Tag: NATO
Putin still has dirty tricks up his sleeve
Russian President Putin has suggested he is withdrawing some forces from around Ukraine. No Westerner has yet confirmed this. President Biden yesterday cited a new, higher number: 150,000 troops. That is 20,000 more than previously reported in the media. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg has said there was no evidence of troop withdrawal yet.
Russian plans
But even if true, Putin’s hint at troop withdrawal may betoken little. He never had enough troops surrounding Ukraine to invade and occupy the entire country. More than likely the Russian plan is to take a relatively small portion. My bet has been on a push in the south to extend the Russian area of control along the Sea of Azov as far as Ukrainian forces permit. The troops in Belarus to the north and Transnistria in the west would do just enough to prevent Ukraine from redeploying forces to counter the real offensive in the south.
It is also possible Russia will not use overt military force but rely instead, as it did in Donbas in 2014, on proxy forces backed by Russians with no overt insignia. Or Putin could use “private” security forces like the Wagner Group. This would be risky militarily, as Ukrainian forces have improved a good deal. But the domestic political backwash from losses would be lessened. It is also possible NATO member states would turn a blind eye, or at least reduce their reaction, to the use of proxy forces.
Military action is not Russia’s only option. Just keeping enhanced forces on Ukraine’s border will create uncertainty, which discourages investors and raises insurance rates. Disinformation does likewise. Moscow presumably has enough minimally credible intelligence on Ukrainian malfeasance to launch innumerable attacks on its ruling elite. Where the Russians lack information, they are good at inventing it. Moscow can also rent crowds to create disorder and sponsor terrorist attacks mounted to look like attacks on ethnic Russians. Russian hackers have penetrated Ukraine’s cyberspace, raising the likelihood of continuing attacks on critical computer capabilities.
The Western reaction
The White House has been revealing Moscow’s plans in order to preempt them. This has been an effective tactic. The National Security Council has reportedly prepared an extensive playbook on how to react to various scenarios. We should hope this includes non-military ones. Putin is good at using all the elements of national power to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors. The West has to be at least as agile, and punishing, in response. Washington has repeated ad infinitum the mantra “Europe whole and free.” It was an attractive proposition in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse.
But Europe whole and free isn’t going to happen anytime soon. Putin has made his choice: Russia is now an autocracy with imperial aspirations in its neighborhood. He will need to defend those aspirations as well as his own hold on power with whatever means he has available, because many Russians and most Europeans and Americans won’t be interested in helping him. Putin still has lots of dirty tricks up his sleeve.
Convergence is desirable but not magical
My SAIS colleague Ed Joseph argues that recognition of Kosovo by the four NATO member non-recognizers would weaken Serbia’s position and improve the negotiating position of Pristina in its dialogue with Belgrade. He is correct about that. Even one or two additional recognitions would be helpful. All four would open the door of NATO membership to Kosovo.
Wrong about Serbia’s reaction
But he is unfortunately wrong about Serbia’s reaction to such recognitions. They will not happen in a “big bang,” all together. At best they will happen over several years. And NATO membership won’t be feasible until 2027 at the earliest, when Kosovo is scheduled to have a fully qualified army. As recognitions happen, Belgrade will stiffen its resistance, not soften it.
The evidence for this is plain and apparent. As Ed emphasizes, Serbia regards Kosovo as its most important security risk. Each additional recognition will raise the alarm level in Belgrade. Serbia will intensify its opposition to recognition with the remaining non-recognizers. Russia and China will back this resistance. The EU will do nothing to soften it, as there will still be one hardline non-recognizer member state, Cyprus. Nicosia will prevent any consensus within the EU to shift away from its “status-neutral” position on Kosovo, which in any case is essential if the EU is to continue convening the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue.
NATO membership is not more important to Kosovo than UN membership
Ed also states that “A pathway to NATO membership is far more meaningful for Kosovo than UN membership.” It is unquestionably easier, since Cyprus is not a member of NATO. But it is just as unquestionably not more meaningful. Remember: NATO-led forces already guarantee Kosovo’s sovereignty and terrritorial integrity, which is what NATO is all about. This seems to be the crux of Ed’s argument:
Without the leverage to sustain its isolation of Kosovo, Belgrade’s strategic calculus will change. The Russian and Chinese vetoes of Kosovo at the United Nations Security Council will be of negligible value on what Belgrade deems its “main political-security challenge.” No longer will the Vucic regime be able to prosecute its aggressive “non-recognition” campaign against Kosovo, or leverage Kosovo to advance ‘Serb World’, or dodge accountability for the regime’s assault on Serbian democracy. With no express demand from the West to recognize Kosovo – and no meaningful backing from Moscow or Beijing on Belgrade’s most important issue – the regime will struggle to exploit convergence domestically, and struggle to explain to citizens how it squandered Serbian leverage.
Even if Serbia were not the home of inat (read “spite, stubborness, persistence”), this would be fantasy. Belgrade’s strategic calculus will not change, at least so long as it is governed by people who claim sovereignty over Kosovo. The Russian and Chinese vetoes will increase in value, as they will be the only insurance against UN membership, which is the universally established symbol of sovereignty in our world. I can’t see any reason why Belgrade would drop its nonrecognition campaign, but even if it did that would make no difference. Serbia’s claim to sovereignty over Kosovo would not be abandoned. NATO troops in Kosovo haven’t changed Belgrade’s attitude, so why would a few more NATO member recognitions or even NATO membership for Kosovo?
Recognitions are desirable but not magical
Let me make clear. I’m all in favor of getting non-recognizers to recognize Kosovo, especially the NATO and EU non-recognizers. Each recognition will improve Kosovo’s position, including in the dialogue with Serbia. But Belgrade will not drop its antirecognition campaign or its opposition to Kosovo membership in the UN. To the contrary, those efforts will be redoubled. What Ed calls “convergence” is desirable, but not magical.
Recognition can weaken Serbia’s leverage
Edward Joseph, a Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, writes:
It’s the Newtonian law of policy debate: every idea that challenges orthodoxy produces an equal and opposite reaction.
We, the co-authors of the recent SAIS-Wilson Center report, ‘From Crisis to Convergence: A Strategy to Tackle Instability at its Source’, welcome debate on our approach, which has generated at least 16 articles, interviews and two controversies, along with interest in key capitals. At the very least, it represents an original way of thinking about a region where the West has struggled for too long, despite holding the strategic advantage.
We will host a live critique of our recent SAIS-Wilson Center report – along with an assessment of just how bad the situation in the Balkans is — on-line this Tuesday, 15 February at 9:30AM ET. Sign up here.
This event will feature leading experts from: Bosnia-Herzegovina – Srecko Latal (Balkans Crossroads); Kosovo — Engjellushe Morina (ECFR); Serbia – Igor Bandovic (BCSP); Albania – Albert Rakipi (AIIS.) They will explore: ‘Balkans 2022: How Bad Can It Get? Is a Breakthrough Possible?’
The report’s co-authors — who hail from the countries most affected by the strategy, including two respected experts from Serbia and Kosovo – will respond.
One of the more thoughtful critiques of our report appeared in Dan Serwer’s Peacefare post of 19 January. To summarize, Dan supports convergence by the European states that don’t recognize Kosovo, and, critically, he acknowledges the threat from “Serbian irredentism” in the Balkans. Dan then questions the impact of convergence – even NATO membership for Kosovo – on Belgrade’s policies. Instead of altering Serbia’s “strategic calculus,” as we state, Dan believes it will “incentivize Serbia in the opposite direction.”
Anti-democratic Serbia is the problem
Dan’s post raises essential and under-examined questions: what drives Serbia’s posture in the Balkans? Why does only Serbia (and its proxies) reject the liberal Western order for the region?
Let me begin with a challenge to Peacefare readers:
How do you explain that more than three-decades after the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia began, the region is not just stagnant – but going backwards, with open talk of “war” from responsible international and regional figures alike? Bear in mind that, unlike in Ukraine, the US, NATO and EU hold the strategic advantage in the Balkans.
We give our answer in the report. The Balkans is not a ‘morass’ of intractable ethno-national tensions. Instead, those ethno-national tensions – which stand in the way of the fight against corruption and the fight for rule of law and democracy – are a function of two factors: national power and strategic orientation.
And that’s the crux of the problem: the largest Western Balkans state – Serbia – has polities in four neighboring states, and is oriented towards the illiberal powers: Russia and China. In power for a decade, the Vucic regime has methodically rolled back Serbia’s weak democracy. The regime is protected within the EU by the leading European illiberal power: Hungary.
In sum, no matter how many Special Envoys are sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, fundamental reform will remain out of reach as long as this condition in Serbia continues. To put it another way, don’t expect democratic progress in BiH or its neighbors, with an anti-democratic Serbia.
Serbia’s leverage
But that only addresses Serbia’s strategic orientation. Where does the Vucic regime get the power to subvert its neighbors – and confound US and EU diplomats? Why do capable, dedicated US officials assail corruption and organized crime in Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo – but are generally quiet on official corruption in Serbia? Why do US officials in Serbia repeatedly laud a regime that openly – on billboards – promotes Beijing, and backs Moscow over Ukraine as, “the political and economic leader” in the region? Why was Serbia invited to the ‘Summit for Democracy’ after US officials stated clearly that it would not be invited? Why did the EU give Serbia a pass on rule of law standards?
The source of the leverage
We believe the answer is clear: Serbia has leverage over Kosovo, and through it, over the US and EU. The source of that leverage is the four NATO non-recognizers. The best way to understand Serbian leverage is by comparison with Bulgaria and North Macedonia. As an EU member, Sofia can unilaterally block the opening of Skopje’s EU accession negotiations. Similarly, Belgrade can unilaterally block Pristina’s pathway to NATO and the EU – even though it’s not a member of either organization. The reason: the non-recognizers have, effectively, handed their proxy to Belgrade: ‘we won’t recognize Kosovo, until Serbia does.’
Kosovo cannot advance until Belgrade, with the proxy of the non-recognizers, says so. The status quo – no settlement between Pristina and Belgrade – inflicts pain on only one side. Indeed, the status quo is beneficial for the Vucic regime as it insulates it from Western scrutiny.
In short, the West is participating in Vucic’s charade. Belgrade’s main aim in the EU-led Dialogue is simply to avoid being blamed for lack of progress, so that the Vucic regime can continue the pretense of interest in making EU reforms and becoming a member. Meanwhile, the regime draws Western praise, even as Vucic – through others – promotes what they call the ‘Serb World.’
The way forward
The way forward is also clear: Western strategy should focus on eroding Serbia’s leverage, reducing the illiberal Vucic regime’s ability to project its destructive vision in the region and domestically. Rather than “incentivizing Serbia in the wrong direction,” we see precisely the opposite: reducing regime power incentivizes it to scale back its destructive aspirations and cooperate. In other words, this is about power dynamics, not incentives. EU membership has incentives ample enough to attract Serbia’s neighbors, Albania and North Macedonia. Tirana and Skopje are desperate simply to have the same right that Belgrade already enjoys and exploits.
Eroding Serbian leverage is not a binary event, i.e. either full recognition by the four NATO non-recognizers, or nothing. Instead, we see Belgrade’s obsessive bid to isolate and weaken Kosovo – evidenced in its own words and actions – as proof of its vulnerability. That’s why senior Serbian officials run nervously to Greece and Spain to shore up – as officials openly state – non-recognition of Kosovo. That explains why at a time of grave European crisis, Serbian Foreign Minister Nikola Selakovic last week visited – of all places – Equatorial Guinea! – praising the country for not recognizing Kosovo. Same with the visits to dangerous countries like Iran and obscure ones like Suriname – all mainly in the name of isolating Kosovo.
Our strategy
Our strategy is entirely pragmatic. Steps towards ‘convergence’ beginning, for example, with returning Slovak and Spanish troops to KFOR, bringing Kosovo into NATO’s Partnership for Peace, aided by continuing movement from Greece, and steps by Romania as well, will have immediate impact on the regime’s posture. Greece’s role is particularly significant because Athens has its own clearly stated strategic reasons for moving toward recognition of Kosovo.
The Russian and Chinese vetoes in the Security Council are no match in this regard. A pathway to NATO membership is far more meaningful for Kosovo than UN membership.
Let’s finally bring the curtain down on the three-decade crisis over Yugoslavia, where it began – in Kosovo. Convergence is the way. Most current approaches, including the fight against corruption, and building a regional common market, continue under convergence — empowered by a US and EU that can finally apply the same standards across the region. Join us on Tuesday to hear how experts from the region process this argument!
China and Russia are friends but not equals
Professor Evan Medeiros of Georgetown University analyzed the Xi-Putin declaration this week on NPR:
The Washington Post comes to similar conclusions: there is less to the declaration than some think.
Craig Singleton at Foreign Policy looks also at the readouts and Chinese press coverage. He goes a step further to suggest that President Xi gave President Putin little in order to protect Chinese economic interests, especially in Europe. Those interests he suggests could provide the West with a wedge to separate China from Russia. Economic prosperity trumps authoritarian solidarity.
The good news
The combined military and economic power and geographic extent of a China/Russia alliance would be formidable. It is good news that the Putin’s Olympics jaunt did not solidify into a genuine defense pact. Unless more was agreed than we know, Russia cannot rely on China to help beat Western sanctions. The Chinese may not like NATO enlargement, but it is not a primary concern for Beijing. The flagging Chinese economy is far more important.
The bad news
Moscow and Beijing are both exercised over human rights. Their joint declaration declares their own countries democracies but denounces human rights as a nefarious concern of the West. This may sound illogical to liberal democratic ears, but it is consistent with their distortion of “democracy.” To them, it means any system that somehow expresses the supposed will of the people, even if the people have no rights and have never validated that will in a free and fair election. Xi and Putin, like many other autocrats, think of themselves as the embodiment of the people’s will, evident in their successful assent to power.
China and Russia may be friends but are not equals
For now, Russians and Chinese are putting up with that claim, which in a perverse way demonstrates the power of the democratic example. Chinese and Russians all know the consequences of contesting the power of their leaders. But there is a big difference. Beijing can afford to repress the opposition and buy off the rest. For now, they are doing it in grand style in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, as well as in more retail ways in other parts of the country. Moscow can afford to buy off a few oligarchs but is leaving the majority of the population in straitened circumstances with shortened life expectancies, low incomes, and few free means of expression.
Putin has reasons to invade
It seems likely Putin will go ahead with the invasion of Ukraine. The Russian deployment is not a Potemkin village. It has gotten him little so far that he could not have gotten for more polite asking. The Americans have offered to limit armaments in Europe, provided the agreement is reciprocal. Putin’s moves have also unified NATO in favor of drastic sanctions, including extinction of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, and solidified Ukrainian support for the Alliance, precisely the opposite of what Putin wanted.
None of that however will make Putin hesitate. He wants to prove to the world that Russia is indispensable. “Nothing about Europe without Russia” is his motto. He is trying to reassert Moscow’s claim as a superpower capital, a claim that died with the Soviet Union. For someone for whom power is he be-all and end-all, only the successful use of force can revalidate it.
Beijing stands to lose little
Beijing won’t be happy if Russia invades Ukraine and disrupts the world’s economy, but it will be in his corner when he tries. If he succeeds, the Chinese will enjoy the outcome as a defeat for the Americans, NATO, and human rights. If he fails, the Chinese can walk away unscathed, comforted in the knowledge Putin will need to sell even more natural gas. China and Russia are friends, but not equals.
Invasion is likely, but its outcome is uncertain
Russian President Putin regards democracy outside Russia as his enemy. He also faces internal challenges from Russia’s many ethnic groups and subnational units. He is nevertheless forging ahead with the build-up of an invasion force on Ukraine’s borders. The question is whether he is overstretching. Can Russia sustain the effort required to bring Ukraine to heel?
Putin has reason to be confident
On material measures, Ukraine is a relatively small strain on an enormous country. Putin has built up reserves of more than $600 billion, so spending $10 billion per month or even more to mount an invasion of Ukraine he can afford. The number of troops involved is still relatively small at about 130,000. Overall Russian active duty military number something like one million, not counting another half million or more reserves.
The political measures are also favorable to Putin. His popularity remains high. The seizure and annexation of Crimea in 2014 gave him a bump upwards in popularity. It would be reasonable for him to think that a successful invasion of Ukraine would do likewise, even if Russian concern about war has increased.
Western reaction could alter the calculus, but only marginally. Deterrence is difficult. Putin has made big efforts to sanction-proof the Russian economy. The loss of the Nordstream 2 pipeline to Germany would be a blow, but not a gigantic one. Technology sanctions, not imposed in the past, could reveal Moscow’s Achilles heel, but the impact would not be immediate.
The invasion would however be risky
The real risk for Putin is the invasion itself. Even small setbacks could undermine his position at home and abroad. Moscow has done little to prepare its own population for war. Few Russians currently support an invasion of Ukraine. If things don’t go well quickly, Putin could find himself in a difficult position domestically, though there is no apparent threat to him at the moment. He has obliterated any real opposition with murder and imprisonment.
Putin has several objectives that an invasion could serve. Occupation of more Ukrainian territory is only one. He also wants to split NATO and force the US to deal with Russia as a peer. He presumably knows well that the Russian army will not be welcome in large parts of Ukraine, making the process of occupying the whole country messy. A major invasion would also solidify NATO rather than split it.
More limited suits Putin better
A more limited intervention would suit Putin’s purposes better and reduce the risk. For example, extending the separatist-held areas along the Sea of Azov coast to Mariupol or even to Crimea might be attractive. Infrastructure close to the separatist-held areas is another possibility.
Limiting the intervention would make consensus within NATO difficult. Germany might not think Mariupol is worth keeping Nordstream 2 shut forever. A quick but significant addition to Russian-controlled areas in Ukraine could make Moscow’s claim to peer status more likely to elicit an acceptable American response than a messy effort to occupy the whole country.
A limited invasion of Ukraine will not only involve kinetic means like tanks, airplanes, drones, and troops. Moscow is expert in “hybrid” warfare, which will include at the least disinformation, political disruption, cyberattacks, feints, and ideological challenges. Ukraine is particularly vulnerable on the issue of corruption, which can be used to undermine the legitimacy of its government. Moscow can presumably reveal things that will embarass Western-oriented politicians in Kiev.
Still, the outcome is uncertain
Ukrainians are going to resist any Russian invasion, not only with their half million or so troops but also with guerrilla efforts in any territory Russia manages to take. Defense will be difficult, as the Russians will presumably control the air. But in the end, will, cleverness, and luck are big factors. There is often miscalculation in going to war. While Moscow looks strong compared to Kiev, the outcome is uncertain.
Stevenson’s army, January 23
– UK says its intelligence sees Kremlin plot to install pro-Russian leader in Ukraine. NYT reports; here’s WaPo report. Baltic states have been shipping arms.
-WaPo reports NATO help.
– But Germany blocks transfer of German equipment.
–Biden is meeting with advisers at Camp David.
– Conservative Ross Douthat urges”retreat from Ukraine”
-LAT sees few options for US in Yemen.
-CARE reminds us of under-reported humanitarian crises.
– FP has several experts grading Biden’s foreign policy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).