Tag: Israel/Palestine
Peace after Gaza?
In the aftermath of the most recent conflict between Hamas and Israel, the question on everyone’s mind is what comes next. Salam Fayyad, former prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, and Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs of the United Nations, joined Walter Isaacson, president and CEO of the Aspen Institute, in a discussion on Peace After Gaza: A New Framwork for a Changing Landscape.
The seven week conflict devastated the Gaza Strip, while consolidating Hamas popularity and causing support for the Palestinian Authority to wane. The question now is whether the change in the Palestinian political sphere will pave a way for peace or hinder the peace process.
Fayyad emphasized there is a growing number of voices calling for immediate peace talks. He is hesistant because there have not been adequate preperations on either side for a constructive dialogue. There must be a way to address the factions and political pluralism within the Palestinian political environment. In order for there to be peace, there must be reconciliation between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.
Fayyad does not believe in rushing back into negotiations. Critical adjustments must be made on the Palestinian side first. On the one hand, there is the issue of the representativeness of organisations claiming to speak for Palestinians. The de jure power of representatation lies with the Palestine Libertion Organization – but this has lost much of its legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinians, especially in the wake of the recent land-grab by the Israeli government in Bethlehem. This occurred in spite of the PLO’s cooperation and collaboration in intelligence gathering.
On the other hand, factions such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad hold de facto legitimacy with large swathes of the population (opinion polls suggest a surge of support for Hamas in Gaza in the wake of last month’s conflict). These groups do not recognize the commitments of the Oslo accords, whereas the PLO does. If any sense is to be made of these disparate positions in the name of negotiating both with the Israelis and the world at large, an intra-Palestinian dialogue must first occur.
According to Fayyad, such a dialogue must include a serious discussion on building a unified leadership framework in which a forum of factions might convene in order to come to a common view of how to proceed as a whole. Without such a forum the Palestinian Authority will struggle to regain legitimacy in the eyes of the people of Palestine – removing peace negotiations further and further from the will of the people it claims to represent.
While Fayyad focused on disunity within the the Palestinian parties he also noted the lack of balance between the occupied (Palestine) and occupier (Israel) in terms of leverage in the peace process.
Feltman acknowleged that the United Nations is still stuck on the “old paradigm” as it still supports Palestinian unity in accordance with PLO commitments to the Oslo Accords of 1993. The two main stipulations included recognition by the PLO of Israel’s right to exist as well as the renunciation of violence. While the UN’s immediate focus is on the reconstrution of Gaza and addressing humanitarian needs, Feltman noted it will take serious and real commitment from both sides this time around to return a sense of normalcy. Fayyad added that Oslo was not meant to be an open ended process and future negotiations should come with clear time-frames for completion that must be adhered to.
There is a growing push from Israelis and Palestinians to deviate from recurring patterns. Fayyad reiterated the need to set an end date for the occupation and work backwards from there, but PLO weakness militates against this course of action. While the question was raised of going to the Security Council, Fayyad noted the inevitability of a veto.
Upcoming months will determine whether either side is serious about a long-term solution. Fayyad and Feltman both called for a strong and unified Palestine that can build lasting solutions in partnership with Israel and the United Nations.
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War, politics and law
The seven week conflict between Hamas and Israel, dubbed Operation Protective Edge by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), began in early July and reached a ceasefire in late August. It left over 2,000 Palestinians and 70 Israelis dead. While the media fervently covered the battle, the international community stood relatively silently on the sidelines. Hamas and Israel remain distrustful of each other. The bill for reconstruction will amount to $8 billion. The implications of the conflict have had far reaching consequences for Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics as well as their human rights records.
At Friday’s Middle East Institute panel on the way forward, Mathew Duss, President of the Foundation for Middle East Peace moderated the discussion with Khalid Elgindy, a Fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Michael Koplow, Program Director at the Israel Institute, and Joe Stork, the Deputy Director at Human Rights Watch in the Middle East and North Africa Division.
Discussing the impact of the conflict on Palestinian domestic politics, Elgindy said that Hamas’ popularity was dwindling before the conflict. The group gained “new-found popularity” with Palestinians both in Gaza and the West Bank during the conflict. Hamas’ popularity came largely at the expense of support and confidence in the Palestinian Authority, whose President Abbas was already perceived as ineffective in peace negotiations with Israel and over-reliant on US-led peace negotiations. The Palestinian national movement is in “crisis” with “chronic dysfunction” in Palestinian political parties, Elgindy said. The priority needs to be cooperation between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.
Koplow described the political atmosphere in the Israeli government pre- and post-conflict. Before the incursion into Gaza, the political dynamic was “relatively stable,” with Prime Minister Netanyahu “firmly in control” and the left largely disorganized. Netanyahu commanded almost unconditional support from the public, which was then challenged by the kidnapping and killing of 3 Israeli teens in June 2014. During the war, support for “staying the course” dwindled from over 80% to 30%. Following the ceasefire, the far right has garnered support as the Prime Minister faced pressure from his own party to reoccupy Gaza. Instead, Netanyahu announced plans to expand settlements in the West Bank in order to appease not only those in his own party but also those farther right.
Although Human Rights Watch has been unable to confirm its impressions due to Israel and Egypt blocking access, Stork sketched Israel’s and Hamas’ compliance, or lack thereof, with the laws of war. The 2014 operation in Gaza showed patterns of indiscriminate hostilities that date back to 2009. One of the most pressing issues is whether or not the parties distinguished between combatants and civilians. What constitutes a legitimate target has become subjective. Human Rights Watch does not define “terrorist operatives” as those who belong to a particular political party while Israeli law does. The IDF has also been cited in a number of cases for using force in areas where there were no military combatants. Rockets fired from the Palestinian side are categorized as war crimes because the targets are indiscriminate, failing to distinguish between civilians and combatants.
In the end, Duss posed a difficult but crucial question, “how can we avoid getting here again?” As both sides continue to dig in their heels, it becomes increasingly difficult to reach a compromise on the critical issues that must be reconciled before there is lasting peace.
PS: Here is the C-span video of the event.
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Resolve or manage?
The most recent crisis in Gaza has forced the international community to ask what alternatives can the Palestinian leadership offer to Hamas’ violence? What future does Israel want for its people and its relationship with Palestinians? Should we reconsider whether resolving this conflict is a real priority for governments in the region or if it is just an arena for proxy conflict? Last week, Brookings hosted “The Gaza Crisis: No Way Out?” to address these issues and the dynamics of the long-standing conflict. Martin Indyk, former US Special Envoy to the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations, Khaled Elgindy, previous advisor to the Palestinian leadership, and Natan Sachs discussed the policy options and regional implications of the current situation.
Indyk discussed the current relationship between the US and Israel and the chronic nature of the conflict. The US has criticized Israel for its blatant disproportionality in this war. There are now apparent strains in the strategic relationship, which survives due to deeply rooted ties and support by many in the US.
However, Israel is a different country than it was thirty years ago. It is now economically and militarily strong and has relationships with other powers beyond the US. New alignments with China, India, and Sunni monarchies in the Arab world have allowed Israel to play the conflict in a different way. According to Indyk, it is not that Israel no longer needs the US, but it now feels more independent of the US than ever before.
Elgindy discussed Palestinian Authority President Abbas’ role in the most recent Gaza conflict. This crisis is the third in six years. Each has marginalized Abbas further. He has had little to no success in advocating peaceful dialogue. Palestinians have come to ignore him because of the lack of results. They choose to pay attention to Hamas. While many did not vote for Hamas, nor do they share its ideology, Hamas’ approach—as painful as it can be—produces results in their eyes. Because of this Abbas has gradually shifted closer to Hamas’ approach rather than the other way around, while both Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have openly embraced Hamas and the resistance.
The US should therefore make peace with the Palestinians as a whole rather than dividing approaches between Gaza and the West Bank. This will allow Hamas and the Palestinian Authority to work together rather than forcing the leadership to take the most effective and violent approach. Hamas knows that there is no chance to open the border in Gaza without a role for the Palestinian Authority, while at the same time the Palestinian Authority desperately wants a role in Gaza. Abbas has been trying to reassert his relevance. This could ultimately be a win-win situation for both sides.
From the Israeli perspective, Sachs stated that Netanyahu wanted to avoid this conflict in Gaza. The original hope was simply to contain the unrest. It has now escalated into a painful and drawn-out battle. Netanyahu believes that Hamas dragged Israel into this mess. Thus, Hamas is just as much at blame for the large loss of civilian lives and destruction over the past month.
According to Indyk, Netanyahu has rediscovered Abbas. The Palestinian Authority forces have remained loyal to him. His peaceful behavior over the last month makes him a serious player. Israel is beginning to sense this, strengthening the idea of a two-state solution in the future. Elgindy advised the international community to empower Abbas by including Hamas under the umbrella of the PLO. This would allow them to have a stake in the political process in order to prevent regression in future talks.
Elgindy also pointed to the fact that the US has focused almost exclusively on conflict resolution to the total neglect of conflict management. This is a mistake. The US should reconsider Israel’s use of disproportionate force in warfare, which is not a legitimate way to conduct military operations.
Indyk concluded that there should not just be a focus on crisis supervision, but rather a stable balance between management and resolution. In the end, all parties must come together in working with the UN and the international community on humanitarian aid and reconstruction in Gaza.
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Peace picks August 11-15
1. Teleconference: Gaza Conflict Resumes After Ceasefire Ends Monday, August 11 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am Wilson Center Teleconference, Toll-free Conference Line: 888-947-9018, Conference Line: 517-308-9006, Passcode: 13304. REGISTER TO ATTEND The breakdown in the 72-hour Egyptian-brokered ceasefire and the resumption of the conflict between Israel and Hamas threatens to take the Gaza crisis to a new level. What are the prospects for escalation and/or for negotiations to de-escalate the situation? Can the requirements of the parties somehow be reconciled? What is the role of the Palestinian Authority and Egypt going forward? And what is the American role? Join the Wilson Center BY PHONE as two veteran analysts of Israeli-Palestinian politics and security strategy discuss these and other issues. SPEAKERS: Jane Harman, President, Wilson Center, Giora Eiland, Former Head of Israel’s National Security Counci, Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, and Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives and Distinguished Scholar, Wilson Center.
2. Laying the BRICS of a New Global Order: From Yekaterinburg 2009 to eThekwini 2013 Tuesday, August 12 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The meteoric rise of the BRICS group has led to an unprecedented increase in partnership, trade, and investment among some of the world’s most dynamic economies. Yet this increase in cooperation should not be allowed to obscure the complexities and contradictions inherent within this cohort of emerging global actors. The Africa Program invites you to the launch of “Laying the BRICS of a New Global Order,” a book edited by Francis Kornegay, Global Fellow, Wilson Center, with contributions from Paulo Sotero, Director, Brazil Institute as this seminal compilation on the emergence of a new global order is discussed.
3. South China Seas Crisis Negotiation Simulation Tuesday, August 12 | 5:00 pm – 7:30 pm Johns Hopkins SAIS – Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C., Room 500 REGISTER TO ATTEND The International Peace and Security Institute will host an interactive simulation exploring the South China Seas Crisis.
4. Holy Icons of Medieval Russia: Reawakening to a Spiritual Past Tuesday, August 12 | 6:45 pm – 8:15 pm Smithsonian Institute, at the S. Dillon Ripley Center, 1100 Jefferson Drive, SW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Scott Ruby, associate curator of Russian and Eastern European art at Hillwood Museum, examines how the appreciation and understanding of medieval icons developed, as well as some of the aspects of medieval iconography that differentiate it from the work of later centuries. Focusing on the great treasures of the period, Ruby looks at some of the superlative icons of Andre Rublev, a Russian monk who some consider the greatest icon painter. He also discusses how icons function in the context of public and private devotions.
5. Taiwan’s Maritime Security Wednesday, August 13 | 10:30 pm – 12:00 pm Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Taiwan’s security is inextricably linked to the sea. Indeed, the nation’s economic livelihood, as well as its national security, requires that Taipei secure the surrounding waters and have access to global sea-lanes. The Taiwan Strait is a key international waterway, and preserving its stability is in the American interest. Furthermore, per the Taiwan Relations Act, America is legally obligated to help this democratic island provide for its maritime security. Join Heritage as their panelists discuss how Taiwan’s maritime security issues are linked with the continuing East China Sea/South China Sea territorial and political disputes, Chinese naval developments, and U.S. Navy strategy in the Pacific. SPEAKERS: Bernard Cole, Ph.D., Captain, USN (Ret.), and Professor, National War College, Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, and Cortez Cooper, Senior International Policy Analyst, RAND
6. Africa Development Forum Event: A New Strategy for Civil Society Development for Africa Wednesday, August 13 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Center for International Private Enterprise, 1155 15th Street NW, 7th Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND A number of challenges face civil society organizations in developing markets in general and in Africa in particular. Now, however, strategies are emerging to address some of these issues. As part of SID-Washington’s Africa Development Forum, the Civil Society Workgroup will host a panel discussion entitled A New Strategy for Civil Society Development for Africa to examine these new approaches to civil society capacity building and how they should influence development strategies in how to engage and support CSOs. SPEAKERS: Lars Benson, Senior Program Officer for Africa, Center for International Private Enterprise, Jeremy Meadows, Senior Democracy Specialist, Bureau for Africa, USAID, Natalie Ross, Program Officer, Aga Khan Foundation, USA and Richard O’Sullivan (moderator), SID-Washington Civil Society Workgroup co-chair.
7. Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War Wednesday, August 13 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Middle East Institute, 1761 N Street, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Middle East Institute hosts Christine Fair, assistant professor of peace and security studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, for a discussion of her book, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Oxford University Press, 2014). Based on an unprecedented analysis of decades’ worth of the Pakistan army’s defense publications, Fair concludes that the army’s perception is that its success depends on its resistance to India’s purported drive for regional hegemony and the territorial status quo. Fair argues that because the army is unlikely to abandon these preferences, Pakistan will remain a destabilizing force in world politics for the foreseeable future. Hosted by Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, President, Middle East Institute.
8. U.S.-Korea-Japan Triangle: A Korean Perspective Wednesday, August 13| 10:00 am – 12:45 pm Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC REGISTER TO ATTEND Please join CSIS for a special roundtable event with Dr. Park Jin, Chair Professor at the Graduate School of International and Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, to discuss issues in the U.S.-Korea-Japan relationship and South Korean view toward the trilateral cooperation.
9. Inside the World of Diplomacy Thursday, August 14 | 10:00 am – 4:00 pm Smithsonian Institute, at the American Foreign Service Association, 2101 E St NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Members of the U.S. Foreign Service are the face of America in countries around the globe. From ambassadors to embassy staffers, their post s are demanding, important, and often difficult ones. How does someone enter the world of diplomacy—and what do they find there? Take a rare opportunity to get answers from men and women whose careers are spent in diplomatic Washington as you go inside the American Foreign Service Association and the U.S. Department of State.
10. Preventing Violence in the Name of God: The Role of Religion in Diplomacy Thursday, August 14 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am Middle East Institute at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND In his remarks at the launch of the State Department’s Office of Faith-Based Community Initiatives, Secretary of State John Kerry admonished, “We ignore the global impact of religion…at our peril,” and told Foreign Service officers “to go out and engage religious leaders and faith-based communities in our day-to-day work.” At a time when religious violence inflames much of the Middle East, the question of how diplomacy and religion can interact takes on high operational importance. What is the Department of State doing to fulfill Secretary Kerry’s instructions? What are the scope and limits of cooperation? These are among the questions to be addressed in presentations by Jerry White (Conflict and Stability Operations, Department of State) and Arsalan Suleman (Organization for the Islamic Conference, Department of State), followed by comments from Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering (former Undersecretary of State). MEI Scholar and retired Foreign Service officer Allen Keiswetter will moderate the panel.
11. Which Poses the Bigger Threat to U.S. National Security—Iran or Non-State Sunni Extremism? Thursday, August 14 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Hudson Institute, 1015 15th Street, N.W. 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Administration’s current policies throughout the region suggest that the White House no longer sees Iran as the key problem. Rather, it views the clerical regime as a potential partner, particularly when it comes to combating Sunni extremists like al Qaeda and ISIS. The Iranian regime, while problematic, represents a real nation-state and rational actor that looks out for its interests and responds to incentives—which is not the case for non-state actors. The White House has re-prioritized American strategy in the Middle East, with groups like al Qaeda and ISIS—rather than Iran—seen as the key threat to American interests. The question is whether the Obama administration has got it right. And if it’s wrong, what are the likely consequences? Hudson Institute Senior Fellow Lee Smith will moderate an expert panel featuring Michael Doran, Hillel Fradkin, and Brian Katulis to discuss whether non-state Sunni extremism or Iran constitutes the major strategic threat to American interests in the region.
12. They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else: A History of the Armenian Genocide Thursday, August 14, 2014 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Starting in early 1915, the Ottoman Turks began deporting and killing hundreds of thousands of Armenians in the first major genocide of the twentieth century. By the end of the First World War, the number of Armenians in what would become Turkey had been reduced by ninety percent—more than a million people. A century later, the Armenian Genocide remains controversial but relatively unknown, overshadowed by later slaughters and the chasm separating Turkish and Armenian versions of events. In this definitive narrative history, Professor Ronald Suny cuts through nationalist myths, propaganda, and denial to provide an unmatched account of when, how, and why the atrocities of 1915–1916 were committed.Drawing on archival documents and eyewitness accounts, Professor Suny’s book is a vivid and unforgettable chronicle of a cataclysm that set a tragic pattern for a century of genocide and crimes against humanity.
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Drops and strikes
A grim President Obama announced last night that the United States is dropping humanitarian assistance to stranded civilians in Iraq and will also strike Islamic State (IS) convoys if the extremists move on Erbil, the thriving capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. IS has reportedly taken the Mosul Dam. Yezidis and Christians, both anathema to IS, have fled.
Continuing to do nothing had become more difficult than doing something, but the President’s moves are at the lower end of the military intervention spectrum. They fall in the temporary expedient category. They will do nothing to reverse IS gains but may save some lives and steer IS away from Erbil.
Those objectives rank high as immediate priorities, but they don’t solve long-term problem, which is the consolidation of IS control over a substantial portion of western and northern Iraq. From there it can threaten Syria, Kurdistan, Turkey and Shia-dominated southern Iraq. IS can also threaten Europe and the United States if it becomes a haven for international terrorists.
The drop that really matters is the political one. Prime Minister Maliki is said to be negotiating the conditions for stepping down from the prime ministry. He wants immunity from prosecution and and security protection. That would be a small price to pay for unfreezing the political situation in Baghdad, though Maliki is likely to remain a force in Iraqi politics for a long time to come. His State of Law coalition won the largest number of seats in the April parliamentary election and he won by far the most personal preference votes.
Moving Maliki out of the prime minister’s office may be a necessary step, but there is no reason to believe it will be sufficient. Whoever replaces him will have a difficult time reconstituting the Iraqi security forces and maintaining a governing coalition that necessarily has to include Sunnis and Kurds as well as Shia. New American military equipment will take time to arrive and the Iraqis will need time to learn how to use it effectively. There will be no instant reversal of IS gains because some brave new soul sits in the prime minister’s office.
Meanwhile in Gaza the 72-hour ceasefire has expired. Hamas immediately dropped more rockets on Israel. The Israelis are striking Gaza from the sea and air. My guess is that this will not last. Both sides seem at the end of their gains. But that does not mean there will be a serious political settlement that changes the situation in a fundamental way. We may just be in for another long pause before they go at it again. That would be a shame, above all for the people of Gaza. Israeli strikes and Hamas drops will solve nothing.
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The politics of Gaza reconstruction
Both the New York Times and the Washington Post feature articles this morning on the destruction in Gaza and the need for physical reconstruction. Houses, mosques and factories are destroyed, infrastructure damaged, people displaced, the economy upended, the society traumatized. Close to 1900 people died and many times that number were injured.
Current estimates put the reconstruction bill at $6 billion. If the past is prologue, even that amount won’t restore Gaza to its pre-war state, which was already miserable due to two previous wars with Israel and seven years of embargo.
The physical conditions are not, however, the main obstacle to Gaza’s reconstruction. The big issue will be who is responsible for it, Hamas or the Palestinian Authority (PA), and what conditions will govern it. The Europeans are already proposing that the PA be in charge and that reconstruction be conditional on Hamas’ demilitarization. Their proposal is said to include:
Preventing the armament and strengthening of Hamas and the rest of the terror organizations in Gaza.
Rehabilitating the Gaza Strip in cooperation with the international community and the Palestinian Authority and enabling the transfer of humanitarian aid.
Setting up an international mechanism to prevent the entry of prohibited materials to the Strip and ensuring that materials such as cement and iron do not reach the terror organizations but are used only to rehabilitate Gaza.
Returning the Palestinian Authority and President Mahmoud Abbas to the Gaza Strip.
The possibility of returning the European Union’s Border Assistance Mission to the Rafah border crossing alongside the Palestinian presidential guard.
I have my doubts that anything like this can be accomplished, as it would depend on Hamas pretty much admitting defeat as well as accepting PA authority and continued international monitoring. It would also require the Europeans to re-enter Gaza. The language sounds more like an Israeli proposal to me than a European one.
From even before the end of the war, the Israelis have been tying reconstruction to demilitarization and reestablishment of PA authority in Gaza. The Egyptians will agree, as the current military-backed regime in Cairo despises Hamas and wants it defanged. Egypt’s Saudi and United Arab Emirates (UAE) backers are also likely to agree, because Hamas is a Muslim Brotherhood organization that rival Qatar supports. The question is whether the Saudis and the UAE will put their deep pockets at the service of Egypt’s and Israel’s efforts to do even more political damage to Hamas in the post-war period than was done during the war.
Another key question concerns the people of Gaza. Will they rally around Hamas, or will their pre-war souring on Hamas’ ineffective governance continue? Will the PA, not known for either speed or effectiveness, be able to take advantage of the situation to at least establish itself and its unity government as a serious player in Gaza, able and willing to provide humanitarian and reconstruction planning and assistance?
There are important political questions on the Israeli side of the equation as well. Israeli protests of the Palestinian unity government have faded in recent weeks. Has Prime Minister Netanyahu come to the realization that the unity government strengthens those in Palestine who are most willing to collaborate with Israel on security questions? Can he reverse his ill-conceived opposition to a technocratic institution that nudges Hamas in the right direction?
The question of accountability will also be important for Israel. There were a lot of Israeli strikes on civilian concentrations, including UN schools and other shelters, during this month-long Operation Protective Edge. Israel claims that it does its best to avoid civilians. Now it has to demonstrate that by seriously investigating and publishing detailed accounts of why it hit targets in which civilians were killed. Illegal targeting, if any, needs to be punished.
Post-war reconstruction is not only a physical activity. It is a political one as well.
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