent, or are the Israelis going to be able to threaten it over and over again in order to gain recognition by Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and maybe Qatar?* Or will those countries raise the ante and get further concessions for Palestinian interests in return for normalization?
On implementation, skepticism is in order. Egypt and Jordan have normal diplomatic relations with Israel, but their peace is not a uniformly warm one. Security cooperation is embraced, but economic and commercial relations are far from maximized. Even travel among the three countries presents serious bureaucratic barriers, not to mention the cultural inhibitions against Arabs going to Israel (and Israel’s Jews going to Arab countries).
There are three strong factors favoring UAE/Israel rapprochement.
First is Israeli security assistance. The UAE is concerned about homegrown Islamists, especially those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. You only need sit for an hour in a business class lounge in Riyadh or Dubai to meet Israeli males with square jaws and muscular physiques, along with a group of nerds. When I asked one in Riyadh why there were so many Israelis in the lounge, he replied with an icy smile, “If I told you I would have to kill you.” My impression is that Israel has bought a lot of good will in the Gulf by helping its autocratic regimes to ensure that nothing like the Arab Spring can succeed there.
Second is a lack of bad blood at the personal level. While the UAE has recognized and support Palestine, there is no decades-long history of war with Israel and subsequent occupation, as there was with Jordan and Egypt. Nor is there a history of Jews being expelled from the Emirates, so far as I can tell. There has been a synagogue in Dubai for decades that is now officially recognized. Ordinary Emiratis may not like the deal, but mass dissent inside the UAE is unlikely, as both its citizens and non-citizens are under tight control. Your traffic ticket arrives by text message within minutes of a violation. Any negative reaction in the “Arab street” will not be in Dubai or Abu Dhabi.
Third is the common enemy: Iran. The Israelis will no doubt want and get intelligence and military cooperation with the UAE, which is conveniently located just on the other side of the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Israel will presumably be glad to provide missile defense and other high tech weaponry. The UAE was never going to be able to stand aside if war happens between Iran and Israel, so it makes sense for Abu Dhabi to get what it can to defend itself, especially after the Iranian attacks on its tankers in 2019.
The Palestinians are objecting vigorously to the UAE/Israel deal, because it rewards Israel for not doing something it should never have threatened to do and gains nothing substantial for Palestine. But the Arab world has mostly been ignoring the Palestinians lately. Certainly the Trump Administration will be uninterested in their complaints. The Palestinians will need to hope that the next Arab country to recognize Israel drives a harder bargain.
*PS: I failed to notice yesterday when drafting this that the Israelis have only suspended their annexation, which means they will try to sell that concession again to the next Arab country wanting to establish normal relations.
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