Tag: Israel/Palestine

From War to Peace

Posted in Daniel Serwer - February 14, 2019 - 1 Comment

Here are the notes I used for my presentation of From War to Peace in the Balkans, Middle East, and Ukraine yesterday at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, which has made it available free world-wide at that link. I am grateful to colleagues David Kanin and Majda Ruge for commenting and critiquing. 

  1. It is a pleasure to present at this Faculty Research Forum, which will I think be a bit different from others. I’ll be concerned not only with analyzing what happened and is happening now in the Balkans but also with what should happen. I will try to fill the academic/practitioner gap.

 

  1. I am particularly pleased as the event includes two of the best-informed people I know on the Balkans: David Kanin, whom I first met when he worked in the 1990s at the CIA Balkans Task Force, teaches the Balkans course here at SAIS; and Majda Ruge, who is both a native of the Balkans and a colleague at the Foreign Policy Institute.

 

  1. Some of you will remember the Balkans in the 1990s: the US and Europe fumbling for years in search of peaceful solutions in Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo only to find themselves conducting two air wars against Serb forces.

 

  1. But most Americans have forgotten this history. Europeans often believe there were no positive results. In the Balkans, many are convinced things were better under Tito.

 

  1. I beg to differ: the successes as well as the failures of international intervention in the Balkans should not be forgotten or go unappreciated.

 

  1. That’s why I wrote my short book, which treats the origins, consequences, and aftermath of the 1995, 1999 and 2001 interventions that led to the end of the most recent Balkan wars.

 

  1. As for the causes of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, my view is that there were three fundamental ingredients: the breakup of former Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević’s political ambitions and military capability, and ethnic nationalism, particularly in its territorial form.

 

  1. Where all three were present in good measure, as in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, war was inevitable. Where Milosevic’s political ambitions were limited, as in Slovenia, war was short. Where his political ambitions and others’ ethnic nationalism were attenuated, as in Macedonia and Montenegro, war was mostly avoided.

 

  1. The breakup of Yugoslavia is now a done deal, even if Serbia continues to resist acknowledging it. So too are Milosevic’s political ambition AND military capability. No one has inherited them. The third factor—ethnoterritorial nationalism—is still very much alive. All the Balkans peace agreements left it unscathed.

 

  1. Conflict prevention and state-building efforts since the 1990s have been partly successful, though challenging problems remain in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia. My former SAIS colleague Michael Mandelbaum is wrong: the transformation mission in the Balkans is not a failed mission, but rather an incomplete one.

 

  1. He thinks it failed because his explicit point of comparison is an ideal: the U.S. he says did not “succeed in installing well-run, widely accepted governments in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo.” I think Bosnia and Kosovo are works in progress because they are so obviously improved from their genocidal and homicidal wars. State capture is better than mass atrocity.

 

  1. The book examines each of the Balkan countries on its own merits, as well as their prospects for entry into NATO and the EU, whose doors are in theory open to all the Balkan states.

 

  1. {slide} Bottom line: all the states that emerged from Yugoslavia as well as Albania are closer to fulfilling their Euroatlantic ambitions than they are to the wars and collapse of the 1990s.

 

  1. All can hope to be EU members, and NATO allies if they want, by 2030, if they focus their efforts.

 

  1. {Slide} They were making decent progress when the financial crisis struck in 2007/8. The decade since then has been disappointing in many different respects:
  • Growth slowed and even halted in some places.
  • The Greek financial crisis cast a storm cloud over the EU and the euro.
  • The flow of refugees, partly through the Balkans, from the Syrian and Afghanistan wars as well as from Africa soured the mood further.
  • Brexit, a symptom of the much wider rise of mostly right-wing, anti-European populism, has made enlargement look extraordinarily difficult.

 

  1. {Slide} The repercussions in the Balkans have been dire:
  • Bosnia’s progress halted as it slid back into ethnic nationalist infighting.
  • Macedonia’s reformist prime minister became a defiant would-be autocrat.
  • Kosovo and Serbia are stalled in their difficult normalization process.
  • Russia has taken advantage of the situation to slow progress towards NATO and the EU.

 

  1. Moscow tried to murder Montenegro’s President to block NATO membership, finances Bosnia’s Serb secessionist entity, campaigned against resolving the Macedonia name issue, and undermines free media throughout the Balkans.

 

  1. Now the question is whether the West, demoralized and divided by Donald Trump and other populists, can still muster the courage to resolve the remaining problems in the Balkans and complete the process of EU and, for those who want it, NATO accession.

 

  1. Plan A is still viable. I also don’t see a Plan B that comes even close to the benefits of completing Plan A.

 

  1. When I wrote the book, three big obstacles remained. Now there are only two.

 

  1. The first obstacle was the Macedonia “name” issue. For those who may not follow the Balkans, the Greeks claim the name “Macedonia” belongs exclusively to the Hellenic tradition and would like the modern, majority Slavic country that uses that name to stop using it.

 

  1. Skopje and Athens have now resolved this issue. New leadership was key to making it happen.

 

  1. For those who claim the West is prepared to tolerate corruption and state capture in order to ensure stability in the Balkans, I suggest a chat with Nikola Gruevski.

 

  1. Washington and Brussels helped chase him from office in 2017, once his malfeasance was well-publicized and a popular alternative appeared on the horizon. If there is a viable liberal democratic option, the West has been willing to support it.

 

  1. The solution to the name issue is deceptively simple: now ratified in both parliaments, the Republic of Macedonia will become the Republic of North Macedonia, which most of its inhabitants and most of us will continue to call just Macedonia.

 

  1. The Republic of North Macedonia can now hope to join NATO, perhaps by the end of this year, and become a candidate for EU accession.

 

  1. There is a lot more to it, but that is all that will matter to you and me. The rest is for the Greeks and Macedonians.

 

  1. The second big obstacle is normalization between Belgrade and Pristina, which will require mutual recognition and exchange of diplomatic representatives at the ambassadorial level.

 

  1. This is closer than most think. Serbia has already abandoned its claim to sovereignty over all of Kosovo, in an April 2013 Brussels agreement that established the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its whole territory and foresaw Kosovo and Serbia entering the EU separately and without hindering each other. Only sovereign states can enter the EU.

 

  1. {Slide} Belgrade has also implicitly acknowledged Kosovo’s sovereignty in opening the question of partition along ethnic lines. Serbia would like to absorb the 3.5 or 4 (depending on how you count) municipalities in northern Kosovo, three of which were majority Serb before the war.

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Money and Israel

Posted in Daniel Serwer - February 12, 2019 - 0 Comment

Newly elected Member of Congress Ilhan Omar has generated accusations of anti-Semitism for her tweet implying that money (Benjamins) from AIPAC is the main reason for support for Israel. This was by way of explanation of her claim that

Israel has hypnotized the world, may Allah awaken the people and help them see the evil doings of Israel.

I don’t much like that appeal to Allah, but in addition Omar certainly oversimplified the situation: many members of Congress support Israel for religious reasons, and others because they think it is in America’s national security interest or because the two countries share democratic values. But charging that money is also a main factor in blinding Congress to Israeli wrongdoing is not in my view anti-Semitic, as many have charged.

Mehdi Hasan makes the point graphically in a series of tweets:

So, on the whole controversy, I wanted to do this pointing out the absurdity of saying it’s off limits to mention money and support for Israel, when the US media (rightly) does mention money, influence-peddling & lobbying when it comes to Saudi Arabia and DC. 1/

Why is it okay to talk about Saudi lobbies, and Saudis buying Trump, and Saudi-first policies, why is it not Islamophobic to say all of that, but it’s anti-Semitic when it comes to Israel? Try changing Saudi to Israel in some of these mainstream headlines – here we go: 2/

Here’s the Washington Post; remember, Saudi, not Israel: 3/

Here’s the Washington Post again; remember, Saudi, not Israel: 4/

Here’s the New York Times; remember, Saudi, not Israel: 5/

Here’s more from the New York Times; remember, Saudi, not Israel: 6/

Here’s Vox; remember, Saudi, not Israel: 7/

Here’s NPR; remember, Saudi, not Israel: 8/

Here’s more NPR; remember, Saudi, not Israel: 9/

Here’s MSNBC; remember, Saudi, not Israel: 10/

Here’s the Tablet; remember, Saudi, not Israel: 11/

Here’s the FT; remember, Saudi, not Israel: 12/

Here’s Vanity Fair; remember, Saudi, not Israel: 13/

Here’s Time magazine; remember, Saudi, not Israel: 14/

Here’s Politico; remember, Saudi, not Israel: 15/

To be clear, it’s not illegal, & of course above it’s the Saudi *government* buying influence in DC vs pro-Israeli *American* groups buying influence in DC but the point is that influence *is* bought. Don’t be naive or play dumb. We see it with Saudi, why not with Israel? *ENDS*

The short answer to that question is that many of us do see it, and that includes the majority of American Jews who, like me, would like to see an end to Israel’s mistreatment of Palestinians and creation of a Palestinian state that will live in peace and prosperity with its Israeli neighbors. AIPAC and the money of its supporters is opposing that goal. There is virtue in recognizing reality. It’s not the whole story, but it is an important piece of it. Would anyone pay attention to Sheldon Adelson if he were poor?

Ilhan Omar has apologized unequivocally for using an anti-Semitic “trope.” I wonder how many of her antagonists who expressed anti-Muslim sentiments in response to her will do likewise.

 

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Keeping rigor in a shallow environment

Posted in Bouela Lehbib - February 7, 2019 - 0 Comment

The Middle East Institute hosted a discussion on Thursday 30 about the role of think tanks in shaping Middle East policy, with Randa Slim, Senior Fellow and Director of Conflict Resolution at MEI. She was Joined by Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Paul Salem, President of Middle East Institute, Steven Kenney, Principal of Foresight Vector LLC, and Sami Atallah, Director of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies.

Katulis stated that Thinks Tanks are in an existential crisis; the weak and incoherent policy planning process inside the US government has affected the analysis they are doing. There is also a growing tendency towards advocacy as opposed to analysis, reflecting Trump’s disruptive style of politics and decision-making. This approach has created an incentive for many think tanks just to react to the latest decisions without examining more holistically what is going on. Katulis claims the sectarianism and tribalism that exist in the Middle East are also echoed in DC in the sense that think tanks tend not to bring together people with different views. Worse, the media has affected the way policy and politics are conducted, making scholars too reactive to events and statements coming out of the current Administration.

Slim mentioned that there is too much Track I dialogue and not enough emphasis on Track II. She stated that Track II diplomacy had become a growing field of study, to which MEI has devoted particular attention. The work done by Herbert Kelman on the Arab -Israeli conflict has fertilized this field in the Middle East. The Taif agreement for Lebanon was negotiated in a three-year Track II process that started before the official negotiations, subsequently producing an outcome that translated into Track I official negotiations.  When there is no working policy process as in the current US administration, or when there are no relations between the antagonists in a conflict such as the Saudi-Iranian conflict, there is no Track I to hook to.

Reflecting on the role of thank tanks in the Middle East, Salem gave an overview of how the civil society organizations fuel of these research centers. They have had a significant impact in producing policy ideas and creating young leaders who are empowered, informed and moving into public space. Think tanks were part of the awakening and empowerment that led up to the Arab Spring.  For Salem, that impact had two effects; it empowered civil society, but at the same time it drew government antagonism. In the US, it is challenging to impact the government due to the lack of a political process that is real, meaningful, and coherent. The same thing can be said about the resurgent authoritarian regimes in the Middle East inspired by China and Russia and encouraged by the current illiberal president Donald Trump.

Atallah described the political environment thinks tanks are operating in as not inclusive or transparent, leaving little chance for them to influence decisions. There is also a problem of financial sustainability. Think tanks need a long-term income stream to hire senior staff to deal with emerging issues. According to Atallah, through research, advocacy and conferences think tanks have been able to introduce key ideas and influence decision-making in Lebanon.

Kenney spoke about the few mainstream think tanks tjat are employing the methods of foresight in a concerted way, alongside the other research and analysis they have traditionally done. For Kenney, the rigor, comprehensiveness and objectivity of think tanks and the methodology behind them do not often get recognized. The misconception many have is that think tanks are the equivalent of looking into a crystal ball and trying to predict the future. Kenny clarified that think tanks explain why things are the way they are today and extrapolate forward from that.

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Hard to know how to please the US

Posted in Bouela Lehbib - January 29, 2019 - 0 Comment

The Middle East Policy Council hosted a discussion January 25 assessing Trump Administration mid- term policy on the Middle East, with Philip Gordon, Fellow in US Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was joined by Michael Doran, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute and Jon B. Alterman, Senior Vice President and Director of the Middle East Program.

Gordon described Trump Administration policy in the Middle East as based on a core contradiction. On one hand, it sets out to constrain Iran from meddling in the region, to defeat ISIS, to achieve a Palestinian/Israeli peace, and show US leadership. On the other hand, the President regards the Middle East as only sand and death where the US has spent around $6 trillion without getting anything in return. The US thus wants to leave and make others pay for the expenses incurred.

Two years of trying to inflict pain on the Iranian economy did not make Iran change its behavior in the region. However costly and risky the mission might be, Gordon thinks the US should have maintained troops in Syria to prevent a Turkish invasion, giving the Kurds the leverage they need in negotiations with Damascus, and finishing the job against ISIS. Trump wants Gulf states to invest invest in the US, buy US weapons, and fight ISIS in return for backing them on countering Iran. This policy has signaled a green light to do what they want to boycott Qatar, continue the bombing campaign in Yemen, and repress dissidents.

Doran offered a different assessment of Trump Administration policy in the Middle East based on what the President promised during his election campaign: doing more with less. Trump’s approach is totally different from Obama’s of no enemies or friends, only stakeholders and problems. The US works to reach an agreement accepted by all friendly parties. Trump looks after US interests and seeks to save blood and treasure by working with allies who accept the US security umbrella in the region, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. This policy favors a coalition of allies to contain Iran. Doran claims this policy is much better than Obama’s.

Ultimately, it’s all about how you read the Iranians for Doran. Obama downplayed Iran’s aspirations. Trump thinks Iran wants to destroy the US alliance system and kick it out of the Gulf region and the Middle East.

Confused about US policy in the Middle East, Alterman pointed out what he sees as Trump’s contradictory policies in the region. John Bolton, National Security Adviser, stated the US is staying in Syria, while the president contradicted him by declaring the withdrawal. Trump said it would take thirty days to pull out and now it’s six months. In Gulf states, Trump disengaged on Yemen, embraced Saudi Arabia, and ignored the GCC conflict. The president is divorced from his government and has a poorly functioning staff.  That said, Trump’s three main objectives are reasonably clear: building close ties with Saudi Arabia, countering Iran (and reversing Obama strategy of engaging it), and holding the Middle East at arm’s length.

But this strategy, Alterman argued, is not working. It is bizarre for Trump to make Iran the core of the Middle East strategy, since Tehran is weak. Its GDP is between the state of Maryland and Michigan. Mississippi, which has the lowest income per capita in the US, has seven times the income per capita of Iran. Iran has no allies in the Middle East. It can be a spoiler in the region but cannot be a winner.

For Alterman, the biggest mistake the US is making is an idiosyncratic embrace of some Middle Eastern states and the abandonment of many, rendering it hard for countries to understand how to please the US.

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Blithering

Posted in Daniel Serwer - January 27, 2019 - 4 Comments

This is a president of the United States in near total self-delusion. Ninety percent of what he says and implies in this rambling peroration is untrue. The simple facts are these: most undocumented immigrants and drugs in the US come through regular border crossings, few come through areas where this is no fencing, crime rates by undocumented immigrants are lower than by native-born Americans, and the overall numbers of undocumented immigrants have fallen dramatically for decades. There is no immigration crisis and no need for more than modest extensions and modernization of existing border barriers.

Trump belatedly realized that closing down of a large part of the US government in order to get border wall funding was a big political mistake. Republican Senators had started to defect on keeping the government closed, and Senate Majority Leader McConnell was warning Trump that he could no longer hold the line. Trump’s approval rating, already unusually low, had fallen further. The strong economy he inherited from Barack Obama is starting to tremble. Special Counsel Mueller has indicted one of Trump’s closest pals for crimes incident to long-denied cooperation with Wikileaks on release of Russian-hacked documents purloined from Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign.

Things are going to get a lot worse.

The re-opening of the government is only for a few weeks. But Trump won’t be able to shut it down again. Instead he is threatening to declare a national emergency that would give him authority to spend money on his border wall. That move would trigger lawsuits that will prevent any border wall construction for years to come.

The Special Counsel has now unveiled a web of cooperation between Trump’s campaign, his friends, Wikileaks, and Russia that suggests the worst: a candidate for President not only willing to accept illegal foreign assistance, but to do so in the form of stolen emails. For details, see law professor Jennifer Taub’s Tweetsummary:

 13 hours ago

More

🧵Thread We Have Seen the Mueller Report –– And It’s Spectacular 1/

Crooked would be a kind word to describe the behavior Mueller has already gotten guilty pleas for as well as convictions. Others should be presumed innocent, but it would take a lot more courage than Trump has not to be frightened. The Special Counsel is only one degree of separation from the President and likely to indict family members soon: Don Jr., Ivanka, and Jared Kushner are in his sights.

Meanwhile, House Speak Pelosi, fresh from her unalloyed victory over Trump in ending the government shutdown without wall funding, will be presiding over a united Democratic caucus ready and willing to investigate every corner of malfeasance and corruption in a grossly misbehaving and corrupt campaign and administration. The next few months will be replete with devastating revelations, quite apart from the Mueller investigation.

Trump will turn to foreign policy to try to stem the tide of disapproval. He’ll meet again with Kim Jung-un, who so far has provided nothing serious to indicate he intends to give up long range missiles and nuclear weapons. He may tout a peace plan for Israel and the Palestinians with no possibility of acceptance by the latter. He’ll double down on trying to oust Venezuelan President Maduro. He’ll reach an accommodation with China on trade, boasting that only he could do it. He is hoping to throw enough jello at the wall that something will stick.

It won’t. The world understands power. Both the domestic political situation and Trump’s many missteps internationally have convinced everyone that he is unreliable at best, perfidious at worst, and incurably weak. Blithering is not what strong, confident reliable, upstanding presidents do.

 

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The foreign policy process is broken

Posted in Bouela Lehbib - January 25, 2019 - 0 Comment

The Center for Strategic and International studies ( CSIS) held a discussion January 23 focused on effects of the US withdrawal from Syria and Afghanistan there, in the region and on US national security. The panel included Jon B. Alterman, Senior Vice President and Director of the Middle East Program, Melissa Dalton, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the International Security Program and Director of the Cooperative Defense Project, Seth G. Jones, Harold Brown Chair and Director of Transnational Threats Project and the Senior Adviser to the International Security Program, and Nancy Youssef, National Security Correspondent for The Wall Street Journal.

Alterman claims that what is troublesome about the US moving out of Syria is reduced control over what it leaves behind, compromising its leverage in the negotiations about the future of Syria. Trump could have negotiated terms of US withdrawal to get concessions from Syria, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Kurds. The immediate and unconditional exit makes the parties do their own deals, with US interests ignored. President Trump has wanted to withdraw but people surrounding him did not. National Security Adviser John Bolton announced last September that the US is staying in Syria as long as Iran troops are there. Alterman added that this shows the broken system: the president does not consider the various options presented to him, and the government does not follow his directions. The President is issuing tweets or making statements that generate reactions because policy is not agreed.

Syria remains crucial for the US, according to Dalton.  She claimed that what happens in Syria has wide implications elsewhere. The terrorism threat is still looming, along with the refugee and humanitarian crisis. It is thus hard to forecast the negative effects of this conflict on the region and Europe. US competitors like Russia and Iran can easily fill the gap left behind, increasing their sphere of influence in the region. Worse, the long-standing principle prohibiting the use of chemical weapons against civilians and facilities is eroding. Dalton asserts that the recent public opinion polling by Pew shows that half of Americans do not believe the US has achieved its objectives in Afghanistan. The majority also suggests US should be pulling out of Syria.

Jones noted that in a recent C-Span appearance he found it striking that all people who called in– Democrats, Republicans and Independents–were supportive of the withdrawal. They were wondering why the money spent in Syria and Afghanistan is not being used at home. Americans seem in favor of withdrawal. Trump’s doctrine for foreign policy looks like restraint: minimizing the use of military force in some areas which he sees not as a strategic interest, such as the Middle East and Asia.

Yet the US is not talking about bringing the 2000 troops back home. Youssef said they are thinking of placing them in Iraq, Kuwait, and other neighboring countries. The risk in this is that when the US is not present, and instead relying on Kurds who feel abandoned, the ability to understand the situation and shape events shrinks. Russia and Iran have long-standing influence in Syria. Neither the US presence nor withdrawal will affect them much. The US is not the dominant force Syria, as the Israeli strikes against Iran and its proxies there suggest. Youssef too noted a major change in how the US makes decisions. In the past, the US deliberated all possible options and the costs associated with them, and then announce its policies. Now it’s the opposite. The policy is announced first, and deliberation comes later.

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