Tag: Israel/Palestine
Two state shuffle
Following on the signing of a “unity” agreement between Fatah (which controls the West Bank) and Hamas (which controls Gaza), Hamas leader Khaled Meshal said in Cairo yesterday that his organization is now committed to seeking a two-state solution for (Israel and Palestine). According to the New York Times, he said he was prepared to accept a common Palestinian platform that includes:
a Palestinian state in the 1967 lines with Jerusalem as its capital, without any settlements or settlers, not an inch of land swaps and respecting the right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel itself.
At the same time, Ziad abu Zayyad, editor of the Palestine-Israel Journal, was at the Middle East Institute in Washington at an event presided over by Ambassador Phil Wilcox, now president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace. Abu Zayyad claimed that Hamas has evolved away from its own political platform, as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) did. Hamas today is acting as “frontier guards” for Israel, preventing more radical groups from launching rocket attacks and other unproductive forms of resistance. Hamas accepts a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank with its capital in East Jerusalem.
Abu Zayyad was at pains to recall that the “unity” agreement was originally an Egyptian proposal accepted by Fatah in 2009, when Hamas rejected it. Saying that its earlier rejection was due to people influenced by Israel and the United States [sic], Hamas has now accepted it without changes (abu Zayyad did not mention annexes added by Hamas, according to the New York Times). The agreement lacks programmatic details, in particular a clear agreement on security forces. It is not clear what will happen on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza, but at least there will be a joint mechanism in which issues can be discussed and resolved. Hamas has come around now because of the Arab spring, which has increased Egyptian pressure and made Hamas uncertain of continued Syrian support and anxious for international legitimacy. The demonstrations in Gaza he thought of relatively minor importance.
The agreement is important, abu Zayyad thought, because it enables the Palestinians to offer a partner for peace, which Israel has complained is lacking. Israel has exploited the period of Palestinian division to intensify settlement activity without facing serious international pushback. It continues to focus on occupying more land, which is making a two-state solution more difficult. Unity will be helpful in the Palestinian effort to gain UN membership in September. If that effort fails, the Palestinians will be better off because neither Hamas nor Fatah will be able to blame the other. Unity will help to make Israel pay a higher cost for continued occupation.
Asked if the U.S. should put forward a detailed proposal, abu Zayyad said the Palestinians no longer trust Washington, because of its veto of a recent UN Security Council resolution on settlements that was consistent with U.S. policy.
Let’s not get our hopes up: Meshal’s version of the two-state solution is far from what Israel would want, both on land swaps and refugee returns, and even in abu Zayyad’s milder version there was no indication that Hamas would give up violence or opposition in principle to the Jewish state. But something does seem to be shifting within Hamas. Let’s hope Israel can also find ways to shift in the direction of a two state solution.
PS: While I was at abu Zayyad’s talk, he did not address the statement of Gaza (Hamas) Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, who said the operation to kill Osama bin Laden was “the continuation of the American oppression and shedding of blood of Muslims and Arabs.” He did claim that Hamas is anxious to distinguish itself from the extreme religious “salafis,” which Haniyeh’s statement definitely did not do. I understand that after I left abu Zayyad expressed his own amazement at Haniyeh’s statement.
PS: Apologies for an earlier version of this post, which misspelled abu Zayyad’s name.
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You make peace with your enemies
News of Hamas/Fatah rapproachement–that’s diplomatese for kissing and making up–has agitated Israel and the United States, which found it more convenient to deal with divided Palestinians and pursue peace only with the Palestinian Authority, which controls the West Bank. Washington and Tel Aviv say Hamas, which controls Gaza, is a terrorist organization that targets Israeli civilians and is therefore not a legitimate negotiating partner.
This is odd. You make peace with your enemies. Israel is well within its rights to defend against Hamas and otherr attacks, including by attacking Gaza (as it has repeatedly). But to refuse to negotiate with the people doing the most harm condemns Israel to perpetual war. And to expect the Palestinians to remain divided so that Israel can deal with the ones it likes and not with the ones it doesn’t like is unrealistic.
The vital question is whether there is any hope for peace with Hamas. Opinions differ on this important issue. A former head of the Mossad and national security advisor to Ariel Sharon suggests it is worth a try. Three years ago most Israelis agreed. Many others say no. Hamas says peace talks with Israel are not on the agenda of the interim government it is to form with Fatah in preparation for Palestinian elections.
So Israel and the United States have something like eight months to think about this issue. Unfortunately, Israel will do so with a government that seems not to want peace on terms that are even remotely acceptable to the Palestinians. We’ll hear more about this side of things directly from Prime Minister Netanyahu when he addresses the U.S. Congress next month. The Americans have had little luck with the so-called Middle East peace process so far. Will they, and the Israelis, be prepared to talk with a new, post-election Palestinian Authority that will likely include Hamas participation in some form? And will Hamas be prepared to talk with Israel and the United States?
The flux in the Arab world makes it really very difficult to imagine the conditions under which such decisions will be made eight months hence. Let’s hope they improve the likelihood of a serious peace process.
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The Passover of Arab liberation
Tonight is the beginning of Passover, the holiday celebrating the founding narrative of the Jewish people, which is also regarded by many non-Jews as the archetypal liberation story.
This Passover is the first in my lifetime that we can truly cast Egypt in the liberation story not only as the oppressor but also as the people liberating themselves. I’ve watched and commented enthusiastically for months now on the events unfolding in North Africa and the Middle East. For those of us privileged to live in a relatively free and prosperous country, the courage and conviction of those demonstrating nonviolently for freedom in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Syria is thrilling. Unlike the ancient Jews, they are not trying to leave the countries that have kept them captive but instead are trying to revolutionize them, creating political systems that will allow far wider margins of freedom to speak, associate and choose their rulers than existed anywhere in the Arab world until now.
Jews of course worry about what the Arab revolutions of 2011 mean for world politics in general and Israel in particular. But my sense of the relatively liberal and secularized community in which I live and pray is that the revolutions have the benefit of doubt. Lots of us anticipate that a liberated Egypt will give greater support to the Palestinian cause, but we may also think that is a necessary ingredient in completing the Middle East peace process. As the Palestinian papers all too clearly reveal, Israel has been less than forthcoming and more than recalcitrant, passing up decent offers from the Palestinian Authority that might have opened the door to resolution.
Americans of all religions also worry about the implications of the revolutions for their interests in political stability, countering violent extremism and reliability of oil supplies. Most it seems to me have gradually tilted towards support for the demonstrators, as has the Obama Administration, even in Yemen. This is made relatively easy by the fact that the revolutions have not yet touched directly on U.S. oil interests: none of the countries so far involved is a major supplier. Where U.S. interests and values have been most at odds–in Bahrain because of the 5th Fleet presence and Saudi Arabia because of oil–the tilt has been in favor of interests. Washington has essentially supported the Saudi and Bahraini monarchies in their efforts to buy off and repress dissent, even if those same monarchies are angry at Washington for promoting revolution elsewhere.
Libya is a special case. There some of the demonstrators chose to respond to violence with violence. The international community has backed them against the Gaddafi regime, but so far at least the results are less than satisfactory. It can be very difficult to dislodge an autocrat with violence, as that is their preferred method. They can and do escalate. The Gaddafi regime will not win in Libya, but it has already created a mess that will be difficult to repair. While Tunisia and now Egypt seem headed down paths that will lead to more open and democratic societies, Libya will need a lot more help to find its way after its devastating experience under Gaddafi and the war that will end his rule.
The outcome in Syria is also in doubt. As I noted yesterday, Syrians need to decide what they really want: the promise of responsiveness from a still autocratic regime, or real choices about how they are governed. Liberation will not be easy, as Bashar al Assad is brutal, determined and marginally more “enlightened” than some of the other autocrats in the Middle East. The benign despotism he is offering may well attract some Syrians, especially those who thrive under the current regime.
My message for Bashar and for all the other leaders on this Passover of the Arab rebellions, is simple: let your people go!
Here they are, in Homs, Syria, today:
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The world beyond Egypt
I’ve been so caught up in Egypt for 10 days, and Tunisia before that, I’m feeling the need for one of those quickie updates, so here goes (even if there is relatively little progress to report):
- Iran: P5+1 Ankara meeting at the end of January went badly, some say because Ahmedinejad did not take advantage of what the Americans were offering. I don’t think we’ve heard the last of it.
- Pakistan: Messy (that’s what I call it when a President has to call for a roundtable conference), but no big crisis.
- North Korea: Quiescent for the moment, but mil/mil talks have stalled.
- Afghanistan: Lots of reports of military progress from David Petraeus, and some sign that the Taliban may be looking for negotiations, or at least that is how I interpret their putting out the word that they might break with Al Qaeda.
- Iraq: some Arab/Kurdish progress that will allow oil to flow north. My friend Reidar Visser doesn’t think that’s good, but I do.
- Israel/Palestine: Biggest news has been the Palestine papers, widely interpreted to suggest Palestinian weakness, ineptitude or both. I think they show the Israelis overplaying their hand to no good purpose.
- Egypt: Trouble. This is what I said at the end of the year: “succession plans founder as the legitimacy of the parliament is challenged in the streets and courts. Mubarak hangs on, but the uncertainties grow.” Did I get it right? All but that part about the courts anyway.
- Haiti: Presidential runoff postponed to March 20. President Preval’s favorite will not be on the ballot; former first lady Mirlande Manigat will face singer Michel Martelly.
- Al Qaeda: No news is good news.
- Yemen/Somalia: Yemen’s President Saleh has so far proved immune to Egyptian flu, but itmay not last forever. Parliament in Somalia has extended its own mandate for three more years, dismaying the paymasters in Washington and other capitals. Nice democracy lesson.
- Sudan: The independence referendum passed, as predicted (no genius in that). Lots of outstanding issues under negotiation. President Bashir is behaving himself, some say because of the carrots Washington has offered. In my experience indictment has that effect on most people.
- Lebanon: Indictments delivered, not published, yet.
- Syria: President Bashar al Assad is doing even better than Bashir of Yemen. No demonstrations materialized at all.
- Ivory Coast: Gbagbo and his entourage are still waiting for their first-class plane tickets. African Union is factfinding, in preparation for mediation. Could this be any slower?
- Zimbabwe: Mugabe continues to defy, sponsors riot in Harare. No real progress on implementation of powersharing agreement with the opposition.
- Balkans: Bosnia stuck on constitutional reform, Kosovo/Serbia dialogue blocked by government formation in Pristina, Macedonia still hung up on the “name” issue. See a pattern here? Some people just recycle their old problems.
- Tunisia: At last some place where there is progress: the former ruling party has been shuttered. Don’t hold your breath for that to happen in Egypt!
PS: on Algeria, see this interesting piece.
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Israelis are from Chelm
It is going to be really hard to say anything new or interesting about the Palestine Papers released by Al Jazeera. The Guardian gives a clear and concise video account of what it believes it has found in them–and they’ve had more time to read them than anyone else besides AJ.
Matt Duss has an admirable, and admirably short, piece at the Wonk Room, emphasizing how the leaked papers demonstrate the overbearing strength of the Israelis (supported by the U.S.) and the weakness of the Palestinians, which will now be exacerbated because the publication of the papers will embarrass the Palestinian Authority and empower Hamas.
And Michael Collins Dunn at the Middle East Institute graces us with this bit of good common sense: “I suspect the key is going to be finding out not just what’s in the headlines but what the documents actually say.”
Of course the problem is that by the time serious people figure out what the papers actually say others will have exploited them for journalistic and diplomatic purposes, making what they actually say pretty much irrelevant.
So here is my quick take: the papers tell us more about the Israelis than about the Palestinians. They demonstrate what we already knew and commented on, namely that the Israelis have a lot better alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). But that is only true in the near term.
In the long term, not only are we all dead, but in the next generation or the one after that there will no longer a Jewish majority in the territory Israel governs, unless a separate Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and Gaza. This is how I put it in November:
Continuing to build Jewish settlements in the West Bank is making it hard to picture a viable two-state solution. Netanyahu says he wants the Arabs to accept Israel as a Jewish state, but his pursuit of his BATNA is putting the country into a demographic trap: the more settlements he builds, the harder it gets to picture a viable Palestinian state, which is an indispensable component of a two-state solution, and the more likely it gets that Israel/Palestine will end up as a single state, which eventually won’t have a Jewish majority.
So Israel and Palestine are careening towards an outcome neither wants, with leadership on the Israeli side that doesn’t want to take the risks required to prevent it and leadership on the Palestinian side that lacks any means to prevent it. Slo-mo train wreck.
So in a way, the papers show an Israeli leadership that, though strong, is not bold and is therefore losing in the longer term a game in which it is dominant in the shorter term. Surely if I knew my Chelm stories well, I’d be able to dredge one up at this point to demonstrate the point through Jewish folklore, in which the residents of Chelm think of themselves as smart but do foolish, self-defeating things. Instead I grabbed this one from Wikipedia:
One Jewish Chelm resident bought a fish on Friday in order to cook it for Sabbath. He put the live fish underneath his coat and the fish slapped his face with his tail. He went to the Chelm court to submit a charge and the court sentenced the fish to death by drowning.
Anyone notice the resemblance to the Israeli negotiators?
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Dominoes anyone?
The metaphorical game in international relations is often chess, or escalation, or maybe just the adjectival “great” game. But these days we seem to be playing that old standby, dominoes, more than anything else: will Iran getting nuclear weapons lead to others getting them? will Tunisia’s revolt spread? will North Korea’s erratic behavior precipitate in one way or another refugee flows into China that Beijing will want to prevent?
As Stephen Walt points out, revolutions don’t usually spread like wildfire. The demonstration effect of what happens in Tunisia may be strong, but it is uncertain what the outcome is and therefore what events there will “demonstrate.” I still wouldn’t call it a revolution, since the prior regime is very much in place, not only in the salubrious sense that the constitution is being implemented but in the less salubrious sense that the old guard remains in key offices. Only the President and his coterie are gone. Tunisia is looking for the moment more like a palace or military coup in response to popular uprising than like a real revolution. I can imagine that being imitated in more than one Arab country.
With respect to Iran and nuclear weapons, Johan Bergenas argues his case against the dominoes falling well, but unfortunately the argument against a nuclear Iran remains strong even without the worst case scenario, as he acknowledges. While diplomats, spooks and geeks (or maybe I should say spoogeeks?) in the U.S. and Israel are chuckling over Stuxnet’s damage to Iranian centrifuges, the problem remains as great as always. We just have more time to find, or not to find, a solution. I’m no fan of Hillary Mann and Flynt Leverett’s triumphalist version of today’s Iran, but I also don’t buy Tehran Bureau’s defeatist version. President Ahmedinejad still looks pretty strong, having managed his personnel challenges to the Supreme Leader as well as his economic reforms and their political impact better than many expected.
China’s willingness to save our bacon with North Korea is but one of the Washington myths that Mort Abramowitz pooh-poohs, suggesting that if we had a clearer and more consistent policy of our own we might be better off than relying on Beijing to do the right thing. In any event, the Chinese seem to be finding the discomfort that North Korea causes “not unwelcome,” as the diplomats say, and they fear more refugee flows arising from the regime change Washington might like than anything else.
So dominoes don’t look like such a good game, and in my experience they are not, being a Vietnam generation fogy. That said, I feel reasonably certain that our weak response to North Korea’s nuclear testing has in fact encouraged the Iranians to move ahead to acquiring whatever technology they think they need to become at least a virtual nuclear power. Did we ever deprive Brazil of its technology after it forswore nuclear weapons and signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco? Or South Africa?
That is the thing about dominoes. When they fall, the consequences are often irreversible, and the directions they fall in unpredictable. I hope that the outcome of last week’s events in Tunisia is not only democratic but relatively liberal and Western-oriented. Many of us–I include myself–will regret the cheering we did from the sidelines if Al Qaeda in the Maghreb finds haven in North Africa, where its recruiting efforts are already strong.
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