Tag: Israel/Palestine
Drops and strikes
A grim President Obama announced last night that the United States is dropping humanitarian assistance to stranded civilians in Iraq and will also strike Islamic State (IS) convoys if the extremists move on Erbil, the thriving capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. IS has reportedly taken the Mosul Dam. Yezidis and Christians, both anathema to IS, have fled.
Continuing to do nothing had become more difficult than doing something, but the President’s moves are at the lower end of the military intervention spectrum. They fall in the temporary expedient category. They will do nothing to reverse IS gains but may save some lives and steer IS away from Erbil.
Those objectives rank high as immediate priorities, but they don’t solve long-term problem, which is the consolidation of IS control over a substantial portion of western and northern Iraq. From there it can threaten Syria, Kurdistan, Turkey and Shia-dominated southern Iraq. IS can also threaten Europe and the United States if it becomes a haven for international terrorists.
The drop that really matters is the political one. Prime Minister Maliki is said to be negotiating the conditions for stepping down from the prime ministry. He wants immunity from prosecution and and security protection. That would be a small price to pay for unfreezing the political situation in Baghdad, though Maliki is likely to remain a force in Iraqi politics for a long time to come. His State of Law coalition won the largest number of seats in the April parliamentary election and he won by far the most personal preference votes.
Moving Maliki out of the prime minister’s office may be a necessary step, but there is no reason to believe it will be sufficient. Whoever replaces him will have a difficult time reconstituting the Iraqi security forces and maintaining a governing coalition that necessarily has to include Sunnis and Kurds as well as Shia. New American military equipment will take time to arrive and the Iraqis will need time to learn how to use it effectively. There will be no instant reversal of IS gains because some brave new soul sits in the prime minister’s office.
Meanwhile in Gaza the 72-hour ceasefire has expired. Hamas immediately dropped more rockets on Israel. The Israelis are striking Gaza from the sea and air. My guess is that this will not last. Both sides seem at the end of their gains. But that does not mean there will be a serious political settlement that changes the situation in a fundamental way. We may just be in for another long pause before they go at it again. That would be a shame, above all for the people of Gaza. Israeli strikes and Hamas drops will solve nothing.
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The politics of Gaza reconstruction
Both the New York Times and the Washington Post feature articles this morning on the destruction in Gaza and the need for physical reconstruction. Houses, mosques and factories are destroyed, infrastructure damaged, people displaced, the economy upended, the society traumatized. Close to 1900 people died and many times that number were injured.
Current estimates put the reconstruction bill at $6 billion. If the past is prologue, even that amount won’t restore Gaza to its pre-war state, which was already miserable due to two previous wars with Israel and seven years of embargo.
The physical conditions are not, however, the main obstacle to Gaza’s reconstruction. The big issue will be who is responsible for it, Hamas or the Palestinian Authority (PA), and what conditions will govern it. The Europeans are already proposing that the PA be in charge and that reconstruction be conditional on Hamas’ demilitarization. Their proposal is said to include:
Preventing the armament and strengthening of Hamas and the rest of the terror organizations in Gaza.
Rehabilitating the Gaza Strip in cooperation with the international community and the Palestinian Authority and enabling the transfer of humanitarian aid.
Setting up an international mechanism to prevent the entry of prohibited materials to the Strip and ensuring that materials such as cement and iron do not reach the terror organizations but are used only to rehabilitate Gaza.
Returning the Palestinian Authority and President Mahmoud Abbas to the Gaza Strip.
The possibility of returning the European Union’s Border Assistance Mission to the Rafah border crossing alongside the Palestinian presidential guard.
I have my doubts that anything like this can be accomplished, as it would depend on Hamas pretty much admitting defeat as well as accepting PA authority and continued international monitoring. It would also require the Europeans to re-enter Gaza. The language sounds more like an Israeli proposal to me than a European one.
From even before the end of the war, the Israelis have been tying reconstruction to demilitarization and reestablishment of PA authority in Gaza. The Egyptians will agree, as the current military-backed regime in Cairo despises Hamas and wants it defanged. Egypt’s Saudi and United Arab Emirates (UAE) backers are also likely to agree, because Hamas is a Muslim Brotherhood organization that rival Qatar supports. The question is whether the Saudis and the UAE will put their deep pockets at the service of Egypt’s and Israel’s efforts to do even more political damage to Hamas in the post-war period than was done during the war.
Another key question concerns the people of Gaza. Will they rally around Hamas, or will their pre-war souring on Hamas’ ineffective governance continue? Will the PA, not known for either speed or effectiveness, be able to take advantage of the situation to at least establish itself and its unity government as a serious player in Gaza, able and willing to provide humanitarian and reconstruction planning and assistance?
There are important political questions on the Israeli side of the equation as well. Israeli protests of the Palestinian unity government have faded in recent weeks. Has Prime Minister Netanyahu come to the realization that the unity government strengthens those in Palestine who are most willing to collaborate with Israel on security questions? Can he reverse his ill-conceived opposition to a technocratic institution that nudges Hamas in the right direction?
The question of accountability will also be important for Israel. There were a lot of Israeli strikes on civilian concentrations, including UN schools and other shelters, during this month-long Operation Protective Edge. Israel claims that it does its best to avoid civilians. Now it has to demonstrate that by seriously investigating and publishing detailed accounts of why it hit targets in which civilians were killed. Illegal targeting, if any, needs to be punished.
Post-war reconstruction is not only a physical activity. It is a political one as well.
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Only the PLO can beat Hamas
When former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad resigned in 2013, Thomas Friedman lamented the death of “Fayyadism.” “If there is no place for a Salam Fayyad-type in [Palestinian] leadership,” he wrote, “an independent state will forever elude you.” As fighting rages in Gaza, a two-state solution seems more elusive than ever. At the Atlantic Council on Thursday, Fayyad articulated his vision for lasting peace in the region.
Fayyad traced many of the current problems to failed implementation of the 1993 Oslo Accords. Oslo was supposed to solve the permanent status issue, and ultimately create a Palestinian state. In signing the accords, the Palestinians accepted a temporary extension of the occupation. This “provisional” extension has lasted more than twenty years and is at the root of current Palestinian indignation towards the ruling Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).
In 2011, Israel traded more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners for Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who had been captured by Hamas six years earlier. The next year, PLO President Mahmoud Abbas sought to gain recognition of Palestinian statehood at the United Nations. Israel retaliated by authorizing construction of 3,000 additional housing units in the West Bank. The message, said Fayyad, is clear: violence trumps political solutions.
Abbas has paid dearly for his cooperation with Israel, with little to show for it. For many Palestinians, his party has come to represent weakness and capitulation. Hamas is seen as the last remaining pocket of resistance in a region that has all but abandoned the Palestinian cause. Hamas’ hand has only been strengthened by current war.
There can be no sovereign Palestinian state without Gaza, which has been ruled by Hamas for the last seven years. All parties, including Gaza, must be represented in any final-status agreement. And there cannot be agreement until the Palestinians demand, with one voice, a “date certain” for an end to the occupation.
Israel is mistaken if it believes it can “defeat” Hamas in the traditional sense. While Hamas has been in control of Gaza for seven years, it is not a state. Non-state actors measure winning and losing differently. As Henry Kissinger said, “The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.” Hamas can still rise from the rubble and claim victory.
Fayyad said that it is unreasonable to condition a ceasefire on total demilitarization of Hamas. Israel couldn’t achieve this even when they were occupying Gaza. The Hamas-PLO Unity agreement should remain in place, he added. It is time to hold another election. Without electoral legitimacy, neither faction can govern effectively.
The new order cannot look like the old one. It will not be easy, he said, but long-term reforms must be embedded in any lasting ceasefire agreement. The despair in Gaza is palpable, and it only burnishes Hamas’s credentials. As one woman told him recently, Gazans are alive “simply because there isn’t enough death to go around.”
In 1993, Palestinians recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security. Israel did not reciprocate. This goes to the heart of the disillusionment felt by most Palestinians. Fayyad was not optimistic about Israel’s willingness to recognize a Palestinian state. Since Oslo, he noted, politicians in Israel have been increasingly unfriendly to the idea of a two-state solution.
Israel will not vanquish Hamas militarily, Fayyad said. In the end, the only way to defeat Hamas is by empowering the PLO. This will only be possible is Israel ends its occupation of Palestine.
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Peace picks August 4-8
- Morocco’s Emergence as a Gateway to Business in Africa Monday, August 4 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am Atlantic Council of the United States; 1030 15th Street, NW, Twelfth Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND H.E. Moulay Hafid Elalamy, Mohamed El Kettani, Hajji, and Nabil Habayeb will discuss how Morocco has emerged not only as a significant US political and strategic partner in Africa, but also as an attractive portal for investment and business headed to the continent. They will discuss US interests and the opportunities to deepen economic and commercial cooperation with Morocco and other African countries.
- Tunisia’s Democratic Successes: A Conversation with the President of Tunisia Tuesday, August 5 | 11:00 am – 12:15 pm Atlantic Council of the United States; 1030 15th Street, NW, Twelfth Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND With both presidential and parliamentary elections due late this year, Tunisia once again faces imminent milestones in its political history. Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki will join the Atlantic Council’s Hariri Center and Africa Center for an exclusive engagement to discuss successes to date and how the country can address pressing economic and security challenges as its democratic transition continues.
- The Gaza Crisis: No Way Out? Policy Options and Regional Implications Tuesday, August 5 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a discussion examining the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the U.S. handling of the crisis, and the regional implications. Brookings Vice President for Foreign Policy and former U.S. Special Envoy to the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations Martin Indyk will share his observations and insights. He will be joined by fellows Natan Sachs and Khaled Elgindy, a former adviser to the Palestinian negotiating team.
- Putting the South Caucasus in Perspective Tuesday, August 5 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have been independent states for more than 23 years. Although geographically contiguous, they differ in language, religion, and political and security orientation. How is each country faring in state building, developing democracy, and improving economic performance? Two prominent academic experts of the South Caucasus, Professors Ronald Suny and Stephen Jones, will discuss the historical experience and current developments of the region.
- Overcoming Obstacles to Doing Business in Sub-Saharan Africa Wednesday, August 6 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Atlantic Council of the United States; 1030 15th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND In the context of the inaugural US-Africa Leaders Summit, the Atlantic Council’s will launch a new study about barriers to doing business in sub-Saharan Africa and how they can be overcome. Visiting Fellow Aubrey Hruby will discuss the inadequate infrastructure, lack of market data, and poor policy implementation in Africa. The publication will also focus on innovative solutions for surmounting such obstacles and how companies who have successfully entered African markets can provide lessons learned for future investors.
- Loved? Liked? Respected? The Success and Failure of U.S. Public Diplomacy Wednesday, August 6 | 6:00 pm – 8:00 pm Washington Institute-Near East; 1828 L Street, NW, #1050, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Washington Institute will host a debate on the value of U.S. public diplomacy. It will analyze the role of public diplomacy in the Middle East with particular attention to the crisis in Gaza, the ISIS campaign in Iraq, the ongoing conflict in Syria, and escalating terrorist threats in the region. Institute’s Executive Director Robert Satloff will stand off against the former U.S. ambassador to Turkey and Iraq, James Jeffrey in a debate moderated by Viola Gienger of the United States Institute of Peace.
- Statesmen’s Forum: His Excellency Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, President of the Republic of Mali Thursday, August 7 | 9:00 am – 10:15 am Center for Strategic and International Studies; 1616 Rhode Island Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita of Mali will discuss the progress and challenges of Mali’s post-crisis recovery, as well as the broader regional prospects for security, development, and good governance in the Sahel region. He will share his perspective on the ongoing peace process and the role that neighboring countries and the U.S. government can play in tackling insecurity and fostering reconciliation.
- President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso Thursday, August 7 | 5:00 pm National Press Club, 13th Floor; 529 14th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND President Blaise Compaore will give his assessment of the results of the US-Africa Leaders Summit taking place in Washington, D.C. from August 5th to 6th. He also plans to speak on his role as a regional mediator to resolve conflicts in West Africa.
- A Batkin International Leaders Forum with the President of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud Friday, August 8 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am Service Employees International Union; 1800 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND His Excellency Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, president of the Federal Republic of Somalia, will explore the future of democracy in Somalia and its many challenges and promises. Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director for Foreign Policy at Brookings, will hold a question and answer session with the president.
- Beyond North Waziristan Friday, August 8 | 10:30 am – 12:00 pm Atlantic Council of the United States; 1030 15th Street, NW, Twelfth Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND As the Pakistani army wages a long-awaited operation, Zarb-e-Azb, against militant sanctuaries in North Waziristan, there are questions about how effectively it confronts the long-term challenge of terrorism in the region. How is the North Waziristan operation impacting militant groups operating in the region, and the overall stability of Pakistan? Can the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan work together to address sanctuaries for insurgents on both sides of the border? Major Ikram Sehgal and Hassan Abbas will highlight the progress, pitfalls, and implications of Pakistan’s strategy in North Waziristan.
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The tides of war
In Gaza the tide of war seems to be receding, though a ceasefire still seems far off. Israel seems to prefer unilateral withdrawal to an agreement that would necessarily involve Hamas. In Ukraine, Russia’s eastern strongholds of Donestsk and Luhansk are preparing for siege. Russian President Putin may well need to invade if he is to save his proxies from an increasingly effective Ukrainian army.
In Iraq, the Islamic State (IS) continues to consolidate its gains and make modest progress against not only the Iraqi army but also against the Kurdish peshmerga. But in Syria, the IS has suffered setbacks. The Western-supported Syrian Opposition Coalition is losing ground to both the regime and IS but hopes to install its next government, to be named soon, inside Syria.
A definitive end to any of these wars seems far off. Each of the contestants–half non-state actors–has enough outside support to prevent defeat, even if none of them appears strong enough to achieve anything close to victory. Bashar al Asad is no more likely to govern all of Syria in the future than Nouri al Maliki is likely to govern all of Iraq. The Islamic State has taken large but largely empty portions of eastern Syria and western Iraq, but it is unlikely to take Baghdad or Damascus. Ukraine may re-establish its authority in Donbas, but only if Russia allows it to happen. Israel won’t reoccupy Gaza, but will instead try to get the Palestinian Authority to play a major role there in the post-war period.
Contemporary warfare is no longer about victory and defeat of clashing armed forces in the classic sense but rather about degrees of control over the civilian population. It is “war amongst the people,” in the phrase UK General Rupert Smith coined. Civilians are not bystanders, collateral damage is not collateral, military objectives are political. A definitive end to war of this sort is unlikely, absent definitive international intervention. The best that can be hoped for is a political settlement that channels conflict into nonviolent directions, at least for a time. We did better than that in the Balkans, but only because Europe and the United States were not only willing to intervene militarily but also insert tens of thousands of troops to stabilize the situation.
The tides of war may be receding a bit now in Ukraine and Middle East, but the respite isn’t likely to last. War amongst the people gives the people a lot of reason to resent the enemy and little reason to reconcile. Non-state actors may melt away but survive to fight another day. Unless states make a conscious and concerted effort to resolve fundamental political issues, they are likely to find themselves fighting non-state actors over and over, as Israel has done with Hamas and Hizbollah. IS’s current explosion in Iraq is not its first. Its antecedents were behind the 2006/7 insurgency that the Americans successfully overcame with the cooperation of Sunni tribes. But that success did not lead to a broad political settlement.
The search for such a settlement is what leads to calls for “national dialogue.” Yemen’s was thought to be relatively successful, though implementation is proving difficult. Libya is trying to launch one, but violence in both Tripoli and Benghazi has made it not only difficult but dangerous. The international intervention many Libyans would like is unlikely. The restored Egyptian autocracy is uninterested in national dialogue. It is forging ahead without trying to return its Islamist and liberal opponents to a political role. Israel doesn’t want Hamas included in the Palestinian Authority government. Nor does Kiev want the separatist leaders incorporated back into its polity.
The tides of war may be receding for the moment, but the odds are they will return, perhaps stronger than ever.
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Mission leap
I’ve been wondering, as many of my readers have, how long the war in Gaza will continue. This depends on what Hamas and Israel are trying to achieve. What is the mission? What is an acceptable end state?
Hamas has been pretty clear: it wants an end to the siege of Gaza, which means opening it to trade and commerce with both Egypt and Israel. Hamas also wants release of the West Bank operatives Israel arrested in the prelude to this latest Gaza war. It will resist demilitarization and try to maintain its hold on governing Gaza.
Israel is more of a mystery to me, so I listen carefully when an Israelis speak. They initially seemed to focus on ending Hamas’ rocket threat. But Iron Dome has effectively neutralized the rockets, one-quarter to one-third of which have either been used or destroyed. Destroying many more would require a full-scale reoccupation of Gaza, which the Israelis are loathe to do.
The tunnels into Israel now loom larger as a security threat, albeit one limited to the immediate surroundings of Gaza. So far, the Israelis have destroyed about half the tunnel network. But in order to be effective, the tunnels have to come up inside Israel. Sooner or later–likely sooner–the Israelis will acquire the technical means to detect the digging. The tunnels could then be destroyed inside Israel, making the kind of operation now going on in Gaza unnecessary. It may provide some satisfaction to destroy a couple of years of digging, but it puts Israeli soldiers at risk. If alternative ways are developed to reduce the threat they would obviously be preferable.
Israel’s objectives do not seem to be limited to restoring calm (aka ending the rocket attacks) and destroying the tunnels. It appears to want to break Hamas’ will to fight. The Israelis think they share this objective with Egypt, which regards Hamas as a Muslim Brotherhood organization and therefore an implacable enemy of the restored military regime in Cairo.
Both Egypt and Israel would like to see a post-war political evolution that puts the Palestinian Authority (PA) back in charge of Gaza. Israel has had bad experience trying to engineer regime change in the Arab world (witness the 1956 effort to overthrow Nasser and its later Lebanon machinations). But the Israelis still imagine they can, with cooperation from the international community, help the PA by steering reconstruction funding from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and border openings in the right directions. Hamas was already in trouble before this latest war, perhaps even on the verge of collapse as a viable governing entity. More radical groups like the Islamic State have little traction in Gaza, the Israelis think.
Unless one side or the other is victorious, the end of this war will likely involve a trade: improved security for Israel, reconstruction and economic benefits for Gaza. But there is no guarantee of the political outcome the Israelis and Egyptians are hoping for. Displacing Hamas entirely is not just mission creep but mission leap. In the meanwhile, Gaza’s civilians are paying an exorbitant price.
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