Tag: NATO
Russia is losing the war even when it wins
The Russians have now adjusted their aggression in Ukraine. They have abandoned for now the homicidal but fruitless assault on Kyiv. Instead they are now focused on enlarging the areas they already controlled in Donbas and ensuring a land bridge to Crimea along the coast of the Sea of Azov. They also continue to bombard Ukrainian cities, including Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Lviv.
This new war plan makes far more sense than the original one. The areas in question are contiguous to territory Moscow already controls. The limited objectives are commensurate with the forces Moscow has available. Russian speakers inhabit much of the coastline in question, though by now most of them have fled westward.
The Russians are gaining ground but at high cost
The Russian assault has gained some ground in the east and south. But the effort is ponderous and costly. They have lost eight generals. If the ratio of generals to troops is the same in Ukraine as in the Russian army, that likely means they have lost at least 15-20,000 troops (killed) plus wounded and exhausted. But generals are harder to kill than soldiers, so that number may be low. It is roughly consistent with NATO’s guesstimate.
The Russian gains are coming at high cost not only in manpower but also in Ukrainian infrastructure. The Russians are leveling not only power and water plants but large numbers of apartments and businesses, especially in besieged Mariupol. If you are planning to occupy territory, destroying its civilian infrastructure is not so smart. Murdering and raping the locals is also not a good idea, as they are not likely to take mistreatment lightly. But that is precisely what the Russian forces retreating from north of Kyiv did.
The strategic outcome is no longer in doubt
These tactical mistakes compound the strategic ones. Ukraine will not be a friend to Russia in the future. When the people you are liberating flee away from your army, you are doing something wrong. If all, or more likely part, of Ukraine is occupied, the population will resist. Putin doubted that Ukrainian national identity is real, but Ukrainians no longer do. They are standing up to defend their country’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. That is a big strategic loss for Russia.
Any territory the Russians occupy will remain unreconstructed, as the West won’t pay and the Russians won’t have the money. Colin Powell’s antique store dictum (“you break it, you buy it”) will saddle Moscow will an enormous burden. Russia doesn’t even have the kind of excess population required to re-populate any parts of Ukraine it occupies. China, which has both the money and the population, will be far more interested in economically penetrating the European Union than supporting a costly Russian satrapy in Donbas.
The geopolitical situation looks no better. Russian aggression has brought strengthened NATO forces to its eastern members, all of whom now understand the risks they run if Moscow succeeds in Ukraine. They are funneling arms and training to the Ukrainians. Finland and Sweden are readying membership applications for the Alliance. Russian threats against them as well as the Baltics, Poland, and other NATO members for supplying weapons to Ukraine are falling on deaf ears. Republicans in the US Congress are muting their Russophilia. Even Turkey is sympathetic with Ukraine. NATO hasn’t been this unified since the Cold War.
Russia’s interests and Putin’s are diverging
Russia needs an end to this war, sooner rather than later. It can’t do that by continuing the fight, which will prolong the agony. But Putin’s interests are not the same as Russia’s. He likely can’t survive in power if Russians conclude the war was lost or that it was a colossal mistake. Hence the massive repression Putin is exercising inside Russia, which has lost all pretence of democratic norms. Putin often says Russia is fighting Nazis in Ukraine, but his own behavior now resembles Hitler’s far more than Ukrainian President Zelensky’s.
Russian aggression in Ukraine was ill-conceived and ill-executed. But so long as Putin is in charge, it will continue. Only if there is a serious threat to his hold on power will he reconsider. President Biden’s references to Putin as a genocidal war criminal are intended to signal US readiness to support an alternative. The Russian security elite, Putin’s oligarchs, and the Russian people have however so far failed to mount a serious effort against him. But that is not to say they never will. Some day they may conclude the obvious: Russia is losing the war even when it is winning.
Stevenson’s army, April 14
The Pulitzer Prizes for 2021 will be announced May 9. Already I’m seeing excellent reporting that might win a year from now.
– WSJ today has two big stories — how NATO training has helped Ukraine and increased intelligence sharing with Ukraine.
– A Politico newsletter says Jake Sullivan has recruited a “nest of China hawks” at NSC.
– Wired tells how hackers have disclosed details about Russians.
– Tom Friedman has a good interview with John Arquilla.
– Russia’s Black Sea flagship has been damaged and evacuated.
– Politico reports complaints about yesterday’s Human Rights report.
– Marine Le Pen wants to reduce French role in NATO, questions aid to Ukraine.
– Russia warns against Finland and Sweden joining NATO.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, April 9 and 10
April 10:
Reading about the Russian law limiting what can be said about the conflict in Ukraine, I remembered that America’s record has blemishes, despite the first amendment. Read Geoffrey Stone’s Perilous Times. And look at the Sedition Law of 1918.
– In preparation for our discussion of the media in week 11, think about the NYTimes’ announcement by Executive Editor Dean Baquet this week limiting its reporters’ use of Twitter, discussed at CJR. In the memo, Baquet said that while Twitter can play a “helpful role,” particularly when it comes to “highlighting the concerns of underrepresented groups,” it has also had deleterious effects on the Times, its work, and its staff in four main ways, with journalists over-relying on Twitter echo chambers in their reporting, worrying too much about feedback from other users, damaging the paper’s reputation (and their own) with “off-the-cuff responses,” and suffering there from harassment and attacks.
– Also worth your time is Ezra Klein’s interview about Ukraine with Fiona Hill. [I’m linking the transcript; it’s from a podcast]
-WSJ reports on Israel’s 4-year air war across the Middle East.
April 9:
I’m concerned that many Americans are taking an overly narrow and naively optimistic view of the Ukraine war. Our media coverage comes mostly from the Ukraine side; we see the war as they do, brutal but with bravery. We’re understandably sympathetic to that side. But…remember that support for Ukraine is limited and perishable. Outside of Europe, governments are indifferent or even hostile [that is, pro-Russian]. Why? Because it’s in their interests.
Josh Rogin is mad at Israel. But already, disruptions in Ukrainian food supplies is already hurting people across the globe.
Even in Europe, Hungary’s pro-Putin Orban easily won reelection. And Marine Le Pen might become president of France. Remember that NATO requires unanimity for big decisions.
Even in America, nearly 1/3 of House Republicans opposed a mere sense of Congress resolution supporting NATO. And the current consensus is that Democrats will lose massively in the midterm elections.Trust in government is higher in Russia than US.
Can the current support for Ukraine continue in Germany, America, and elsewhere until the fall? Into next year?
Problems to be overcome: Shortage of 152 mm artillery. A new Russian general with Syria experience. Chinese expansion of its nuclear arsenal.
Meanwhile, take heart from this analysis of how Kyiv prevailed.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, April 6
– Paul Pillar notes how hard a Ukraine peace deal because of disagreements over war aims on all sides. More on that from WaPo.
– Gen. Milley disagrees with Biden budget cut to nuclear cruise missile.
– 63 House Republican oppose resolution supporting NATO.
– DOD officials admit inflation estimate too low.
– Kori Schake wants 50% increase in defense spending.
– Incoming South Korean president wants return of US nukes.
– Japan has moved radar closer to China.
– WSJ says Czechs have sent tanks to Ukraine.
– With LePen surging in polls, GMF has survey of presidential candidates’ views on foreign policy.
– Andrew Exum explains Russian atrocities.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
The way out runs through the Kremlin
President Putin has put himself in a losing situation, almost no matter what happens.
Putin couldn’t afford to win
Had he succeeded in taking Kyiv and overthrowing its government, he would have been in Colin Powell’s china shop quandary: you break it, you bought it. Even without the economic sanctions the West has levied, Russia had nowhere near the resources–hundreds of billions of dollars–required to fix Ukraine. Putin’s successful pacification of Chechnya relied heavily on physical reconstruction and supportive local potentates. Neither would have been available this time around.
He won’t like the consequences of partition either
The Russians have now decided to tone down the military assault on the capital and Russian-speaking Kharkiv. Both cities put up a stalwart defense. Instead, Moscow will focus on the east, where it already controlled parts of Luhansk and Donetsk, as well as the south. The south is proving a challenge. Mariupol refuses to surrender and Kherson, the first major city the Russians captured, is still fighting back.
Here, too, winning is no consolation. If Putin succeeds in partitioning Ukraine, with part of the east and south under Moscow’s military control, the remainder of Ukraine will march straight into the arms NATO. While the Russian reconstruction burden would be lighter, Western sanctions would still make it difficult to bear.
In a partition scenario, NATO won’t welcome Kyiv with open arms. Many members are loath to take on the responsibility of defending any part of Ukraine. But Kyiv will be able to rely on the West for ample rearmament to defend against any new Russian offensive. The Ukrainians will also try hard to qualify for EU membership. After all, EU members Austria, Ireland, Finland, Malta and Sweden are officially neutral.
Losing might be Russia’s best bet
Russia could still lose the war and retreat entirely from Ukraine. It would then have an opportunity to negotiate the end of Western sanctions. That could happen in return for security guarantees for Ukraine, withdrawal of some NATO forces from near Russia’s borders, and limits on Ukrainian armament. Ukraine would still not be welcomed into NATO for the foreseeable future, though no one would guarantee neutral status forever.
But Putin can’t sell it
Russia wouldn’t be the first country to benefit from losing an ill-conceived and poorly executed war. But defeat would not benefit President Putin. Neither popular revolt nor election defeat seems likely, but you never know. You do know however that there are officers in the Russian army who didn’t like the invasion plan. The deaths already of nine or ten general officers in combat, along with more than 10,000 soldiers, won’t have made them happier.
President Biden’s remark in Warsaw about Putin made sense only as a wish for divine justice, or failing that a military coup. Biden says it was an expression of personal outrage, which makes sense. He wants to avoid it becoming the proverbial red line that Obama failed to enforce against President Assad in Syria. But the President also no doubt hopes someone in the inner circle will recognize that Putin has put Russia in a lose-lose-lose situation. The way out runs through the Kremlin.
Lament of the Ukrainians won’t stop soon
We all needed that. But the reality is grim. Over 2 million Ukrainians are now refugees. Many more are internally displaced. Russia has expanded and intensified its attacks in western Ukraine. They are also pounding Kharkiv in the northeast and Mariupol in the south, having already captured Kherson. Only a determined stand at Mykolaiv is preventing an assault on Odesa. The Russians all but surround Kyiv:
Courage v criminality
The Ukrainians have proven courageous, agile, and stalwart. The Russian army has demonstrated clumsy logistical incompetence. It has also targeted civilian areas, proving its criminal intent. But no one should be fooled. If this goes on much longer, Russia will occupy a destroyed country whose population will mount a ferocious resistance against brutality.
NATO defanged
NATO is standing by, reluctant to intervene because doing so might trigger a wider war as well as escalation between the US and Russia. Alliance members have been sending massive war supplies to Ukraine, which is why the Russians are attacking military bases and airfields in the west. They are the reception areas for foreign assistance. Attacks there make a lot more strategic sense from the Russian perspective than pulverizing Ukraine’s cities.
I imagine there are circumstances in which NATO might intervene. Russian use of chemical weapons could trigger a cruise missile attack on whoever launches them. But such interventioins would be carefully limited and calculated not to generate escalation.
The future Russian occupation
Russia’s war against Ukraine looks a lot like its second war againsts Chechnya, when Putin gained credits for obliterating Grozny. But the post-war occupation isn’t going to be as generous. In Chechnya, Moscow rebuilt and installed a puppet government that rules with an iron fist. In Ukraine, Moscow will need to skip the rebuilding. Western sanctions will guarantee that it doesn’t have the money. The insurgency will require the puppet government to crack down even harder than in Chechnya. So even if the war ends soon, Ukrainians will not be able to return home. It will be unsafe for years, if not decades, to come.
Moscow has biten off more than it can chew
Russia is itself in bad shape and deteriorating. It has biten off more than it can chew. But there is no telling when Russians will decide they’ve had enough of Vladimir Putin and his delusional gang. Certainly the courageous protests so far don’t reach the rule of thumb for successful popular mobilizations: 3.5% of the population. But there are definitely courageous Russians speaking truth to power:
None of the oligarchs or the inner circle of former KGBers appears ready and willing to do what many of them must know would benefit most Russians. But we may not know they were willing until they do it.
Even then, the challenges for Ukraine will be gigantic. Russia should pay hundreds of billions of dollars in reparations for a war of aggression. It won’t be willing or able. The West will do its part, but the scale of reconstruction requirements will be daunting, even if Russia were to withdraw today. The lament of the Ukrainians won’t stop soon. They may not even be permitted to sing Verdi’s version for Hebrews for much longer: