Tag: NATO
Ethics matter
On Wednesday, the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs in New York hosted a talk by Jean-Pierre Filiu, Professor of Middle East Studies, Sciences Po.
Filiu related that he chose this topic months before the Paris Attacks; he knew the ISIS threat was unprecedented.
Thirty years ago, Filiu met the first jihadis while doing humanitarian work in Afghanistan. He was introduced to the disturbing Arab “volunteers” who had already begun to sneak in. He heard about Bin Laden and Zawahiri but never met them. He concluded that they lived on a different planet and wished to annihilate our way of life. Nobody took his warnings seriously.
The jihadists founded Al Qaeda (AQ) in the last month of the Soviet occupation. Al Qaeda means “the base,” which refers to a territorial base and a transnational network.
In 2001, the US and its allies responded appropriately by hitting AQ in its base in Kandahar. It is important to strike such threats at the source, the territorial base, before going after the global network. The decision to rely on local forces in the Northern Alliance was prudent. This action prevented a second wave of planned attacks.
Then the US launched the Global War on Terror and invaded Iraq. France warned against this and was correct, as it opened the Middle East to AQ. It also provided the instability that led to the London and Madrid attacks. French jihadis who had fought in Iraq were the masterminds of last year’s attacks.
ISIS was formed as a continuation of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), established by former Jordanian criminal Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. Unlike Bin Laden (a son of a tycoon) and Zawahiri (a doctor), he was not bourgeois. He used his expertise in crime. He was the first to behead a hostage, Nicholas Berg, in 2004.
Bin Laden thought this tactic too gory. But it made Al-Zarqawi a star. The US focused on targeting him, so other jihadis followed him. He was killed in 2006. His successors were killed in 2010 and were succeeded by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, who had been detained in Camp Bucca in 2004, but was released for good conduct. Al-Baghdadi was able to maintain order in the camp by making other inmates listen to him; this would have made Filiu suspicious.
When Al-Baghdadi took over, AQI was losing ground because of the surge of US troops. AQI was later able to regain ground with the help of former Baathists alienated by the sectarianism of the Maliki government. AQI also gained ground in Syria thanks to Assad, who preferred to be up against jihadis rather than peaceful protesters for propaganda reasons. The more dictators you have in the Arab world, the more jihadis you will have. Ethics in international relations is not a luxury, but could be a real solution to many problems.
The US lost moral leverage after it did not act on its red line regarding chemical weapons in Syria. ISIS recruitment exploded. ISIS argued that the US and its allies were letting Syrians be gassed and presented its mission as humanitarian. ISIS learned from AQ not to depend on an external force, like the Taliban. ISIS runs its own totalitarian regime in a region more symbolic for Muslims than Khorasan.
The Levant is key to Muslim “end times” narratives. ISIS now incorporates much of this apocalyptic material into its propaganda; they talk about places mentioned in prophecies. In their narrative, the final battle will be in Jerusalem. The Israeli strategy of hoping ISIS and Hezbollah will just fight each other is shortsighted. ISIS is now recruiting inside Israel. Read more
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Kosovo’s rough patch
Arbana Xharra of Pristina daily Zeri asked some questions. I answered:
Q: Mr Serwer, you were familiar with the political developments in Kosovo for the long time. What where your expectations 16 years after the war and 7 from declaring independence for Kosovo? How do you see the recent confrontation within the Kosovo parliament?
A: I don’t really remember my expectations in 1999, but I did not then believe that independence would necessarily be the outcome. It was Serbian failure after the war to do anything whatsoever to “make unity attractive” that made independence inevitable. For me, the failure to count the Kosovo Albanians on the voter rolls in its 2006 constitutional referendum, in order to meet the 50% threshold for voting by registered voters, was the final straw.
As for the situation in the Kosovo parliament, I deplore the violence and disruption, which has no place in a democratic institution.
Q: Where does this situation leads Kosovo? There is a barricaded opposition that seems is not going to resign from their requests?
A: The opposition is entitled to its opposition. But it cannot block the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions.
Q: What do you thing about the Association of Serb Municipalities. Does this agreement define ethnically those municipalities? As we know a separate Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina has led to a dysfunctional state.
A: I am not a fan of the Ahtisaari provisions on the Association of Serb Municipalities. But Kosovo accepted the Ahtisaari plan as the basis for independence and needs to implement it faithfully. I think that can be done in a way that avoids the threat to the Kosovo state that a “Serb entity” would represent. The ethnic veto provisions in the Bosnian constitution are far more extensive than anything in the Kosovo constitution.
Q: Did Ahtisaari leave the door open for the Serbian government interference in Kosovo?
A: Serbia has a legitimate interest in the welfare of Serbs in Kosovo. The Ahtisaari package left the door open to ways in which that interest can be exercised. Kosovo should be aiming for analogous mechanisms by which it can ensure the welfare of Albanians in Serbia.
Q: How is Kosovo moving toward the Euro-Atlantic integration? Kosovo remained the only isolated country in Balkans with no visa liberalization. Why?
A: You’ll have to ask the European Union why. I think it is clearly a mistake to leave Kosovo as isolated as it is. But of course Pristina needs to demonstrate its willingness to fulfill the obligations that come with visa liberalization and other EU privileges. The current refugee crisis will no doubt make the EU even more exigent than normal in requiring fulfillment of those obligations.
Q: How long it will be a journey of Kosovo to the EU?
I don’t think it needs to be long–look at Montenegro, which has made remarkable progress in a short time. Kosovo has the advantage of building EU-compliant governance from scratch. The big challenge will be implementation of the acquis communitaire. Rule of law is likely to take longer than many other things. But Kosovo could be well on its way within 10 years.
Q: Why has Kosovo failed to become a member of UNESCO? Is Belgrade pressure getting the support of international politics?
Belgrade wielded all the leverage it could to block membership in UNESCO, which required a two-thirds majority in the UNESCO assembly. That threshold proved too difficult. But there will be other occasions, including in other international organizations. Belgrade may have gained some leverage from what happened at UNESCO, but it lost an opportunity to solidify the considerable commitments Kosovo made during the process.
Q: Does Kosovo have an advantage of being able to build its security force from the ground up to meet NATO requirements’?
A: Yes, I think that is an enormous advantage, one that could lead to quick NATO membership once the security force is created.
Q: Corruption and organized crime is one of the biggest problem in Kosovo, also according to the international reports. Did EULEX mission failed on dealing with “big fishes” in Kosovo?
A: I have not been impressed with EULEX, but what is the alternative? I think it hard to argue that more “big fish” would be prosecuted if there were no international rule of law mission in Kosovo.
Q: There were rejections from most of the political parties regarding the establishment of Special Court. What are your expectations toward this additional international project?
A: I think the Special Court is a lot better than the alternatives: extending the mandates of either ICTY or the ICC. The fact is that crimes were committed against both Serbs and Albanians after the 1999 war in Kosovo. They need to be investigated and perpetrators prosecuted. Without individuals being held accountable, the blame falls on the Kosovo Liberation Army.
Q: Islamic radicals are seen recently as a great threat for the secular constitution of Kosovo. More than 300 people from Kosovo are believed to have joined ISIS or Al Qaeda in the Middle East. What is the US stance on the reason that lead to this big problem for the newest country in Europe?
A: I don’t provide a “US stance.” Speaking personally, it seems to me that we are seeing a dramatic increase in Kosovars willing to fight for a cause I find heinous but they find attractive. Lack of job opportunities, isolation, foreign funding of extremists, disappointment in the benefits of independence, disillusion with corrupt governance–all these play a role in inspiring Islamic State recruits.
Q: Kosovo used to be more secular state; do you notice the change of the society toward religion?
A: I haven’t visited Kosovo in a few years now. But Kosovars visiting me in Washington report a big change. Kosovars used to be very secular and even anti-religious. That is apparently changing. That doesn’t worry me–people are entitled to pursue whatever religion they want. It is the appeal of violent extremism that worries me.
Q: Kosovo was poor also during the Milosevic regime, is it believable to say that because of the economy bad situation Kosovars are joining this new Islam ideology?
A: Kosovo was also brutally repressed during the Milosevic regime, and the global environment did not present many examples of success by violent extremists. Then was then. Now is now.
Q: We hear recently that for the US, Russia poses the greatest threat….How do you see Russian attempt to gain ground in the Balkans? Do you think that Russia’s role in the Balkans is increasing?
A: Russia is doing in the Balkans what it is doing elsewhere: trying to block what it views as NATO expansion into its sphere of influence. It has good reason to worry about that: Slovenia, Croatia and Albania are already members of NATO, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo want to be members, and Bosnia and Serbia are likely to follow eventually. Many of Russia’s moves are counter-productive. The annexation of Crimea and the seizure of part of eastern Ukraine as well as the “independence” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia illustrate all too clearly what happens to your country if it happens to lie near Russia and is not a NATO member.
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The snowball starts rolling
NATO has sent Montenegro its much-coveted invitation to join the Alliance, most likely at the Warsaw Summit July 8-9 next year. This is in many ways a small matter: Montenegro is a country of 620,000 people with a military force of fewer than 2000. It is no threat to anyone, least of all Russia, and no big addition to NATO capacities.
It is nevertheless significant. First because Russia saw fit to oppose NATO membership for Montenegro, first through bribery and later through support for unruly anti-government demonstrations. These efforts to block Montenegro’s NATO accession will continue, making it a test of will between Moscow and the West. If Moscow loses, Western spirits will be raised.
Those raised spirits will include people in other Balkans states who want their countries to join NATO. Moscow fears that Montenegrin accession will be a step onto a slippery slope that will lead to Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia all joining the Alliance. The Russians are correct, which makes the Montenegro decision a key one for the region.
Macedonia, though now stalled by its internal problems and long blocked by Greece, has already sent its troops to fight in Afghanistan integrated with US forces. It has recently decided to send a few more. Its eventual accession to NATO is inevitable. Ditto Kosovo, which still lacks a fully fledged security force and faces the hurdle of four non-recognizing NATO members. But Kosovo’s citizens are all but unanimous in wanting membership in a club that saved it from Serbian attacks.
Serbia and Bosnia are less obvious cases. Resentment of NATO bombing among Serbs in both countries is still strong. But sooner or later Belgrade and Banja Luka will come around the way Germans, Italians, Japanese and others bombed and even occupied by the United States have. Surrounded by NATO members, it will make little geopolitical sense for Bosnia and Serbia to align themselves with Russia or even to remain “neutral.” The Serbian chief of staff told me a decade or so ago that his country’s military, which already participates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace, would adapt itself to Alliance standards. Bosnia’s now unified army has been built from scratch with assistance from the US and NATO. The most secure place for Bosnia and Serbia will be inside the Alliance, not outside it.
None of this threatens Russia. Even taken all together the Balkans armies pose no serious challenge to Moscow. What Balkans NATO membership threatens are Russia’s efforts to divide and weaken Balkans states and limit Western influence in southeastern Europe. That for me is a good thing. Montenegro has started the snowball rolling. Dobrodošla, Crna Goro!*
*I’ve corrected a grammatical error made in the original posting. Apologies!
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Dayton plus 20, again
Here are the conclusions I offered at the Dayton Peace Accords at 20 Conference in Dayton, Ohio, which ended yesterday:
- Context matters. Dayton was not just about Bosnia but represented a test of the West’s effort to achieve a Europe whole and free at the start of the post-Cold War era. That’s one reason it got the attention it did.
- US leadership was critical, but so too were the local, European and Russian contributions. Even when it leads, the US needs partners and has to work with whoever is available.
- Getting both the civilian and military elements of US power pointed towards a clear goal is extraordinarily difficult. Dick Holbrooke excelled at it.
- Negotiating with your own people and lining things up can be the hardest part of a negotiation. A lot was agreed before Dayton, both within the US government and within the international contact group, that was crucial to the ultimate agreement.
- Two subjects are often neglected, including at Dayton: economics and rule of law. They should not be left aside, the first because resources are always an issue and the second because it is vital and takes so long to establish.
- Dayton worked because it provided opportunities for powersharing and local autonomy.
- It is these vital characteristics of 1995 that are causing problems twenty years later.
- Inclusivity matters in ending a war, even if it makes statebuilding more difficult.
- Clear, shared goals are important, but so too is the process for getting to them.
- Timing is particularly important. It is not clear, for example, that Syria is ripe for a negotiated settlement. Bosnia was, largely due to the Federation offensive and Milosevic’s need for an end to the war.
The war did end but the ethnoterritorial conflict continues even today. Bosnia remains far from the ideals its young people, several of whom spoke at Dayton, cherish: tolerance, respect, equality and cooperation. The ways forward are clear, but precisely how to achieve them is not:
- The Reform Agenda the EU, IMF and IBRD are pursuing is part of the solution, in particular if privatization is conducted in transparent ways that prevent state assets falling into the hands of crony capitalists.
- Corruption is a major issue, but how to get it under control is not clear.
- An independent judiciary is vital to accountability. The referendum proposed in Republika Srpska would undermine the state judiciary and weaken prospects for accountability.
- Political reforms that go beyond the Reform Agenda will be necessary. This should include changes to the electoral system that encourage more accountability, like single-member electoral constituencies.
- Separate ethnic education is an unfortunate and persistent consequence of the war. Integrated education in magnet schools (offering, for example, science, technology, engineering and mathematics or education in English) is one possible path towards a solution.
- Increased respect for human rights–both of individuals and groups–is important for all.
While these needs are clear, the balance between international and Bosnian efforts is not. Some think the international community has to be more forceful than it has been in the last decade. Others think responsibility now lies principally with the Bosnians, who should get international support, principally through the European Union.
While progress in recent years has been slow and serious obstacles remain, I believe that 20 years from now Bosnia and Herzegovina will be an established member in good standing of both NATO and the European Union. That is a worthy objective that should motivate both the Bosnians and the international community.
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Montenegro will survive the challenge
- It was clear that the protests were violent. I am not sure if this was an attempt to topple the government by force, but I believe that this could not happen in Montenegro.
- To assume power in a democratic system, it is important to obtain more votes, and I am not sure how such violent protests could contribute in gaining more votes, or even uniting opposition. People can love or hate Djukanovic, but the fact of the matter is that he is in power thanks to a democratic system and it will be very difficult to take over the power from him through street demonstrations. In democratic systems this is done through elections.
- Moscow will try to create an impression that there are intensifying efforts against Djukanovic, but in reality it is all about resisting Montenegrin membership in NATO. For Moscow Djukanovic is insignificant, what is important is NATO membership. NATO enlargement, even when it comes to small Montenegro, is a defeat for Putin, and they will try to avoid that kind of defeat.
- As long as the security forces refrain from using excessive force, and as long as it is clear that Montenegro has a considerably stronger group that supports its membership, I believe that NATO will recognize what is behind this. These protests might in fact solidify support for the Montenegrin bid among NATO member states.
*Sinisa tells me I was wrong when I said yesterday Vijesti published the interview. He informs that it was Montenegrin Radio and Television (RTCG).
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Obama’s Syria options
Russia has in the last ten days deployed a forward operating base and ground troops in Syria, bombarded opposition forces the US supports, intentionally attacked hospitals, repeatedly violated a NATO ally’s (Turkey’s) air space and has launched long-range cruise missile attacks from the Caspian Sea. Russia is at war in Syria and signaling determination to win at any cost.
How should the US react?
Let’s assume direct military action (destroying the Russian base near Latakia, for example) is out. The United States does not want to go to war with Russia over Syria. Great power wars have a way of spinning out of control, with unintended consequences not likely to be worth our while. What else can Barack Obama do?
- Nothing. Or more precisely he can continue to denounce the Russian behavior as self-defeating and counter-productive, as well as likely to put Moscow into a quagmire from which it will find it difficult to emerge without costly consequences. The main difficult with continuing this policy is that it risks projecting an image of weakness and inviting more Russian aggression. It isn’t likely to do much for Barack Obama’s legacy either.
- Push the Syrian opposition into a negotiated solution that leaves Assad in place. This is what some close to the current administration have argued for. It is the most likely result of current UN mediation efforts. It would amount to surrendering Syria back to Bashar al Assad and solidifying Moscow’s and Tehran’s hold on the country. The problem with this idea is that it is unlikely to end the war, because a large part of the opposition will continue fighting, led by its most extreme elements. The Sunni world would regard this outcome as confirming America’s bad faith, dramatically reducing Washington’s influence in the Middle East.
- Mirror Russian behavior in Ukraine. Moscow has installed a forward operating base in a third country and is acting against forces we support at the request of a friendly government in Damascus. The US could install a forward operating base in Ukraine and even act against the rebel forces Russia supports, at the request of the friendly government in Kiev. This would risk a direct clash with Russian forces, but it is noteworthy that Moscow calmed the war in Ukraine before striking in Syria, suggesting that it doubts its own capability to act in both places at the same time. The US military should not have the same problem.
- Mirror Russian behavior in Syria. Like Moscow, Washington could strike against people it considers terrorists inside Syria: Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are both designated by Washington as terrorist organizations and both operate inside Syria. There is no logical reason to limit US action to Sunni extremists. The Shia variety is no more appetizing. Moscow’s action will make it an enemy in the Sunni world. The US is already an enemy in Iran and has little to lose there. Some Iranians would be happy to see the more extreme parts of their Islamic Republic forced to withdraw from Syria.
- Ratchet up sanctions. Putin is upping the ante in the hope of proving himself indispensable to a solution in Syria and using a political solution there to wriggle out of sanctions. We don’t need to allow him to do that, but could instead work with European allies, whose interests in stemming the flow of refugees will be hurt by the Russian military action, to “see” him and double down. Moscow is feeling the pinch of both sanctions and lower oil prices. If the Europeans and Americans can stick together, either Putin will break or the Russians will break him. Popularity doesn’t last forever even in an autocracy if the autocrat can’t deliver.
- Prevent Syrian helicopters from flying. The Syrian Air Force drops its “barrel bombs” on civilian areas from a relatively few remaining helicopters. Such attacks violate international humanitarian law. The UN Security Council has asked that they stop. Making clear that if they fly they will be destroyed, either in the air or on the ground, would be a relatively easy move and would signal a willingness to rebalance the military equation in the opposition’s direction.
- Increase support for the Syrian Interim Government. The war in Syria is unlikely to be won or lost on the battlefield. Who governs best will win in the end, both at the negotiating table and in the hearts and minds of the Syrians. Our allies in the Syrian opposition need a much more concerted effort to help win the civilian contest. Their capabilities have improved. But support arrives fragmented and irregularly. It should be constant and unified. The amounts may sound big–I would guess they need hundreds of million per year to make a real impact–but that is a lot cheaper than war.
Note the absence from my list of increasing humanitarian aid. We are already spending billions on it. The time has come to expect Russia, which is now causing humanitarian problems in Syria, to step up. Washington should tell Moscow that a contribution of $1 billion per year to UN relief in Syria is the minimum expected.
The trouble with writing an “options” post like this one is that someone will inevitably claim that I supported one or the other of these ideas. So I need to be explicit: I am inclined toward 5, 6 and 7, though I confess to thinking 4 is also appealing.
We should be thinking about all of them and not crossing them off the list too soon. If Putin keeps pushing, sooner or later we’ll need to push back. Force may need to be a last resort, but it should not come too late to make a difference.
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