Tag: NATO
One thing not to worry about
Yesterday’s front-page New York Times piece on radicalization in Kosovo is every diplomat’s nightmare: a well-written, prominent story with solid facts that contradict what his or her government wants the Americans to believe. But there is another two-thirds of the story that got short shrift:
- the Kosovo government has already reacted vigorously and effectively to the inroads Islamic extremists have made, and
- Kosovo Albanians as well as their government remain overwhelmingly and enthusiastically pro-American and pro-European.
The article would have been a clarion call to action three or four years ago. But today it is largely old news. The story of relatively high levels of extremist recruitment and Saudi funding Carlotta Gall tells has already been amply documented. In fact, radicalization according to Adrian Shtuni is not uniform across Kosovo but focused in four municipalities:
The Kosovars themselves have spilled a lot of electrons on the subject, in particular the Saudi connection that is one of Gall’s main, and well-told, points. They figure:
In terms of the number of foreign fighters per capita amongst their Muslim population, Kosovo is in the bottom half of the list of countries, ranked 14th among 22 countries with the highest number of foreign fighters per capita of their respective Muslim populations.
The Kosovo government is claiming there have been no known Kosovar recruits to the Islamic State (ISIS) in the past year or so. To my knowledge, no one is denying that claim.
ISIS recruitment worldwide is down overall, due to its loss of territory and fighters over the past year. But in addition Pristina has been conducting a legal crackdown, described by the Police Director earlier this month in Brussels. It includes 110 arrests, 67 indictments and 26 convictions so far. This is not an easy thing to do for a young country still not a member of Interpol with lots of other problems. But it is getting done. The government has also prepared a 2015/20 strategy for countering violent extremism covering early identification, prevention, intervention and de-radicalization and reintegration.
The overall political environment is favorable to blocking ISIS recruitment: Kosovars are remarkably pro-NATO and pro-Europe, with over 90% supporting membership in the Alliance and the European Union. Despite divisive domestic politics that have led to street demonstrations focused on the wisdom of continuing Pristina’s dialogue with Belgrade, dissenters from the Euroatlantic path Kosovo has chosen are few and far between.
Americans are quick these days to see threats, in particular from Muslim populations. Kosovo however is a constitutionally secular state whose mostly Muslim population is as friendly to the West as any on earth. The Alliance saved Kosovo Albanians from Serbia’s effort to expel them in 1999, has protected the country ever since and is now in the process of helping it to build up its security forces. The European Union has been generous and helpful, providing most of the NATO troops deployed there and much of the international aid. It is not surprising that most Kosovars view Washington and Brussels as friends and protectors, not enemies.
Of course there are some individuals who feel differently. Unprovoked, a Kosovar killed two US airmen five years ago in Frankfurt. Other incidents may happen. What we need to do to ensure they are few and far between is to continue to help ensure the success of Kosovo’s democracy and economy, as well as its application of the rule of law. Despite the Times’ front-page article, Kosovo is one of the last things Americans should have to worry about.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Still works in progress
Home from the Balkans for a couple of days, I’ve had time to reflect a bit on my almost two weeks in Podgorica, Belgrade and Sarajevo. I was in Podgorica and Sarajevo for academically-sponsored conferences. I inserted the stop in Belgrade during the week between them. In all three places, I organized my own visit, with the cooperation of friends and colleagues. The US embassies were not involved, except that in Sarajevo it was one of the sponsors of the meeting.
All three capitals are wrestling with internal political issues with profound implications: Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic has taken some opposition figures into his cabinet to try to ensure wide acceptance of the October elections as well as NATO accession, Serbian Prime Minister Vucic is rejiggering his coalition in an effort to accelerate progress towards the EU, and the many levels of governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina are trying to convince the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to release $800 million to support implementation of the EU-imposed Reform Agenda.
Montenegro, despite some recent Russian-promoted disorder in Podgorica’s streets and even in parliament, has the best chances of success. NATO issued its formal invitation yesterday. The Russians objected, demonstrating how false its avowals of feeling threatened by NATO expansion really are. Montenegro’s 2000-person army is not even a threat to its immediate neighbors, much less to Moscow. The 28 members of the Alliance still have to ratify the accession. Podgorica is nervous mainly about US ratification, because of the Trump factor, and would like to see it done during the lame duck Senate session following the November election, in particular if he becomes president.
The real significance of NATO accession for Montenegro is that it keeps up the momentum in the Balkans, where Macedonia and Kosovo are already committed to joining the Alliance. That leaves only Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has asked for a Membership Action Plan, and Serbia, which has not made a decision on joining and flirts with Russia incessantly. Montenegro’s entry into NATO doesn’t threaten Russia, but the continued attraction of the Alliance to Balkans countries could end Russia’s troublemaking in the region.
Belgrade’s infatuation with Moscow was one of the disappointments of my trip to the Balkans. Normally proud and self-reliant Serbs tell me they need Russia’s warm embrace and cultural affinity. The pan-Slavic sentiment I get. We all like to chum with those who speak our language, or something close to it, listen to similar music and worship in ways we recognize.
The warm embrace is harder to comprehend. Russia is a declining regional power that allowed its currency to appreciate unrealistically during the period of high oil and gas prices, making its other industries uncompetitive in world markets. With prices now less than half of what they once were, Moscow is unable to balance its budget and lacks the industrial infrastructure needed to diversify its economy and finance the solution of its many serious social problems. It is also stuck in wars in Syria and Ukraine, not to mention smaller and less arduous military interventions in Georgia and Moldova.
Prime Minister Vucic recognizes the sterility of Russophilia and ran a markedly pro-Europe re-election campaign in April. But getting to Europe is not done in one big leap. Even while I was in Belgrade, masked thugs destroyed allegedly illegal construction on the waterfront, in order apparently to avoid a drawn-out court procedure. Many think the government was involved, or at least turned a blind eye, at the behest of someone well-connected. Calls to the police for help went unanswered. That’s not how things are handled in European states with consolidated judicial systems.
Many more liberal democratic Serbs and others in the Balkans think Europe and the US are turning a blind eye too. Washington and Brussels appreciate the progress Vucic has made reaching agreements with the authorities in Kosovo. He has accepted the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its whole territory, including the Serb-majority north, and has acknowledged that Serbia and Kosovo will enter the EU as separate states, each at its own pace. This is not far from formal recognition of Kosovo’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. But are Washington and Brussels rewarding this progress on Kosovo by ignoring Serbian government control of the media and courts as well as failure to reform its security services?
This is a good question. I hope the answer is no, but I also hope that we will be patient as well as exigent. There are lots of things that can be done to assist Serbia’s progress towards Europe: improved road connections to the Mediterranean through Montenegro and Kosovo, for example, as well as gas supplies that do not come from Russia. There are also next steps with Kosovo: the Serbian and Kosovar chiefs of staff, who have apparently never met, should be talking with each other regularly, and the boundary/border between the two should be agreed and demarcated.
When it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina, I confess to being flummoxed. I’m not at all sure that the rather slow and rudimentary steps so far in the European Reform Agenda are worth $800 million, especially if some portion of that amount ends up feeding the corruption beast. The IMF and World Bank will tell you they can account for their funds, but part of the money will be displacing Bosnian funding that will then be diverted to less transparent purposes. Money is fungible. Some authorities in Bosnia are past masters at enriching themselves whenever it passes through their hands. That helps them to consolidate power and maintain their stranglehold on a country that deserves better.
Or it may help them defy the international community and make promises about independence for Republika Srpska, the Serb-dominated half of the country. That isn’t going to happen, because the international community won’t accept it. But those who support that goal are succeeding at making Bosnia and Herzegovina exceedingly difficult to govern effectively. A coffee at an outdoor cafe in Sniper Alley and a walk with an old friend to buy a Sarajevo football club tee shirt for my grandson are great pleasures, but I’d trade them happily for a Bosnia in which ordinary people could enjoy European standards of living and freedom from bombastic nationalism.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Montenegro looks pretty good from DC
I am speaking at the University of Montenegro in an hour or so. Here are my notes:
It is a great pleasure to be back in Montenegro. I enormously enjoyed my visit over the weekend to the coast, which I had never seen, with Sinisa Vukovic, a star professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Montenegro has exports it can be very proud of.
My last visit to Montenegro was well before independence, so this is a new country for me. I think you should be pleased with what you have achieved, but anxious to improve on it in the future. Let me explain.
Ten years of independence have wrought significant economic and political progress. Montenegro’s economic freedom score according to the Heritage Foundation has improved, even if rapid growth took a big hit from the 2008 financial crisis. Adoption of the euro as your currency has avoided many difficult issues, but also tied the country to Europe’s current recession and to a difficult competition with other producers within the eurozone. Democracy, while still a bit better than the Balkans average, has not improved overall according to Freedom House, even if the media have become more independent and the World Bank reports slowly improving government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law.
Your country is a candidate for EU membership and seems to be progressing, even if slowly, in the accession process. NATO membership is imminent and most welcome. These are no small achievements. They bode well for the future. You need only look to nearby Macedonia to see what happens to a Balkan country that stalls in its progress towards Euroatlantic goals. The proverbial bicycle needs forward motion to prevent it from keeling over.
There are in my view two main obstacles blocking Montenegro’s bicycle path right now. There is no going around them. You have to clear them.
The first is rule of law. A weak judicial system has been unable to adequately counter organized crime, graft and other endemic forms of corruption, especially in public procurement and abuse of state institutions for political purposes. Major prosecutions are now ongoing, and I trust there will be more. I worry not when prosecutions happen but when they don’t. A year doesn’t go by in Washington DC without serious judicial accusations against two or three members of Congress, not to mention three or four governors in the rest of the country. I am pleased, not dismayed, when justice is done. I think you should be too. Not every prosecution will be successful, but every successful prosecution will be a warning to others.
The second major obstacle at the moment is the lack of a viable alternative to the main governing party. There has been no alternation in power since independence. While there are now small opposition forces that are Europe-focused, a big portion of the opposition has failed to detach itself from its Russian patron and end its campaign against independence. Montenegro needs a viable, constitutional, united Europe-focused alternative to your founding President and his dominant political party, who among other things have laudably earned allegiance from Montenegro’s substantial minorities.
The broad pro-independence coalition will not last forever, nor should it. At some point it will fragment—maybe that process has already started. This is a natural evolution that signals the beginning of the end of transition. It is necessary and unavoidable.
My saying this should not be interpreted as criticism of Prime Minister Djukanovic. To the contrary, he deserves a great deal of credit for the progress Montenegro has made, but it is time for Montenegro’s citizens to be thinking about how they can move beyond his long-dominant leadership to the normal democratic alternation in power of more conservative and more liberal political coalitions. Alternation in power cannot be done with an opposition that doesn’t accept the constitution of the state and seeks instead to create a greater Serbia, an idea defeated in four wars and during more than 16 years of peace. Nor can it be done with people who reject Montenegro’s European future and pine for a return to an alliance with Mother Russia. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
This doesn’t make sense
US Ambassador to NATO Lute said Friday:
I think Russia plays an important part in the strategic environment…[which] will put a break on NATO expansion. If you accept the premises…about Russia’s internal weakness and perhaps steady decline, it may not make sense to push further now and maybe accelerate or destabilize the decline.
I am assured that this statement represents no departure from Article 10 of the NATO treaty, which provides for the membership to unanimously “invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty.” Montenegro has already received such an invitation and will be admitted to membership at the July 8/9 NATO Summit in Warsaw.
What doesn’t make sense to me is Washington accommodating Moscow’s aggressiveness internationally in order to avoid destabilizing it internally. Quite to the contrary: pushing back on Moscow’s increasingly aggressive stance against NATO expansion would provide incentive and opportunity for Russia to refocus its energies on its internal problems, which lower oil prices and Ukraine-induced sanctions are aggravating.
This is particularly true for NATO expansion into the Balkans, a region not contiguous with Russian territory. NATO expansion to tiny and distant Montenegro can in no way be reasonably perceived as a threat to Russia, no matter how often Russian diplomats repeat that refrain. The same is true of Slovenia, Albania and Croatia, all of which became NATO members with little or no comment from Moscow. Even if all of the remaining Balkans countries join–that’s Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Serbia–Russia is in no way militarily at risk.
That makes the Balkans different from Georgia and Ukraine. Location matters.
This hasn’t prevented Moscow from mounting aggressive campaigns in all but pro-American Kosovo against Alliance membership, as well as a rearguard action against Montenegrin accession. Moscow uses its diplomats to speak out crudely against NATO membership, its money to fund anti-NATO protests, and its commercial influence to turn local politicians against the Alliance. Russia has even planted a proto-base (allegedly for humanitarian rather than military purposes) in southern Serbia, hoping this will inoculate Belgrade from catching the NATO flu.
Russia’s anti-NATO efforts threaten to destabilize the Balkans, where the prospect of NATO membership is an important factor in promoting democratization and reducing inter-ethnic tensions. This is especially true in Macedonia, where much of the Albanian population regards the prospect of NATO membership as vital to its own security. It is of course also true in Kosovo, where NATO troops have been vital to maintaining a safe and secure environment since the NATO/Yugoslavia war in 2001. Bosnia and Serbia are more ambivalent towards NATO, though Serbia’s prime minister recently noted (in the runup to a parliamentary election) that NATO troops in Kosovo protect the Serb population there.
So Ambassador Lute’s comments–even if not meant to qualify Article 10–will be read in the Balkans as discouraging hopes for NATO membership and in Moscow as a green light for Russian efforts to undermine the generally positive trend the region has taken for the past 20 years. It would be good now for the American Administration to reiterate that Washington still wants a Europe “whole and free,” including in particular the Balkans and even Russia if it so chooses. Anything less than that gives Moscow further incentive to muck in what it increasingly considers its sphere of influence, which could set back decades of democratization and run the real risk of destabilization.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks April 4-8
- Is Europe Post-Secular? Religion and Politics in the European Union | Monday, April 4th | 12:00-1:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels have put religion back on the European agenda. François Foret will discuss his book, Religion and Politics in the European Union: The Secular Canopy, which analyzes the place and influence of religion in European politics. He presents the first ever data collected on the religious beliefs of European decision makers and how they act on these beliefs. Discussing popular assumptions such as the resurgence of religion, aggressive European secularism, and religious lobbying, Foret offers objective data and frameworks to analyze major issues in the contemporary political debate.
- The European Refugee Surge: Transforming Challenges into Opportunities | Tuesday, April 5th | 9:00-10:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The humanitarian catastrophe that is now unfolding at the gates of Europe raises profound challenges as well as opportunities to European nations. In the long term, growth will depend on how effectively they integrate in the labor market. The panel will ask the question: Which policies can ensure that this challenge is transformed into a success story? The report presentation will be followed by a panel discussion between American and European experts who will shed light on best practices in migration policy and lessons learned on both sides of the Atlantic. The event is part of the Atlantic Council’s transatlantic EuroGrowth Initiative, focused on getting Europe back on the path to sustainable economic growth by convening top policymakers, business leaders, and academics who work to identify and apply best practices and policies on both sides of the Atlantic. Antonio Spilimbergo, Head of Mission to Turkey for the International Monetary Fund, will present a report. Other panelists include Moreno Bertoldi, Principal Advisor to EU Delegation to the US, and Laura Lane, UPS President of Global Affairs. Katerina Sokou, Kathimerini Greek Daily’s Washington DC Correspondent, will moderate.
- Global Military Spending and the Arms Trade: Trends and Implications | Tuesday, April 5th | 10:00-11:30 | The Forum on the Arms Trade Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Global military expenditure and the international arms trade are driven by changing economic circumstances, shifting priorities, emerging security threats, and regional and international instability. Examining the recent trends in the global arms market and in the budgets of government militaries allows us to identify potential hot-spots and future areas of concern. Each year, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) releases data on current trends in military spending and international arms transfers. SIPRI’s Military Expenditure Database contains information on defense spending by almost all countries, and monitors broader trends that emerge over time. Likewise, SIPRI’s arms transfers database identifies top exporters and importers of conventional weapons. Drawn from open source documents, SIPRI’s databases provides analysis on the economic, political and security drivers that influence military spending around the world and offers insights into their implications for global peace, security and development. Please join us on April 5, 2016 to discuss the findings of SIPRI’s most recent data and the potential implications on U.S. national security and foreign policy. This event will present major findings and key trends in global military expenditures and international arms sales.This event is co-hosted by SIPRI, the Forum on the Arms Trade and the Stimson Center. Speakers includeAude Fleurant, Director, Arms and Military Expenditure Programme, SIPRI, Gordon Adams, Distinguished Fellow, Stimson Center, and Aaron Mehta, Senior Pentagon Correspondent, Defense News. Rachel Stohl, Senior Associate, Stimson Center, will moderate.
- Latin America in International Politics: Challenging US Hegemony | Tuesday, April 5th | 4:00-6:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In recent years, the countries of Latin America have moved out from under the shadow of the United States to exercise their agency as active players in the international system. What changed? Why? And why did it take so long for that change to happen? A new book by former Latin American Program Director Joseph S. Tulchin, Latin America in International Politics: Challenging US Hegemony, explores the evolving role of Latin American states in world affairs from the early days of independence to the present. Please join us for a book discussion featuring Dr. Tulchin along with commentary from two distinguished diplomats. This includes Juan Gabriel Valdés, Chile Ambassador to the US, and Luigi Einaudi, Former Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States. Cynthia J. Arnson, Director of the Latin American Program at the Wilson Center, will moderate. A reception will follow.
- Saudi Arabia’s Regional Role and the Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations | Wednesday, April 6th | 2:30-4:00 | Project on Middle East Democracy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Saudi Arabia has long been one of the United States’ closest allies in the Middle East, among the largest recipients of U.S. arms sales globally, and perceived as a crucial partner in the war on terrorism. Nonetheless, there have always been serious questions regarding the costs of the U.S.-Saudi military relationship, which have become more pronounced over the past year. The Saudi military intervention in Yemen has resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, and recent executions in the Kingdom, including of nonviolent dissidents, have renewed longstanding concerns about the state of human rights in the Kingdom. In addition, concerns remain about Saudi support for extremist networks in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, as well as the impact of Saudi militarism on divisions throughout the region. How has Saudi Arabia’s role in the region changed in recent years, and what has driven these changes? What relationships have various factions in Saudi Arabia had with extremist movements throughout the Middle East and North Africa? What impact does U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia have on the Kingdom’s role in the region, as well as on human rights concerns within the country? How have recent events, such as the ongoing conflict in Yemen, Saudi’s role in the Syrian conflict, and mass executions within Saudi Arabia, affected the U.S.-Saudi relationship? And what might we expect for the future of bilateral relations. This will be a conversation with Andrea Prasow, Deputy Washington Director, Human Rights Watch, Amb. Stephen Seche, Executive Vice President, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, and Stephen McInerney, Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED). It will be moderated by Amy Hawthorne, Deputy Director for Research, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED).
- Is There Any Hope for Peace Talks in Afghanistan? If Not, Then What? | Wednesday, April 6th | 2:30-4:30 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In recent months, the Taliban has intensified its insurgency in Afghanistan. It now holds more territory than at any time since 2001. Civilian casualties reached record levels in 2015, and scores of Afghans are fleeing the country. In an effort to finally bring an end to Afghanistan’s 14-year war, Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the United States have formed a Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QDC) to prepare the ground for peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Despite periods of progress, this effort has so far fallen short. What will it take to launch and conclude a successful peace process? And if it fails, what’s next for Afghanistan? This event will consider these questions and others, with particular focus on the thinking of the four QDC countries. Speakers include Vanda Felbab-Brown, Senior Fellow at Brookings, Raoof Hasan, Executive Director of the Regional Peace Institute in Pakistan, Barnett Rubin, Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Center on International Cooperation for New York University, and Andrew Small, Trans-Atlantic Fellow of the Asia Program at German Marshall Fund.
- Distract, Deceive, Destroy: Putin at War in Syria | Tuesday, April 5th | 2:30-4:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join the Atlantic Council for the release of Distract Deceive Destroy—Putin at War in Syria. While President Putin announced the end of Russia’s military operations with much fanfare, the modest forces withdrawn thereafter suggest that by no means is Russia’s military role in Syria over. Using digital forensic research and open source investigation methods, a new Atlantic Council report presents the reality of Russia’s Syrian campaign: Russia launched air strikes on hospitals, water treatment plants, and mosques. Russia used cluster bombs. Russia almost exclusively targeted non-ISIS targets—Truths that Russia will not admit, but truths that must be understood when negotiating with Russia as a potential partner. Panelists may be found here.
- A Conversation with NATO Secretary General H.E. Jens Stoltenberg | Wednesday, April 6th | 4:00-5:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Alliance is facing a broad range of challenges of unprecedented complexity and increasing urgency. Confronted with a newly aggressive Russia to its east and an arc of instability across the Middle East and North Africa, NATO must take bold and innovative steps to respond to a fast-changing security landscape. Secretary General Stoltenberg will join the Atlantic Council to discuss NATO’s strategy to deal with the serious challenges along the Alliance’s flanks, and outline the Alliance’s priorities for its summit in Warsaw this summer. Jens Stoltenberg has been Secretary General of NATO since October 2014 after a distinguished career in Norwegian politics. As Prime Minister of Norway from 2000-2001 and then 2005-2013, Mr. Stoltenberg played an instrumental role in strengthening Norwegian armed forces and fostering stronger transatlantic unity on challenges close to Alliance territory. During his tenure in the Norwegian government, he also served as Minister of Finance, Minister of Industry and Energy, and State Secretary at the Ministry of the Environment. Throughout his career, Stoltenberg has held a number of international assignments, including Chair of the UN High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence, Chair of the High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, and UN Special Envoy on Climate Change. Mr. Stoltenberg holds a postgraduate degree in Economics from the University of Oslo.
- Looting and Trafficking of Antiquities in the Middle East | Thursday, April 7th | 9:30-11:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | While the world watched in horror as ISIS destroyed the ancient city of Palmyra, the terrorist organization was simultaneously conducting a second—and nearly invisible—form of cultural destruction: looting antiquities from archaeological sites. These artifacts, along with material culture from similarly plundered sites throughout the rest of the Middle East, have been funneled through a complicated network and sold to collectors throughout the world, most of whom are unaware of their origins. Join us as four experts discuss the global illicit antiquities market and its impact on how the modern world views the true value of these ancient artifacts. Speakers include Tess Davis, Executive Director, Antiquities Coalition, Iris Gerlach, Head of the Sanaa Branch of the Oriental Department, German Archaeological Institute, Monica Hanna, Egyptian archaeologist (via Skype), and Alexander Nagel, Research Associate, Smithsonian Institution’s National Museum of Natural History.The moderator will be Henri J. Barkey, Director, Middle East Program, Wilson Center.
- Securing development in insecure places | Thursday, April 7th | 10:00-11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The defining development challenge for the next 15 years will be whether rapid progress can be made in conflict-affected places. The historical record is mixed. Some countries, for example Cambodia, have put conflict behind, achieved rapid economic growth, and brought down poverty levels significantly, while others, such as Afghanistan, continue to have stubbornly high rates of poverty with little discernable progress over the last decade. On April 7, the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings will host a discussion on the links between security and development. Japan International Cooperation Agency President Shinichi Kitaoka will lead off with a keynote address on the interaction between security and development and what Japan has learned from its development cooperation in Mindanao, Syria, and South Sudan. He will then join a panel discussion moderated by Brookings Senior Fellow Homi Kharas. Panelists include Sharon Morris, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, Bruce Jones, Project on International Order and Strategy Senior Fellow, and Joel Hellman, Dean at Georgetown University. Afterwards, questions will be taken from the audience.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
No one gets dragged into NATO
Vladimir Filipović of Belgrade daily Blic asked me some questions about the US bombing in Libya that killed, among others, two Serbs. I asnwered:
1. Do you think that this incident will affect Serbia’s relations with NATO and US, and that maybe Russia will try to use this situation to get closer to Serbia at that expense?
DPS: First let me say how regrettable the death of the Serbian diplomats is. There is no excuse for their abduction and imprisonment. Their deaths in an American raid against their captors was clearly unintended.
Russia will use any incident it can to denounce NATO and the US, as Moscow seeks to block NATO expansion in the Balkans. You can tell how sincere the Russians are by watching how many civilians they are killing in Syria, despite their continuing denials.
2. Do you think that something would be different if the US knew that there are two Serbian hostages in Sabratha, in that specific terrorist object? That the attack maybe would be postponed or differently conducted?
DPS: My understanding of American policy is that Washington seeks to avoid civilian deaths. I certainly hope that the attack would have been postponed or conducted differently had Washington known of the presence of the Serbs, or any other prisoners. But on that subject you really need to talk with an official spokesperson.
Vladimir wasn’t satisfied, so he asked me to expand and I replied again:
3. If you could expand your yesterday’s statement about Russia trying to use the incident in Libya to get closer to Serbia at the expense of NATO and USA.
DPS: What’s to add? It is clear that Moscow is desperate to keep Serbia out of NATO and will use any incident to accomplish its objective.
No one gets dragged into NATO. They come because they believe it will make their country more secure. With Russia increasingly aggressive in Europe and the Middle East, it is not hard to imagine ways in which NATO membership will make a country more secure. The only humiliation comes from toeing the Russian line rather than helping to shape the NATO line.
RSS - Posts
