Tag: Israel/Palestine

Backfire

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu yesterday obliterated his own argument against the Iran nuclear deal. Let’s leave aside whether it is appropriate for a country that has clandestinely produced nuclear weapons to criticize others for attempting to do the same thing. Netanyahu presented evidence that before 2004 Iran had such a clandestine nuclear weapons program. This is well known and confirmed at the time by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is a major reason the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is needed: to stop and to some extent reverse Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons.

Netanyahu doesn’t like the JCPOA because some of its provisions expire in the 2020s and none of its provisions deal with ballistic missiles. What he has failed to explain is how the US withdrawing from the deal now would fix that or in any other way make Israel and the US better off. The Europeans have made it plain they will stick with the deal if the Iranians do. The Iranians are divided: some want to keep to it while others want to withdraw. If they continue the deal with the Europeans, US re-imposition of sanctions is unlikely to get Tehran to negotiate a follow-on agreement. The sanctions worked in 2015 because everyone was supporting them. If the Iranians withdraw, they can go hell bent for nuclear weapons immediately.

If US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal doesn’t benefit Israel, what then might Netanyahu be trying to achieve? One possibility is a crisis that would result in a US attack on Iran’s remaining nuclear facilities. Another is the worsening of Iran’s economic situation to encourage demonstrations and eventual regime change.

Both of these are dicey propositions. While the US certainly now has an excellent idea of precisely where the nuclear facilities are located (credit to the IAEA), any attack on them would precipitate Iranian retaliation against US forces  and civilians in the Gulf, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, in addition attacks on Israel from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria as well as from Iran. Trying to prompt regime change is always iffy, but especially so in an Islamic Republic that has weathered several episodes of mass demonstrations that might have brought down a less entrenched or less brutal regime.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Netanyahu is pushing for a withdrawal from the JCPOA without any clear notion of what the benefits might be. That however isn’t likely to phase Donald Trump, whose ability to reason things through is limited. He likes acting on impulse, especially when flattered by someone he thinks well of like Netanyahu. Sheldon Adelson’s campaign contributions are no doubt another factor in favor of withdrawal.

Fortunately, there will be some in the Administration who will argue against, noting that the US has already gotten most of the benefits withdrawal might produce: the Europeans are open to discussing a follow-on agreement that could encompass ballistic missiles and banks have hesitated to provide financing to Iran and those who want to do business there. The US, by contrast, continues to benefit from the IAEA inspections and the delay in Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense Mattis has made it plain that Iran is complying with the JCPOA, which has ample provision for verification. He no doubt also understands that the prospects for a nuclear deal with North Korea, already dim, would evaporate entirely if the US walks away from the JCPOA.

So Netanyahu’s showy non-TED talk yesterday was unconvincing. I’d would say it even backfired. The US (and Israel) will be far better off if the US stays in the nuclear deal.

PS: A chat April 30 with someone well-informed about Israel suggested Netanyahu’s aim is to get the Europeans to re-impose sanctions, so that the Iran of the 2020s is far less resource-rich than it would be otherwise. Asked why the Europeans would do that, I was told they are more afraid of war with Iran than they are of reimposing sanctions. That game is called chicken and often ends in catastrophe.

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“Wicked” globalism

“Wicked” is the word wonks use to describe problems that are difficult to solve because they are so complex it is difficult to predict the impact of anything you do, which may cause consequences different from those you intend. That’s what is happening today: the US is facing nuclear issues with both North Korea and Iran that defy resolution in part because they may interact in both predictable and unpredictable ways.

This was not necessary. President Trump has chosen to schedule a decision for withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal for May 12, the date on which Congress requires him to certify whether continuing it is in the US interest. He refused to do that three months ago, without consequences. This time around he says he’ll withdraw if the deal isn’t “fixed” to include ballistic missile and eliminate the expiration clauses. There is no indication that can be done in the time frame available, though the Europeans are trying to back him down by committing to a follow-on agreement. The Iranians, however, show no sign of being interested in that.

Meanwhile, things are moving in the other direction with North Korea, which has expressed some interest in “denuclearization,” though what that means to Kim Jong-un is not yet clear. It almost surely doesn’t mean “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization” that the Americans want. The North Koreans have a long history of reneging on agreements with the international community, but the Trump Administration seems determined to ignore that and instead seek still another one. Trump has already given Kim a big prize: the promise of a meeting that will legitimize Kim’s regime, something he would have criticized ferociously had his predecessor done it. Any agreement will have to involve some concessions from the US, likely on the American military presence in South Korea and maybe elsewhere in Asia.

Israeli President Netanyahu today went on TV to demonstrate that Iran was lying when it claimed not to have a nuclear weapons program prior to 2004. That was already well known. How that is supposed to undermine the agreement concluded in 2015 known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not clear. The JCPOA committed Iran to international inspections that have so far confirmed there is no longer a nuclear weapons program, as well as dismantling of most of Iran’s centrifuges and one of its reactors. The JCPOA looks to many like a good antidote to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Netanyahu’s TV appearance confirmed that.

Trump has nevertheless indicated he will withdraw from it and reimpose unilateral sanctions. That will give Iran the option of sustaining the agreement with the Europeans (thus splitting them from the US and weakening the impact of sanctions) or withdrawing and going hell bent for nuclear weapons. Neither outcome would benefit the US. Withdrawal would also give North Korea good reason to doubt that any agreement with the US concerning its nuclear program will be maintained, though admittedly it already has ample reason for doubts. Iran racing for nuclear weapons would certainly give North Korea more than enough reason to hold on to its own.

This trifecta of likely bad outcomes has not been enough to convince Trump that he should override whatever promises he made during his election campaign. Most Americans support the JCPOA. But Trump isn’t interested in what most Americans think, only what his deep-pocketed donors like Sheldon Adelson think. That’s what Trump meant when he told French President Macron he would withdraw from the JCPOA due to domestic political pressure.

Netanyahu has also ordered airstrikes on Iranian facilities in Syria that reportedly store missiles for use against Israel. Tehran, including the Iranian Supreme Leader, has promised a response, while denying any Iranians were killed. Escalation of the tit-for-tat in Syria could well get out of hand, leading to a still wider war and even the Israeli ground invasion Syrians often warn of. The Americans have shown no interest in joining such an enterprise to drive the Iranians back from the Israeli border, but they likely aren’t saying a loud “no” to it either.

We are at one of those tipping points, like the eve of the Iraq war. The US can barge ahead on its current path, with some predictable negative consequences and likely many other unpredictable ones, though it is hard to think of positive outcomes. Or it can pause, rethink, and try to unravel the global interconnections that make its current course so likely to produce bad results. Globalism has its virtues, but it also has its exceedingly complicated, “wicked,” side. Clarifying problems so they can be solved is a lot better than muddying them, as Trump and Netanyahu both prefer to do.

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Peace picks, April 9 – 15

  1. Russia and the European Court of Human Rights after 20 Years | Monday, April 9 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Wilson Center | Register here |

Despite ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights 20 years ago, the Russian government today remains widely criticized for its human rights record. Using the findings of the recent book Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: the Strasbourg Effect, the panel will discuss what socialization has taken place in Russia as a result of its participation in the ECHR system. Featuring Marina Agaltsova (Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, Human Rights Center), Maria Issaeva (Threefold Legal Advisers, Moscow), and Lauri Mälksoo (Professor of International Law, University of Tartu, Estonia).

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  1. The Race is On: 2018 Electoral Landscape Starts to Take Shape in Brazil | Monday, April 9 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |

Join the Wilson Center for a conversation with leading political analysts, six months out from perhaps the most consequential election since Brazil’s return to democracy and just days after the Brazilian Supreme Court voted to reject former President Lula’s request to remain free while he appeals a corruption conviction, likely ending his bid for the presidency. The looming April 7th deadline for prospective candidates for the presidency of Brazil to affiliate with a political party and resign from their current executive positions will also help to define an electoral landscape that has been unusually difficult to predict. Although opinion polls at this early stage often tell us little about an election’s eventual outcome, the field of contenders is beginning to take shape and will soon provide the first real indications of where this race could be headed. Featuring David Fleischer (Professor Emeritus, University of Brasilia), Christopher Garman (Managing Director for the Americas, Eurasia Group), Mauricio Moura (CEO and Founder, IDEIA Big Data), and Ricardo Sennes (Director and Partner, Prospectiva Consultoria Internacional). With introductory remarks by Paulo Sotero (Director, Brazil Institute, Wilson Center). There will be a live webcast of this event.

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  1. The Russian Way of Warfare | Monday, April 9 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | CSIS | Register here |

After ten years of military modernization and defense reform, Russia’s military is now a reliable instrument of national power that can be used in a limited context to achieve vital national interests. Russian strategists, concerned about instability along the Russian periphery or an aerospace attack on the Russian heartland, are focused on preserving influence in buffer states and on reinforcing defensive bulwarks. Russian military strategy and operations show an increasing degree of coordination, deception, and simultaneity to achieve objectives quickly while minimizing vulnerabilities. What does the evolution of Russia’s armed forces, its strategy, and the way it uses force tell us about the future? Featuring Scott Boston (Defense Analyst, RAND), Dara Massicot (Policy Researcher, RAND), Olga Oliker (Senior Adviser and Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS), and Michael Kofman (Research Scientist, Russia Studies Program, CNA) as moderator. There will be a live webcast of this event.

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  1. Mexico Elections 2018: A Referendum on Populism? | Monday, April 9 | 6:00pm – 7:30pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register here |

Join the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) for insights on the state of the Mexican political and economic climate ahead of the country’s upcoming presidential election. Featuring Dr. Monica de Bolle (Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University SAIS & Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics), Dr. Antonio Ortiz-Mena (Senior Vice President, Albright Stonebridge Group & Former Head of Economic Affairs, Embassy of Mexico in the United States), Mr. Christopher Wilson (Deputy Director, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center), and Dr. Riordan Roett (Professor & Director, Latin American Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University SAIS) as moderator.

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  1. The UN’s New “Sustaining Peace” Agenda | Wednesday, April 11 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Stimson Center | Register here |

From North Africa and the Middle East to South Sudan, Ukraine, and Afghanistan, the past several years have witnessed a marked uptick in political violence within states, reversing the trend recorded since the end of the Cold War. In 2016 alone, more countries experienced violent conflict than at any time in nearly 30 years, including the continued sharp rise in terrorist attacks. Earlier this year, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres released his Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace to inform a related UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting planned for April 24-25, 2018 in New York. This panel discussion will explore whether and how best the UN’s new “Sustaining Peace” Agenda can help to reduce violence substantially in fragile and conflict-affected countries, while building more just, inclusive, and resilient societies. Featuring Ambassador Tariq Al-Ansari (Director of the Department of International Cooperation, Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Charles Call (Associate Professor, American University), Eric Gaudiosi (Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, DOS), Corinne Graff (Senior Policy Scholar, USIP), Elizabeth Hume (Senior Director for Programs and Strategy, Alliance for Peacebuilding), and Richard Ponzio (Director, Just Security 2020 Program, Stimson & Co-Chair, UNA-NCA Peace & Security Committee) as moderator.

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  1. The French-American Alliance in an America-First Era | Thursday, April 12 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |

In April 2018, President Donald Trump will host French President Emmanuel Macron for the first state visit of the US president’s term. As these two unlikely partners meet again, the visit will signal a pivotal moment in the bilateral relationship between the United States and France that has matured markedly in the last decade. It could set the stage for continued deep cooperation that has flourished in recent years or preface a return to competitive rivalry in an occasionally tempestuous relationship between Washington and Paris. On the occasion of the launch of Non-Resident Senior Fellow Jeff Lightfoot’s report “The French-American Alliance in an America-First Era,” the Future Europe Initiative will convene a panel of experts to discuss this forthcoming state visit as well as assess the outlook of the US-French relationship more broadly. Featuring H.E. Gérard Araud (Ambassador, Embassy of France in the United States), Ms. Susan Glasser (Staff Writer, The New Yorker), and Mr. Pierre-Andre Imbert (Social Policy Advisor, Office of the President of the Republic of France).

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  1. Palestine in Political Limbo: What the Loss of the Two-State Framework Means for Palestinians | Thursday, April 12 | 1:00pm – 3:00pm | New America | Register here |

The emerging consensus is that the two-state solution is all but dead, largely due to the continuing expansion of Israeli settlement colonies in the occupied Palestinian territory and President Trump’s proclamation recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. How will Israel’s efforts to legalize certain aspects of its occupation under its domestic law impact Palestinians in historic Palestine and in the diaspora? Will Israel’s warming relations with the Arab world complicate or facilitate a just solution to the Palestine-Israel conflict? What role might the international community play as Israel attempts to extend its sovereignty over Palestine? Might recent events have opened up new opportunities for Palestinians to re-imagine Palestine? Featuring Zena Agha (Co-founder and Executive Director, Al-Shabaka), Yara Hawari (US Policy Fellow, Al-Shabaka), Nadia Hijab (Palestine Policy Fellow, Al-Shabaka), and Zaha Hassan (Middle East Fellow, New America).

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  1. The Venezuelan Refugee Crisis: Challenges and Solutions | Friday, April 13 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Brookings Institution | Register here |

The current mass exodus of Venezuelans into neighboring Colombia, Brazil, and other South American countries has the potential to wreak havoc in border communities and budgets. Official figures place the number of Venezuelan residents in Colombia at 600,000 and in Brazil at around 40,000, with observers on the ground estimating the real numbers to be much higher. To manage such an enormous challenge, the international community—including the U.N. system, international institutions, and other private, public, and multilateral stakeholders—will have to work together to mobilize the necessary resources and forge a collective response that provides relief to suffering Venezuelans fleeing their country. Featuring Karen L. Freeman (Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID), Matthew Reynolds (regional representative for the United States and the Caribbean, UN High Commissioner for Refugees), and Dany Bahar (David M. Rubenstein Fellow, Brookings Institution) as moderator. With introductory remarks by Ted Piccone (Senior Fellow, Latin America Initiative and Charles W. Robinson Chair, Brookings).

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  1. Ending Civil Wars: How Can We Succeed with Limited Opportunities? | Friday, April 13 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |

As a part of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ ongoing project on Civil Wars, Violence and International Responses, the second volume of a special issue of the journal Dædalus was released in January 2018 to explore trends in civil wars and solutions moving forward. Join us as experts discuss their findings and recommendations on how the United States can better respond to intrastate conflict and promote both development and stability to create lasting peace. Featuring Nancy Lindborg (President, USIP), Dr. Stephen Biddle (Professor, George Washington University), Stephen Krasner (Professor, Stanford University), Barry Posen (Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Clare Lockhart (Director and Co-Founder, Institute for State Effectiveness), and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry (Director, U.S.-Asia Security Initiative, Stanford University) as moderator.

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Dare to dream

Alexandros Mallias, former ambassador of the Hellenic Republic to the US and now a special adviser to Eliamep, writes (based on his presentation to the 5th Hellenic High  Strategy Conference, March 29 -30: 

A process that runs from Tehran to Helsinki via Jerusalem?  Madness,  or surrealism? Call it utopia, but tomorrow it may become necessity. Allow me to identify six major problems and offer six proposals:

Mismatch between threats, military interventions and their consequences

The so-called “Arab Spring” is not simply a lost opportunity for the Arabs but also a great occasion missed by Europe and the United States as well. For the first time since the rise of “Arab nationalism” in the 1950s, the origin of the revolts did not target Europe, the United States, and Israel. What happened next was due also to our action, miscalculations or inertia and affects our own security and stability.

The unprecedented flow of refugees and migrants to Europe is the unavoidable “collateral damage.” The refugee and migration flows undermined the European integration process and pushed xenophobia and nationalism into mainstream politics. The refugee issue was the catalyst for the Brexit referendum. The European Union is losing a global politico-military partner and capabilities. I earnestly hope this trend will be reversed.

The EU was inadequate, divided and slow to assess the threat, to react, and to act. The lack of a common and integrated foreign policy as a functional common denominator is at the heart of the problem.

Proposal: prevention of population movements should be at the center of political decision-making

The following conditions need to be fulfilled before giving the “green light” for military power:

  1. Defining the problem: what threat was Libya’ s dictator Muammar Gaddafi to Europe’s security? Is today’s Libya a security provider for Europe?
  2. A clear political goal: what do we want to achieve? What does success consist of?
  3. A clear line between wishful thinking and what is possible: no early “mission accomplished” fireworks.
  4. Political objectives matched by appropriate economic, political, and military means.

Conflicts of interest of the Middle East actors

The vital interests of regional players diverge. They are part of the problem as well as of the solution.

Proposal:  a new regional security system covering the Middle East and the Mediterranean

The proposed arrangement might include all MENA States, Iran included, the five Permanent Members of the UNSC and the EU. This idea was floating in the UN Security Council Resolutions (Iran-Iraq cease fire) in the late 80’s.

Without a minimum understanding between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia, there is no possibility of establishing balanced, interest-based security in the wider region of the Middle East and North Africa.

Saudi Arabia is changing. The modernization policies are essential for the Kingdom’s stability and security. Potentially aggressive behavior by Iran during the implementation of Saudi Arabia’s welcome reforms must be prevented. But the stabilization process of the wider Middle East is not achievable without Iran.

Logic dictates that long-term balance of power and interests should allow establishing the terms for the inclusion of Iran, Saudi Arabia and at a later stage Israel in a  regional security arrangement, no matter how  impossible this perspective looks today. However, logic rarely becomes a mainstream practice in international relations.

We should remember that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 cemented the era of détente and cooperation, before the end of the Cold War. It included recognition that: “The participating states are convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole…”

We need to launch a process including the OSCE member-states and the MENA states. The participating states should undertake commitments similar to those adopted within the  Helsinki Process. China should also participate.

Nuclear proliferation

The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East is real. It will become unavoidable if Iran gets nuclear capabilities. Already, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and possibly Egypt are contemplating their own nuclear ambitions.

Egypt’s well-known proposal for the creation of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Middle East sounds good.  However, Israel has its own reasons not to back the Egyptian plan.

Proposal: a phased multilateral treaty

First : The elaboration and adoption of a  binding multilateral  treaty for  the non-use of nuclear weapons in the greater Middle East (including Iran).

Second: the Treaty could include a clause that bans, within a defined time schedule (for example 20 years), nuclear weapons in the wider Middle East, establishing a nuclear-free zone. The Permanent Members (P5) of the UN Security Council and the European Union could also be contracting parties.

Ballistic missiles and conventional forces

Iranian ballistic missiles are a threat to Israel’s security. The anticipated improvements in their accuracy and delivery capacity will further increase Israel’s and others’ concern and need for security, deterrence and retaliation.

Proposal: a “Middle East Conventional Forces Control and Reduction Treaty”

This would require the proportional and simultaneous reduction of ballistic and other conventional armaments. It could take the shape of a legally binding instrument similar to the November 1990 Paris “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.”

We could foresee an intermediate set of Confidence Building Measures, including international  inspections and observation of military exercises.

Anachronism and dysfunction of the global collective security system

The UN is unable to discharge its duties as the global collective security system. Unilateral actions by the P5 without foresight actions are well illustrated through their involvement in the Syrian chaos.

Often acting at the margins of their mandate (mainly the UN Charter’s Articles 23 and 24 ) their acts are justified by self-interest.  Their motivations are geopolitical; about prevailing and expanding or containing influence.

Proposal: The UN Charter to be revised and the Security Council updated

Τhe post-war composition and the abuse of veto power do not match the present global  risks, balance of power and capabilities.

Conclusion

We need to dare to dream. Today’s impossible is tomorrow’s achievement. Peace in the Middle East is not beyond our reach.

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Next year in Jerusalem

Israel’s use of deadly force against mostly nonviolent Gaza demonstrators on Friday raises lots of questions: as none of the Palestinians succeeded in crossing the border fence, why did the IDF use live ammunition? They claim to have fired only on those using violence or trying to cross into Israel, but on the Gaza side there are lots of videos and eye witnesses contradicting that claim. Was the Israeli government focused on violent militants, or was it really trying to frighten masses of nonviolent Palestinians away from the demonstrations? “Violence” in this instance seems to refer to throwing of stones, but the Israelis present seem to have been well out of range. Burning tires and approaching the border fence are definitely not violent or terrorist acts. Why are they being referred to as such?

I suppose we’ll never know the answers to these questions, as the Israelis will not allow an independent investigation. They appear to me genuinely frightening by the prospect of thousands of Palestinian refugees walking peacefully into Israel and claiming their rights to land their grandparents left, or were compelled to leave, in 1948. The Israelis are determined not only to stop that kind of popular protest, even if peaceful, but also to scare Palestinians into submission. Doing so redounds to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s benefit in domestic politics: his supporters are unconcerned with the deaths of Palestinians and devoted to an expansive vision of Israel’s security needs.

During my visits to both Israel and Palestine in January, I was unable to visit Gaza, but talked with a nonviolent activist who lives there. Gaza is desperate. Even the White House recognizes that the conditions in which its two million people are living–without adequate clean water, little electricity, limited medical care, and few jobs–are unacceptable. Who would not want to demonstrate? The Israelis and the Palestinian Authority would like the refugees to blame Hamas, which has controlled Gaza since 2006. Hamas is supporting the demonstrations, trying to deflect criticism for its governance failures. It seems to be succeeding, not least because it too uses violence and brooks little opposition.

Of course Palestinian lives matter to the friends, families, and communities from which they come. The fifteen or more reported killed Friday will have hundreds if not thousands of relatives and personal acquaintances who will mourn them, in addition to a far wider circle who feel they are martyrs to the Palestinian cause. Will future protests attract more than the 30,000 or so who attended the first demonstration? The plan has been to repeat them until May 15, the day Israelis celebrate the country’s 1948 independence while Palestinians mark the nakba (catastrophe).

But Palestinian lives matter in other respects too. Israel may be an electoral democracy, but it is not a liberal democracy that treats everyone as having equal rights. This matters because its friends in Europe and the US shouldn’t settle for less. Either Israel needs to treat the Palestinians whose Gaza and West Bank territory it embargoes as equal to its own citizens, or it has to let them establish their own state and allow them to govern it as they see fit, so long as it doesn’t threaten Israel. For most American Jews, there is no acceptable in-between, as Ron Lauder recently pointed out. Most of us will not support an increasingly theocratic Israel in which Palestinian lives don’t matter.

It is ironic that the Jewish and Palestinian historical narratives are mirror images of each other. The Jews were exiled almost two thousand years ago and now feel it is time to reclaim their ancient lands. The Palestinians were exiled 70 years ago, from lands they had occupied for most of those two thousand years. “Next year in Jerusalem,” the cry with which Jews finished the Passover Seder Friday evening, could just as well be uttered by Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, most of whom do not have the permit required to reach the Haram al Sharif. It is time for all of us to acknowledge the others’ aspirations. Palestinian lives do matter.

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Two states

I’m just going to leave this full-page NY Times ad from J Street here for your perusal:

New York Times, 4 March 2018
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