Tag: NATO
Stevenson’s army, January 16
I have a backlog of papers to review [latest first], but I wanted to share a few items:
Several administration sources told the media that Russia might be planning a false flag operation to justify intervention in Ukraine.
NYT says recent events have strengthened NATO.
NYT also said US might support, covertly and openly, an insurgency in Russian-controlled Ukraine.
WaPo in print today documents the more than 1700 congressmen who owned slaves, including over 40% of members until just before the Civil War.
WaPo also reports that earmarks are back in money bills.
I liked the WOTR article on cyber surprise.
Also the article on reforming DOD’s budget process.Also liked Walter Pincus’ take on nuclear policy review.
Historian Michael Beschloss put on Twitter the Willard Hotel menu just before Lincoln’s inauguration and the Senate Restaurant’s menu in 1940.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
It’s not only about Ukraine
Negotiations with Russia went nowhere in this first week. The US, NATO, and the OSCE failed to budge Putin from his insistence on rolling back the NATO presence in Europe and blocking forever NATO membership for Ukraine. The Russians failed to budge NATO from its insistence that the door to membership be kept open (even if both NATO and the Russians know that Ukrainian membership is not in the cards for now). The odds of war, already high, have likely gone up, not down. What now?
Unity is strength
Above all, the US and European members of NATO need to strengthen Ukraine’s military capacity. Training and equipping should continue and expand. Stefano Graziosi and James Carafano are correct to argue that
Putin fears and respects strength. He exploits weakness. Europe must cease its dithering and give him what he fears, not what he wants.
Just today the Russians apparently launched a cyberattack on Ukraine. There are also indications they are planning a false flag operation as a pretext for invasion. Europe and the US made a pretty good show this week of unity in support of Ukraine. Let’s hope that show is backed up with real weapons and training.
Russia is vulnerable
There is still much more to be done. The Russians are more active today worldwide than the Soviets, who focused less on international presence and more on the strategic standoff with the US. In some of these places, Moscow is vulnerable. Witness what happened to the Wagner proxies in Libya, where Turkish drones forced them out of Tripoli. Some of these vulnerabilities are in Russian satellites. Witness what happened in Belarus and Kazakhstan, both of which had to rely on Moscow to protect their autocrats. And there are vulnerabilities inside the Russian Federation, where the economy is stagnant. The West needs to exploit these vulnerabilities when good opportunities present themselves.
Any Russian intervention will be limited
We also need to think realistically about what Putin is likely to do. An invasion aiming at taking all of Ukraine is unlikely. The 100,000 troops Russia has already massed are not adequate. Moscow would need to increase them by fourfold or more for that purpose. Ukraine has more and far better equipped and trained forces than when Russia first invaded in 2014. Turkey has provided its cheap but effective attack drones.
Kiev has also gained popular support. This report from Kharkiv, close to the Russian border, is telling:
The Russian Army cannot expect to be welcomed in most of a country where the Soviet-imposed Holodomor famine of 1932-33 is remembered as genocidal.
Putin presumably knows this and will keep any military intervention to limited objectives commensurate with the size of his forces. One of my more knowledgeable colleagues suggests this might be the canal that supplies water from the Dnipr to Crimea, or some expansion of the insurrectionist-controlled area in Donbas.
The US will need to lead the Western reaction
That kind of limited intervention will pose a problem for the US and Europe. Should they react with the full force of the financial and technological sanctions and military assistance to Ukrainian resistance fighters that they have threatened? Even those may not be effective. Some in NATO will want to modulate downwards to match the magnitude of any limited Russian intervention. Others will argue that a disproportionate response is appropriate, to deter further offensive efforts on Russia’s part.
The US will need to play the leadership role, whatever the Russians do. The Europeans are too fragmented and compromised to reach quick decisions and implement them with rigor. President Biden has spent a year building up credibility with NATO. He will need to draw down on those credits, especially if he reverses his own decision not to continue objecting to operation of the now completed Nordstream 2 pipeline from Russia to Germany. The Germans have paused their own decision on the pipeline’s operation, but high gas prices in Europe are bringing pressure to go ahead.
Of course it would be best if Moscow backed off and accepted some of the face-saving propositions NATO is offering: limits on military exercises, missile deployments, and other classic OSCE-style confidence building measures. But hope is not a policy. The Americans need to continue to keep the Europeans in line and the Russians concerned about what an invasion of Ukraine might portend, not only in Ukraine but elsewhere as well.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Make Putin watch his back
Alexander Vindman is the former National Security Council official who gave vital incriminating testimony in Trump’s first impeachment. He blew the whistle on the President’s phone call with President Zelensky of Ukraine, in which Trump sought dirt on then candidate Joe Biden. Now a doctoral student at SAIS, Vindman has interesting, if discouraging, things to say about Russian intentions with respect to Ukraine:
Not a lot of good options in Ukraine
Vindman believes Russia is likely to invade Ukraine, with the aim of keeping Ukraine in its sphere of influence and making it a failed state, one that cannot offer a democratic model for those who want to escape Moscow’s tentacles. Sanctions he thinks won’t have much more impact than in the past, because Russia has hardened its economy against them. In addition, Putin controls a $620 billion sovereign wealth fund, and China will help cushion the blow.
The best military hope lies in NATO countries. The US could station more troops in NATO countries near Ukraine. They, especially those on the eastern front that Russia threatens, could in turn train the Ukrainians and perhaps deploy troops and equipment to help the Ukrainian army defend against attack.
But Putin is vulnerable elsewhere
Vindman ignores Putin’s vulnerabilities beyond Ukraine. One of these was dramatically apparent in Kazakhstan over the last few days, when protesters challenged President Tokayev. The protests quickly turned violent. Tokayev sought Russian help to protect vital installations and ordered his forces to shoot to kill.
The Russians did not send a big force–supposedly only 2500 troops–but Putin is also saddled with defending his annexation of Crimea, besieged Belarusan President Lukashenko, secessionist provinces in Georgia, and the homicidal Syrian President Assad, not to mention maintaining Russian forces in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The Russians are also active through proxy forces in Libya and the Central African Republic. They are building bases in half a dozen African countries. Russian empire-building is reaching further than even Moscow’s Soviet-era ambitions.
A crisis in any one of these places could bring a halt to Putin’s ambitions in Ukraine.
Including at home
Putin is also vulnerable at home. While he has acquired de facto autocratic powers, he is less popular than once he was. Corruption is his Achilles heel. The Kremlin has murdered one potential rival and poisoned, then imprisoned, another. A free and fair election could well do Putin in, so he won’t allow that. He also faces local ethnic and religious minority resistance to his increasingly nationalist and chauvinist rule.
If the Americans want to protect Ukraine, they will need not only to beef up its defenses and undermine Russia’s economy, but also figure out how to exploit Putin’s political and military vulnerabilities beyond Ukraine.
Make Putin watch his back.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Focus on what matters
In addition to the previous, I did this interview with Besnik Velija of Kosovo’s Gazeta Express on New Year’s eve (it was published in Albanian this morning):
Q: I am writing about the US involvement in Western Balkans developments. Mr. Jeffrey Hovenier now is officially the new US Ambassador at Kosovo, Mr. Christopher Hill at Serbia. We have also Mr. Escobar as Special Representative for the Western Balkans.
With the completion of this mosaic of important people in the Western Balkans, do you expect an offensive by Joe Biden in 2022?
A: I expect this new crew to want to accomplish something in the Western Balkans, starting in 2022. Their focus initially will likely be on preventing disaster in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they will also want to achieve something with Kosovo and Serbia.
Q: Do you expect concrete developments in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue?
A: Yes. I certainly hope to see progress on missing people and on financial issues. I would also like to see adoption in the Western Balkans, including by Pristina and Belgrade, of principles that govern correct behavior towards neighbors, along with implementation plans.
Q: Do you find the EU negotiation model profitable, and do you think that the US should take over the entire Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process, in order to end the protracted negotiations?
A: I think the EU process is still the best forum available, but it requires more support and commitment from the US, including monitoring implementation of agreements reached. I doubt the US will take it over, as the destiny of the Western Balkans is in Europe.
Q: What do you think about a meeting at the White House, led by Biden, that would not end without the parties reaching a final agreement?
A: Such spectaculars happen only when carefully prepared. I see no prospect that either Belgrade or Pristina will be ready for it before the Serbian presidential election next year, and perhaps not after that either.
Q: If a final agreement is not reached with these people and with Joe Biden at the helm of the US, what do you foresee for the Western Balkans and specifically for Kosovo and Serbia?
A: Whether a “final” agreement is reached or not, what I hope is the Western Balkans will focus on what matters: preparation for EU accession and, for those who want it, NATO membership. The benefits of both come mainly from those preparations. Once qualified, potential EU member states will need to wait for the political window to open, likely not much before the end of this decade. The road is long. Slow but steady will win this race.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, December 27
– The Guardian says US & Japan are coordinating on Taiwan.
– Russia will have talks with US & NATO in January.
– WSJ reports how Taliban “outwitted and outwaited” US.
– Just Security has long report on military activity last January 6.
– NYT reviews book challenging views on WWII. I also found the book persuasive. My take is here.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Jaw-jaw is better
The Russian buildup on its border with Ukraine looks increasingly like a real invasion force. While Moscow has already built a bridge from Russian territory to Crimea, which it annexed in 2014, President Putin would also like a mainland connection along the coast through Mariupol. Or he has signaled he might settle for an agreement with Washington that Ukraine and other immediate neighbors of Russia will never join NATO. The deployment of 100,000 invasion-ready troops is expensive, but Russia is still relatively flush despite the decline of oil from more than $80 per barrel to less than $70. Putin is using military threat to gain what the West has successfully denied Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union more than three decades ago: a “near abroad” sphere of influence Russia regards as vital to its security.
Moscow claims it is reacting to NATO threats, but there is no real sign of those. Putin knows that NATO is an inherently defensive alliance, one ruled by consensus that is difficult to achieve. The Alliance will not deploy troops to defend non-member Ukraine. If the balloon goes up, it will be Kiev’s responsibility to respond to a Russian invasion. While it did poorly at that in 2014, when the Russians took Crimea as well as Luhansk and Donetsk, the Ukrainian army has improved since then and received a modicum of assistance from the US, in particular defensive Javelin missiles to counter Russian tanks. Presumably Washington is also providing Kiev with satellite and signals intelligence.
There is an obvious off-ramp from the current confrontation: the Minsk II agreement that provides for self-governance for Luhansk and Donetsk in return for re-establishing monitored control of the border with Russia and withdrawal of illegal armed forces from Ukrainian territory. But Russia has no interest in self-governance anywhere and uses proxy forces inside Ukraine to ensure that control of the border remains in exclusively Russian-friendly hands. The Germans and French led the negotiation effort that produced Minsk II, but they haven’t got the diplomatic clout to make it stick with Moscow. Even if the US were to weigh in heavily, it is not clear Moscow would be prepared to implement Minsk II.
While Putin’s statecraft in using the threat of military force may look promising, it could turn out badly. It is not clear Russia would win a war with Ukraine. Even without one, any patriotic Ukrainian might conclude from the current situation that membership in NATO and the EU is the most promising way of defending the country and enabling it to prosper. Russia is just too big and relatively well off for Kiev to confront alone. While Russia might bite off another morsel in Ukraine’s southeast, political and economic conditions in the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine are miserable. Ukraine’s best hope will be to prove itself far better at governing and prospering than Moscow. That should not be impossible, as Russia is a declining petro-state of no particular distinction in benefiting its citizens.
In the meanwhile, the West will need to react to any military move on Russia’s part. The usual response is perhaps the best it can do: rhetorical condemnation, tightening and expanding sanctions, and increasing military, economic and political assistance to Kiev. The alternative is unattractive: agreement to close the doors of NATO and the EU to Ukraine, Belarus, and other neighbors of Russia. That would demonstrate that sabre rattling is a successful strategy and would no doubt lead to more of the same. We should not go to war with Russia over Ukraine, but nor should we cave to Russian intimidation. Jaw-jaw is better.
RSS - Posts
