Tag: NATO
Where strong men rule
I spent most of last week in Moscow talking with Russian Middle East experts. It was a deeply saddening experience. Not because of the Middle East: that is a gloomy subject even in Washington DC. It was above all Ukraine, but more broadly Putin’s Russia that darkened the mood.
First, the good news: Moscow looks good, the Russians I met were friendly and helpful, and the Bolshoi Opera is once again open. Contrary to my expectations, downtown the skyline has not changed much, Lenin is still in Red Square (though it is unclear how often his mausoleum is open or whether anyone bothers to visit it), and traffic is light compared other European capitals. Skyscrapers have not been allowed in the center. I saw them only at a distance from the Foreign Ministry, near the Arbat market. Most of the older buildings in the center are renovated, some like the GUM department store beautifully. Ditto the churches.
Walking streets lined with high-end fashion as well as low-end chic lace the center. As in the Gulf petro-states, the number of customers seems inadequate to support the investment. Recently enforced parking rules have cleared the streets of double parked cars and limited the number of people interested in paying a couple of dollars per hour for a space. Drivers are surprisingly respectful of pedestrians and each other. Public spaces (Red Square, parks, walking streets) are well-groomed. Security guards, private and public, are everywhere. Order prevails, at least in the center.
The smiling Moscow I found on the street evaporated quickly in the meetings I attended. Ukraine cast a long shadow. American and Russian leaders, the Russians said, are not communicating. There is a lack of trust. The media are biased. Russia has pursued integration with the rest of the world only to find itself blocked by sanctions, even after the recent ceasefire in Ukraine. US/Russia relations are at a nadir. Is it wise to sacrifice global issues for the sake of Kiev? Fascism is reemerging in Ukraine, which the West is using as a pretext for blocking Russia. All Russia wants is for Ukraine not to join NATO, for the Black Sea not to become a NATO lake threatening to Russia, and for the Russian navy to remain in Sevastopol. Crimea did not join Ukraine voluntarily. There is no reason why it shouldn’t return to Russia.
From the American perspective, the Russians are in denial. They deny their army has anything to do with the rebellion in Ukraine. They ask Americans to understand that Ukraine for them is an emotionally searing internal question, apparently unaware that this implies that they do not recognize the independence or sovereignty of their neighbor. They deny Ukraine the right to make a free choice about joining the European Union and NATO. They fail to mention the downing of the Malaysian airliner, the deaths of Russian soldiers, or the photographic evidence of Russian army tanks and other heavy equipment crossing the border. They insist that Russia is in no way involved in Ukraine, even while trying to justify anything Moscow and its proxies might be doing there.
The Russian attitude on Ukraine is linked to broader themes. The Russians I spoke with do not regard Moscow as having lost the Cold War. It liberated itself from the Soviet Union, defeated totalitarianism and initiated a democratic transition on its own. While this was achieved under Boris Yeltsin, no one has anything good to say about him. President Putin is viewed as the best available leader, attractive because of his efforts to restore Russian power. Nostalgia for that power is palpable: even a casual conversation produces admiration for the Soviet Union. Czarist Russia is not far behind in the memory pantheon. The opposition to Putin is all more nationalist than he is, claim his defenders. Americans should view Russia as an equal, a superpower that Washington should treat with caution and respect.
It is not easy to convey what the Russians had to say about the Middle East with this static in the air. Harking back to Condoleezza Rice’s “transformational diplomacy,” we were told rigid American ideologically driven efforts to export democracy triggered the Arab uprisings, even though democracy is inappropriate for traditional societies in which family relations are predominant. The UN, the G7, the G8 and the G20 are all fronts for American ambitions, which are driven by an “energy elite” thirsting for hydrocarbons (no mention was made of America’s soaring energy production and reduced dependence on imports). Ukraine is part of the American democratization program. Ultimately, Washington aims at regime change in Moscow.
The Russians see what is happening in Syria as vindicating their support for Bashar al Assad, even as they repeat the refrain that they are not necessarily attached to him personally. The Russian port facilities at Tartous are not vital to Moscow. The Russians attribute the emergence of Islamic extremists, in particular the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to American mistakes and even to American assistance. At the root of the crisis is the American invasion of Iraq, which gave power to the Shia and incited the Sunni rebellion in both Syria and Iraq.
Fearing that it will eventually infect Russia’s Muslim population, the Russians want ISIS defeated. It will take a long time. The US should team up with Russia for the fight. Russia can be helpful in identifying and blocking foreign fighters, especially Chechnyans coming not only from Russia but also from Austria and other European countries. Bombing ISIS in Syria without permission of Damascus would be wrong and likely counter-productive. Arms sent to the opposition will end up in the hands of jihadists. Rejection of the election results in Syria while accepting them in Ukraine demonstrates America’s double standard. Assad has to play a role in the Syrian transition. Russia may prove useful in promoting intra-Syrian dialogue, though the regime has not yet accepted this idea.
My last night in Moscow was spent at a marvelous performance of Mussorgsky’s “Boris Godunov.” This iconic Russian opera features a guilt-ridden hero who rises to the throne by murdering the heir apparent. Guilt was not something I found in Moscow last week, but confidence in strong men was much in evidence.
How to degrade and destroy
President Obama has now clarified his goal in the war on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL): it is to degrade and destroy. His model is what was accomplished against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That should be little comfort to those who live in areas where ISIL operates. A dozen years of war have rendered parts of the border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan even more lawless and ungovernable than it was before the US intervened there starting in 2001. But it is fair enough to say that the remnants of Al Qaeda that remain there are little threat to the United States.
What will it take to defeat ISIL?
The military campaign will require a 360 degree effort against ISIL. This means an international coalition that includes not only those NATO members willing to engage but also the security forces of Iraq and Iraqi and Syrian Kurdistan as well as Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), all of which are seriously threatened if ISIL is able to consolidate its position inside Iraq and Syria. The precise division of labor will have to be negotiated, but the United States should expect that its bombing of ISIL in both Syria and Iraq is only the tip of the spear. Iraq and the Syrian rebels will need to provide the biggest share of the ground forces. The others should be prepared to attack from the air or provide funding, advice and equipment.
The military campaign against ISIL will go much faster and much better if the mainly Sunni populations in the areas it controls rise against it. This is what enabled the American “surge” in 2006 and 2007 to succeed against Al Qaeda in Iraq. Then it was the Sunni tribes that rebelled and helped the Americans to destroy Al Qaeda. Any serious effort to destroy ISIL will need to make something similar happen now. But it won’t be easy: without boots on the ground, the Americans will be unable to organize or pay for a Sunni “awakening.” The Saudis and UAE have shown little aptitude in this direction, but it is high time they learned how to get what they pay for.
While confronting ISIL militarily, the coalition acting against it will need to weaken its sources of financing and recruitment. This is shadowy work that requires the best efforts of many intelligence agencies working together. The focus on foreign fighters coming from the US and Western Europe may be necessary to prevent their flow back to those places. But most of them appear to be coming from other places and need to be slowed or stopped, whatever their origins. This is an area where the Russians can contribute: Chechnyans play a significant role, as do others from the Caucusus. Rumors of Qatari financing have been rife. It is time to stop any supposedly private contributions going from Doha to ISIL or its supporters.
The toughest issue in dealing with ISIL will be preventing its return to the places where it is militarily defeated. President Obama may think leaving the border area of Pakistan and Afghanistan devoid of effective governance is all right, because eventually Kabul and Islamabad will fill in. But it is going to be a long time before Damascus or Baghdad can govern effectively in the eastern provinces of Syria or the western provinces of Iraq, respectively. If you want to degrade and destroy ISIL there you are going to have to make some provision for governance, justice and public services.
This cannot be done by remote control. Someone is going to need to establish a presence in the areas ISIS currently controls, unless we want to see it go the way of Libya, whose various militias are tearing the country to shreds. In Syria, it might be the moderate revolutionaries, but then they will need protection from Bashar al Asad so long as he rules Damascus. In Iraq, it will likely need to be Sunni Iraqis who take control and govern–initially at least–without much reference to Baghdad. International humanitarian and other assistance in both countries will be vital, unless we want to see them go the way of Libya, where militias are now battling each other for control of the state. The UN or maybe the Arab League had better get ready for big challenges.
Presidents have to deal with the world they are dealt, not the one they prefer. “Degrade and destroy” will take years, not months. Obama would prefer to do retrenchment. Maybe his successor will get the opportunity.
NATO on the spot
NATO presidents and prime ministers meet next Thursday and Friday in Cardiff, Wales for their biannual summit. It was supposed to focus on the withdrawal from Afghanistan, which is already well-advanced. But that will be overshadowed now by the Russian invasion of southeastern Ukraine.
Some are still calling it a “stealth” invasion. Hardly. Russian personnel, tanks, artillery and other equipment are crossing the border and have taken the southeastern town of Novoazovsk. The fact that the troops don’t wear insignia makes them no less Russian. They could drive north from there to reinforce the rebel-held towns of Donestk and Luhansk or west to the important Ukrainian port of Mariulpol, which appears to be what they are doing.
NATO is under no obligation to defend Ukraine. It did little military to react during the Cold War to Soviet interventions in its then satellites Hungary and Czechoslovakia. But that is nothing to be proud of, even if it all worked out in the end. Both countries took advantage of the fall of the Berlin Wall to move as rapidly as they could into NATO and the European Union (EU). Those who take the long view may want to suggest that Putin’s incursion into Ukraine is nothing but folly. It will surely drive Ukraine into the arms of NATO and the EU.
It may also do harm to Putin’s standing at home. The Crimea annexation is proving difficult and expensive. Russians are beginning to notice the funerals of Russians killed in the Ukraine fighting. There are likely to be more. Moscow will discourage the media from reporting on these and encourage a drumbeat of alleged abuses against the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine, but sooner or later the truth is likely to come out.
How NATO reacts will be important. Both its European and North American members have strengthened sanctions in reaction to Russian behavior in Ukraine. The rebel downing of Malaysia Air 17 with a Russian-supplied missile over Ukraine caused the latest turning of the screws. Moscow appears to be responding with cyber attacks on US and maybe other banks.
NATO has to decide whether to up the ante. Ideas on what to do are few and far between: start supplying lethal equipment to Kiev and deploy more NATO forces to allies who have borders with Russia. That’s thin gruel. The equipment won’t have any immediate effect on Ukrainian military capabilities and Putin will laugh off NATO deployments in the Baltics and Poland. He doesn’t plan to attack them.
Another turn of the sanctions screw, this time against Russian banks and other financial institutions, is another serious possibility. President Obama has to worry about whether that or othe moves will cause the Russians to fall off the P5+1 wagon (permanent five UN Security Council members plus Germany) that is trying to negotiate an end to Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions. But the Russians have good reasons of their own not to want Iran to get nuclear weapons. It would be a big strategic mistake for them to undermine the current negotiating effort.
The NATO summit would do well in any event to denounce the invasion of Ukraine in explicit and stentorian tones, making it clear that Russian annexation of territory taken by force, including Crimea, will never be recognized by the Alliance. It would be a serious mistake to let Crimea go unmentioned, as that would only suggest to Putin that he can get away with more territorial conquest. The United States took a principled position of this sort on the Baltic states during the Cold War, when there seemed little to no likelihood they would ever be anything but Soviet prisoners. That worked out well when the Soviet Union fell apart.
There are other things to consider that aren’t discussed in polite company in public. The US will want to help Ukraine with intelligence. It may also want to consider stirring trouble inside Russia, though that particular type of covert action has a very mixed record, at best. If Moscow has in fact conducted cyber attacks against Western banks, response in kind will need to be considered. Another possibility is to reply to the Russian invasion of Ukraine with vigorous military action not only against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) inside Syria but also against Bashar al Asad’s regime, which Russia supports.
NATO is on the spot. It hasn’t got a lot of good options. But it needs to react if it wants to stop Putin from going further.
PS: Vox.com provides video evidence:
A good election, now work to be done
It seems safe to say now that Prime Minister Hashim Thaci’s PDK has won Kosovo’s Sunday parliamentary election, with close to 31% of the vote. Second place LDK was closer than some anticipated at almost 26%, but the big news was that the “Self-Determination” movement led by Albin Kurti beat out Ramush Haradinaj’s AAK, 13.5% to 9.6%. Overall turnout was low at about 42%. The Serb List garnered 4.2%, after a Belgrade push for Serbs in Kosovo to vote.
My friends who wished for a major shift in political power will be disappointed. My friends in the PDK are celebrating, even if the margin was narrower than some imagined.
My fondest wish was apparently realized: under the watchful eyes of a lot of Kosovo observers, the election appears to have been clean. I am told the biggest problems were attempts to influence voters within the restricted area near polling stations, problems with the voters’ list, and family-influenced voting. I have not heard complaints of ballot-box stuffing, intimidation or other wholesale cheating. Complaints were similar in Serb and Albanian areas.
There are lots of mathematical possibilities for Thaci to gain a majority. With minorities, any of the top Albanian parties might do as a partner. While Thaci has told many people he would prefer to retire from the prime ministry, I and a lot of other people will be surprised if he actually does it. His party has found him to be the absolutely necessary glue to hold things together. They won’t want him throwing in the towel after a respectable, if narrower than hoped for, victory.
The big issues facing Thaci or any other prime minister for the next four years will be economic. Kosovo needs much more investment (foreign and domestic) to create jobs for its still rapidly growing and young population. Some would like to focus on government-controlled investment, using funds held so far abroad. A wise course would be to improve conditions for private investment, both domestic and international. This will not be easy: Kosovo holds an unenviable 86th position in the World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking, admittedly ahead of Serbia and Albania but well behind neighboring Macedonia and Montenegro. The perception of corruption is a big hindrance to investment. Kosovo manages only 111th in the Transparency International ranking.
But whatever Kosovo’s problems, a decent election is a good foundation. Kosovo knows its ultimate goals: membership in NATO and the EU. Now it has to decide how to make tangible progress in that direction during the next four years. The country is a long way from where it was at independence six years ago, but it is still much farther than that from its ultimate goals.
PS: a late thought: all that NGO energy that went into election monitoring needs now to turn to accountaility and transparency of government actions. There is work to be done for everyone.
Keep it clean
It’s unusual that I post three days in a row on the Balkans, but on reflection yesterday I did not emphasize enough how important it is that Kosovo’s elections be transparently clean. The 2010 parliamentary election had serious problems. There were fewer problems in last November’s municipal elections, but they were not perfect. I am told the issues often arise within political parties, with candidates trying to falsify preference votes. I have no way of independently judging that.
But I do know that it is vital to Kosovo’s most important ambitions–NATO and eventual EU membership–that this election go well. A democratic state has to be able to conduct an election well. It isn’t easy–we’ve still got problems in parts of the US more than 220 years after independence.
I am told the EU is sending some observers, and the Kosovo government is recruiting some in the US. But international observers are not nearly as important to a good election as local people, who can much more readily detect fraud and abuse, both at polling stations and away from them. I am told there will be a nongovernment telephone hotline for citizens to call to report problems. That strikes me as a fine idea.
What really counts in the end is the attitude of those who might try to abuse the electoral system. If they are convinced that not only the country’s best interests but also their own will be served by a good election, they will align their behavior accordingly. If they think their competitors will be able to cheat, they will respond in kind. Potential malefactors need to fear the consequences. A big turnout helps to ensure that polilticians know they are being watched, but it also strains the electoral mechanism.
The country’s best interests are clear. If this election goes badly, Pristina will have a harder time convincing Brussels that it merits goodies like the visa waiver program and a Stabilization and Association Agreement, which I am told should be ready for signature in January. A bad election would also give Serbs and other non-Albanians pause, raising once again the archetypal Balkans question: why should I live as a minority in your country when you can live as a minority in mine?
If the election goes well, whoever gains the largest share of seats will have a much easier road ahead. As always in Kosovo, gaining a majority will require a coalition, one that includes Serb and other non-Albanian participation. The capacity to form the government depends in part on everyone accepting the validity of the election results. If I think you may have cheated your way to victory, I’m far less likely to want to negotiate a pact with you to govern.
So yes, the Kosovo election may be dull. But it is important to those who live there. The good functioning of the electoral mechanism would itself be a key result.
Bosnia and Herzegovina adrift
I spoke last night at the Austrian Cultural Center in New York City, in an event presided over by Tim Judah, who has been covering Ukraine lately but cut his teeth in the Balkans. The panel included Damir Arsenijevic, Atilla Aksoj, and Wolfgang Petritsch. Here are my talking notes:
1. I confess I’ve been tempted to do a John Cage this evening, but that would require I stand here for four minutes and thirty-three seconds completely silent, as the composer once did.
2. I haven’t got that kind of discipline. So you’ll have to settle for something less edifying and not much longer: warmed over ideas from someone who can’t remember when he last had a good one on the subject.
3. Let me start with the conventional wisdom, which I think is correct: Bosnia is stuck because the Dayton agreements, while ending a war, ensconced ethnically nationalist political parties and politicians in positions of power from which only more nationalist parties and politicians are be able to remove them.
4. The fault lies in the country’s constitution. Dayton ended the war but failed to provide Bosnia with a functional governing structure capable of negotiating and implementing the requirements of NATO or European Union membership.
5. This didn’t matter much for the first decade after the war. There were lots of things that needed doing. NATO and EU memberships were not much of an issue.
6. But in 2005/6 a team of Americans, with European support, tried to start fixing the constitutional problem by facilitating preparation by the Bosnian political parties of constitutional amendments later known as the April package.
7. The package clarified group, individual and minority rights, as well mechanisms for protecting the “vital national interests” of Bosnia’s constituent peoples. It also included reforms to strengthen the government and the powers of the prime minister, reduce the president’s duties, and streamline parliamentary procedures.
8. The April package narrowly failed in parliament to achieve the 2/3 majority required by two votes. The responsibility was clear: one political party that had participated fully in the negotiations blocked passage, in order to ensure its leader election to the presidency.
9. Whatever the faults of the April package, its passage would have opened the way for a different politics in Bosnia, one based less on ethnic identity and more on economic, social welfare and other issues of common concern to all its citizens.
10. I confess I thought its defeat would only be temporary. For sure the package would be reconsidered the next year and passed.
11. I failed to understand that the moment was not reproducible. Damage was done. Defeat of the April package ushered in a period of virulent ethnic polarization. Over the past eight years, the situation has deteriorated markedly. Only one constitutional amendment has passed during that period, under intense international pressure, to codify the status of the Brcko District in northeastern Bosnia.
12. Meanwhile, the country has fallen further and further behind most of its neighbors in the regatta for EU membership and now looks likely to end up in last place, with little hope of entering the EU before 2025 or later.
13. Those who advocate, as I trust Wolfgang will, that the High Representative responsible for interpretation of the Dayton agreements be removed and Bosnia’s problems be left to the EU accession process for resolution have little evidence that mechanism will work.
14. All the leverage of EU accession did not work to get Bosnians to align their constitution with a decision of the European Court of Human Rights. Nor has it accelerated the adaptation of Bosnia’s court system to European standards.
15. So what is to be done?
16. I think there is no substitute for the Bosnians solving their own problems, even if the internationals helped to create them. The recent “Bosnian spring” plenums are for me a positive sign. So too is the interethnic cooperation in response to the recent floods, which demonstrated clearly that Bosnia’s many governments are unable to serve its citizens well.
17. But the plenums have so far focused on local issues, not national ones. At some point after October’s elections, Bosnians will have to try to fix its constitution. They could do worse than return to the April package and get on with the process of constitutional revision.
18. I also think there are directions that would not be fruitful. Some would like to see even greater group rights and ethnic separation than provided for in the Dayton agreements. That is not in my view a fruitful direction. Apart from its impact on Bosnia, it would have the undesirable effect of encouraging separatism in Ukraine and elsewhere.
19. Others would like to further weaken the central government or allow the entities to negotiate separately their entry into the EU. Those in my view are not fruitful directions.
20. There is a simple test for any proposal for reform in Bosnia: will it make the government in Sarajevo more functional? The corollary question is whether it will accelerate Bosnian entry into NATO and the EU.
21. The April package would have done that. The time is coming to return to it and get the difficult job of constitutional reform done.