Tag: NATO
Belgrade and Banja Luka should draw the right conclusions
Here is an interview I did for Rasim Belko of Patria, a Sarajevo-based news agency, on the repercussions of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Q: Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, you announced that Russia would continue to destabilize the Western Balkans. Will Putin go to war with the West in another hotbed such as the Balkans?
A: Russia isn’t going to war in the Balkans, where it has few military resources. But it uses its proxies there to de-stabilize: Serb nationalist organizations, Dodik, and Vucic.
The danger of Bosnian collapse is not the issue
Q: Bosnia and Herzegovina is a key focal point of the Balkans. In your opinion, how real is the danger of its collapse?
A: I would not call the risk “collapse.” There is a real possibility that Dodik will go too far and provoke a response.
Nor is NATO membership for now
Q: Many believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be admitted to NATO under a shortened procedure. Do you think it is realistic that this will happen soon?
A: The pre-condition is consensus within the Bosnian leadership. So far as I can tell, that does not exist. I doubt NATO be interested in enlargement so long as the crisis with Russia continues. But eventual NATO membership is certainly possible. I have no problem with Bosnians pressing for a “shortened procedure.”
Separatism demands a vigorous response
Q: Milorad Dodik’s separatist policy is Putin’s dangerous extended arm in the heart of Europe. Have the US and the EU missed the chance to address this threat to peace in the Western Balkans in time?
A: They have waited too long, but there is still time. What has been lacking is political will. The invasion of Ukraine may help the US, UK, and EU find the political will.
Q: Is it time for more concrete and stronger measures of the West towards such a policy of Milorad Dodik?
A: Yes. All international funding that finds its way to Republika Srpska should be cut off.
Serbia has reason to hesitate
Q: Serbia and its President Aleksandar Vučić sided with Russia, and at the same time they are continuously working from Serbia against the sovereignty and integrity of BiH. In your opinion, does Europe have grounds for fear of a Serbian invasion of BiH, like Putin on Ukraine?
A: Nothing about the Russian invasion of Ukraine so far should encourage Serbia. Even Milosevic opted not to intervene openly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I imagine Vucic will not want to take the risk.
Q: How do you see the outcome around Ukraine and what are the possible consequences for Europe, and especially in relation to the Western Balkans?
A: A quick Russian victory in Ukraine would have been bad news for the Balkans, as it would have encouraged Serb irredentism. In addition, many Serbs in Republika Srpska and in northern Kosovo would welcome an invasion more than the Ukrainians did. That said, things have gone so badly so far for Russia that even a victory would not be very rewarding. And Western solidarity has been strong. Belgrade and Banja Luka should be able to draw the right conclusions.
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Stevenson’s army, February 27
– Germany approves sending weapons to Ukraine.
– Europe agrees to Swift sanction.
– Slate has as good list of additional possible sanctions.
– Russian infantry now attacking Kharkiv
But note these reports on Saturday from a friend whose client has business interests in Ukraine:
Attacks Around Ukraine – “Indiscriminate shelling by cruise missiles and various range rockets continues throughout northern and western Ukraine. These attacks are not supported by ground forces. The one exception is Kharkiv. Kharkiv, once a Ukrainian capital, is under air and ground attack from numerous directions as is Kyiv. The attacks on Kharkiv have been beaten off by a combination of military and volunteer forces and since mid-day yesterday the Russians have been shelling Kharkiv suburbs with no military significance. Civilian deaths have now been reported from all parts of Ukraine and currently exceed 300. Military deaths are now reported at around 400.”
Minimal commitment of Russian infantry. Russia has not been able to control air, due to a combination of skilled Ukrainian pilots, SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles that date back to Soviet times, and the apparent deployment of AWACS planes under NATO command, with the capability of jamming Russian tactical communications, both air and ground, and aircraft targeting and navigation equipment. They are flying over Polish and Romanian territory. Their jamming equipment has a radius of over 450 miles (725KM), allowing the AWACS to cover the entire Ukrainian airspace from a stand-off position. With no commitment of infantry and limited ability to control the air, it appears that Russia is relying on missile strikes launched from Russia and Belarus against civilian targets inside Ukraine, like this example, trying to intimidate Ukrainians into pressuring the Government into peace negotiations
Market Vendors – The street market vendors in our neighborhood of Kyiv are emptying bottles of beer on the street, and then they give the empties to others to fill the empties with gasoline for Molotov Cocktails.
Drone Strike – Earlier today, one of Ukraine’s Turkish-made drones took out an entire Russian re-supply column, including supplies of gasoline, ammunition, and food.
Logistics – Logistics seems to be a major Russian weakness. They have little or no experience in re-supply. The 2008 invasion of Georgia lasted 4 days, and Russia had complete control of Georgian airspace. In Georgia, re-supply was not a problem. It is likely that Russia assumed that the invasion of Ukraine would take only a few days, and therefore re-supply wouldn’t be a problem. It appears that Russian forces are in danger of running out of fuel and ammunition. As for food, there were reports that when they were in Belarus, before the Ukraine invasion started, Russian troops were not being fed, and they had to buy food on their own, or forage.
Ground Attacks – “For example, the fighting near my home consisted of a breakthrough of one tank and two armored personnel carriers coming in from the north at 2 am. Prior to their arrival a cruise missile hit a military academy about two kilometers away. The column was coming in after the missile. They were stopped and destroyed with anti-tank weaponry. Two soldiers got away and they were killed by small arms fire. From start to finish about two hours.”
Little or no infantry support. It seems as if Russia doesn’t want to commit infantry into an urban setting, leaving armor open to attacks from Ukrainians firing anti-tank missiles from hidden positions.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Only resistance can stop Putin
President Putin has committed Russia not only to a full-scale invasion of Ukraine but also to replacing its democratically elected government. He wants a vassal state with a puppet government in Kyiv, like Lukashenko’s in Minsk. Donald Trump is expressing his admiration. China’s President Xi is helping finance the enterprise, which has ended a long peace in central Europe.
Putin is winning
I was wrong in thinking Russian objectives would be limited to the south and east. I wasn’t alone. Ukrainian President Zelensky did not anticipate the assault on the capital, which aims to replace him. Russian forces are already in Kyiv, which is suffering bombardment with missiles as well as a ground assault. Appeals to citizens to take up arms at this point aren’t likely to change the situation. Unless something dramatic happens soon, Ukraine will soon be captured, except perhaps for a rump territory around Lviv in the west.
The Western response
The Western reaction has been vigorous. Pre-emptive release of intelligence on Russian plans ruined Putin’s effort to blame the invasion on its Ukrainian victims. Sanctions are making it difficult for Russian banks to survive while the stock market crashes and the ruble tanks. More sanctions are on the way. Banks and individuals will be cut out of world financial markets. Russia will soon find it difficult to obtain Western technology.
But sanctions won’t change Putin’s mind. You get what you want from them only when an opponent negotiates for relief, not when they are imposed.
NATO has beefed up its forces on Russia’s periphery, the opposite of what Putin wanted. Any move against a NATO country now will bring a far wider and more dangerous war.
The conflict will continue
The war may end soon, but the conflict will continue. the Russian government has earned the enmity of all Ukrainian patriots. Unfortunately, some of those are extreme nationalists, but so too are lots of Putin’s supporters in Russia.
It is arguable that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is in the tradition of Hitler’s Anschluss into Austria. The invasion has certainly been justified on similar grounds. Even if the war ends in a Russian victory, the conflict will continue until Ukraine is again an independent state. I doubt however that it will accept the neutral status Austria lives with, and RAND colleagues have proposed. Ukrainians are going to want NATO membership more than ever before.
Impact in Russia
The impact of this war on Russia is difficult to predict. Pre-invasion views of Russians on Ukraine issues were more nuanced than might be assumed. Even views in Donbas were equivocal on remaining in Ukraine. Putin and his circle are diehard Russian nationalists, but he regards Ukrainians as “brothers.” That view is common in Russia. But unlike Putin, most Russians don’t think it appropriate for Cain to kill Abel.
War polarizes. Putin’s propaganda machine is working overtime. His repressive forces are too. Russian police have arrested thousands of anti-war protesters all over the country. The question is whether the economic pain from sanctions will strengthen Putin’s hold on power or loosen it.
Worse in Ukraine
The repression in Ukraine will be far worse than in Russia. Moscow’s forces will attempt to capture or kill the officials of its democratically elected government and parliament. They will install a puppet government that will need to impose its will. Ukraine’s army and police forces will be subjagated and purged. Its educational system will be vetted for hints of anti-Russian or Ukrainian nationalist sentiment. Moscow will take control of the media and install Russia Today and Sputnik, or clones of them, as major outlets.
One outstanding question
It is not clear yet whether Russia will try to take all of Ukraine, or leave a rump territory in the west near Lviv as an escape valve for opponents. That might make repression in Kyiv easier, but it would also given Ukrainians a territory from which to mount an insurgency. Best bet is that Moscow will try for all of Ukraine. Putin will only stop when resistance forces him to do so.
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First bite taken, but still hungry for more
Russian President Putin has made his move against Ukraine. He yesterday recognized the “independence” of Luhansk and Donetsk and deployed Russian forces. For now, they remain in territory already under Russian control. No one will swallow his “peacekeepers” line, which he has previously used in the occupied Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The irony of occupying a territory you’ve just recognized as independent seems lost on him.
There is another irony. Putin’s move is not welcome in Kyiv, but it relieves Ukraine of any lingering obligation to implement the Minsk 2 agreement. That would have given Luhansk and Donetsk some say-so, if not a veto, in Kyiv. But there would still have been no near-term prospect of reintegrating them with the rest of the country. If Kyiv continues on the path of serious political and economic reform, it will be clear soon enough to the remaining residents of the secessionist territory where their bread is best buttered.
Crimea, which Russia has annexed and militarized, is a separate question.
The big question is how much further Putin will go. In the best of all possible worlds, he would stop now, declaring his objective achieved. That is unlikely. An obvious next move would be to occupy parts of the secessonist provinces not already under Russian control. That would be harder, but not likely too hard. He could also take part or all of Ukraine’s southern coast, focusing first on the littoral of the Sea of Azov. That approach would be more feasible for Moscow and less deadly than a full-scale invasion and occupation of the entire country.
Full-scale invasion would be colosally stupid
Some think however that Putin is in the first stage of a full-scale invasion aimed at occupying all of Ukraine. That would be colosally stupid:
- Ukraine is a country of 44 million people, larger than Iraq or Afghanistan when the US invaded them. It is the second largest in Europe, next to Russia.
- Even if every one of the 150,000 Russian troops in the invasion force were to enter Ukraine, there would still be 300 Ukrainians for every Russian.
- Past experience suggests a force of over 650,000 would be required for a comparable “heavy” peacekeeping operation, 80,000 or so for a “light” one in which the local security forces are cooperative. In Ukraine, they won’t be.
- The direct costs would range up to $100 billion if things go well, not counting the economic impact.
- Moscow is claiming the West is weak so now is the time to strike, but there are lots of indications that the West is united and not so weak. The sanctions it imposes will be unprecedented and punishing if Russia tries to take all of Ukraine.
- Putin believes in a history of Ukraine and its relations with Russia that is at best fabricated and at worst delusional.
- It makes no sense to invade a country whose population you claim are your “brothers” or to occupy one you’ve just recognized as independent.
- Russia has been alleging Ukrainian provocations that are blatant lies.
- Moscow wants Ukraine not to join NATO, but it knows that is not in the cards for at least another decade, if ever.
- The Russian invasion threat has made NATO membership far more desirable to many Ukrainians than it once was. Removing Luhansk and Donetsk from Kyiv’s control subtracts a lot of anti-NATO people from the political equation inside Ukraine.
Moscow theater
Putin started yesterday staging a National Security Council meeting that looked more like a school room listening to his dull lecture:
Then these top officials took turns glumly lying to the press about Ukrainian provocations. Putin wrapped the day with his recognition of Luhansk and Donetsk. The Soviets were better at this, but the performance was in their tradition.
The Western reaction
Ukraine and the West will not accept the already announced partition or full-scale occupation. Yesterday, the Americans announced sanctions on the economy and secessionist authorities in Luhansk and Donetsk. That won’t frighten Putin or anyone else. Far more effective is German Chancellor Scholz’s halt to the administrative procedure needed to open the Nordstream 2 natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany. That will get some attention in Moscow, but it is also painful in Berlin.
The West needs to be ready to react with more vigorous and united sanctions. But we also need not hit so hard that Putin concludes we have nothing left in reserve. The European security order is at stake in Ukraine. Washington should ensure the punishment for undermining that order is not only severe but can also get worse.
Putin has taken his first bite, but he is hungry for more.
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Putin is hesitating but not yet lost
Russian President Putin has given his military orders to prepare for the invasion of Ukraine, but he is hesitating to give the green light. The French claim he has agreed to a meeting with President Biden following on a meeting between Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary of State Blinken February 24. For the Americans, all of this is contingent on the Russians not invading Ukraine. Moscow says there are no plans for a presidential meeting.
What is going on? There are several possible explanations:
- Military preparations are not yet complete.
- Putin is not satisfied with his domestic support in Russia and Donbas.
- The Chinese warning against invastion has given him pause.
- Diplomatic efforts are promising.
- The Western threat of sanctions is deterring action.
Military preparations
I’m no military expert, but journalists report that Russian commanders have everything they need to proceed. Blood supplies and field hospitals were already in place by last week. Putin was lying when he said Russian forces were drawing down. They are now up to 150,000, enough to seize and control a piece of the country but not enough to occupy its entire territory.
I still am not inclined to believe the Russian objective is to seize Kyiv. I think they aim to make the Sea of Azov a Russian lake. A movement toward Kyiv might make the Ukrainians draw down in the south. But a serious attack on Kyiv would cause devastation that would be difficult for the Russians ever to repair, not to mention Ukrainian hostility and resistance.
Support in Russia and in Donbas
Russia’s parliament has already urged Putin to recognize the independence of the Russian proxy authorities in Donestk and Luhansk, as he has done for South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. The de facto authorities in Donbas have ordered an evacuation of civilians, many of whom have been getting Russian citizenship.
But they are for the most part not departing, even though the rebel military forces have ratcheted up the bombardment of Ukrainian targets to provoke a response. The popular mood in Russia does not favor full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But extending Russian control in the Donbas area would not prove highly problematic either in Russia or in the insurgent portion of Donbas.
Chinese opposition
President Xi did not give Putin the full-throated endorsement he sought for invasion of Ukraine when they met at the opening of the Beijing Olympics. Then last week the Chinese Foreign Minister used the occasion of the Munich Security Conference to back Russia’s position on keeping Ukraine out of NATO but also to pull the rug out from under Putin’s invasion plans.
China favors continued diplomacy instead. Russia will desperately need China to help in sanctions-busting if the invasion proceeds. Beijing however wants to avoid further aggravation of relations with the US. Putin needs again to seek and get Chinese reassurance.
Diplomatic efforts
There is little sign that diplomatic efforts are bearing fruit. According to French President Macron, Putin has agreed to meet with Ukraine and the OSCE. But that is thin gruel.
The US has rejected Russia’s demand that Washington guarantee no NATO membership for Ukraine. Moscow has continued to insist. The Americans have tried to shift the diplomatic agenda to mutual arms and conventional force limitations. They hope Russia will view those as responsive to Moscow’s effort to roll back NATO forces from its borders. Putin however isn’t buying. He wants Russian forces right on the borders of the Baltics, Poland, Belarus, or Ukraine.
Sanctions
Sanctions are a likely factor in Putin’s hesitation. Britain is prepared to end Russia’s access to pounds and British property. The Americans are presumably ready to do likewise. For a country that depends on oil and gas exports, both normally denominated in dollars or another hard currency, that is major.
We don’t know what German Chancellor Scholz said to Putin during his visit last week to Moscow. But President Biden has repeatedly asserted that the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline (completed but not yet operational) is toast “one way or the other” if Russia invades. We don’t know what that means. Scholz likely does. He has shown no sign of disagreeing with Biden.
Bottom lines
Putin holds his cards close, but he is hesitating. I’d give sanctions and the China factor each 40% as factors in his hesitation. Support in Russia and Donbas as well as military preparations I’d each put at 10% each. The diplomatic factor is important only insofar as Blinken continues to reassure Putin that the Americans are still willing to negotiate. That gives him reason not to hurry while he gets China and sanctions-busting fixed.
Still, invasion is more likely than not. Putin is hesitating, but he is not yet lost.
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Putin’s ugly war of choice
Today the de facto authorities in the Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine are ordering the mass evacuation of civilians to Russia. Supposedly in response to the threat of a Ukrainian attack, this is classic self-cleansing. Its purpose is to create a free-fire zone without a friendly civilian population and to cast the adversary as an ethnic cleanser.
Putin is determined
President Putin appears determined to use force once again in Ukraine. He succeeded eight years ago in the occupation and annexation of Crimea as well as his use of Russian and proxy forces to establish rebel zones in Donbas. Why not try again? With luck, Ukrainian resistance might collapse altogether and allow Moscow to set up a puppet government in Kyiv. More likely, Russian forces will succeed in extending their area of control along the Sea of Azov, perhaps going as far as Crimea.
In the meanwhile, NATO will be reinforcing its forces in the eastern-most member states, something Russia says it doesn’t want. They will also be trying to decide on the sanctions required to respond to Russian aggression. Putin is betting the Alliance will split on that issue and reduce the sanctions to the lowest common denominator. Net result: a NATO military presence that doesn’t really threaten Russia and a falling out among Russia’s adversaries.
Europe whole and free in smithereens
Once the smoke clears, the idea of “Europe whole and free” will be in smithereens. A new curtain will have descended. It won’t be made of iron. On one side will be Lukashenko, the Russian proxies in Moldova and Georgia, Armenia and the central Asian ‘stans. On the other side will be NATO and EU members. Others will either need to choose which sphere of influence they wish to align with or reinvigorate the idea of non-alignment that Serbia and others already champion.
NATO expansion is still possible
It is anyone’s guess how many people will be killed in Putin’s effort to convince the Americans that Ukraine can’t be allowed to decide whether it wants to join NATO. Putin already knows that Ukrainian membership is impossible now and for the foreseeable future, because all of NATO’s 30 member states would need to approve. I doubt even a majority would favor Ukraine’s accession at this point.
But that doesn’t mean NATO won’t expand. Russian behavior in the Baltic and aggression in Ukraine is already well on the way to convincing Sweden and Finland that NATO membership would be a good idea. Both are well-equipped and trained. But neither has the means to defend itself on its own. The NATO door may well be open to both well-ordered and consolidated democracies.
Net results
Putin has succeeded in getting America’s attention and reasserting Russia’s claim to superpower status. The invasion may well split the Alliance on the issue of sanctions. Ukraine will be divided at best and subjugated at worst. But NATO forces will be far stronger and closer to Russia after this war than before it. Moscow will be saddled with an enormous reconstruction burden as well as sanctions.
The biggest known unknown is how Russians will react. This war will belie Putin’s claim of brotherhood with Ukrainians and undermine the Russian economy. Moscow has tried hard to hide the body bags coming back from its military ventures in Syria and Libya. But Russians are not supportive of war in Ukraine and hiding the body bags may be much harder in a ground war of these dimensions. A Russian told me long ago: “We support our czars until we don’t. Then we get rid of them quickly.” Putin’s ugly war of choice could be ugly not only for Ukraine and NATO, but also for him.
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