Tag: Israel/Palestine
The rich get richer
Yesterday’s conference on investment prospects in the wake of the Arab Spring over at the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was a lively couple of hours–these economic types are briefer and more to the point than their political counterparts–but the bottom line was gloomy: the GCC states and Iraq are likely to attract the lion’s share of investment while Egypt and Tunisia (Syria, Yemen and Libya weren’t even mentioned) go begging in the short term. There was disagreement on longer-term prospects, with Ian Bremmer registering a strong minority view that the geopolitics are unfavorable, both because of Iran and the Israel/Palestine conflict.
An upbeat and indefatigible Afshin Molavi started off underlining that we live in a world of surprisingly interconnected risk, that there is a lot of diversity in what we should not really label “Arab Spring,” and that the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) has a young population, many unable to get married because of the lack of jobs and looking for “dignity.” Growth has now slowed, hurting their prospects.
Citibank’s Hamid Biglari said investors have adopted a wait and see attitude toward the more revolutionary part of the region and are shifting their attention towards the GCC and Iraq, whose prospects are good if Baghdad can get security under control. Multinationals are not pulling out. Egypt is a larger and better known market than Tunisia, which however is more homogeneous, more secular, more middle class and better educated. Tunisia is more likely to succeed economically, but Egypt is the bigger prize. The immediate concerns of investors are about legitimacy and whether the new governments will treat the old elite decently, but it will be a decade before “equilibrium” returns.
Ian Bremmer of Eurasia Group admitted enthusiasm for the Arab Spring (“it feels good”) but noted that Ukraine and Georgia felt good at first too. Tunisia seems to be moving in the right direction, Egypt less so but will likely muddle through. Iraq is the most exciting investment opportunity in the region. U.S. influence is declining, and Saudi influence is increasing. Saudi policy objectives and conditionality will differ from those of the U.S. Overall though the immediate political risks have been overvalued. The problem is in the longer term, both because of Iran and the Israel/Palestine conflict. Europe and the U.S. will increasingly be occupied with other problems.
Cairo-based Walid Bakr of Riyada Enterprise Development, Abraaj Capital, was more optimistic in the medium and long term. Egypt’s big market and tourist attractions are not going away. Half the population is under 24, well educated and internet savvy, with lots of entrepreneurial spirit. The revolution has unleashed strong feelings of national pride and dignity. Youth is the engine of growth and can contribute to the all-important creation of small and medium enterprises so vital to job creation and wealth distribution.
Dubai-based Yasar Jarrar of PwC Middle East underlined that we are still at the beginning of the changes in the Middle East, which suffered a long period of stagnation (not real stability). The GCC countries are moving well to kickstart job creation for youth, major infrastructure investments and dialogue between their governments and the citizens. But it is going to be a long spring in a region that really does matter. Philip Haddad of Mubadala Infrastructure Partners agreed that we need to take the long view, but in the meanwhile as much as $38 billion is being invested in infrastructure, which is not bad.
The Omani ambassador, Hunaina Sultan Ahmed al-Mughairy, led off with a very upbeat assessment of the Sultanate’s prospects. The message was “yes, we can” reform ourselves, if we put our minds to it. Jean Francois Seznec of Georgetown said he was very pessimistic about Bahrain, where the basic issue is governance. In recent weeks, only 5% of the hotel rooms in Bahrain have been occupied.
There was a good deal of agreement that the issue everywhere is at least in part governance. Citizens did not feel they were benefiting under the old regimes, because of a lack of accountability. Political and economic reform need to go together, but it is not clear that new parliamentary democracies will credit competence and choose economic reform, which is discredited because it is associated with the old regimes.
Wrapping up, Ravi Vish of MIGA confirmed the importance of governance, addressing social inequality and the income gap, and job creation, mainly through a stronger and more entrepreneurial private sector. He also reviewed MIGA’s portfolio of political insurance products, for which demand is naturally rising in the region.
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Avoiding a September Israel/Palestine train wreck
Doom and gloom over at Woodrow Wilson this morning: Shai Feldman and Aaron David Miller in particular foresee no prospect of agreement under current conditions. Train wreck is more likely, Feldman believes: what happens in New York will trigger youth demonstrations in Palestine. This will threaten the Palestinian establishment (Fatah especially) and force it into a more radical posture. Politics in both Palestine and Israel militate against a conflict-ending settlement. In the absence of some unexpected event, or act of unusual statesmanship, prospects are not good.
Nevertheless, Hussein Ibish suggests that there is some possibility of incremental progress in the fall at the General Assembly. Palestine will not become a member of the UN, because the U.S. will veto. What is important, according to Ibish, is that Palestinian progress in state-building be preserved and sustained. He believes there are real possibilities for avoiding a counter-productive clash at the UN. The Palestinians will not press a General Assembly resolution if negotiations are restarted, and they can accept something less than UN membership in order to back off.
Palestinian unity is not really on the horizon, Ibish suggests. The Hamas/Palestine Liberation Organization agreement is nothing more than an agreement to agree, but in fact there is still no agreement on anything important. They can’t even agree on who should be prime minister, much less on things more important than that, like how to deal with Israel.
Jackson Diehl suggests the U.S. has a good deal to lose from vetoing Palestinian membership in the UN. The Saudis have already warned that they will react. Aaron David Miller asks if there is a way to avoid Washington being put in this position? Is this sufficient reason for Obama to launch a grand initiative to solve the Israel/Palestine conflict? Or, Shai Feldman asks, is there something more modest that could be done, like adopting the Obama parameters (from his speech in May) as the basis for future negotiations? Aaron David Miller suggests this is a real possibility, with the Obama speech (including 1967 borders) as a common frame of reference.
But how close are they to a deal, Diehl asks? Shai Feldman thinks Netanyahu may be focused on demographic trends, which have been presented recently to the Israeli cabinet. The issue for him is not Palestine, whose population he envisages in a separate state, but rather the Arab population of Israel. This is the issue that may pull Netanyahu toward the center, as it has other Israeli leaders, and push him into serious negotiations.
Hussein Ibish thinks the sides are far apart on the issues. There will be no quick breakthrough. But once gaps start closing, they could close quickly. Nothing will happen without restarting the negotiations, so that is the way out of the September train wreck, even if Aaron David Miller suggests though there is nothing worse than another failed negotiation effort.
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The lemonade gambit
Regular readers of www.peacefare.net will know that I don’t usually refer to Tom Friedman, who often strikes me as more facile and glib than profound. But his What To Do With Lemons in yesterday’s New York Times seems to me right on: there is going to have to be a UN General Assembly resolution on Palestine this fall, so why not make it one that says something useful and gets the peace process restarted?
His proposed resolution would read:
This body reaffirms that the area of historic Palestine should be divided into two homes for two peoples — a Palestinian Arab state and a Jewish state. The dividing line should be based on the 1967 borders — with mutually agreed border adjustments and security arrangements for both sides. This body recognizes the Palestinian state as a member of the General Assembly and urges both sides to enter into negotiations to resolve all the other outstanding issues.
Friedman suggests this be passed not in the General Assembly, where resolutions are like pre-season football games (sometimes well played but they don’t count in the standings), but instead in the Security Council.
What are the tradeoffs here? The Palestinians get General Assembly membership (Friedman’s wording on this point needs some work though) and reference to the 1967 borders as the basis for any adjustments as well as reference to security arrangements. Security is generally regarded as an “Israel” issue, but there are many ways in which it applies also to Palestine. Israel gets recognition as a Jewish state, something Friedman notes was mentioned explicitly in the original 1947 UN partition resolution.
I’d have some concern that the specific wording Friedman suggests could be abused by Jewish extremists, some of whom would like Arabs to leave Israel and go to the newly independent Palestine, but that could be fixed. New population displacement would be an unwelcome development.
More important: Friedman’s suggestion does nothing to guide resolution of two other critical questions: return of refugees and Jerusalem. I imagine he would say these issues should be resolved in the subsequent negotiations. But the temptation of the parties to want any new resolution to tilt in their favor will make it difficult to leave these issues out.
The important thing here is not the specific wording: it is the idea of getting a resolution, whether through the General Assembly or the Security Council, that makes a positive contribution. That would be far better than a one-sided resolution that isolates Israel and the United States in the General Assembly, or is vetoed by the United States in the Security Council.
Something similar was achieved last fall, when a Serbian demand for General Assembly resolution on Kosovo was turned into a generally acceptable appeal for Belgrade/Pristina talks on practical issues that are reportedly now close to reaching some modest conclusions. The Middle East diplomatic challenge is orders of magnitude greater, but the Friedman gambit–to turn lemons into lemonade–might still work.
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Marvel the Syrians!
From Hama, yesterday:
You’ve got to admire the fortitude and organizational capability of the Syrians. Josh Landis has the most complete coverage I’ve seen of both the “Friday of the Children of Freedom” and the opposition conclave Wednesday and Thursday in Antalya, Turkey.
The demonstrators inside Syria managed to turn out in good numbers to protest the torture and murder by security forces of a 13-year-old boy as well as other atrocities against children, despite shut-down of a large part of the internet and cell phone systems. Damascus and Aleppo, the country’s two biggest cities, are still not turning out big numbers, but yesterday’s demonstrations were widespread and energetic according to the reports that have leaked out. Several dozen people appear to have been killed.
The opposition meeting in Antalya that ended Thursday not only reached agreement on a statement (not yet available in its entirety) but also elected an executive board. So far as I can tell, the program focuses on getting rid of Bashar al Assad in favor of his vice president and holding free and fair elections within a year. There is talk as well of maintaining separation of state and religion as well as Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Kurdish representation in Antalya was strong, so this is significant). The Washington Post reported:
The statement also called for the creation of a democratic, secular Syrian state, in which freedom of worship would be guaranteed, but religion would play no role, and the rights of the country’s minorities would be respected.
All of this is fine, but of course the big problem is the regime’s determination to hold on to power. My understanding is that the protesters are not promising amnesty to Bashar al Assad, who therefore has a choice of using maximum repression to stay in power or expatriating himself to some safe haven. All indicators are that he is determined to hold on.
The protesters now have the challenge of maintaining nonviolent discipline and unity while under enormous pressure from the security forces. They also need eventually to spread their mass mobilization efforts into the centers of Damascus and Aleppo. Only when some of the security forces begin to hesitate–when they refuse to fire on protesters or even join them–will the revolution in Syria begin to see the fruits of its labors. Connecting with the army, some units of which are believed to be less committed to Bashar al Assad than others, needs to be a priority objective. This is likely to happen earlier in the provinces than in the major cities, where Assad will station the most loyal troops.
The international community is still proving ineffective on Syria. No UN Security Council resolution has emerged, despite expectations earlier in the week. Washington is sounding a bit more stentorian, but nevertheless holding on to the slim hope that Assad will institute reforms. The Wall Street Journal had a good article Friday detailing Obama Administration efforts to win Assad over to a settlement with Israel and a break with Hizbollah, Hamas and Iran. The odds of that now seem vanishingly small, but I suppose someone in the White House (and in Senator Kerry’s office) may still harbor hopes.
The die is cast. Either Assad will succeed, as his father did, in repressing the protests with state violence or he will have to yield to what is beginning to look like a more or less united, determined and focused revolution.
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A soggy version of the Arab spring
Big Carnegie Endowment/Harvard discussion of Arab Spring yesterday. Outcome: pretty gloomy. But these are experts, who admittedly failed to see the budding of the Arab Spring and are unlikely to be able to predict its course either. They all acknowledged the many unknowns and the difficulties of prediction.
Marwan Muasher, who prefers reform from above, thinks doing nothing in response to the protests is no longer an option but also noted there is more “empire strikes back” (Libya, Yemen, Syria) and “buying time with money” (the Gulf) than “promises of reform” (thin in Jordan, a bit more serious in Morocco). And his criteria for successful reform from above were exacting: it has to be holistic and inclusive, power has to be shared seriously, it should be gradual and measurable. Nothing makes the cut yet.
No optimism from Marina Ottaway either. She noted that even in Tunisia and Egypt there are problems of political will to complete the reform process, that some of the politicians formerly associated with the ruling parties will be able to recycle themselves, that secular parties are weak and fragmented, that Islamists may be a bit stronger but also fragmented, with Salafi influence rising. It is not clear yet what the protesters will be able or willing to do politically, and it is too early to count the military out.
Tarek Masoud did not like what he sees in Egypt. He noted the intense conflict among political forces and between political forces and the military, with the military wary of democracy. They don’t want democratic oversight, fear the demand for justice and don’t want to break with past policy on Israel and the U.S. The military would like to reign without ruling, keeping out of the public eye and avoiding responsibility for governing. They have already made mistakes by scheduling the constitutional referendum, then having to fix the amended constitution with their own constitutional declaration. Early elections will favor Islamists, and opening the constitution to a constituent assembly will open the question of the relationship between state and religion, which is not a good idea. The future holds more discord.
So spring wasn’t so cheery. How about the U.S. policy response?
Nick Burns praised President Obama’s relatively rapid and thoroughly nuanced response in a difficult international situation. He was not too late to support the Tahrir protesters, correctly hesitated about Libya but signed on in response to the Arab League appeal in light of Gaddafi’s threat to Benghazi, and gave the Gulfies more slack because there was no rebellion to sign on to in Saudi Arabia, Oman or Qatar. Only under questioning did Nick state baldly that he could not understand why we hadn’t zapped Bashar al Assad earlier and admit that in Bahrain Washington had chosen interests over values. Nick urged that we focus on Egypt, decrease out focus on governments and security, increase our focus on development and outreach to people, move on Israel/Palestine and shift to a containment policy on Iran.
Agreeing that the case-by-case contextual approach was the right one, Steve Walt concluded that we would soon face Arab governments more sensitive to public opinion, that there would be no easy fixes for the problems of over-centralization and corruption in the Arab countries, Western governments are not flush and would find it hard to ante up, Israel’s position would be weakened as Egypt and Jordan became less compliant to U.S. wishes and that U.S. strategy in the region is obsolete even if its interests are the same as always: unhindered flow of oil and gas, nuclear nonproliferation, countering terrorism and protecting Israel. A more effective policy would pay more attention to Arab public opinion, embrace reform, sustain multipolarity in the region, get U.S. troops out (to an offshore balancing role, naturally, that would still prevent others from exerting control), internationalize the Israel/Palestine peace process (including encouragement of European support for the Palestine resolution at the GA and a possible settlement imposed by the Security Council). Most importantly: we need to stop threatening Iran, which gives Tehran incentives to build nuclear weapons and attempt more creative (unspecified) diplomacy. In response to a question, Walt said he also thought we need a residual force in Iraq to counter Iran.
Chris Boucek, focused mainly on Yemen, warned of economic meltdown, suggested we manage the Saudis better and noted that the youthful protesters are espousing our ideals.
There was a good deal more, but this gives you the flavor: the U.S. focus on stability, peace and democracy has failed: no stability, little prospect for peace and not much for democracy either. Burns and Walt, each in his own way, thought the U.S. could still play an important role, but no one was sanguine about the prospects for the Arab spring or U.S. interests in its aftermath.
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Veh is mir!
The issue is not the 1967 border–President Obama did not ask the Israelis to accept it, but to use it as the basis for negotiation of territorial swaps that would result in a more secure and defensible Israeli border. There is nothing controversial about that. It is what all Israeli prime ministers before Netanyahu have accepted.
Nor did Netanyahu use his speech to Congress to pick at that scab. In fact, he was at pains to close ranks with President Obama as much as possible. But note that he did not talk about “swaps,” which imply equal exchanges of territory, only about generosity.
But he made it clear that he is asking much more than other Israeli prime ministers have been prepared to accept. He wants explicit recognition of Israel as a Jewish state (the existing PLO recognition of Israel tout court is not sufficient), he wants all of Jerusalem (which would presumably preclude part of it being the capital of Palestine), he wants Israeli troops along the Jordan river (not clear to me which way the guns will be pointing), he wants no return of Palestinian refugees to Israel (even though Israel would end up with the lion’s share of the land).
And he expects American support for these positions, which would wreck any near-term hope of a negotiated agreement. So does he really accept the two-state solution? I think not, despite his explicit reference to it as free, viable and independent.
The next big move in this diplomatic game will be at the General Assembly in the fall, when the Palestinians attempt to get a resolution that will “recognize” their state. This is a bit silly, since the GA doesn’t recognize states, and GA resolutions are cheaper by the dozen and often ignored. But Israeli and American opposition to the resolution has made it symbolically important. The GA does recommend states for UN membership, but President Obama has signaled clearly that the U.S. would veto that in the Security Council, which has the final say.
My grandmother would support Netanyahu. I say what she taught me: “oy, veh is mir.”
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