Tag: NATO
Stevenson’s army, March 12
Moment of reflection: Two years ago today, SAIS shut down and I had to teach my first Zoom class.
-FT has good article on Putin’s inner circle.
-NYT debunks Russian claim of US bioweapons lab
– Fred Kaplan reviews Prof Sarotte’s book about NATO.
-AP notes how Congress has pushed Biden on Ukraine.
– WSJ notes China gave nuclear security guarantees to Ukraine in 2013.
And the start of Daylight Savings Time tonight reminds me of the time Congress was considering some change in the law and an Iowa lady wrote to her Senator: “I don’t like Daylight Savings at all. The extra hour of sunlight turns my grass brown.”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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This is how bad things could get
Russia is expanding its bombing in Ukraine to the west and deploying its artillery for intensified barrages on Kyiv. Poland is reaching the limits of its capacity to take in refugees. So are other near neighbors. Moscow is accusing the US of supporting biological and chemical warfare research in Ukraine. Russian forces have already taken control of several nuclear power plants. Moscow has also thrown a monkey wrench into negotiations on re-entry of the US into the Iran nuclear deal.
How bad could things get?
Pretty bad. Here are some guesses:
- The Russians could lay siege to Kyiv and obliterate its governing institutions, displacing many of those who remain of its 2.9 million pre-war population.
- They could also destroy what remains of Ukraine’s air force and its ability to operate. That is presumaby the purpose of their attacks on airfields in the west.
- Poland could limit the intake of refugees, forcing many to remain displaced and vulnerable inside Ukraine.
- Russia often accuses its adversaries of doing things it intends to do. Mocow’s obviously false accusations about biological and chemical weapons may presage Moscow’s use of them.
- Russian forces have already risked disaster in occupying nuclear power plants. Their continued operation depends on Ukrainians and electricity supplies that are at risk. A meltdown like the one at Chernobyl in 1986 would be far more catastrophic under current conditions.
- Moscow may de facto scupper the nuclear deal and try to trade with Iran despite US sanctions. That would allow Tehran to proceed with enrichment and nuclear weapons research.
- Putin is using the war in Ukraine to impose a dictatorial regime inside Russia, making dissent and protest ever more difficult.
All the while, Russia will continue to attack population centers, medical facilities, and schools throughout Ukraine. This “Grozny” strategy is a war crime, but then so is the war of aggression Moscow launched without provocation.
Sanctions aren’t likely to work quickly
The NATO Alliance meanwhile continues sitting on its military hands while Russia crosses multiple red lines. The EU and US are imposing more sanctions on trade and investment, but those rarely if ever change an aggressor’s mind quickly. You are far more likely to get what you want from them when you negotiate lifting them rather than when you impose them. The day when that might be possible is far off.
Military responses have been ruled out
President Biden has so far prioritized prevention of a wider war. He has repeatedly emphasized that Americans will not fight in Ukraine. The Pentagon has apparently blocked transfer of military aircraft from Poland to Ukraine on grounds that might cause Russia to attack Poland and trigger NATO’s mutual defense commitment. The US can’t send the best air defense systems because they require trained personnel that Ukraine doesn’t have and can’t produce in short order.
The Americans and other NATO allies are sending massive arms shipments to the Ukrainians, whose commitment to fighting for themselves should not be doubted. But it may not suffice. Ultimately, Russia has resources, technology, manpower, and immorality that Ukraine cannot equal. We are all likely to suffer the consequences.
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Stevenson’s army, March 9
I like a good kielbasa, but look at this:
– VP Harris goes to Poland today, just as the snafu over fighters to Ukraine emerges.
– USG was surprised and unhappy over Poland’s announcement.
– Poland now agrees this has to be a unanimous NATO decision.
– Russian propaganda at home assessed by NYT and by FP.
– Heads of IC give open testimony to House Intelligence Committee. And here’s the DNI’s unclassified annual report.
– Meanwhile, deal reached on spending bills–$1.5 trillion, including $13.6 billion for Ukraine. But also includes short term CR until next Tuesday to allow time for Senate action.
– Interesting analyses: Why Russia is bad at urban warfare, lessons from USMC.
– What Taiwan should learn from Ukraine.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 5
– A distinguished historian of Russia says the US made a key mistake last November in signing a“strategic partnership” with Ukraine. I hadn’t noticed it myself.
– Politico reports on the supply lines of western equipment into Ukraine.
– WaPo notes what US & NATO are not saying.
– FP reports a new NSC hire.
– In a new annual report, China says it wants to “resolve” the Taiwan issue.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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No fly won’t fly, despite what you may think
Why can’t NATO do more to help Ukraine? Why not institute a no-fly zone that prevents Russian aircraft from attacking Ukrainians forces and population centers?
Yes it would make a difference
Preventing Russian air attacks and close air support would certainly make a difference. The Russians have not established absolute supremacy in the air, but they are stronger there than the Ukrainians. Moscow still has lots of air power in reserve. Preventing it from coming into the fight could be necessary to preserve the viability of Ukraine’s forces.
But enforcing it would entail unacceptable risks
Enforcement of a no-fly zone requires willingness to force down or shoot down violators. Or to destroy violating aircraft while they are on the ground. That’s where things get dicey. NATO would need to be ready to attack Russian aircraft. Bluffing won’t work. Putin would quickly test whether the Alliance is prepared to put its pilots where its declarations are. He would not worry about getting a few Russian pilots killed.
No doubt NATO could put up rather than shut up, but that would initiate hostilities with Russia. Putin could retaliate against the Alliance in any number of countries: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, or the Baltics. That would trigger Article 5, NATO’s mutual defense commitment, puttng the Alliance at war with Russia. It is easy to imagine further escalation and even eventually a nuclear attack. President Biden is wise not to want to risk that.
It could happen anyway
An escalation of that sort could happen even without a no-fly zone. I hear tell that NATO AWACS flying in Polish airspace is jamming Russian signals. Putin could take that, too, as reason enough to attack Poland. Arms shipments to Ukraine from NATO countries could be another trigger for widening the war. Supply of effective air defenses might be particularly provocative from the Russian perspective.
That argues for ending this war quickly
The risks of escalation will be there so long as the fighting continues. Ending this war quickly is the best way of eliminating those risks. The Russians so far seem unable to defeat Ukraine, but the Ukrainians aren’t able to defeat Russia either. Negotiation is the way to go, but there is no overlap between what Russia wants and what Ukraine is prepared to give, or between what Ukraine wants and Russia is prepared to give. A no fly zone would have virtues, but it won’t fly. The fighting is likely to continue until one side or the other can claim at least pyrrhic victory.
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Doubling down will make things worse
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan. Kyiv is not yet captured. Russian losses are substantial. Russian air power and logistics have been ineffectual. A war that Moscow imagined would be an easy walk has turned into a hard slog.
Both the Russians and the internationals are doubling down
Still Putin has no reason to abandon the effort. Kharkiv is all but surrounded. A long military convoy is close to Kiev. The Russians have made progress in the south. Putin will double down, throwing more military resources into the fight. The Russian Army has started to launch artillery shells into civilian areas. That will enhance the flow of refugees and displaced people, complicating the Ukrainians’ responsibilities. Russia hasn’t yet exhausted his its cyber capacities. It could still turn out the lights and the cell phones. Moscow could also strike outside Ukraine. Georgia and Moldova are vulnerable to Russian forces. Or worse: the Russians could strike the Baltics or Poland, bringing NATO into the war.
Ukrainian capacity to double down is limited, but NATO and partner countries are a force multiplier even if not yet belligerents. The sanctions adopted go much further than anyone anticipated. Central banks have blocked Russian access to most of its own reserves in foreign currency. International financial transactions are getting to be impossible. Technology controls will take longer to bite, but bite they will. Weapons and ammunition are flowing rapidly into Ukraine from its supporters, now including Germany.
How can this end?
Sooner or later, this war will end. What are the possible scenarios?
- A Russian military victory in a week or two, without much further destruction. This now seems unlikely, if only because the Ukrainians are determined to fight on. Russia would still have its hands full pacifying the country. It will meet passive and active resistance at every turn. Sanctions will remain in place, wrecking the Russian economy. Russia will be forced to rely on China to evade them.
- Months of siege warfare, with a lot of destruction. If the Ukrainians can hold out, Moscow will also persist, causing massive damage in Kiev, Kharkiv, and other cities. Eventually a Russian puppet government will be installed. Sanctions will remain in place, not only wrecking the Russian economy but also making required reconstruction in Ukraine impossible. Russian reliance on China will be even greater. Again, the Russians will face passive and active resistance.
- A coup in Moscow. Putin’s oligarchs are already jumping ship. His Defense Minister and Chief of Staff looked noticeably unhappy meeting when he ordered them to put Russia’s nuclear weapons on alert (video above). Coups in the aftermath of military setbacks have happened before in Russia. It could happen again, though it would not necessarily bring to power someone who wants to change Moscow’s autocratic direction.
- A popular revolt in Russia. This is perhaps Putin’s greatest fear. The anti-war demonstrators in Russia have numbered in the thousands so far. If the war continues, they could start numbering in the tens and hundreds of thousands. Putin did little to prepare the Russians for killing Ukrainians, presumably because he thought the Ukrainians would fold easily. His disinformation machine is now working overtime, but it is late in the game.
Yes, I would favor this fourth outcome. Popular revolts have a clear record of producing faster and more democratic outcomes. But they require a degree of commitment and planning that hasn’t yet been evident in Russia.
A fifth scenario
It is also possible the Ukrainians, and democracy, will win. This is an even lower probability than a quick Russian victory. But it could happen. The Russians would withdraw and pay reparations, as Iraq has done to Kuwait. The West would provide massive assistance for reconstruction. The EU would begin a serious accession negotiation. Ukraine would crack down on corruption, attact foreign investment, and begin to catch up economically with Poland and Hungary. Russians would notice and insist on their own democratic regime.
Yes, doubling down is going to make things worse, but we can always dream.
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