Tag: Israel/Palestine
Maliki makes his case
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was in Washington last week to talk about Iraq’s problems and the future of US-Iraq relations. Maliki’s trip culminated on Friday, with a visit to the White House to meet with President Obama and Vice President Biden. On Thursday, Maliki spoke to a large audience at the United States Institute of Peace.
Iraq has experienced significant change since the United States withdrew its troops from the country in 2011. The economy has improved over the last few years, according to Maliki’s op-ed in the New York Times on Tuesday, with an overall expansion of 9.6 percent in 2011 and 10.5 percent in 2012. The nation’s oil production has increased by 50 percent since 2005. Iraq is on pace to become the world’s second largest energy exporter by 2030.
But the security situation is dire. The presence of extremist groups like Al-Qaeda in Iraq has increased with the seemingly interminable and volatile situation in Syria. Sectarian tension is on the rise, with increased instances of violence. Read more
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Unhappy allies need to carry more burdens
Everyone’s favorite subject this weekend is America’s allies, who are unhappy for many reasons:
- France and Germany don’t like their phones bugged, and Brazil is also in a lather;
- Saudi Arabia wants the Americans to push harder against Syria’s Bashar al Asad and Iran’s nuclear program;
- Israel concurs on Iran and would rather President Obama didn’t insist it talk to the Palestinians;
- the Egyptian military didn’t like the cutoff of some major military equipment;
- President Karzai has not yet agreed to U.S. jurisdiction for troops who commit criminal acts in Afghanistan post-2014.
Everyone found the US government shutdown disconcerting. No one is looking forward to the January budgetary showdown, except maybe Russian President Putin. He likes anything that brings America down a peg.
There are solutions for each of these issues. We’ll no doubt reach some sort of modus vivendi with the Europeans, who won’t want to shut down either their own eavesdropping or America’s. More likely they’ll want us to share, while swearing off Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande’s cell phones. The Brazilians will be harder to satisfy, but they aren’t exactly what I would call an ally either. The Saudis may go off on their own to arm whomever they like in Syria, thus deepening the sectarian conflict there. That could, ironically, increase the prospects for some sort of political settlement at the much discussed but never convened Geneva 2 conference. It is hard to find anyone at this point who seriously opposes the effort to negotiate a settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. The alternatives (war or containment) are worse. Even Netanyahu has toned down his objections, while unleashing Sheldon Adelson to advocate nuclear war. The Egyptian military doesn’t actually need more Abrams tanks; it has lots in storage. Karzai has convened a loya jirga to approve the continuing American presence in Afghanistan and to share the rap for agreeing to American jurisdiction. Read more
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Untying the Turkish knot
Mort Abramowitz and Eric Edelman published this week a super Bipartisan Policy Center report “From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing US Turkey Policy.” Mort was US ambassador in Ankara 1989-91 and Eric 2003-5. It doesn’t get much more knowledgeable when it comes to US policy on Turkey than these two. Caveat emptor: Eric is a valued colleague at SAIS (his office is next door to mine) and Mort is a treasured regular lunch partner and occasional co-author.
They argue for something few sitting ambassadors would be keen on, though it seems likely that the current ambassador was at least forewarned if not approving. They want to shift from rhetoric about shared objectives in the Middle East to frank talk (with an Ankara already resenting US policy on Syria, Iran, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and other issues) about Turkey’s domestic situation.
The aim is to keep Turkey moving in a democratic direction, restore its economic vitality, and encourage it to play a leadership role in the region consistent with US policy. As diplomatic propositions go, this is pretty daring:
Practically, this means that Washington should be more open with Ankara about its concerns about issues like press freedom, freedom of assembly, rule of law, and the Turkish government’s increasing sectarianism.
Edelman and Abramowitz view such frank assessments as likely to produce good results and cite chapter and verse of Israel-related occasions on which American bluntness was productive.
The agenda they propose for Washington is an ample one: Read more
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The gulf with the Gulf
Yesterday was Gulf day. I spent part of the morning reading Christopher Davidson, who thinks the Gulf monarchies are headed for collapse due to internal challenges, their need for Western support, Iran’s growing power and their own disunity. Then I turned to Greg Gause, who attributes their resilience to the oil-greased coalitions and external networks they have created to support their rule. He predicts their survival.
At lunch I ambled across the way to CSIS’s new mansion to hear Abdullah al Shayji, chair of political science at Kuwait University and unofficial Gulf spokeperson, who was much exorcised over America’s response to Iran’s “charm offensive,” which he said could not have come at a worse time. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was already at odds with the US. The Gulf was not warned or consulted about the phone call between Iranian President Rouhani and President Obama. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to occupy the UN Security Council seat it fought hard to get was a signal of displeasure. The divergences between the GCC and the US range across the Middle East: Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq and Palestine, in addition to Iran.
On top of this, US oil and gas production is increasing. China is now a bigger oil importer than the US and gets a lot more of its supplies from the Gulf. Washington is increasingly seen as dysfunctional because of its partisan bickering. Its budget problems seem insoluble. American credibility is declining. The Gulf views the US as unreliable. Read more
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Blast from the past
Revisiting peacemaking in history, Professor Bill Quandt yesterday discussed the Camp David peace process at American University.
Quandt opened his remarks on the Egypt-Israeli peace by offering a timeless key to peacemaking. In order to have a successful peacemaking process, there must be more peacemaking and less process. The parties involved should see change that would convince them that the old ways and tensions can be put away and new ways adopted. It is not enough to have parties come to the negotiation table.
The Arab-Israeli conflict is often seen as an insoluble conflict, one that cannot be addressed by diplomacy. But there is one aspect of the conflict that was resolved with diplomacy, between Egypt and Israel. Egypt and Israel fought four wars that gave Israel the military upper hand. But how come diplomacy ultimately worked?
Quandt attributes the success of the 1978 Camp David Accords to four things:
Change of leadership in Egypt. When Anwar Sadat succeeded Gamal Abdel Nasser, he was determined to try a different path. He wanted to shift his international relationship from the Soviet Union to the US and knew that he would not be able to do that without making peace with Israel. Sadat began sending costly signals to the US by expelling Soviet advisers in Egypt and using backchannel messages to Nixon. Because Sadat saw no movement towards peace talks, he launched the 1973 war with Israel in order to break the status quo. Thus, it was not simply Sadat coming to power that changed things; rather, there was a gradual change over a few years. Sadat’s constant signaling, and his willingness to travel to Tel Aviv, made him able to change the course of Egyptian-Israeli relations.
Global context. This was a period of détente between the US and Soviet Union. It looked as if the US and Soviet Union could resolve some of their issues. This was no longer an international environment in which one superpower or the other was giving unconditional support to countries such as Israel and Egypt. Quandt sees a parallel to the present day global context, in which the US and Russia were able to work together in order to come to a chemical weapons deal with Syria.
Role of the mediator. Sadat asked the US to be the mediator between Egypt and Israel in the peace negotiations. Israel could explain to its public that the US pressured it into signing a peace treaty. The US could guarantee Egypt that Israel would return land in exchange for peace. President Carter was important to the ultimate success of the Camp David Accords. As mediator, he invited Sadat and Begin to Camp David for the summit. When the meeting started poorly, he presented the US plan for peace between the two countries and discussed it separately with both parties. The US maintained control of the drafting process. Carter’s personal relationship with Sadat was important in convincing Sadat to carry on with the negotiations.
Clear and mutual understanding of the end game. Israel and Egypt understood what they wanted and what the other country wanted. Israel wanted peace and was willing to return Sinai to Egypt for a guarantee of that peace.
Ultimately, Sadat got peace with Israel, the Sinai Peninsula back and a relationship with US. Begin was able to achieve peace with Egypt without making concessions on the Palestinian issue. The US gained strategic position in the region.
Quandt does not see these same factors present in the current Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. In order for these talks to be more serious, Secretary Kerry needs to do more of the “heavy lifting.” There is also currently no common point between the Israelis and Palestinians. That needs to be established in order to have a starting point for negotiations.
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Smoke signals don’t count, guarantees do
The smoke signals from two days of P5 + 1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) talks with Iran are good: the Iranians proposed a solution to a crisis they claim is unnecessary, they met bilaterally with the Americans, they signed on to an optimistic statement with European Union High Representative Ashton, and new talks will convene in Geneva on November 7 and 8. The Iranians may even have given an interview to an Israeli radio station. This kind of open, cooperative and positive atmosphere marks a sharp improvement from the past.
But we need to be hardnosed. The Iranians are increasing their capacity to produce fissionable (bomb) materials rapidly, both by enriching uranium and by soon making plutonium. There is no reason to believe that they will back off recognition of what they term their “right” to enrich (and I imagine to reprocess). They are much closer to a nuclear weapons capability today than ever before.
The Americans meanwhile are under pressure not to allow in a negotiated settlement any enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of plutonium in Iran. That is almost surely not achievable. But lifting of sanctions in the U.S. Congress will require an airtight agreement that verifiably and irreversibly ensures Iran is not diverting nuclear material to a weapons project.
Common ground lies somewhere in the area of enrichment up to 5% inside Iran with shipment of higher enriched materials and plutonium out of Iran and tight, frequent and unannounced inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This would be significantly tighter than the arrangements Brazil, Argentina and many other potential proliferators have made with each other and the international community.
The military option, whether Israeli or American, is not attractive. It might set back the Iranian nuclear program by as much as five years, but Tehran would surely abandon its denials and redouble its efforts, precipitating a rush to nuclear weapons by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others. Repetition of military attacks with unintended and unpredictable consequences would be required at more and more frequent intervals. This is not a formula for a peaceful world.
Nor is containment of a nuclear Iran a good alternative. It would put nuclear war on a hair trigger: Israel would need to lanuch on warning against all of Iran’s nuclear assets if it wanted to survive, which it surely does. To imagine that Jerusalem and Tehran could reach the kind of modus vivendi that prevailed between Washington and Moscow during the Cold War is delusionary.
So we are on a good path, or at least a better one than the alternatives, but one that will not be easy to complete. The same split Congress that brought us budget crises will not roll over and play dead when President Obama brings it a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear threat. It will demand, as it should, ironclad guarantees that we haven’t been rolled and will not be tricked. But if the guarantees are good, the deal is one they should take. Smoke signals don’t count, but guarantees do.
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