Tag: NATO
NATO 2030: focus on cyber, Russia, and China
On June 4, the German Council on Foreign Relations together with the Brookings Institution hosted NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg for a keynote address on NATO in 2030. This address was held ahcommead of the NATO summit in Brussels on June 14, when a new policy paper will be published. The Secretary General provided an overview of NATO’s key challenges and opportunities, emphasizing. He emphasized NATO’s achievements and ambitions in the field of cyber security, as well as the new focus on China as a global competitor. In the Q&A, he acknowledged the differences between certain NATO allies on democracy and human rights, but stressed the alliance’s strength in finding common ground.
The speakers were:
John R. Allen (opening remarks)
President
Brookings Institution
Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook (introduction)
Designated Director and CEO
German Council on Foreign Relations
Constanze Stelzenmüller (moderator)
Fritz Stern Chair, Center on the United States and Europe
Brookings Institution
Jens Stoltenberg (keynote)
Secretary-general
NATO
The keynote: achievements, challenges, ambitions
Secretary General Stoltenberg acknowledged the challenges facing NATO today. While the Alliance leaving Afghanistan, its longest mission ever, it faces authoritarian threats from Russia and China. Russia threatens the Arctic Circle and perpetrates cyber attacks. China’s rise is obvious to all. It will soon be largest economy and already has the second largest military. Beijing doesn’t necessarily see NATO as an enemy. Cooperation on issues such as arms control or climate change is possible. Nonetheless, Beijing’s rise poses a challenge as it does not share NATO’s values of democracy, rule of law, and individual liberty. None of NATO’s members can face these challenges alone, but Stoltenberg declared “the countries of Europe and North America are not alone. We stand together.”
He then proceeded to outline the key areas NATO will focus on in the next decade in nine points:
- NATO is the key theater in which to tackle transatlantic challenges such as Syria and Iran. Even if NATO does not intervene directly, its members still coordinate on such issues. After all, “NATO is not just a military alliance, but a political-military alliance.” It therefore has to resolve its differences and enhance cooperation.
- NATO will boost its collective response to threats and invest in modernizing and expanding its capacities.
- NATO members must strengthen their domestic resilience against outside interference. “Strong societies are our first line of defense.”
- Transatlantic innovation must be given a boost as well. NATO’s technological edge should be sharpened and gaps between allies need to be prevented. For this purpose, the Alliance will establish a Transatlantic Defense Accelerator in which members will cooperate in innovation.
- NATO will play its part in upholding the rules-based international order and speak with one voice to defend its values and interests. This means encouraging others to play by the rules; upholding freedom of navigation, as well as a safe and secure cyber space; and setting rules and standards for emerging technologies.
- NATO will continue capacity building in friendly neighboring states, as conflict in NATO’s periphery undermines its safety. Examples include Georgia and Iraq.
- NATO recognizes that climate change is a crisis multiplier and must confront its security implications. The Alliance will integrate climate change considerations into its operations. Sustainable technologies will be prioritized in procurement. NATO will work with industry to create climate neutral capabilities that eventually lead to net-zero emissions.
- NATO will develop its next strategic concept. It will recommit to its values and consider its changing purpose in a changing world.
- To achieve all this, NATO members will have to invest more. Developments on this front are on the right track, as defense spending has increased in seven consecutive years after decades of cuts. NATO will “not just invest more, but invest better,” doing so collectively, as NATO is a force multiplier. This increases efficiency, and sends a clear message of unity and resolve to adversaries.
The Q&A: overcoming internal challenges
Many of the public’s and moderator Stelzenmüller‘s questions focused on the apparent internal disunity in NATO. Stoltenberg made it clear that NATO is a group of 30 different nations and that it will never speak as one. These are democracies and their disagreements and internal discussions are part of their strength. That said, it is important that the allies remain unified on the main issues. They need to rally behind their core values and stand up to authoritarian encroachments by Russia, China, and others, as the regime plane hijacking in Belarus recently demonstrated. Ukraine is a key partner on this front. While the Secretary General shied away from giving explicit commitments, his main message to Kiev is to focus on domestic reform and combating corruption. These matters are valuable in themselves, but also key to eventual NATO accession.
Several questions addressed Turkey’s apparent disregard for NATO’s core democratic values. Stoltenberg has expressed his concerns on this front in Ankara, as have other allies, and he believes that NATO can also be a platform to have open discussions on such issues. However, Turkey remains a key member of the Alliance. It is the only state to border Syria and Iran. It plays a key role in combatting ISIS and the refugee crisis. NATO’s presence in the Aegean, where it provides a bridge between Greece and Turkey, showcasesits capacity for resolving and preventing conflicts when views diverge.
Cyber threats
NATO has explicitly refocused on cyber as a military domain. Cyber attacks can trigger NATO’s article 5 (which considers an attack on one of its members as an attack on all) in the same way as kinetic attacks. Stoltenberg was not explicit on the threshold, as this would only be a favor to adversaries. However, NATO’s message is clear: cyber warfare is warfare.
China and Russia
The Secretary General promised that the communiqué to be issued at the coming NATO summit will mention China more often and more explicitly than ever before. He considers this a major oversight of previous strategy papers. Cooperation with Pacific states such as Australia will be increased, as will resilience against the domestic threats that China poses to member states. NATO will not look to declare China an enemy. There are many fields in which cooperation and trade with China are possible and beneficial. The differences in opinion on such matters between, for example, the US and Germany, will not undermine the Alliance’s consensus or resolve. The same is true for Russia. NATO will continue to talk to Russia while challenging it. “There is no contradiction between being clear-eyed about the threat that Russia poses, and the need to talk to them.” At the core, NATO must acknowledge changing global power dynamics, which have real consequences for the Alliance.
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Engagement with armed groups is necessary, “good” or “bad”
The Crisis Response Council and the Brookings Institution’s Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors June 3 convened a discussion on challenges posed by armed groups to security sector reform (SSR) in the Middle East and beyond. Panelists agreed that SSR too frequently views armed groups from a unidimensional perspective. Militias are not inherent spoilers whose power is limited to the security sector. They are more often politically or socially embedded potential power brokers. State monopolies on violence are an anomaly in post-conflict states. Armed groups can contribute positively to SSR and governance.
The speakers were:
Vanda Felbab-Brown
Director – Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors; Co-Director – Africa Security Initiative; Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Brookings Institution
Frederic Wehrey
Senior fellow, Middle East Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Bernadetta Berti
Head of Policy Planning in the Office of the Secretary General
NATO
Yaniv Voller
Senior Lecturer in the Politics of the Middle East
University of Kent; Stanford University
Ranj Alaaldin (moderator)
Visiting Fellow – Brookings Doha Center; Nonresident Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
Brookings Institution
The present: thriving and misunderstood
Vanda Felbab-Brown highlighted the Corona pandemic’s effect on armed groups around the world. The associated economic downturn has pushed some states to their limits. 200 million people have been pushed into poverty, and many of those will be forced to engage in criminal activities to scrape together a living. Under these conditions, armed groups thrive. Hundreds of millions of people already live under total, partial, or shared control by armed groups. As state spending on social welfare, but also security provision, shrunk, armed groups moved in to fill the gaps.
Wehrey discussed the case of Libya, where armed groups have thrived in part because they were misunderstood by outsiders. Emerging after the fall of Gadhafi, they were useful security providers, but politicized and prone to state capture and corruption. The Libyan case could have ended more positively if the ‘prizes’ for militias had been placed under better oversight. Oil revenues, ministerial positions, ports, airports were targets for militia competition. Protection of such prizes could have prevented the militia growth that Libya has seen.
Multiple efforts to “train and equip” a Libyan army from scratch have failed. Such an effort takes years and the security vacuum that exists before its completion is sure to be filled up by someone. Furthermore, in Libya new armies have often recruited from specific tribal, communal, or political backgrounds. These are less national armies and more new militias. This is something Wehrey sees happening now with Turkish support for the Tripoli-based armed forces. The current effort to defer security issues while working on political unity is reminiscent of 2012. The outcome might be similar: a relapse into violence.
The panel agreed that armed groups are not anomalies and they will not go away. Ahram suggested states do not necessarily want to be centralized. There are many examples of leaders deliberately fragmenting power. Militia fighters are not unlucky souls whose dream is to join the regular army and leave the militia life behind them. These groups are an embedded part of their communities and not easily fixable aberrations.
What makes an armed group “good” or “bad”?
The exact drivers of armed groups are poorly understood by academia and policy makers. Voller focuses his research on the question of why certain pro-government militias act predatorily, while others do not. Rather than an inherent inclination to violence, he believes that a core determinant is whether an armed group acts in a theater where its constituency is present. The predominantly Shia PMF in Iraq became predatorial when they entered the Sunni northwest in the fight against ISIS, while the Kurdish Peshmerga refrained from doing so as they always operate among their Kurdish communities. Felbab-Brown countered that other factors must also be important, as there are plenty of examples of armed groups acting predatorily among their own communities. She posits that any armed group gets feedback from its community, even if it is only by means of resistance to violence. If a community lacks social cohesion, this feedback can be unclear or weak, allowing greater predatory behavior.
Wehrey warned against an overly economic focus when it comes to controlling militias. Paying off armed groups to steer them, or turning off their incomes to force their hand, only treats part of the reality. These groups are embedded in and motivated by communal identity, religion, and history. Ahram agreed. He added that armed groups are also not merely political, as there are many cases of armed groups engaging in negotiations or elections and still continuing their armed struggles. Normative motivations are also part of the equation, as local norms, national laws, and even international law (and the fear of a Hague tribunal) are all considered by militias. Ahram believes that the onus is on researchers to identify which of these different levers matter under which circumstances, and how they can be used effectively.
Berti joked that she would enjoy this academic exercise, but that the policy maker in her called for a different course of action. She warned that all of these tools are highly context specific. What works best in practice is a willingness to enter a long-term commitment to a peace building effort. An intervening power needs to engage in a dynamic relationship with local power brokers and be willing to deal with new actors and change course when the situation calls for it.
Policy makers’ task: flexibility and pragmatism
The panel agreed that thinking in terms of “good” or “bad” militias is a fruitless exercise. Voller emphasized once more that militias are embedded in their communities. He used the example of Syrian militias that might align with Assad and engage in repression in order to protect their own constituencies. We might not call these actors “good”, but we can understand what motivates them. Felbab-Brown explained that it is better to think in pragmatic terms of available alternatives. An armed group might be odious, yet be the best option in terms of service provision, behavior, and accountability. Local populations as a rule adapt to harsh and illiberal actors if they provide stability and security.
The task that faces policy makers is a daunting one, as current tools and theories are poorly equipped to deal with the realities. The key is to be flexible and to accept militias as an embedded part of society. Berti and Ahram underlined this. We often speak of ‘allowing’ armed groups to exist or participate in a society. In practice, however, we usually have little influence over their existence. Voller emphasized that engaging with a militia directly as the state, rather than condemning and ignoring it, is usually the best way to have a positive influence on its behavior. Using the example of the Lebanese Hezbollah, however, Berti warned us to beware of who’s steering whom in these dynamics.
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Peace Picks | May 10-14, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- What does the future hold for NATO in the MENA region? | May 10, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) Frontier Europe Initiative in collaboration with the Arab News Research and Studies is pleased to host an online Briefing Room Conversation to discuss the future of NATO in the Middle East-North Africa region.
Speakers:
Luke Coffey
Director, Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation
Iulia Joja
Senior fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI; adjunct professor, Georgetown University
Tarek Ali Ahmad (Moderator)
Head, Arab News Research and Studies
2. Iraqi-US Relations Under Changing Administrations | May 10, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Brookings Institute | Register Here
As President Joe Biden completes the first 100 days of his presidency, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi nears his one-year anniversary in office. Iraq and the United States held their first strategic dialogue under the Biden administration in early April, discussing bilateral security cooperation, economic development in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, and protection of democracy and freedom of speech, among other topics. These two new administrations will now have to set the course for the future of Iraqi-U.S. relations.
Speakers:
Suzanne Maloney (Introduction)
Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy, Brookings Institute
Joey Hood (Keynote)
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, US Department of State
Abbas Kadhim
Iraq Initiative Director and Resident Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council
Marsin Alshamary
Post-Doctoral Fellow in Foreign Policy, Brookings Institute
Louisa Loveluck (Moderator)
Baghdad Bureau Chief, The Washington Post
3. Border Battle: Assessing the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan Clashes | May 10, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
The death and destruction wrought by the recent violence between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the Ferghana Valley is a tragedy, with scores of victims on both sides of the border. Worryingly, the clashes might yet have broader implications for both countries and their Central Asian neighbors. How might the confrontation affect the rights of ethnic minorities, particularly in the various exclaves throughout the region? How can Bishkek and Dushanbe avoid a security dilemma that might further destabilize an already tense situation?
Speakers:
Dr. George Gavrilis
Fellow, University of California-Berkeley’s Center for Democracy, Toleration, and Religion
Jonathan Henick
Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, US Department of State
Akylai Karimova
Kyrgyz civil activist based in Osh
Dr. Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center
Anahita Saymidinova
Dushanbe-based journalist for Iran International TV
Ambassador John Herbst (Moderator)
Director of the Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council.
4. Restricted Data: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the United States | May 10, 2021 | 4:00 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
The American atomic bomb was born in secrecy. From the moment scientists first conceived of its possibility to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and beyond, there were efforts to control the spread of nuclear information and the newly discovered scientific facts that made such powerful weapons possible. Drawing on troves of declassified files, including records released by the government for the first time through Wellerstein’s efforts, Restricted Data traces the complex evolution of the US nuclear secrecy regime from the first whisper of the atomic bomb through the mounting tensions of the Cold War and into the early twenty-first century.
Speakers:
Alex Wellerstein
Stevens Institute of Technology
Christian F. Ostermann (Co-Moderator)
Director, History and Public Policy Program; Cold War International History Project; North Korea Documentation; Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center
Eric Arnesen (Co-Moderator)
Former Fellow, Professor of History, The George Washington University
Kathleen M. Vogel
Former Wilson Center Fellow; Arizona State University
Matthew Connelly
Former Fellow; Columbia University
5. Addressing Security Concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean | May 11, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | CSIS | Register Here
As a vital partner for the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece is witnessing significant shifts in its regional security environment. Minister Panagiotopoulos will discuss the reasons behind growing instability in the region and Greece’s initiatives to advance security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, working closely with regional partners. As NATO prepares to update its Strategic Concept starting this summer, Minister Panagiotopoulos will also reflect on Greece’s priorities for the updated concept; discuss how NATO can enhance its political cohesion and address new challenges; and outline ideas for expanding and deepening the U.S.-Greece strategic defence partnership. The conversation will be moderated by Heather A. Conley, CSIS Senior Vice President for Europe, Russia, and the Arctic, and Rachel Ellehuus, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia program.
Speakers:
Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos
Minister of National Defence, Greece
Heather A. Conley
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia and the Arctic; and Director, Europe, Russia and the Eurasia Program, CSIS
Rachel Ellehuus
Deputy Director, Europe, Russia and Eurasia Program
6. Nonviolent Action and Minority Inclusion | May 11, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Mass movements employing nonviolent action have a demonstrated track record of improving democracy. But how deep and meaningful are these changes? Does nonviolent action merely change political institutions, or can it also address deeper drivers of social and political conflict, particularly for the most marginalized?
To better understand the intersection of nonviolent action and peace processes, join USIP for the final event in our series on people power, peace and democracy. The event series highlights multiple groundbreaking research projects and features insights from activists, international practitioners and policymakers that provide viewers with actionable takeaways.
This USIP event features lessons learned from cutting-edge research showing how nonviolent action affects political and economic inequality — particularly for historically excluded social and ethnic groups — using a cross-national statistical study and in-depth case studies from recent political transitions in Nepal and Indonesia. The research also specifically examines how movements can employ dialogue, negotiation and mediation to better ensure that political transitions following nonviolent action campaigns lead to greater inclusion for marginalized groups. This event will explore the important implications for both policy and practice in ensuring more inclusive democratization processes in the aftermath of nonviolent action.
Speakers:
Jonathan Pinckney (Moderator)
Senior Researcher, Nonviolent Action, U.S. Institute of Peace
Mohna Ansari
Member, National Human Rights Commission of Nepal
Subindra Bogati
Founder and Chief Executive, Nepal Peacebuilding Initiative
Titik Firawati
Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, Northern Illinois University
Rosa Emilia Salamanca
Director, Institute for Social and Economic Research and Action
Deepak Thapa
Director, Social Science Baha
Ches Thurber
Assistant Professor, Northern Illinois University
7. Developments in Iran: Scandal, Schism and US-Iranian Relations | May 11, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has sensationally admitted that the Foreign Ministry in Tehran has no power to shape strategic policies. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has also scolded Zarif for questioning Tehran’s regional policies, which are designed and implemented by the Revolutionary Guards. This deep schism inside the Islamic Republic raises some important questions at a time when the US is engaged in direct talks with the Iranians in Vienna.
What is the balance of power between elected and unelected centers of powers in Tehran? How certain can the United States be about the ability of the Iranian state to collectively adhere to any nuclear agreement reached in Vienna? Where does this political reality in Tehran mean for Washington’s Iran policy that continues to impose sanctions on key entities in Iran, including the Revolutionary Guards?
Speakers:
Kenneth Katzman
Senior analyst, Congressional Research Service
Barbara Slavin
Director, Future of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Reza Vaisi
Editor, Iran International TV
Alex Vatanka (Moderator)
Director, Iran Program, MEI
8. China-Russia Relations at the Dawn of the Biden Era | May 12, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment: Center for Global Policy | Register Here
While U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations have steadily deteriorated, China-Russia cooperation has grown in its stead. On the heels of the contentious U.S.-China Alaska summit, Chinese and Russian foreign ministers met in Guilin to discuss bilateral cooperation on a range of issues and even published a joint statement promoting a shared vision for global governance.
However, it is unclear to what extent Russian and Chinese interests will continue to converge. Although both nations have found a common adversary in the United States, any divergence of Russian or Chinese interests could create roadblocks to the two countries’ warming relations. Given China’s increasing economic and political clout, how will Russia manage the relationship in a way that concurrently maintains cooperation with China and protects its own national interests? Will China continue to view Russia as a security and economic partner? And how does the United States view and approach strong China-Russia ties?
Speakers:
Paul Haenle (Moderator)
Maurice R. Greenberg Director Chair, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, Beijing China
Andrew S. Weiss
James Family Chair and Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment
Guan Guihai
Associate Professor and Executive Vice President, Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University
Vita Spivak
Analyst, Control Risk
9. Middle East Security Establishments and Social Reform | May 12, 2021 | 2:00 PM ET | Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School | Register Here
Across the Middle East, the security sector has exercised substantial influence over media, education, and religious institutions, often to the detriment of their societies and American interests. Could they instead become a force for positive reform, and what role might their American allies play in helping them? Please join the Intelligence and Defense Projects for a seminar with Middle East expert Joseph Braude, who will discuss these issues and provide a number of policy suggestions.
Speakers:
Joseph Braude
President of the Center for Peace Communications
10. Czechmate? Russia’s Relations with Czechia go up in Smoke | May 13, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
As the Czech Republic and Russia spar over groundbreaking reports of Russian intelligence operations in Czechia, key lessons emerge about the Kremlin’s tactics, goals, and the ability to exploit openings from foreign governments to attempt operations with impunity. Importantly, these operations were not just designed to harm Czechia—the 2014 destruction of arms depots holding weapons bound for Ukraine link these attacks to the Kremlin’s broader hybrid war against Kyiv, and show an early operation carried out by the same officers responsible for some of the most high-profile Kremlin attacks on foreign soil in recent years. With diplomatic expulsions and talk of further measures to hold Moscow accountable for killings on Czech soil, this crisis is fast becoming the latest significant flashpoint in Russia’s relations with Europe.
Speakers:
H.E. Jakub Kulhánek (Keynote)
Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Czech Republic,
Ambassador Daniel Fried
Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council
Jakub Janda
Director of the European Values Center for Security Policy
Ambassador Jaroslav Kurfurst
Special Envoy for the Eastern Partnership at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Laure Mandeville
Senior Reporter at Le Figaro and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center
Ambassador John Herbst (Moderator)
Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.
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The Alliance needs its members to get tough
In advance of the upcoming NATO Leaders Meeting, it is a timely to discuss the Alliance as a political forum and its future cohesion. NATO’s strength and resilience derive from Allies’ shared committment to the values and spirit of the Washington Treaty, namely the principles of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, and the development of peaceful international relations. As NATO grapples with a challenging security environment, it must also confront erosion of democratic norms within some member countries, which undermines NATO unity. On April 27, 2021, The Center for Strategic and International Studies convened a panel to discuss prospects for NATO cohesion in light of a changing strategic environment. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below:
Ambassador Muriel Domenach: Permanent Representative of France to NATO
MdB Omid Nouripour: Foreign Policy Spokesperson for the German Green party.
Rachel Ellehuus (Moderator): Deputy Director of the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
Heather A. Conley (Introductory Remarks): Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic
Values and Principles Define NATO
One consistent theme of the panel was the centrality of democratic values and ideals for defining the character of the NATO alliance. Ambassador Domenach noted that a lack of ideological and political cohesion across NATO member countries is a detriment to Alliance structure. The increasing failure to agree on basic norms of good governance and democratic rule intensifies tension and undermines meaningful cooperation. Moreover, the failure to agree on basic values undermines the material ability of NATO and its member nations to engage in its core functions of deterrence and defense in two ways. First, ideological rifts are particularly significant in the context of NATO’s organizational structure, which requires unified decision-making. When any one country can block actions by the group, schisms within the group become increasingly problematic. Second, lack of ideological cohesion in NATO undermines credibility because it decreases the likelihood that NATO will be able to act decisively against its enemies.
Nouripour similarly argued that ideological divisions among NATO members has material implications for security. He pointed to Turkey’s current attempts to play the US and Russia off of one another. The most significant manifestation of this strategy of straddling with ideological opponents has been the purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system. However, Ankara has recently discovered that the black boxes in the S-400 will not allow them to target Russian planes. In essence, then, a NATO ally has ceded its air defense sovereignty to Russia.
Ellehuus pointed out, however, that NATO has not always relied on, or succeeded based on, ideological uniformity. In fact, at the outset NATO included members such as Portugal that did not at the time share the same democratic values as many of the other members. She argued that this might indicate that value cohesion is not necessarily crucial for NATO. However, both Nouripour and Domenach agreed that ideological cohesion is more critical now than it was in the early days of NATO. Nouripour argued that democratic backsliding and the rise of disinformation campaigns and other attempts to actively weaken democracies dictates that a stronger emphasis be placed on maintaining democratic values.
Compelling Good Behavior
One clear weakness of the NATO structure that emerged out of this panel’s discussion is the difficulty that the organization has in compelling good behavior from non-compliant member states. Domenach pointed to suggestions about creating a code of conduct or reviewing compliance with fundamental NATO values. Ellehuus similarly pointed to two proposed articles that would require NATO allies to 1) refrain from politically motivated blockages of NATO business, and 2) to report any interactions with third countries that might affect the security of allies.
However, she also acknowledged that these changes were highly unlikely to pass in any meaningful form, largely because non-compliant members can and most likely will veto any attempt to pass these measures. She also argued that the North Atlantic Council is a valuable forum through which to air disagreements and negotiate solutions. Recent attempts by the NATO Secretary-General have proven fruitful in this regard.
Nouripour disagreed with this assessment to some extent. While he agreed that NATO is unlikely to pass meaningful reforms that allow it to police the conduct of member states, he similarly found the prospect of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO Secretary-General negotiating compliance to be unlikely. Instead, he argued more in favor of direct bilateral and multilateral engagement to push for democratic values. Given the constraints of NATO as an organization, he believes that states acting on a national basis can perhaps create greater leverage with member countries. Ellehuus ultimately agreed that national power might be an effective mechanism through which to encourage compliance
Therefore, while NATO faces a variety of internal and external threats to its political and ideological cohesion, member states are stepping up in innovative ways to tackle the new threats of the 21st century.
To watch the event in full, please click here.
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Peace Picks | April 26 – April 30, 2021
Peace Picks | April 26 – April 30, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
1. Supporting Sustainable Development in the Arctic: Estonia’s Role in Advancing Arctic Collaboration| April 26, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
There are many challenges in building sustainable and thriving communities in the Arctic while addressing the impacts of a warming and changing Arctic landscape due to climate change. As one of eight Arctic nations that comprise the Arctic Council, the United States, under the Biden Administration has called for an increase in international cooperation to address climate change in all facets of its domestic and foreign policy, including the Arctic. Estonia, a close neighbor of the Arctic, is applying for Observer status in the Arctic Council, is committed to mitigating the impacts of climate change, and advancing sustainable development in the Arctic. This discussion will offer an exchange of views by experts from the United States and Estonia on ways to promote collaboration to address the critical issues facing the Arctic, especially in the areas of research, environmental protection, and sustainable development.
Speakers:
Caroline Kennedy
Attorney, Author, Former US Ambassador to Japan
2. Soft Power and Practice of Diplomacy: A Conversation with Ambassador Caroline Kennedy| April 26, 2021 | 2:00 PM ET | Belfer Center| Register Here
In a conversation with Ambassador Caroline Kennedy, we will explore how she employed cultural diplomacy while serving as U.S. Ambassador to Japan (2013-2017), our key ally in Asia. Ambassador (ret.) Nicholas Burns, Harvard Kennedy School professor and Faculty Chair of the Future of Diplomacy Project, will welcome and introduce Ambassador Kennedy. Carla Dirlikov Canales, 2021 Advanced Leadership Initiative Fellow, will moderate the discussion.
Speakers:
Ambassador Märt Volmer
Undersecretary for European Affairs, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tarmo Soomere
President, Estonian Academy of Sciences
Ambassador David Balton
Senior Fellow, Polar Institute; Former Ambassador for Oceans and Fisheries, US Department of State
Ambassador Kaja Tael
Special Envoy for Climate and Energy Policy, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Aimar Ventsel
Associate Porfessor in Ethnology, University of Tartu
David M. Kennedy
Global Fellow, Polar Institute; Chair, United States Arctic Research Commission
Michael Sfraga
Director, Polar Institute; Director, Global Risk and Resilience Program
3. Russian Aggression in the Black Sea: Regional and International Responses| April 26, 2021 | 2:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute| Register Here
Russia’s largest military buildup since the 2014 annexation of Crimea is taking place along the Ukrainian border and in the Black Sea. Moscow has resorted to escalatory measures, announcing the closing of the Kerch Strait and the Azov Sea to foreign ships and cutting off Ukraine’s ability to export. In response, the West has reacted with warnings and invitations to dialogue while Turkey is trying to walk a fine line between Russia and Ukraine. To prevent further escalation of the crisis, much will depend on the Biden administration’s response.
Speakers:
Gen. (ret.) Philip Breedlove
Distinguished chair, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Yörük Işık
Non-resident scholar, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Iulia Joja
Senior fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Mamuka Tsereteli
Non-resident scholar, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Gönül Tol, (Moderator)
Director, Turkey Program; senior fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
4. Revitalizing NATO’s Political Cohesion | April 27, 2021 | 10:30 AM ET | CSIS | Register Here
In advance of the upcoming NATO Leaders Meeting, it is a timely moment to discuss NATO as a political forum and its future cohesion. NATO’s strength and resilience derive from Allies’ shared committment to the values and spirit of the Washington Treaty, namely the principles of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, and the development of peaceful international relations. As NATO grapples with a challenging security environment, it must also confront an erosion of democratic norms within some member countries that undermines NATO’s unity. Will an updated strategic concept as well as a new U.S. administration provide an opportunity to prioritize transatlantic values and NATO’s political cohesion?
Speakers:
Ambassador Muriel Domenach,
Permanent Representative of France to NATO
MdB Omid Nouripour
Foreign Policy Spokesperson for the German Green party.
Rachel Ellehuus (Moderator)
Deputy Director of the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
Heather A. Conley (Introductory Remarks)
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctica
5. African and South Asian perspectives on the Leaders Summit on Climate| April 28, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Under the Biden administration, the United States is making climate action a top priority. While the Trump administration failed to properly drive United States’ environmental policy towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the use of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, the Biden administration is set for unprecedented action on climate issues, even going as far as to pledge commitment to working with China to fight climate change and to help developing nations finance their efforts to lower their carbon footprints.
As part of his efforts to tackle the imminent threat posed by climate change, President Biden will host a Leaders Summit on Climate on April 22 and 23, to conclude days before our event. Some of the key themes of the summit are to explore the possibilities of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in order to mitigate the consequences of a global temperature increase over 1.5 degrees Celsius as well as financing vulnerable countries’ efforts to transition to clean energy economies.
Speakers:
Jairam Ramesh
Former chief negotiation for India, Copenhagen Climate Change Summit;
Former cabinet minister for rural development, Government of India;
Present member of parliament (Rajya Sabha)
Dr. Syed Mohammed Ali
Non-resident scholar, Middle East Institute;
Adjunct Professor, Johns Hopkins University
Ms. Ayaan Adam
Senior Director and CEO, AFC Capital;
Former Director of the Private Sector Facility, Green Climate Fund
Irfan Nooruddin (Introductory Remarks)
Director, Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center
Aubrey Hruby (Moderator)
Nonresident senior fellow, Atlantic Council’s Africa Center
6. The UK Integrated Defense Review: A Conversation with General Sir Nick Carter| April 28, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | CSIS | Register Here
Please join the Center for Strategic and International Studies for a conversation with General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the UK Defence Staff. General Sir Nick Carter and Dr. Seth Jones, Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program, will discuss the UK Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, and how the UK military is prioritizing modernization.
Speakers:
General Sir Nick Carter
Chief of the UK Defence Staff
Dr. Seth Jones
Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program
7. Strengthening International Peace and Security | April 28, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | German Marshall Fund of the United States| Register Here
The German Marshall Fund of the United States would like to invite you to a timely conversation with Helga Schmid, the new secretary general at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The conversation, moderated by GMF’s Ian Lesser, will focus on Secretary General Schmid’s priorities in her new capacity at the OSCE. This includes a focus on OSCE efforts to address the far-reaching impacts of COVID-19 and Secretary General Schmid’s vision on how multilateral organizations, including the OSCE, can strengthen peace building, prevent conflict, and empower women and girls.
Representing 57 member countries, the OSCE holds a unique position in the international security architecture. Promoting a comprehensive approach to security that encompasses politico-military, economic and environmental, and human aspects, the organization addresses a wide range of security challenges, including arms control, human rights, democratization, policing strategies, counterterrorism, and economic and environmental activities.
Speakers:
Helga Schmid
Secretary General, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Ian Lesser
Vice President, The German Marshall Fund of the United States
8. Putin’s Mediterranean gambit: Endgame unclear | April 29, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
A discussion on President Vladimir Putin’s successes in the Mediterranean, his broader objectives in the Mediterranean, the factors that have helped and hindered Putin’s achievement of these objectives and why the United States should be concerned and what it should do about growing Russian influence in the Mediterranean.
For more than 250 years, Russian leaders have sought to project power and influence in the Mediterranean region. Sometimes these efforts have met with a significant degree of success. At times, though, Russia has pulled back from the Mediterranean because of setbacks in the region, events in Europe, or convulsions inside Russia. These pullbacks, however, have never been permanent and have always been followed by renewed Russian efforts to gain influence in the region.
Speakers:
Christopher J. Bort
National Intelligence Officer for Russiaand Eurasia
National Intelligence Council
Laura K. Cooper
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia
United States Department of Defense
William F. Wechsler
Director, Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East ProgramsAtlantic Council
Mark N. Katz (Moderator)
Nonresident Senior Fellow
Atlantic Council
9. World order in the 21st century: Illiberal orders, a concert of power, or a Western revival?| April 29, 2021 | 6:00 PM ET | Chatham House| Register Here
In the years after World War I, many international affairs schools and think tanks opened their doors, dedicated to educating students, informing publics, and devising solutions to the problems of war, peace and international order.
A century later, political, socio-economic and geopolitical change has raised profound questions about whether today’s ideas and institutions, many of which emerged in the aftermath of World War I and World War II, are fit for purpose.
The stumblings of liberal democracy, the onset of the digital economy, growing inequality within and among nations, the COVID-19 pandemic, mounting great-power rivalry and many other developments necessitate a re-evaluation of how best to preserve order in an interdependent world.
Speakers:
Professor Charles Kupchan
Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University; Senior Director for European Affairs, US National Security Council (2014-17)
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Director, US and the Americas Programme, Chatham House
Dr Anne-Marie Slaughter
CEO, New America; Director of Policy Planning, US Department of State (2009-11)
Professor Rana Mitter
Professor of the History and Politics of Modern China, St Cross College, Oxford University
Dr Robin Niblett
Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House
10. Criminal justice reform in America: Policing and pretrial detention |April 30, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Brookings Institute| Register Here
The United States incarcerates more people per capita than any other country in the world. Recidivism rates continue to be high as millions of people cycle in and out of the criminal justice system and deal with a cumbersome pretrial detention process. Black people are disproportionately more likely to die from police violence, and racial and ethnic minorities are simultaneously over- and under-policed. After 50 years, it is clear there are a plethora of unintended consequences of the War on Crime and the War on Drugs, which have led to issues across the criminal justice system.
Speakers:
Rashawn Ray
David M. Rubenstein Fellow: Governance Studies
Brent Orrell
Resident Fellow: American Enterprise Institute
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No first use of nuclear weapons
Pantelis Ikonomou, former IAEA inspector, writes:
Last week, the No-First-Use Act (NFU) was reintroduced in the US Senate to establish in law that the US policy is NOT to use nuclear weapons first in any conflict. This is a key initiative necessary to advance NFU policy in the US, in its nuclear allied countries (NATO, Japan. South Korea, and Australia), and ultimately in all other nuclear armed states.
President Obama, who had considered ruling out the first use of a nuclear weapon in a conflict, eventually abandoned the idea. Allied countries maintained the option of first use of US nuclear weapons was needed for their protection. There was conern in the US that NFU would embolden Russia and China.
President Biden could now run into these same problems. Armed conflicts in the NATO vicinity have grown stronger. Strategic tensions between the US and the two nuclear powers, Russia and China, are escalating. There is no clarity about their policy on first use of nuclear weapons.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated “Our nuclear weapons doctrine does not provide for a pre-emptive strike…” however, “… we are prepared and will use nuclear weapons only when we know for certain that some potential aggressor is attacking Russia, our territory.”
Beijing in its White Defence Charter 2011 underlines the posture of maintaining a “minimum nuclear deterrent,” with the commitment of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, but without a detailed analysis of the term “minimum.”
The need for NFU nuclear doctrine is becoming more important than ever. Continuously modernized nuclear arsenals are getting more capable. They can wipe out humanity and civilization on the planet (more than once). The probability of nuclear Armageddon due to accident or miscalculation is dangerously increasing.
Unfortunately, global peace and mankind’s existence depend currently upon an irrational equilibrium, that of Mutually Assured Destruction. The deadlock of of nuclear deterrence ought now be obvious to all: sensible superpower leaders, their expert advisors, and the terrified world public.
There is no better moment for a great world power, such as the US, to take the leadership and steer the world towards the adoption of global NFU. Doing so would challenge the Russians and Chinese to clarify their doctrines, lower the risk of nuclear war, and pave the way for nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons, the most dangerous invention the world has ever seen, must be prevented from ever being used again. May the US Senate open the door to this way.
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