Tag: Israel/Palestine
Israeli advantages
I wrote a couple of days ago about the current Palestinian narrative. Today I’ll try to describe the Jewish Israeli narrative, though that is more difficult because there is a far wider range of views. The Palestinians seem to me to have become a nation (that is: a community with a common language, culture and beliefs about their identity, even though most are Muslim and a small percentage Christian) but failed to complete their state, partly due to Israeli resistance. The Jews have built an impressive state that dominates both in Israel inside the 1967 borders and outside them, but their nation is less fully formed. My liberal Judaism, to which most American Jews adhere, is a small and sometimes barely tolerated minority in Israel.
Many Israeli Jews believe their presence in the West Bank and the (not complete) blockade of Gaza are security necessities. They attribute the decline of terrorist attacks in Israel to the security barrier, which they like to call a fence (they claim it is 92% fence and only 8% wall). They are pleased with the recently unveiled capacity to detect and destroy tunnels Hamas and others dig into Israel from Gaza. Even Israeli Jews who would like to see withdrawal from the West Bank in order to allow the creation of a Palestinian state emphasize that the Jewish settlements there constitute a small percentage of the land area: some say less than 3%, others less than 6%, as it depends on what you count.
There is little doubt though that someone in Jerusalem is planning the settlements and infrastructure (roads, electricity, water) for a permanent presence in the West Bank, especially but not only in the territory near Jerusalem that the Israelis have formally annexed. The settlements already break up the areas the Palestinian Authority controls or administers into more than 150 enclaves (islands). Some are connected by tunnels, but not most. The right-wing parties that participate in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government want to expand the population living in the West Bank to one million, while legalizing many outposts that are currently considered illegal.
Some claim that the settlements built on state or privately owned land are legitimate. This relies on a claim that Israel is the successor state to Jordan, the British mandate, and the Ottoman Empire in the territory it controls, a claim that has been neither agreed nor adjudicated so far as I am aware. Some also believe legitimate settlements should be able to stay under Palestinian sovereignty after final status is decided. That is difficult to imagine in practice, but there are certainly Israeli Jews putting it forward in theory.
When talking about the Palestinians, many less liberal Israeli Jews–and for that matter American ones–betray an attitude that can only be described as discriminatory, or worse. One carefully explained that the more Orthodox Jewish settlements outside the 1967 borders were built to give poor Haredim more acceptable living conditions than in the crowded neighborhoods of West Jerusalem. There is little concern or funding for the crowded Palestinian neighborhoods, and certainly no building of new towns for them near Jerusalem. Another cited his settlement’s good relations with its Arab neighbors–a laudable achievement–in terms that suggested their social and cultural inferiority. Americans should be familiar with these attitudes: in a more virulent form, they now occupy the mind of the current inhabitant of the White House when it comes to Mexican and African Americans, not to mention all of Africa and Haiti.
Israeli Jews both inside and outside the 1967 borders find the current situation tolerable. Most have little contact with Arabs, apart from those who do construction or menial jobs. Intellectual interchange with Palestinians is now mostly limited to a Jewish elite that sympathizes with their desire for self-determination. The fence/wall is not only physical but psychological and cultural. The costs of securing (the Palestinians would say occupying) the West Bank and blockading Gaza are tolerable. Tuesday’s “day of rage” against Trump/Pence proved eminently manageable. The Israelis exploit the water and other resources of the West Bank with abandon, training their soldiers in its nature parks and raiding supposedly Palestinian-secured areas at will while denying building permits.
There is an enormous power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians: politically, militarily, and economically Israel is overwhelmingly dominant. Its per capita GDP is perhaps 20 times that of the Palestinians outside the 1967 borders. The Palestinians have no army and apart from their police no legitimate weapons. Their state is largely dysfunctional and their security forces beholden to the Israelis. The Palestinians say the West Bank and Gaza live under an apartheid system in the making, or some say already made. The Israelis see these asymmetries as advantages to be exploited.
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Resist to exist in dignity
I’m in Jerusalem, where Vice President Pence declared to the Knesset today:
We stand with Israel because we believe in right over wrong, good over evil and liberty over tyranny.
That confirms what President Trump had already made clear with his decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, without even mentioning the Palestinian hope of a capital there: that Washington will no longer even pretend to be neutral in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.
I’ve spent the last four days or so on a SAIS study trip talking mainly with Palestinians, having spent the previous several talking with Israelis. Here I’ll focus on the Palestinians, since their views will be less reported and are far less known. I’ve also spoken to quite a few Jewish Israelis who would agree at least in part with their Palestinian colleagues, though the majority is thrilled with Trump’s move and Pence’s audacity.
The mood among the Palestinians I’ve talked with is annoyance, sadness, frustration, and exasperation. They are profoundly disappointed that the United States, which they have seen as the standard bearer of human rights and international law, has abandoned that vocation for an America First policy that guarantees declining American influence and strengthens Israeli determination to maintain its settlers in occupied Palestinian territory. The rumor that the Americans intend to relabel their East Jerusalem consulate as the embassy, in order to make the move more quickly, rubs salt in Palestinian wounds, since it means that the Americans will not accept a Palestinian capital in that traditionally Arab part of a city.
The Palestinians are planning a general strike and demonstrations tomorrow in response to Trump/Pence. That of course may boil over into violence, not least because in the Palestinian view the Israeli security forces seem to prefer it that way: they can more easily disperse a crowd with tear gas and rubber bullets if given even a slight excuse to do so. But at least those Palestinians we’ve been talking with are hopeful that violence will be avoided. The successful nonviolent confrontation in July, when massive crowds of praying Palestinians forced the Israelis to remove security devices from the entrances to the Al Aqsa compound in Jerusalem, is the paradigm many hope will prevail. There is of course no guarantee it will.
Conditions for Palestinians vary from catastrophic in Gaza and the refugee camps of the West Bank to maddening in the more or less middle class neighborhoods of Ramallah, Beit Jalla, and Nablus. The Israeli occupation is evident to Palestinians every day:
- Checkpoints not only coming into the West Bank but between the major Palestinian towns
- Settlements that loom like recently arrived space ships over the West Bank
- Prohibited roads used only by settlers, who hope to number 1 million within the next few years
- Settler violence, rarely punished, against Palestinians, including murder
- Destruction of olive trees and other factors of production
- Jerusalem Palestinians “exiled” to the West Bank without permission to return to the city and the vast majority of Gaza residents who can never leave their densely populated strip
- Gates that close off particular towns without any apparent or announced security justification
- House and other building demolitions, ostensibly due to lack of permits, which are almost never granted to Palestinians while Jewish illegal outposts are not only tolerated but often legalized
- Israeli security raids into areas that are supposed to be under exclusive Palestinian control
Some Jewish Israelis would claim these measures are justified, but that reminds me of a story one told: he found one of his two children crying uncontrollably and when asked what happened she responded “It all started when she hit me back.”
The Palestinian leadership is aging. No one knows who will succeed Mahmoud Abbas as President, or many other figures now reaching into their late 70s and 80s. Seventy per cent of their population is under 30 years old. Many young people are looking not to Fatah and Hamas for leadership but rather to “popular struggle”: resist to exist in dignity is their motto. They trust no one, one elder statesman advised, follow no one, and want to define their own future. Let’s hope they do so nonviolently, and with more wisdom and restraint than the President and Vice President of the United States.
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Peace picks, January 22-26
- Ending Civil Wars | Monday, January 22 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
The cause of civil wars and effective policy responses have been debated extensively for decades, and the United States has often stressed counterinsurgency doctrine and state-building to restore political and societal stability. However, 21st century rebel movements, shifting geopolitics, and the high costs of intervention bring the “standard treatment regime” for resolving civil wars into question. Join us as experts discuss their findings and recommendations on how the United States can better respond to intrastate conflict and promote both development and stability to create lasting peace. Featuring former Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry (Stanford University), Nancy Lindborg (President, U.S. Institute of Peace), Steve Krasner (Stanford University), Stephen Biddle (George Washington University), Susanna Campbell (American University), Clare Lockhart (Director and Co-Founder, Institute for State Effectiveness), and Paul Wise (Stanford University).
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- Turkey, the Kurds, and the Struggle for Order in the Middle East | Tuesday, January 23 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
The American-led campaign against the Islamic State (ISIS) has empowered Syria’s Kurds and, as a result, alienated Turkey. Meanwhile, Russia and Iran have expanded their presence in Syria. Washington, Moscow, and Tehran now find themselves in a complicated diplomatic contest over the orientation of Turkey and various Kurdish polities and factions. How should the U.S. manage its role in this contest? Hudson Senior Fellows Eric Brown and Michael Doran will discuss the current state of affairs in the region and offer recommendations for future U.S. policies. Hudson Fellow Peter Rough will moderate the conversation.
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- What Does 2018 Have in Store for Turkey? | Wednesday, January 24 | 12:00pm – 1:00pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Turkey began 2018 embroiled in domestic dissent and diplomatic friction. Last April’s constitutional referendum was met with widespread criticism as an attempt by President Erdogan to consolidate power. Activists and journalists face increasing restrictions on their rights, the government continues its crackdown on the opposition, and debates swirl over the future of Turkey’s economy, the Kurdish question, and relations with the United States and European Union. These various issues are coming to a head in advance of 2019’s presidential election. The Middle East Institute (MEI) will convene a panel of experts to examine these key issues and more, featuring Soner Captagay (Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy), Howard Eissenstat (St. Lawrence University), and Max Hoffman (Center for American Progress). MEI’s Director for Turkish Studies Gönül Tol will moderate the discussion.
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- Bringing Armed Groups into the Peace Process in Afghanistan | Thursday, January 25 | 9:30am – 11:00am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Peace negotiations to end the war in Afghanistan remain elusive, despite years of effort and a growing consensus that no side is likely able to defeat the other militarily. The Afghan government, United States, and Taliban leadership all profess openness to a peace deal, but efforts have suffered from mistrust, conflicting objectives, and each party’s efforts to break the military stalemate. Afghanistan in the meantime continues to face widespread violence, insurgent control of large swathes of the countryside, and major economic challenges. The Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum at the U.S. Institute of Peace will host a panel of leading experts to discuss options for advancing peace talks, reaching an inclusive political settlement, and transitioning Taliban and other insurgents off the battlefield and into nonviolent politics. Featuring Johnny Walsh (U.S. Institute of Peace) as moderator, with speakers Alexander Ramsbotham (Conciliation Resources), Laurel E. Miller (RAND Corporation), and Javid Ahmad (Atlantic Council).
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- The Impact of Trump’s Jerusalem Move: A Conversation with PLO Ambassador Husam Zomlot | Thursday, January 25 | 12:00pm – 1:15pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and to relocate the U.S. embassy there was met with Arab and international censure. The United Nations General Assembly voted 128 to 9, with 35 abstentions, for a resolution demanding that the United States rescind this declaration. Human rights groups decry the decision as a death knell for the two-state solution. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a conversation with Ambassador Husam Zomlot, head of the PLO General Delegation to the United States. Ambassador Zomlot will address the implications of this announcement on Palestinians as well as their Arab neighbors, and how a future peace process might be revived. MEI’s Senior Vice President for Policy Research and Programs, Paul Salem, will moderate the discussion.
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- Current Challenges in US-Turkey Relations | Thursday, January 25 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | SETA Foundation | Register here |
President Trump’s win in the November 2016 election was met with cautious optimism in Turkey, however, as the first year of his administration draws to a close, the bilateral relationship still faces a number of challenges. The National Security Strategy issued in December 2017 promises a “dramatic rethinking” of US foreign policy as National Security Advisor HR McMaster put it, but it is unclear what prospects it holds for US-Turkey relations. Moving forward into 2018, how will the divergent approaches between the US and Turkey in Syria affect the broader bilateral relationship? Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC for a discussion on the challenges facing the bilateral relationship between the US and Turkey. Featuring speakers Luke Coffey (The Heritage Center), James Jeffrey (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Kilic B. Kanat (SETA Foundation), with moderator Kadir Ustun (SETA Foundation).
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- People Power Movements and International Human Rights: ICNC Monograph Launch | Thursday, January 25 | 4:00pm – 5:15pm | Atlantic Council| Register here |
From winning freedom for slaves to achieving recognition of women’s rights, the real source of many historical breakthroughs in international human rights has been the bottom-up resistance efforts of ordinary people to collectively and nonviolently fight injustice and lack of freedoms. The International Center on Nonviolent Conflict’s (ICNC) monograph author and legal scholar Elizabeth A. Wilson (Rutgers University) will explore a legal framework for understanding the relationship between civil resistance movements and international human rights. A moderated discussion will follow, featuring Maria Stephan (U.S. Institute of Peace) and Sean Murphy (The George Washington University Law School), moderated by Maciej Bartkowski (International Center on Nonviolent Conflict). Mathew Burrows (Atlantic Council) and Maciej Bartkowski will deliver welcoming remarks.
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- Islamist Politics in the Middle East and North Africa | Thursday, January 25 | 5:30pm– 7:00pm| Project on Middle East Democracy (Elliott School of International Affairs) | Register here |
The past decade has witnessed major changes as Islamist parties and movements across the Middle East and North Africa were democratically elected, ousted from power, formed coalitions, splintered internally, faced increasing repression, and governed. This panel of top scholars will discuss innovative new political science research on Islamist movements and parties, examining who votes for these organizations, their internal dynamics, and how our study of them continues to evolve. Featuring panelists Lindsay Benstead (Portland State University), Steven Brooke (University of Louisville), Quinn Mecham (Brigham Young University), Jillian Schwedler, (Hunter College, CUNY), and Joas Wagemakers (Utrecht University), moderated by Marc Lynch (George Washington University).
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What has God got to do with it?
I gave a much shortened version of this talk on the role of religion in the Israeli/Arab conflict this afternoon at DACOR Bacon House, a club for retired US Foreign Service and military officers: What Has God Got To Do With It? Comments/suggestions would be much appreciated.
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A weakened America
Is America stronger after 11 months of Donald Trump or not?
It is demonstrably weaker, mainly because of his diplomatic moves and non-moves, but also because Trump has done nothing to reduce American military commitments and a good deal to expand them. Let me enumerate:
The diplomatic front:
- Trump withdrew from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) early in the game. The remaining negotiating partners have X-ed out the provisions the US wanted on labor and environmental protection and are preparing to proceed, without American participation. TPP was America’s ace in the Asia Pacific.
- He is withdrawing as well from the Paris Climate Change accord. That is also proceeding without the US, which will be unable to affect international deliberations on climate change unless and until it rejoins.
- He has withdrawn from UNESCO, which excludes the US from participation in a lot of cultural, scientific and educational endeavors.
- He hasn’t announced withdrawal from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but the negotiations on revising it are thought to be going very badly, mainly because of excessive US demands.
- He has refused to certify that the Iran nuclear deal is in the US interest, which is so patently obvious that the Republican-controlled Congress is making no moves to withdraw from it.
- His ill-framed appeal to the Saudis to halt financing of terrorists has precipitated a dramatic split among US allies within the Gulf Cooperation Council.
- Through his son-in-law he encouraged the Saudis to try to try to depose Lebanon’s prime minister and embargo Qatar, making the prime minister more popular than ever and shifting Doha’s allegiance to Iran.
- He has continued American support for the Saudi/Emirati war effort in Yemen, while at the same time the State Department has called for an end to the Saudi/Emirati blockade due to the humanitarian crisis there.
- His decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem heightened tensions between Israel and the Palestinians, undermined his own peace initiative, and obstructed the rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia he hoped for.
- He has done nothing to counter Iran’s growing influence in Iraq and Syria, or Russia’s position in Syria and Ukraine.
- He initially embraced Turkey’s now President Erdogan but has watched helplessly while Turkey tarnishes its democratic credentials and drifts into the Russian orbit.
- He has also embraced other autocrats: Philippine President Duterte, China’s President Xi, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to name only three.
- He has failed to carry the banner of American values and preferred instead transactional relationships that have so far produced nothing substantial for the US.
The military front:
- Use of drones is way up.
- So is deployment of US troops in Europe, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, not to mention ships and planes in the Asia Pacific.
- The Islamic State, while retreating in Syria and Iraq, is advancing in Afghanistan, where the Taliban and Al Qaeda are also holding their own.
- Allies are hesitating to pitch in, because the president is erratic. Japan, South Korea, and the Europeans are hedging because the US can no longer be relied on.
- The US continues to back the Saudi and Emirati campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, precipitating a massive humanitarian crisis.
- Cyberthreats to the US, including its elections, have increased, without any counter from the administration.
- Promises that North Korea would not be allowed to develop a missile that could strike the US have gone unfulfilled, and Trump did nothing effective once it accomplished that goal.
- Military options against North Korea, which are all that Trump seems to be interested in, will bring catastrophic results not only for Koreans but also for US forces stationed there and in the region.
- Russia continues to occupy part of Ukraine, with no effective military or diplomatic response by the US, and Moscow continues its aggressive stance near the Baltics, in the North Sea, in the Arctic, and in the Pacific.
The diplomatic record is one of almost unmitigated failure and ineffectiveness, apart from new UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea. The military record is more mixed: ISIS is defeated on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria, but that is a victory well foreshadowed in the previous administration. It is also far from reassuring, since ISIS will now go underground and re-initiate its terrorist efforts. None of the other military pushes has done more than hold the line. Anyone who expected Trump to withdraw from excessive military commitments should be very disappointed. Anyone who expects him to be successful diplomatically without a fully staffed and empowered State Department is deluded.
The US is more absent diplomatically than present, and more present militarily than effective. We are punching well below our weight. This should be no surprise: the State Department is eviscerated and the Pentagon is exhausted. Allies are puzzled. Adversaries are taking advantage.
Where will we be after another three years of this?
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It may not last
I spent three days last week in Baghdad: two talking with people from all over the Middle East (with the important exception of Turkey) about the current situation and one talking with Iraqis.
First Baghdad: It is looking and sounding far more peaceful than it did six years ago, when I last visited. No detonations, lots of trees and other plants, heavy traffic, and bustling sidewalks. I didn’t get out of the Green Zone a lot, but we did stop in Kadhimia and Adhamiyah to see the main mosques. Apart from the all too evident sectarian character of both (the former Shia and the latter Sunni), there was nothing remarkable: just people going about normal life shopping, chatting, praying, strolling, and honking. What a change from 2004-2011, when I visited a couple of times per year. Adhamiyah during part of that time had to be surrounded with T-walls and checkpoints to protect its population from slaughter.
The Iraqi leadership: We of course only met a few people in high places, including the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of parliament, and one minister, in addition to a member of parliament and some of the prime minister’s staff. All are happy to see the Islamic State defeated on the battlefield and all are concerned not to allow it to revive. All are also looking to make cross-sectarian or cross-ethnic alliances in advance of next year’s May 12 election. None were waving sectarian or ethnic identity as their main calling card. This data suggests why (sorry for the size–Wordpress won’t scale it up):
In the general population, sectarian and ethnic identities are still terribly important. While Ayatollah Sistani’s call for volunteers roused some Sunnis to the cause of fighting ISIS, the Popular Mobilization Units he spawned are mostly aggressively Shia and believed to harbor political ambitions. Nor has the Kurdish retreat from pursuing independence reduced popular Kurdish enthusiasm for their own, independent state.
But the leadership has come to understand that gaining a majority in parliament and thereby control of the state requires, under the somewhat ramshackle 2005 constitution, coalitions. Besides, most Iraqis are looking for civil or secular technocrats to run the country. That reduces the relevance of ethnic and sectarian identity, of which Iraqis seem to have had their fill, at least as qualifications for governing.
None of this means the competition among the elite is finished, or even attenuated. To the contrary: all the main sectarian and ethnic blocks are fragmenting. The Kurds are no longer as united as once they were, among the Shia both the Dawa party and what used to be the Supreme Council are split, and there is no clearly dominant figure among the Sunnis. This should make cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian alliances a far more important factor than they have been in the past.
The other Middle Easterners: The mood among the other Middle Easterners attending this session of the Middle East Institute’s Dialogue was likewise more sanguine and friendly than I would have anticipated. All, like the Iraqis, are glad to see the Islamic State dealt defeat in Iraq and Syria, even if they anticipate that it will go underground and re-emerge as an insurgency. All disapproved but seemed more puzzled than angry about President Trump’s announcement on moving the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. All were happy to see Iraq in a better place.
There the commonalities seemed to end. The Iranians, who in the past have sometimes appeared irascible, were calm and analytical as well as concerned that their victory in Syria brought responsibilities they would rather avoid and anxious for a political solution in Yemen. They also seemed concerned that Iran’s effort to defend itself by supporting Shia proxy forces in the region was at its limit.
The Saudis and Emiratis were enthused about the new direction Riyadh is taking not only in Iraq but also in Yemen and in domestic Saudi policy. Others from Arab countries (Egypt and Jordan) were more reflective and a bit unsure what to make of the “new” Saudi Arabia. Several were concerned that the war is not really over: an Israeli or American attack on the Iranians or Hizbollah there could renew hostilities, not to mention the risk of an American clash with the Russians.
Unfortunately there were neither Turks nor Kurds in these group discussions. Had there been, the atmosphere and substance would have been more contentious. The uncertainty about American policy towards the Syrian Kurds is still big: will the Americans restrain them from attacking inside Turkey, or helping the Kurdish insurgents there? Will the Americans try to take back the heavier weapons they provided? Will the Americans withdraw precipitously? There are a lot of known unknowns that could affect the situation in Syria dramatically.
The extra-regional great powers: While a Moscow-based participant was quick to suggest that Russia had defeated ISIS, the Russians and Chinese were concerned, not happy, that post-ISIS Syria is their responsibility. They want the US involved, for both political and financial reasons. The Americans are showing no such inclination. Their assumption is that the Astana/Sochi process run by the Russians with cooperation from Iran and Turkey has superseded the Geneva process run by the UN to resolve the political conflict in Syria. They see no reason beyond defeating ISIS and possibly countering Iran for the American presence in Syria.
Bottom line: Despite the war in Yemen and the uncertainties surrounding how the war is ending in Syria, there is more reason to be sanguine about the region than people in Washington perceive. The bad news is it may not last.
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