Tag: Morocco
Stevenson’s army, December 16
Military families need food assistance.
Iraq’s economy is collapsing.
White House meddled in CDC.
Somalia breaks relations with Kenya.
John Bolton criticizes Trump action on Morocco.
A reporter tries to tell what will happen to nuclear “football” if Trump skips inauguration.
The hawkish FDD has its policy recommendations.
Analogy of the day: writers call for “Goldwater-Nichols for emerging technology.”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, December 11
US changed policy on Morocco in order to get Israeli-Morocco agreement, but angering Sen. Inhofe. More background from NYT.
Senate failed to block UAE arms sale.
Sen. Paul delays NDAA because of Afghanistan; government shutdown threatened.
US helps Taliban by attacking ISIS.
At last, sanctions against Turkey.
Good reads from CNAS: on revising war powers; and on revising export controls.
Not sure of their criteria, but Hill has list of top lobbyists.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Forty-five years is too long to wait for a referendum
Bouela Lehbib, who was a Middle East Institute research intern with me in 2019 during his time as the first Fulbrighter from Western Sahara, writes:
The 29-year UN-brokered ceasefire that had been in place since September 1991 between the Polisario Front and Morocco has collapsed. Morocco’s military incursion on November 13 in the Guergarat’s buffer-strip — a UN- designated demilitarized zone in the south-western corner of Western Sahara — prompted the Polisario Front, a liberation movement seeking independence, to resume armed struggle.
Morocco claims its operation comes as a response to “restoring free circulation and commercial traffic” towards sub-Saharan Africa. It had been blocked since October 21 by dozens of Saharawi civilians protesting peacefully against what they consider Moroccan occupation of their land and plundering of their natural resources.
The Polisario Front sees Morocco’s move as a violation of the ceasefire and a bid to alter the status quo in its favor. Both parties had agreed according to the UN peace plan of 1991 to keep maintain the status quo until the final status of the territory is decided.
Tensions have been on the rise in Guergarat since 2016, when Morocco tried to asphalt an approximately 5-km road in Western Sahara, across the buffer strip and into Mauritania near Nouadhibou. The Polisario interfered with the work, claiming it was illegal. The military agreement No.1, signed in the late 1990s, forbids any military presence in the buffer strip. It allows, though, Saharawi civilian circulation under Polisario Front control.
There was no crossing point at the time of the ceasefire agreement. It was introduced by Morocco on March 2001. Although MINURSO, the UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara, warned Morocco the road construction and change of the status quo “raised sensitive issues and involve activities that could be in violation of the ceasefire agreement,” the latter went ahead with the work.
For Rabat, ensuring a crossing point and an asphalted road in Guergarat is strategically and economically significant. Since 2010, Morocco has invested widely in West African countries, becoming the first investor in the region and the third in all Africa, with its communication, construction, and bank enterprises leading the market. In 2017, it had officially requested to become a member of ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. Though admission was blocked, Morocco still has political and economic clout in the region and seeks to neutralize the Saharawi Republic in the African Union, which it joined on January 2017. An asphalted road in Guergarat would link Morocco to ECOWAS economically but, most importantly, it contests the Polisario Front in the 20% territory it considers liberated.
Pundits blame the UN for the region slipping into tension. MINURSO has not fulfilled its mandate of holding a self-determination referendum according to Security Council resolution 690. Nor has it maintained a neutral position as an independent entity. Its vehicles carry Moroccan plates and its staff passports carry Moroccan stamps. The UN is playing a waiting game.
Security Council members, including the US, bear some of the blame. Its do-nothing policy and effort to ignore 45 years of low-intensity conflict have allowed the return of war. Joe Biden’s victory has raised the possibility that a shift in US policy towards Western Sahara could fix past mistakes. A self-determination referendum that both Morocco and the Polisario Front accept and the UNSC ratifies remains by far the best way out of this long-standing dispute.
With war in Libya and chaos in Mali, the new conflict in Western Sahara is likely to expose the region to much more instability. But it can also be an opportunity for the new Administration, as the moment looks ripe to bring a just solution to what many see as the last colony in Africa.
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Watch the pot
The pot is boiling once again in North Africa. Sudanese President Bashir, in power since 1993, is under arrest and his country under de facto martial law. Algerian President Bouteflika has resigned after almost 20 years in power. Libyan General Haftar is trying to take Tripoli by force. The smart money is betting he will bog down in a stalemate with opposing militias from Western Libya.
Not everyone is in turmoil. Morocco and Tunisia, which both embarked on political reforms in the wake of the Arab Spring, are at least for now continuing in that direction. Egypt’s President and former Field Marshall Sisi has restored its military dictatorship, cracked down hard on both Islamist and secular opposition, and embarked on some economic reforms.
Less visible in all these countries is the role of the Gulf potentates. The United Arab Emirates has backed both Sisi and Haftar, hoping to they will eradicate Islamists from their polities. Qatar has backed the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The Saudi-led coalition fighting against the Houthis in Yemen has used mercenary Sudanese troops, thus indirectly supporting Bashir. Iran has backed the Houthis but has not engaged heavily in North Africa, since there are few Shia there. Tehran’s interests are much stronger in Syria and Iraq.
American engagement in North Africa has been sporadic and targeted mainly against violent Islamist extremism, especially in Libya and more indirectly in Egypt. President Trump has said Libya is Europe’s problem, which makes a lot of sense since Spain, France, and Italy all have strong stakes in North Africa due to migration as well as oil and gas supplies. The problem is that the Europeans have found it hard to combine their efforts. Instead they compete for influence and undermine each other. It is unlikely that they will find a way to use their considerable clout to good effect.
The result will likely be that the North Africans will be left to find their own way. That might not be the worst of all possible worlds, even if it is fraught with risks. Libya’s downward spiral after its 2011 revolution does not suggest much indigenous capacity to manage without international help. But Libyans have always resisted it and are now vitiating the latest UN efforts to unify its state structures and begin the process of recovery from civil war.
Sudan and Algeria have better prospects. Their revolutions have so far been mostly nonviolent (apart from the force the police and military have indulged in). Nonviolent revolutions have a much higher probability of generating peaceful and democratic outcomes. But in both places the strong role of the military runs the risk of a detour to autocratic rule, as in Egypt. That is a contingency the demonstrators will have to guard against, so as not to fall into the Sisi trap.
The trick is to bring the pot to boil, but not let it boil over. If it does, extremists will exploit the situation. North Africa is not immune to Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and more localized jihadist organizations. Derna in Libya, where the US marines fought “on the shores of Tripoli,” has seen several revivals of extremists since Qaddafi fell, though Haftar for now seems to have things there under control. Tunisia has likewise generated lots of foreign fighters for the extremists, despite its so far successful political transition.
Let’s keep an eye on this pot.
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At a crossroads
The Arab Center for Washington DC hosted a panel discussion April 4 about “Algeria’s Protests and the Prospects for Change.” The panel included Marina Ottaway, Middle East Fellow at The Wilson Center, Geoff D. Porter, president of North Africa Risk Consulting Inc., Hugh Roberts, Edward Keller Professor of North African and Middle Eastern History at Tufts University, and Sara Yerkes, Middle East fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Roberts spoke about the unanimity and uniformity of the Algerian protests demanding the ailing president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, step down. Six Fridays of protest passed so far in a friendly manner: people chanting the slogan “the system must depart.” Although the president has resigned, it is much harder to get the entire system to leave, as it would be impossible to import a new one. Elements of the system should be preserved, Roberts said, but unfortunately the protesters have not yet come to this conclusion.
According to Roberts, the protests were successful in large part due to support from groups like National Organization of Mujahideen (veterans), lawyers, judges, school teachers, and some radical political parties. Most importantly, Gaid Salah, vice minister of defense, who was appointed by the resigned president and supported him in the past, has also aligned himself with the uprising. The military will try to convince ex-President Liamine Zerwoual, known for his integrity and transparency, to run the transitional period. Failing to do so, it could be hard to legitimize the presidency with the people.
Ottaway note that Algeria was widely viewed as immune to the 2011 Arab Spring. Eight years later that was no longer the case, as Algerians took to the street and high-level officials around the president sacrificed him. It is however still unclear whether the opposition can force a new system. The outcome of the uprising in Algeria will be determined not by how soon elections are held, but by how successful the regime’s opponents are in moving from protest in the street to becoming participants in the transition. Protesters need to remain in the streets to put pressure on the regime, while also organizing to become effective political players. Tunisia offers an example of a slow transition with broad-based participation that led to real change. By contrast, Egypt embarked on a much faster process with narrow participation, resulting in an entrenched militay.
Yerkes gave an overview of the effect of the Algerian protests on neighboring countries, mainly Morocco and Tunisia. Morocco said it “will not interfere or comment” on the Algerian protests. Morocco hopes the new Algerian government will reach an agreement regarding the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco is also worried it could be next, as most North African presidents have either been ousted or run away. While Moroccans favor the Algerian protests, the government would rather see the situation return to normality. In Tunisia, there is a big worry the insecurity will affect the Western border between the two countries, which was once a harbor for terrorists. Tunisia won’t be able to handle chaos in Libya and in Algeria. Tunisia’s president has not said a word about the Algerian protest movement, but he would like to see his country’s “successful spring” being replicated elsewhere.
Porter argues the political structure of Algeria has not changed since independence. There are four elements that make it unique:
- War veterans are held in high esteem but have lost their connection with young people.
- The military does not know where its role starts and ends, and whether it is a political actor or only a guarantor of stability.
- People have a kind of blind trust in the military reflected in the slogan “Army and the people are brothers.”
- Rule of law is uncertain.
Bottom line: the government is emphasizing the importance of consensus at this critical juncture, but the reason for the current situation is lack of consensus, in particular on a new president. Where this crossroads will lead is still unclear.
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No way out
A few weeks ago, the second round of UN-led peace talks between Morocco and the Polisario independence movement ended in Geneva without substantial progress that would bridge the parties’ contradicting positions. Morocco insists on a form of autonomy for the Western Sahara territory under its sovereignty, while the Polisario Front clings to a referendum on self-determination.
A former Spanish colony, Morocco annexed the mineral-rich Western Sahara in 1975. Sixteen years of bloody war between Morocco and Polisario Liberation Front ended with a UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991, enabling a self-determination referendum for the Saharawi people to choose between independence or integration into Morocco. The UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) deployed to supervise the democratic transition. Yet the referendum has not taken place due in large part to the parties’ disagreement over who gets to vote, as well as the “winner takes all” solution.
In March 1997, the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, appointed James Baker, former US Secretary of State, as a personal envoy to Western Sahara. Baker put forth two additional proposals: The Baker plan I in 2001(also known as the Framework Agreement) and Baker Plan II in 2003. Although his last plan won Security Council endorsement, neither got both parties’ approval. In 2004, Baker resigned, lacking the full support from the Security Council to enforce a solution. UN mediators who came afterward were doomed to failure, putting the issue in the textbook of frozen conflicts.
In 2007, Morocco offered an autonomy plan that would give the Saharawi people the power to run their executive, legislative and judicial affairs under Moroccan sovereignty. Polisario Front put forth a parallel proposal: a referendum on self-determination giving wide guarantees to Moroccan settlers if it lead to independence. The seemingly irreconcilable proposals stalled negotiations in 2012, undermining the efforts of the then UN mediator, former US ambassador, Christopher Ross. The deadlock continued for over six years. This stagnant situation has prompted recurrent tensions between the parties on the UN-monitored buffer zone between Moroccan- and Polisario-controlled territory. The possibility of war looms.
Last December, in a speech at the Heritage Foundation displaying the Trump administration’s new Africa strategy, National Security Advisor John Bolton made clear the US would like to see a self-determination referendum take place. This new US approach to the conflict was also reflected at the level of the Security Council when the US shortened MINURSO’s periodic one-year mandate to six months, tying its renewal to progress on the ground. The US representative at the UN stated “there is no business as usual” regarding this issue, signaling the US willingness to push towards a final solution to the conflict.
The current active US involvement in the long-standing dispute has generated momentum. After six years of deadlock, the UN Special Envoy to Western Sahara, former German President Horst Kohler, has been able to bring the parties to the table. Yet the parties’ views are fundamentally diverging; Morocco seeks no solution beyond sovereignty over the territory, while the Polisario Front is committed to the principle of self-determination.
Based on the current UN paradigm, a “realistic, practicable and enduring solution based on a compromise which would provide the Saharawi people for self-determination” seems impossible to achieve. Morocco sees autonomy as a practicable and realistic form of self-determination, while Polisario Front considers giving the people the right to decide their future as the most viable and realistic solution. Since 2001, no single plan has so far won the parties agreement.
Shortening MINURSO’s mandate to six months has broken the deadlock, but it is still not enough to yield positive results. Without an existential threat–such as expelling MINURSO, which would trigger a war the parties cannot handle–there is no “zone of possible agreement.”
There are two other possible options:
- Compelling the parties to accept a tailored compromise in which they either both win or both lose.
- A drastic change in the region, bringing new governments seeking regional integration and willing to end this conflict.
Something like the latter is already underway in Algeria. But unless something more serious starts to happen in Morocco, the low -intensity conflict in Western Sahara is likely to remain a frozen conflict.
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