Tag: Israel/Palestine
Bob Marley, Israel, and Palestine
I made it home from Jerusalem in good order Saturday, just 20 hours after leaving the American Colony Hotel. Its reality was a bit shabbier than its reputation, but nonetheless welcome after a couple of weeks with our SAIS students in lesser accommodations. Fortunately, the opposite was true of Israel and Palestine: the reality is a better than their reputation.
Let’s start with security. Bad things can happen suddenly anytime anywhere, but on both sides of the quintessential Middle East conflict things were generally calm these past two weeks. Ramallah, Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Nablus were no less normal than Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. A day of rage declared last week in response to President Trump’s Jerusalem decision and Vice President Pence’s visit seems to have mostly fizzled, though we did see some stone throwers on the outskirts of Ramallah. I’d be more concerned about the cold, wind, and rain in Jerusalem and the West Bank this time of year than the risk of terrorism. The State Department travel warning issued just before our trip is clearly intended to cover bureaucratic asses if something happens.
I’ve already reviewed how Palestinians and Israelis see things. Perhaps more important is how they view each other. You can get the official line at the top from the media: Israelis say they have no partner for negotiating peace, as Palestinians are still making bereavement payments to the families of suicide bombers, while Palestinians say Israel continues to blatantly violate international law in its more than 50-year occupation of the West Bank, its building of settlements, and its continuing constraints on Gaza (despite the withdrawal of its troops).
Israelis seem content with the current situation. They don’t see much of the Gaza or West Bank Palestinians, who are mostly kept on the opposite side of security fences. A very few Gaza Palestinians and more West Bankers work in Israel, especially in construction and menial jobs. Even in Jerusalem, many Palestinians keep to the eastern, Arab part of the city and to the Arab quarter. There are areas where Jews and Arabs mix a bit, especially in the Old City, and there are Palestinian citizens of Israel who are rising socially and professionally throughout Israel. Few of them are likely to prefer living in an independent Palestine, but all can describe the prejudice and discrimination they are subject to. It doesn’t take much to illicit from Jewish Israelis racist remarks about Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular.
Palestinians are holding the short end of the stick. The power imbalance is overwhelming and they know it. Israel’s vibrant economy, advanced technology, and military prowess make it a “First World” country, more akin to Europe than the Middle East. The West Bank and Gaza are poor and largely powerless, all the more so for having a customs and monetary union with Israel. The Israelis not only collect customs revenue on behalf of the Palestinians (and withhold it when they want to exert pressure), but the West Bank is unable to protect its nascent industries with tariffs or devalue its currency. Agriculture, not industry, is therefore still the mainstay of the West Bank economy. There is remarkably little Israeli investment in the West Bank except for its Jewish settlements, and of course none in Hamas-governed Gaza.
But the Palestinians still hold a trump card: their demographic growth. It may already be that there are more Arabs west of the Jordan river than Jews, but if not it will be so soon. Israel’s only option if it wants to remain a Jewish-majority state but prevent an independent Palestinian one is what the Palestinians term apartheid: a system of isolated “bantustans” in the West Bank that will govern themselves while Israel controls security, including freedom of movement, as well as the economy. The Palestinians do not think such a system can last. Some are advocating a one-state solution that will eventually be under Arab control. That, they remind, is what the Palestine Liberation Organization advocated until its 1993 recognition of Israel and acceptance in principle of a Palestinian state on 22% of Mandate Palestine.
Palestinians are fond of correcting foreigners when they ask about “the Jews.” The Jews they say come in many varieties, including those who support an independent Palestinian state and join in nonviolent Palestinian protests. The biggest problems for Palestinians come from the religious settlers in the West Bank, who are often verbally and physically abusive. But ultimately, Palestinians aver, their problems are not with Jews, whom they say they accept as one of the indigenous peoples, but rather with Israel, which refuses to allow them their state and is consequently headed in a non-democratic direction.
Both Palestinians and Israelis should not forget Bob Marley’s message:
Trump will fail
I’ve been in Israel and Palestine for the past two weeks, contrary to the State Department’s unequivocal guidance. It would be foolish of me to suggest that I know what people here think. Khalil Shikaki’s polling will serve you much better. But personal contact and conversation also have their virtue.
One Israeli early in my time here suggested that he knew why the conflict has lasted so long and proved so intractable. While many here refer pejoratively to the “peace industry” that grew up around and after the Oslo accords, there is also now a war industry: politicians so attached to derogatory images of the other side that they don’t believe they can survive without it. Yitzhak Rabin, assassinated by an ultra-nationalist supporter of settlements in the West Bank in 1995, was the last Prime Minister to have both the political clout and the confidence in the peace process to deliver.
This rings true to me. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas need each other for political survival: Netanyahu’s over the top positions provide Abu Mazen with what he needs to remind Palestinians, many of whom are not fond of the PA, that the Israeli state does not treat them fairly. When Netanyahu says Jerusalem has been the capital of the Jews for 3000 years, the more than 35% of the population that is Arab runs (figuratively) to embrace the PA. When Abbas says he intends to end security cooperation with Israel, many Jews embrace Netanyahu’s hard line.
Netanyahu is also fond of saying he has no negotiating partner. The Palestinians feel the same way. Their view is that Israel wants to hang on to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, allowing the Palestinians self-governance but preventing them from joining the Palestinian citizens of Israel (20% or so of the population) in having the right to vote. Netanyahu confirmed that is his one-state plan at Davos yesterday. This from the Palestinian perspective is no better than apartheid, since it denies Arabs equal political rights within a single state.
President Trump signaled that he supports this idea when he tried to take Jerusalem off the table by American support for Israeli sovereignty over the entire city. He thought this would facilitate negotiations, which he described as stuck on Jerusalem. That is false. Jerusalem has never really been on the negotiating agenda as it was always left for last of the so-called “final status” issues. Even so, the various negotiations since Oslo have made significant progress on defining shared solutions for the city, as Israeli scholar Lior Lehrs points out. As usual, Trump upset the apple cart, but to no apparent purpose, while also proposing the barbaric idea of cutting humanitarian assistance for refugees.
The result is that people here are gloomy about the prospects, but most are also enjoying the relative peace and stability of the past few years. Many Jews like the separation wall that keeps the Palestinians separate, though tens of thousands cross it daily both legally and illegally to work in Israel. Many Palestinians are resentful of Israeli restrictions on their freedom of movement, of which the wall is but one example: West Bankers need special permission to visit Jerusalem and some even need permission to leave Ramallah. Palestinians regard the West Bank and Gaza as “occupied” and many believe violence in resisting occupation is justified.
But few in the West Bank take up arms, which are not generally available, while virtually all Israelis have weapons and its security forces have excellent intelligence capabilities. Instead, the Palestinians are pursuing non-violent means: international acceptance of the Palestinian state as well as a campaign for boycott, disinvestment and sanctions (BDS) against Israel and the West Bank settlements. Israel finds that much harder to respond to than terrorist acts, and Jews worldwide are uncomfortable to the point of complaining about “de-legitimization” of Israel.
Neither side at this point has the kind of leadership or strategy that could lead to a negotiated peace. Netanyahu regards the current situation as better than anything he can get at the negotiating table. It allows him to continue expanding settlements on the West Bank, to the glee of his right-wing coalition partners, and to pursue an anti-Iran coalition with Sunni Arab states. Abbas is serving the ninth year of a four-year term, validated only by a vote of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Central Council. His relatively moderate strategy may make Jews uncomfortable, but it hasn’t raise the costs to Netanyahu significantly. The US, whose proper role in the negotiations is to deliver its ally Israel to an otherwise unsatisfactory outcome, has chosen instead to align itself with Trump.
I do think peace is possible, despite the enormous power asymmetry. But not now. Until the US, PA and Israel have new leaders committed to a negotiated outcome, all three will muddle through, with the Israelis changing the reality on the ground and the Palestinians trying to undermine Israel’s international legitimacy while increasing their own. Trump will fail to deliver the deal of the century, as he has at everything but enriching himself and gaining enormous notoriety.
PS: For a marginally more optimistic view, see Chatham House’s recent commentary.
Israeli advantages
I wrote a couple of days ago about the current Palestinian narrative. Today I’ll try to describe the Jewish Israeli narrative, though that is more difficult because there is a far wider range of views. The Palestinians seem to me to have become a nation (that is: a community with a common language, culture and beliefs about their identity, even though most are Muslim and a small percentage Christian) but failed to complete their state, partly due to Israeli resistance. The Jews have built an impressive state that dominates both in Israel inside the 1967 borders and outside them, but their nation is less fully formed. My liberal Judaism, to which most American Jews adhere, is a small and sometimes barely tolerated minority in Israel.
Many Israeli Jews believe their presence in the West Bank and the (not complete) blockade of Gaza are security necessities. They attribute the decline of terrorist attacks in Israel to the security barrier, which they like to call a fence (they claim it is 92% fence and only 8% wall). They are pleased with the recently unveiled capacity to detect and destroy tunnels Hamas and others dig into Israel from Gaza. Even Israeli Jews who would like to see withdrawal from the West Bank in order to allow the creation of a Palestinian state emphasize that the Jewish settlements there constitute a small percentage of the land area: some say less than 3%, others less than 6%, as it depends on what you count.
There is little doubt though that someone in Jerusalem is planning the settlements and infrastructure (roads, electricity, water) for a permanent presence in the West Bank, especially but not only in the territory near Jerusalem that the Israelis have formally annexed. The settlements already break up the areas the Palestinian Authority controls or administers into more than 150 enclaves (islands). Some are connected by tunnels, but not most. The right-wing parties that participate in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government want to expand the population living in the West Bank to one million, while legalizing many outposts that are currently considered illegal.
Some claim that the settlements built on state or privately owned land are legitimate. This relies on a claim that Israel is the successor state to Jordan, the British mandate, and the Ottoman Empire in the territory it controls, a claim that has been neither agreed nor adjudicated so far as I am aware. Some also believe legitimate settlements should be able to stay under Palestinian sovereignty after final status is decided. That is difficult to imagine in practice, but there are certainly Israeli Jews putting it forward in theory.
When talking about the Palestinians, many less liberal Israeli Jews–and for that matter American ones–betray an attitude that can only be described as discriminatory, or worse. One carefully explained that the more Orthodox Jewish settlements outside the 1967 borders were built to give poor Haredim more acceptable living conditions than in the crowded neighborhoods of West Jerusalem. There is little concern or funding for the crowded Palestinian neighborhoods, and certainly no building of new towns for them near Jerusalem. Another cited his settlement’s good relations with its Arab neighbors–a laudable achievement–in terms that suggested their social and cultural inferiority. Americans should be familiar with these attitudes: in a more virulent form, they now occupy the mind of the current inhabitant of the White House when it comes to Mexican and African Americans, not to mention all of Africa and Haiti.
Israeli Jews both inside and outside the 1967 borders find the current situation tolerable. Most have little contact with Arabs, apart from those who do construction or menial jobs. Intellectual interchange with Palestinians is now mostly limited to a Jewish elite that sympathizes with their desire for self-determination. The fence/wall is not only physical but psychological and cultural. The costs of securing (the Palestinians would say occupying) the West Bank and blockading Gaza are tolerable. Tuesday’s “day of rage” against Trump/Pence proved eminently manageable. The Israelis exploit the water and other resources of the West Bank with abandon, training their soldiers in its nature parks and raiding supposedly Palestinian-secured areas at will while denying building permits.
There is an enormous power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians: politically, militarily, and economically Israel is overwhelmingly dominant. Its per capita GDP is perhaps 20 times that of the Palestinians outside the 1967 borders. The Palestinians have no army and apart from their police no legitimate weapons. Their state is largely dysfunctional and their security forces beholden to the Israelis. The Palestinians say the West Bank and Gaza live under an apartheid system in the making, or some say already made. The Israelis see these asymmetries as advantages to be exploited.
Resist to exist in dignity
I’m in Jerusalem, where Vice President Pence declared to the Knesset today:
We stand with Israel because we believe in right over wrong, good over evil and liberty over tyranny.
That confirms what President Trump had already made clear with his decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, without even mentioning the Palestinian hope of a capital there: that Washington will no longer even pretend to be neutral in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.
I’ve spent the last four days or so on a SAIS study trip talking mainly with Palestinians, having spent the previous several talking with Israelis. Here I’ll focus on the Palestinians, since their views will be less reported and are far less known. I’ve also spoken to quite a few Jewish Israelis who would agree at least in part with their Palestinian colleagues, though the majority is thrilled with Trump’s move and Pence’s audacity.
The mood among the Palestinians I’ve talked with is annoyance, sadness, frustration, and exasperation. They are profoundly disappointed that the United States, which they have seen as the standard bearer of human rights and international law, has abandoned that vocation for an America First policy that guarantees declining American influence and strengthens Israeli determination to maintain its settlers in occupied Palestinian territory. The rumor that the Americans intend to relabel their East Jerusalem consulate as the embassy, in order to make the move more quickly, rubs salt in Palestinian wounds, since it means that the Americans will not accept a Palestinian capital in that traditionally Arab part of a city.
The Palestinians are planning a general strike and demonstrations tomorrow in response to Trump/Pence. That of course may boil over into violence, not least because in the Palestinian view the Israeli security forces seem to prefer it that way: they can more easily disperse a crowd with tear gas and rubber bullets if given even a slight excuse to do so. But at least those Palestinians we’ve been talking with are hopeful that violence will be avoided. The successful nonviolent confrontation in July, when massive crowds of praying Palestinians forced the Israelis to remove security devices from the entrances to the Al Aqsa compound in Jerusalem, is the paradigm many hope will prevail. There is of course no guarantee it will.
Conditions for Palestinians vary from catastrophic in Gaza and the refugee camps of the West Bank to maddening in the more or less middle class neighborhoods of Ramallah, Beit Jalla, and Nablus. The Israeli occupation is evident to Palestinians every day:
- Checkpoints not only coming into the West Bank but between the major Palestinian towns
- Settlements that loom like recently arrived space ships over the West Bank
- Prohibited roads used only by settlers, who hope to number 1 million within the next few years
- Settler violence, rarely punished, against Palestinians, including murder
- Destruction of olive trees and other factors of production
- Jerusalem Palestinians “exiled” to the West Bank without permission to return to the city and the vast majority of Gaza residents who can never leave their densely populated strip
- Gates that close off particular towns without any apparent or announced security justification
- House and other building demolitions, ostensibly due to lack of permits, which are almost never granted to Palestinians while Jewish illegal outposts are not only tolerated but often legalized
- Israeli security raids into areas that are supposed to be under exclusive Palestinian control
Some Jewish Israelis would claim these measures are justified, but that reminds me of a story one told: he found one of his two children crying uncontrollably and when asked what happened she responded “It all started when she hit me back.”
The Palestinian leadership is aging. No one knows who will succeed Mahmoud Abbas as President, or many other figures now reaching into their late 70s and 80s. Seventy per cent of their population is under 30 years old. Many young people are looking not to Fatah and Hamas for leadership but rather to “popular struggle”: resist to exist in dignity is their motto. They trust no one, one elder statesman advised, follow no one, and want to define their own future. Let’s hope they do so nonviolently, and with more wisdom and restraint than the President and Vice President of the United States.
Peace picks, January 22-26
- Ending Civil Wars | Monday, January 22 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
The cause of civil wars and effective policy responses have been debated extensively for decades, and the United States has often stressed counterinsurgency doctrine and state-building to restore political and societal stability. However, 21st century rebel movements, shifting geopolitics, and the high costs of intervention bring the “standard treatment regime” for resolving civil wars into question. Join us as experts discuss their findings and recommendations on how the United States can better respond to intrastate conflict and promote both development and stability to create lasting peace. Featuring former Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry (Stanford University), Nancy Lindborg (President, U.S. Institute of Peace), Steve Krasner (Stanford University), Stephen Biddle (George Washington University), Susanna Campbell (American University), Clare Lockhart (Director and Co-Founder, Institute for State Effectiveness), and Paul Wise (Stanford University).
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- Turkey, the Kurds, and the Struggle for Order in the Middle East | Tuesday, January 23 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
The American-led campaign against the Islamic State (ISIS) has empowered Syria’s Kurds and, as a result, alienated Turkey. Meanwhile, Russia and Iran have expanded their presence in Syria. Washington, Moscow, and Tehran now find themselves in a complicated diplomatic contest over the orientation of Turkey and various Kurdish polities and factions. How should the U.S. manage its role in this contest? Hudson Senior Fellows Eric Brown and Michael Doran will discuss the current state of affairs in the region and offer recommendations for future U.S. policies. Hudson Fellow Peter Rough will moderate the conversation.
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- What Does 2018 Have in Store for Turkey? | Wednesday, January 24 | 12:00pm – 1:00pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Turkey began 2018 embroiled in domestic dissent and diplomatic friction. Last April’s constitutional referendum was met with widespread criticism as an attempt by President Erdogan to consolidate power. Activists and journalists face increasing restrictions on their rights, the government continues its crackdown on the opposition, and debates swirl over the future of Turkey’s economy, the Kurdish question, and relations with the United States and European Union. These various issues are coming to a head in advance of 2019’s presidential election. The Middle East Institute (MEI) will convene a panel of experts to examine these key issues and more, featuring Soner Captagay (Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy), Howard Eissenstat (St. Lawrence University), and Max Hoffman (Center for American Progress). MEI’s Director for Turkish Studies Gönül Tol will moderate the discussion.
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- Bringing Armed Groups into the Peace Process in Afghanistan | Thursday, January 25 | 9:30am – 11:00am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Peace negotiations to end the war in Afghanistan remain elusive, despite years of effort and a growing consensus that no side is likely able to defeat the other militarily. The Afghan government, United States, and Taliban leadership all profess openness to a peace deal, but efforts have suffered from mistrust, conflicting objectives, and each party’s efforts to break the military stalemate. Afghanistan in the meantime continues to face widespread violence, insurgent control of large swathes of the countryside, and major economic challenges. The Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum at the U.S. Institute of Peace will host a panel of leading experts to discuss options for advancing peace talks, reaching an inclusive political settlement, and transitioning Taliban and other insurgents off the battlefield and into nonviolent politics. Featuring Johnny Walsh (U.S. Institute of Peace) as moderator, with speakers Alexander Ramsbotham (Conciliation Resources), Laurel E. Miller (RAND Corporation), and Javid Ahmad (Atlantic Council).
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- The Impact of Trump’s Jerusalem Move: A Conversation with PLO Ambassador Husam Zomlot | Thursday, January 25 | 12:00pm – 1:15pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and to relocate the U.S. embassy there was met with Arab and international censure. The United Nations General Assembly voted 128 to 9, with 35 abstentions, for a resolution demanding that the United States rescind this declaration. Human rights groups decry the decision as a death knell for the two-state solution. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a conversation with Ambassador Husam Zomlot, head of the PLO General Delegation to the United States. Ambassador Zomlot will address the implications of this announcement on Palestinians as well as their Arab neighbors, and how a future peace process might be revived. MEI’s Senior Vice President for Policy Research and Programs, Paul Salem, will moderate the discussion.
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- Current Challenges in US-Turkey Relations | Thursday, January 25 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | SETA Foundation | Register here |
President Trump’s win in the November 2016 election was met with cautious optimism in Turkey, however, as the first year of his administration draws to a close, the bilateral relationship still faces a number of challenges. The National Security Strategy issued in December 2017 promises a “dramatic rethinking” of US foreign policy as National Security Advisor HR McMaster put it, but it is unclear what prospects it holds for US-Turkey relations. Moving forward into 2018, how will the divergent approaches between the US and Turkey in Syria affect the broader bilateral relationship? Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC for a discussion on the challenges facing the bilateral relationship between the US and Turkey. Featuring speakers Luke Coffey (The Heritage Center), James Jeffrey (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Kilic B. Kanat (SETA Foundation), with moderator Kadir Ustun (SETA Foundation).
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- People Power Movements and International Human Rights: ICNC Monograph Launch | Thursday, January 25 | 4:00pm – 5:15pm | Atlantic Council| Register here |
From winning freedom for slaves to achieving recognition of women’s rights, the real source of many historical breakthroughs in international human rights has been the bottom-up resistance efforts of ordinary people to collectively and nonviolently fight injustice and lack of freedoms. The International Center on Nonviolent Conflict’s (ICNC) monograph author and legal scholar Elizabeth A. Wilson (Rutgers University) will explore a legal framework for understanding the relationship between civil resistance movements and international human rights. A moderated discussion will follow, featuring Maria Stephan (U.S. Institute of Peace) and Sean Murphy (The George Washington University Law School), moderated by Maciej Bartkowski (International Center on Nonviolent Conflict). Mathew Burrows (Atlantic Council) and Maciej Bartkowski will deliver welcoming remarks.
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- Islamist Politics in the Middle East and North Africa | Thursday, January 25 | 5:30pm– 7:00pm| Project on Middle East Democracy (Elliott School of International Affairs) | Register here |
The past decade has witnessed major changes as Islamist parties and movements across the Middle East and North Africa were democratically elected, ousted from power, formed coalitions, splintered internally, faced increasing repression, and governed. This panel of top scholars will discuss innovative new political science research on Islamist movements and parties, examining who votes for these organizations, their internal dynamics, and how our study of them continues to evolve. Featuring panelists Lindsay Benstead (Portland State University), Steven Brooke (University of Louisville), Quinn Mecham (Brigham Young University), Jillian Schwedler, (Hunter College, CUNY), and Joas Wagemakers (Utrecht University), moderated by Marc Lynch (George Washington University).
What has God got to do with it?
I gave a much shortened version of this talk on the role of religion in the Israeli/Arab conflict this afternoon at DACOR Bacon House, a club for retired US Foreign Service and military officers: What Has God Got To Do With It? Comments/suggestions would be much appreciated.