Tag: Moldova
Stevenson’s army, October 28 and 29
– Fed Kaplan critiques the nuclear posture review.
– Atlantic Council team has good menu of options related to Russian nukes in Ukraine.
– Robert Draper worries about the GOP.
– WaPo says Russians are undermining Moldova.
– National Security Archive has more on how JFK lied to keep Cuban missile deal secret.
I failed to post yesterday’s edition:
– DOD released its new National Defense Strategy. Here’s NYT analysis. The Guardian notes the nuclear posture section.
– National Security Archive has JCS documents during Cuban missile crisis.
– House Veterans Affairs Committee warns of extremists in the military.
– House GOP plans tough China policy.
– Somalia wants more US drone strikes.
– Army strategist has good ideas for defense innovation.
NYT has good background on micro-targeting of political ads.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Where the line is drawn matters
I am going to go out on a limb. Broadly speaking, the Ukraine war can end with three outcomes:
- Complete Russian withdrawal from the 2013 borders of Ukraine.
- Partition of Ukraine, with Crimea and perhaps some other slices of the south and east annexed by Russia.
- Russian victory.
Note that these are outcomes. They say nothing about the path, which could include war, political change in Moscow or Kyiv, or negotiations. Outcome 2. looks much more likely today than 1. or 3., but there really is no telling. Let’s assume for current purposes that Russia remains under the control of Putin, or someone with similar territorial ambitions. Let’s also assume that a pro-EU government remains in Kyiv. What are the implications from the American perspective of these possible outcomes?
Complete Russian withdrawal
Complete Russian withdrawal would leave Ukraine still at risk. It would want to join the EU, for which it has already applied, and NATO. The former is a real possibility, provided Ukraine reforms its politics and economy to qualify. But the latter is unlikely. It would require all NATO members to agree. Several will be reluctant.
This circle can be squared, as it has been during wartime. NATO would need to provide security guarantees to Ukraine ensuring the kind of support Ukraine has received since February. This would ideally include not just ammunition and equipment, but also training, intelligence, logistics, funding, and political solidarity. A Ukrainian win will not be cost free.
Partition
The costs will be higher if Ukraine is partitioned. Putin would claim victory. Russia would be an even greater continuing military threat. NATO would need to arm “rump” Ukraine to repel another potential Russian invasion and repress the kind of “hybrid warfare” Moscow would continue to conduct inside Kyiv-controlled territory. NATO would also need to counter Moscow’s intensified hybrid warfare campaigns in member state Hungary or non-member state Moldova.
Partition of Ukraine would also encourage Moscow to expand its support for partition elsewhere, especially the Balkans. There Serbian President Vucic would welcome expanded Russian support for his “Serbian world” efforts, which entail de facto or de jure partition of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kazakhstan, where there is a large Russian population, might also be at risk.
Russian victory
Russian victory, achieved by either military or political means, would entail the incorporation of all of Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence. Kyiv would be, like Minsk, subject to Moscow’s suzerainty. It would loyally follow Moscow’s foreign policy directives. Russia would likely garrison troops in Ukraine, which would be mostly disarmed.
Ukraine’s subjagation would put not just Hungary and Moldova at risk from hybrid warfare but also Poland, the Baltics, and other NATO members (possibly Romania and Slovakia) from Russian conventional as well as unconventional attack. Maintaining NATO solidarity would become more difficult as Moscow threatens these newer neighbors while leaving the older NATO members untouched.
Where the line is drawn matters
American diplomacy since the end of the Cold War has aimed for a Europe “whole and free.” That isn’t happening. The Ukraine war is drawing a new line. The question is whether that new line will go through or encompass Ukraine. If it does, NATO will pay a higher price. The cost will be lower, but still substantial, if Ukraine as a whole can complete its Western ambitions.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Another long war in the offing
Mark Hertling, a retired lieutenant general who knows his stuff, offers on Twitter a good explanation of what is going on inside Ukraine:
Ukrainians currently outgunned, but not forever
A few weeks ago, as the “new phase” was being discussed, I suggested we should look for a couple things happening in the east and south of Ukraine. We’re very early in that new phase & there are indicators those things are happening. Let’s review what we should see. What RU has done is reinforce with lots (repeat, LOTS) of tube and rocket artillery. That is according to RU doctrine. To penetrate an enemy’s defense, RU uses mass artillery barrages all along the front. They’ve been doing that. And it is deadly.
There’s two ways to counter massive artillery strikes. 1. Get out from under it (giving up land) 2. Conduct counterfire with your own artillery after pinpointing the enemy’s guns with radar. While Ukraine’s army (UA from here out) have some Russian 152 mm cannons, and they are receiving LOTS of guns (155 mm cannons) from the US & NATO, there’s 2 problems. 1. UA is running low on 152 (Russian) ammo 2. The western guns/ammo ain’t there yet.
Yeah, yeah, I know @PentagonPresSec said the guns/radars are arriving fast, and *some* are already there. But they’re not all at the front, with the ammo, just yet. Things just don’t magically move to the front & get into the fight immediately in combat. A seque: during combat our division fielded MRAPs (mine-resistant ambush protective) trucks, due to an IED threat. Trucks. Not hard to learn. Not hard to drive. No triggers to pull. It took us awhile. Fact: fielding ANY new equipment to units in combat takes time.
So there will be counterfire fights between RU and UA, but it might be awhile. So UA has to give up ground. When they do that, the RU will send in “reconnaissance in force” or RFI. Small combat units to take limited objectives in multiple places. That’s what we’re seeing now in several locations in the east & south. Lots of Russian artillery barrages against the front line, followed by smaller RU combat units attempting to seize terrain/cities/critical objectives. RU artillery is working.
The RU maneuver forces……are undermanned, not well supplied, not well led, are on ground they’re not familiar with, and they don’t do maneuver all that well. So we’re seeing RU forces temporarily take ground, then being pushed back by the smart, better led, more adaptive active defense of the UA. Finally…we’re about 7-10 days (at best) into this second phase. It will go for awhile. New forces are feeling each other out in the east. RU will initially outgun with arty, then it may become a big arty duel. But UA maneuver force will outperform the RU.
The other front
The other front is in Washington DC. There President Biden has launched a money salvo. He is asking for $33 billion more to support Ukraine. That is a lot of money, on top of $17 billion or so already spent. The Americans are also talking about using frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine.
These moves betoken a broadening of US objectives. Defense Secretary Austin says he wants to weaken Russia so it can’t in the future invade other countries. President Biden has labelled President Putin a genocial war criminal who should not remain in power. Secretary of State Biden is more circumspect, but it is clear that the Americans are now aiming for a clear Russian defeat and Putin’s fall from power (at the hands of his own people, Biden has clarified). These things are not happening anytime soon, so anticipate a long war and even more spending.
The Russians are also going long
The Russians have also changed their objectives. They gave up on capturing Kyiv and installing a puppet government there. Now they aim to take all of Donetsk and Luhansk in the east and the entire southern coast, most of which they already control. But they are stalled at Mykolaiv and will have a hard time swallowing a big city like Odesa, which had about one million inhabitants before the war.
The only major city they have taken so far is Mariupol, which they had to destroy to occupy. Resistance there continues. The Russians may try to use their 1500 or so troops in the Moldovan region of Transnistria to attack Ukraine from the west, but that should not be hard for the Ukrainians to counter. Russian artillery attacks on Kyiv while the UN Secretary General was visiting there signal Moscow’s determination to continue the fight, but current Russian objectives will not be achieved any time soon.
How long can Ukraine take it?
War often involves miscalculation, at least by one side or the other. Both the Americans and Russians have had to recalibrate. Only the Ukrainians have kept constant. They want to push the Russians entirely out from Ukrainian territory, but might well settle for Russian withdrawal to pre-February positions. The issue for Ukraine is how long its population can take the terrible devastation the Russians are wreaking. So far, the Ukrainians are stalwart. Another long war is in the offing.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, April 28
– WSJ says Russia making slow progress in southern Ukraine.
– Microsoft says Russia has been hacking Ukraine.
– Moldova events raise fears of wider war.
– Axios says pro-Israel groups have been involved in primary fights.
– RollCall notes that the Senate has been having only 1/3 as many votes on amendments as 30+ years ago. Only in passing does it mention what I think is the cause — repeated filling of the amendment tree.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, April 27
– UK says Ukraine controls most of its airspace.
– Russia halts gas shipments to Bulgaria & Poland.
– WaPo has background on Moldova .
– US warns Solomon Islands about China pact.
– UN modified rules on Security Council vetoes.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, April 23
[The magnificent “Merchant of Venice” ends its run at STC tomorrow.]
– An issue that may come up in next week’s discussion of the Courts is the Chevron Doctrine and delegation of powers to the bureaucracy. See this CRS report.
– Moldova worries about Russian threats
– Cornell prof says sanctions won’t stop the Ukraine war.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
RSS - Posts
