Tag: Israel/Palestine
Peace picks, October 14-18
Today is officially a holiday and the government is still “shut down,” but there are good war and peace events this week in DC:
1. U.S. Policy in the Arab: World Perspectives from Civil Society
In collaboration with the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND)
Monday, October 14, 2013 – 11:15am – 12:45pm
New America Foundation
The United States has long shaped developments in the Arab world, but the 2011 popular uprisings and subsequent period of unrest have diminished U.S. influence and credibility in the region. More recently, Washington’s reluctance to militarily intervene in Syria and passive reaction to political changes in Egypt have further damaged its image in the eyes of Arab populations. While media coverage of regional events focuses on governments and street protests, the voices of civil society organizations are often marginalized or unheard.
On October 14, the New America Foundation’s Middle East Task Force and the Arab NGO Network for Development will host a distinguished panel of researchers, academics, and activists from Arab civil society organizations. The panelists will present civil society priorities and perspectives on U.S. policies in the region, and will specifically debate whether these policies advance popular aspirations for democracy and sustainable development.
PARTICIPANTS
Kinda Mohamadieh
Policy Advisor, Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND).
Mahinour El-Badrawi
Researcher, Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR)
Mohamad Loutfy
Campaign Coordinator, The Campaign on World Bank Safeguards and Disability
Senior Advisor, The Lebanese Physical Handicapped Union (LPHU)
Rana Khalaf
Activist, Syrian League for Citizenship
Moderator:
Research Associate, Middle East Task Force, New America Foundation
RSVP: http://www.newamerica.net/events/2013/us_policy_in_the_arab_world Read more
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Palestinians displaced, again
In 1948, approximately 90,000 Palestinians sought refuge in Syria during the Arab-Israeli War. Sixty-three years later, in 2011, the Palestinians who had created new lives in Syria became refugees yet again, but this time in the wake of the Syrian revolution. On Monday, Georgetown University hosted a discussion titled “Displaced Again: Palestinian Refugees from Syria.”
Samar El Yassir, the Lebanon Country Director for American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), talked about the bleak situation Palestinian refugees face in Lebanon. In September 2012, there were only 10,000 Palestinian refugees in the country. But just over a year later that number has increased to about 92,650, according to UNRWA records, and it is estimated to reach 180,000 refugees by the end of 2013. In addition to the Palestinians, there are about 900,000 more refugees in Lebanon who have sought refuge from the oppressive Assad regime. The one million refugees in the country, whose numbers are equivalent to about a third of the population, live in cramped conditions awash with crime and corruption.
The number one concern for refugees in Lebanon is shelter. Refugees either live with host families, rent shelters for between 150 to 300 Lebanese pounds, or squat in partially built structures. Recently, it has become increasingly hard for refugees to pay rent since the Syrian pound has lost much of its value and is worth about three times less than the Lebanese pound. For those who have found jobs, the average salary is about 100 to 300 pounds per month, and this barely covers the price of rent. About 25 percent of all refugee shelters are inadequate, which means they have little or no access to water, have primitive bathrooms, have open vents or doors, and have no kitchen. The incessant struggle with living conditions, especially in the midst of the winter months, only compounds the economic woes that Palestinian refugees face in Lebanon.
Among working age Palestinian refugees, there is an astonishing 90 percent unemployment. This is largely due to the fact that Lebanese law prevents them from working in many sectors of the country’s workforce. As a result, the job market is very competitive, and most families cannot even afford three meals a day. These dire conditions have led many families to give in to child labor in order to maximize their income, which takes children away from their studies. Even children who do not have jobs often are not in school for two main reasons—the curriculum is often taught in French, not Arabic, and there is no space in Lebanon’s classrooms. As El Yassir said, “The best way to ‘normalize’ life is to put children in school.” These educational hardships make it difficult to facilitate change in the region and improve the lives of refugees displaced from Syria.
Noura Erakat, a human rights attorney and activist, gave a brief history on Palestinian refugees in the region and talked about their lack of support and basic rights. In 1948, the Syrian government took great pride in harboring Palestinians and supporting their cause. Once inside Syria, they were allowed to start new lives and essentially lived as equals to the native Syrians. But a few months into the 2011 Syrian revolution, the Assad regime began to target Palestinian refugees, which initiated their massive influx into Lebanon and Jordan.
It would make sense that the Palestinian refugees who are displaced by the uprising in Syria would fall under the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR). But instead they remain under the authority of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). This means that the Palestinian refugees’ futures depend on the work of a largely underfunded United Nations agency that already has its hands full in the Levant. They continue to suffer from lack of diplomatic and legal support as they live in limbo in the 12 Palestinian refugee camps that are scattered across Lebanon.
The future for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon remains bleak. It is imperative that the international community help these oppressed people rebuild their lives, lest we have a lost generation of youth on our hands. Such civil society organizations as ANERA play an important role in improving these refugees’ lives by setting up assistance programs that provide food, shelter, medication, clothes, education, and counseling. But with a million more refugees estimated to flee from the violence in Syria over the next year, it will be essential to improve aid programs in the Levant in order to provide for this vulnerable group.
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One-state, two-states
The Middle East Policy Council (MEPC) hosted a conference Wednesday discussing a question not usually asked in polite company: “Two States or One?” Challenging the usual presumption that a two-state solution is necessary and sufficient, Thomas Mattair, Executive Director of MEPC, described the Israel/Palestine conflict as one that has severely affected both sides, with countless lives destroyed for the sake of “a pile of rocks called the Holy Land. Call it idolatry.” The panel included four speakers, with two advocates for each solution.
Ian Lustick, professor at the University of Pennsylvania and author of “Two State Illusion,” believes that a two state outcome is possible but will not happen as a result of negotiations, which only perpetuate divisions that already exist. The odds are against the two-state solution because of the increasing Islamization of the region and the influence of the Israeli lobby on US foreign policy. The route to a two-state solution is not through negotiations, but through “rough politics.” History has shown that civil wars and revolutions, rather than negotiations, have led to the formation of democratic states. They also produce a result that no one would have expected. Lustick does not advocate a one-state solution but sees one already in place. There are slim prospects for a two-state solution in the absence of a huge political shift.
Also arguing for a one-state solution was Yousef Munayyer, Executive Director of the Jerusalem Fund and the Palestine Center. He believes the negotiations have never been further from a two-state solution than they are now – it is a one-state reality. The one-state advocates are mostly concerned with ensuring the rights of Israelis and Palestinians are afforded to all equally. He sees and debunks 3 myths in the ongoing negotiation rhetoric:
- Middle East peace is a vital US security interest, or the US will be at a greater risk of attack if Israel is not protected. He explains that a vital security interest means that the US would get involved militarily, which is not necessarily the case.
- It is in Israel’s interest to end the occupation. In reality, Israel reaps many benefits from the occupation, including many resources from the West Bank.
- The status quo is unsustainable. On the contrary, Israeli occupation is sustainable and profitable. The US is supporting the status quo diplomatically and financially.
He does not see the negotiations yielding a just solution; rather, Israel will continue to impose its will as the stronger power with the backing of the US. Thus, Munayyer concludes that Israel has no reason to change this one-state reality because there is no outside pressure to do so.
On the other hand, President of J-Street Jeremy Ben-Ami argues for a two-state solution. He sees a necessity for a Jewish homeland and the justice of its existence. There will only be justice, peace and security for the Jewish people if there is justice, peace and security for the Palestinians as well. This has been a conflict between two groups who have legitimate, yet conflicting, rights to the same piece of land. The only viable option: division of the land between the two groups. The one-state “nightmare” would not give both groups equal rights. The two-state solution would allow both groups to have national self-determination, security and independence from one another. He sees real hope for the two-state solution with Secretary Kerry’s renewed energy for negotiations.
Finally, Ahmad Samih Khalidi, Senior Associate Member of St. Anthony’s College at Oxford University, sees the Palestinian conflict as the convergence of many conflicts, including ethnic tensions and national conflicts with a global resonance because of the historicity of its location as well as Israel’s international support. The two-state solution is nothing new. It was adopted by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1988 and was rejected by Israel and the US for decades after. However, now it is the only common ground among the US, PLO and Israel. There can be no other negotiated solution. However, it will be difficult to create a just and sustainable solution that factors all the issues such as the division of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees and the Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Khalidi does not see a one-state or two-state dichotomy. There could eventually be a union in one-state, after the establishment of two separate states.
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Peace picks, October 7-11
A wide array of interesting events this week (be aware of possible event cancellations due to the government shutdown):
1. A New Look at American Foreign Policy: The Third in a Series of Discussions
Monday October 7 | 12:00pm – 1:00pm
The Heritage Foundation, Lehrman Auditorium, 214 Massachusetts Avenue NW
For decades, libertarians and conservatives have been at odds over American foreign policy. But perhaps a conversation is possible today between classical liberals and conservatives on the nature of American foreign policy. Some are trying to find a “middle way” that is less doctrinaire. At the same time the “neo” conservative phase of hyper military interventionism is a spent force in conservative circles. Therefore, the time may be ripe for an open and honest conversation among some libertarians and conservatives about the future of American foreign policy. It may be possible a new consensus could be found between Americans who consider themselves classical liberals and traditional conservatives on the purposes of American foreign policy.
Join us as Heritage continues the discussion regarding this question, what the dangers and opportunities are and whether they afford an opportunity to take a “new look” at American foreign policy.
For decades, libertarians and conservatives have been at odds over American foreign policy. But perhaps a conversation is possible today between classical liberals and conservatives on the nature of American foreign policy. Some are trying to find a “middle way” that is less doctrinaire. At the same time the “neo” conservative phase of hyper military interventionism is a spent force in conservative circles. Therefore, the time may be ripe for an open and honest conversation among some libertarians and conservatives about the future of American foreign policy. It may be possible a new consensus could be found between Americans who consider themselves classical liberals and traditional conservatives on the purposes of American foreign policy.
Join us as Heritage continues the discussion regarding this question, what the dangers and opportunities are and whether they afford an opportunity to take a “new look” at American foreign policy.
More About the Speakers
Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D.
Distinguished Fellow, The Heritage Foundation
Randy E. Barnett
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center
Marion Smith
Visiting Fellow, B. Kenneth Simon Center for Principles and Politics, The Heritage Foundation
Hosted By
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Why Ken Pollack is wrong
Ken Pollack has written a highly readable but serious and in-depth book claiming that–contrary to US government policy, Congressional sentiment and popular preference–we can live with the “unthinkable”: an Iranian nuclear bomb. Containment, he claims, is not only possible but desirable when compared to war, which would have uncertain and unintended consequences.
He is wrong on two counts: these are not the only options and containment is the least desirable of them. Here’s why.
Ken looks at containment from the American perspective. He worries about whether the Iranian regime is rational and produces ample evidence for Karim Sadjadpour’s judgment that it is homicidal but not suicidal. Deterrence then can work, with only some small and tolerable probability that it might fail, as during the Cold War.
He is lacking two vital perspectives: Israeli and Iranian.
If Iran somehow gets nuclear weapons, Israel faces what it considers an existential threat. What will it do in response to any indication that Tehran is preparing a nuclear attack? Ken cites a Cold War example–the 1983 Able Archer incident–that brought the US and Soviet Union close to nuclear war when the Soviets misinterpreted an American exercise as preparation for a nuclear attack. But the US and Soviet Union had good communications and significant transit time for their intercontinental ballistic missiles. Launch on warning during the Cold War meant launch after the enemy’s launch but before the missiles struck their targets.
Israel, while it has a second strike capability aboard its submarines, cannot wait that long. A second strike after your country has been obliterated is little satisfaction and even less deterrent. Launch on warning for Israel will mean launch before Iran is able to launch. The targeting would have to be comprehensive, against any installation from which Iran might retaliate. With virtually zero communications between the two countries and a lot of mutual distrust, this makes a world in which Iran has nuclear weapons frighteningly close to Armageddon, for the region if not for the world. Iran faces the risk of assured destruction at Israel’s initiative, with nothing mutual about it.
This is not however as apocalyptic as it sounds. It gives Tehran, which has no second strike capability, a very good reason for stopping its nuclear program short of nuclear weapons and doing so in a way that is transparent, verifiable and irreversible. Iranian President Rouhani has said clearly but generically that
Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran’s security and defense doctrine…
Why not? I’d guess that this is because Iran will be less secure if it develops nuclear weapons, which could lead to an Israeli nuclear strike that would destroy not only the nuclear program but the entire country.
There is another reason for hope that diplomacy can stop Iran’s nuclear program short of making weapons. Rouhani knows that sanctions relief, which he needs urgently to fulfill his electoral promises of improving Iran’s economy, will require US Congressional action. The Congress will not lift sanctions unless it is certain that Iran cannot and will not develop nuclear weapons. If Rouhani is serious about getting sanctions lifted, he must also understand what this entails for transparency, verifiability and irreversibility.
Of course there is a possibility that the Iranians aren’t serious at all but are just conducting a charm offensive to buy time while they proceed apace to develop nuclear weapons and even use them. This possibility argues for a deadline for nuclear negotiations with Iran. The problem with a deadline is that it is a species of red line. We would have to specify what comes if the deadline isn’t met.
I would suggest adding to Administration policy a soft deadline: an expectation, publicly expressed, that we get a satisfactory agreement on Iran’s nuclear program within 2014. What happens after that is all too clear from voting and discussions in the US Congress. Restating it publicly only raises the ire and strength of anti-Rouhani forces in Iran. The end of 2014 is about when Israeli patience is likely to run out anyway, raising the specter of a less than 100% effective conventional military attack that causes the Iranians to recommit and accelerate their effort to develop nuclear weapons.
But the key point is this: if Iran gets nuclear weapons, the risk of a nuclear war in which it will suffer the worst consequences rises, not only because of Tehran’s decisions but because of Israel’s calculations. It would be foolish to doubt Israel’s willingness to use nuclear weapons against a nuclear weapons state in order to ensure the Jewish state’s survival. The Israelis are surely no less committed to survival than the Americans were when they faced the Soviets and were prepared to use nuclear weapons first. It is still US policy to assure “no first use” only against non-nuclear states in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. Once Iran has nuclear weapons, nuclear war can happen not only because of a real threat from Tehran but also from a misunderstanding (genuine or willful) in Washington or Jerusalem (Tel Aviv for those who prefer).
Containment is not a stable outcome, as it was in a situation where destruction was mutually assured. For Tehran, it is perilous and to be avoided, preferably by diplomacy based on calculations of Iran’s real interests. Israel will be justifiably hard to satisfy with a diplomatic outcome, but it would be far better and less precarious than containment.
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Diplomats v. intelligence analysts
It will take me more time and energy than I can spare from the Middle East these days to plow through all the 300 documents the Clinton library has decided to publish on “Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency.” I gather that the spin that accompanies this material is how effective the CIA Balkans Task Force was. I’m in no position to give an overall evaluation of that proposition, but let me take a hard look at its November 22, 1994 memo on the Bosnian Federation.
The gist of the memo is this: Read more
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