Tag: NATO
Landslide
According to exit polls, Ukrainians Sunday gave Petro Poroshenko a landslide mandate in the presidential poll. While voting in the eastern provinces of Donbas was sparse, turnout elsewhere was high and the margin over also-ran Yulia Tymoshenko was so wide that it is difficult to see how even Russian President Putin could question the legitimacy of the result. The Ukraine crisis is not over, but Poroshenko’s election could open the way to a negotiated political settlement, which is his often expressed preference. Poroshenko has not favored NATO membership for Ukraine and has pledged to protect the rights of Russian speakers, but he also favors stronger ties to the European Union.
Russian President Putin has reason to be content. His red line is NATO membership for Ukraine. Poroshenko has indicated he will not cross it, though he occasionally suggests Russian intransigence will make him reconsider the proposition. Putin will plump for maximum self-governance in Donbas, to allow Russian speakers the kind of de facto ethnic independence Serbs have in Bosnia. He will also want Poroshenko to attract lots of money from the EU and the International Monetary Fund, so that Russia will get back the money it loaned Poroshenko’s predecessor.
While likely to oblige Putin’s interest in getting his money back, Poroshenko has his work cut out for him. He has pledged to visit Donbas first, including to thank the Ukrainian security forces who have tried–without much success–to restore order there. Parliamentary elections are not due until 2017. There appear to be no plans to bring that date forward. The parliament has been an important player since previous President Yushenko abandoned his post. Its slate of priorities will be daunting: Ukraine needs to phase out its expensive energy subsidies, attract private investment, end oligarchical cronyism and cut back on corruption.
Europe has some serious thinking to do in light of the Ukraine crisis. Its dependence on Russian natural gas, its weak military forces and its diplomatic clumsiness–all closely related–should make not only Brussels but the 28 member state capitals think harder about what it takes to sustain a coherent and successful foreign and security policy.
If in fact the Ukraine crisis now heads in the direction of a peaceful denouement, the Obama administration will have reason to boast that its low-key diplomatic approach has produced a decent result. Particularly important was the decision not to listen to experts who advised agreeing with Putin to postpone the election.
But even if things go well now with Ukraine, Washington needs to rethink policy towards a Russia bent on expanding its hegemony in what it considers its “near abroad.” NATO expansion in particular needs presidential attention: Montenegro and Macedonia are technically qualified and could be admitted at the Summit in Cardiff, Wales in September, but Macedonian membership will require President Obama to deliver bad news to Athens. A broader package of moves closer to NATO would be ideal, one that includes Kosovo, Bosnia, Sweden and Finland. I am hesitant about Georgia, a country NATO is in no way capable of defending. But letting Putin know that NATO is determined to expand to those countries that it can defend, that meet the membership criteria and that want to join will limit his ambitions and encourage those who seek a democratic future.
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Why Putin maybe blinked
It is easy to predict how many babies will be born next year. It is hard to predict who the individual mothers will be. That’s one of the important lessons in international affairs, where the decisions of unique individuals often matter.
Forty-eight hours after I posted that we should expect worse in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin decided to lower the tension. He claims to have withdrawn Russian troops from the Ukrainian border and to have asked the Russian-speaking insurgents in eastern and southern Ukraine not to conduct a May 11 referendum on independence. The US and NATO are saying they’ve seen no evidence of either claim. He is also sounding amiable about the May 25 presidential election that Kiev is organizing.
What made Putin blink? I don’t know. Maybe the significant declines in Russia’s credit rating, stock market and currency since he started up the Ukraine crisis. Maybe some of the sanctions are starting to bite. Maybe the withdrawals from his St. Petersburg economic forum weighed heavily. Maybe the Swiss President, who met with Putin just before he made his comments about Ukraine, said something about personal or institutional finance that gave the Russian President pause. Maybe it’s all a ruse to catch the West off balance and tomorrow he’ll invade.
Whatever his tactical maneuvers, Putin will not lose sight of his strategic goal: to dominate the Russian-speaking areas of eastern and southern Ukraine and deprive Kiev of the authority it needs to counter Moscow’s preferences, including its opposition to Ukrainian membership in NATO and a closer relationship with the EU. The cheapest and easiest way to achieve his purposes is autonomy for the Russian-speaking provinces, and some sort of “entity” binding them together. He is all too familiar with recent precedents for this: Republika Srpska in Bosnia and the Association of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo.
No doubt some degree of decentralization will be part of the solution in Ukraine. It is not only American communities that want to run their own schools, provide services, maintain their own infrastructure and manage their own revenues. The Federal government has little to say about my daily life. I interact far more often with the District of Columbia, which collects much of its own revenue and in many respects governs itself, despite the residue of Congressional oversight that no state has to put up with.
What Kiev has to be careful about is to maintain its authority over foreign affairs, defense, the judiciary and at least some of the forces of law and order. It also needs a supremacy clause, like the one in the existing constitution, that enables it to override local decisions that threaten the integrity of the state, including the holding of referenda on independence.
Putin is not going to be interested in decentralization, which would block him from the kind of dominant position in Ukraine that he seeks. Decentralization to provincial administrations will make it more difficult for Russian-speakers to unify and fight Kiev, even if it enables them a wide margin of control over the services provided within the provinces.
My best guess is that Putin blinked to provide some time for negotiations to produce the result he wants. President Obama is not the only one who prefers not to use military force but instead accomplish his ends by diplomatic means.
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Peace picks May 5 – 9
1. Russia in East Asia: History, Migration, and Contemporary Policy Monday, May 5 | 9 – 11am 5th Floor, Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW REGISTER TO ATTEND This talk explores Russia’s ties with East Asia through the lens of migration and policy. Russia spans the Eurasian continent, yet its historic and present connections with East Asia are often forgotten. At the turn of the 20th century, thousands of Asian migrants arrived in the Russian Far East, spurring fears of a “yellow peril.” A century later, the recent influx of new Asian migrants to Russia has generated similar sentiments. The talk discusses Asian migration in the context of cross-regional attempts to strengthen trade ties and diplomatic relations in the 21st century. SPEAKERS Matthew Ouimet, Public Policy Scholar Senior Analyst, Office of Analysis for Russia and Eurasia, U.S. Department of State. Alyssa Park, Kennan Institute Title VIII Supported Research Scholar Assistant Professor of Modern Korean History, University of Iowa 2. The Democratic Transition in Tunisia: Moving Forward Monday, May 5 | 10 – 11:30am Kenney Auditorium, The Nitze Building, Johns Hopkins University; 1740 Massachusetts Ave NW REGISTER TO ATTEND Mustapha Ben Jaafar, president of the National Constituent Assembly of Tunisia, will discuss this topic. Sasha Toperich, senior fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS, will moderate the event. Read more
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Kosovo gets an army and a special court
With the kind permission of Belgrade daily Danas, here is the report on its interview, published Monday under the headline “Prishtina is creating an army and is not afraid of a special court,” with Kosovo Deputy Foreign Minister Petrit Selimi. I have made minor editorial changes to the English version, supplied by Petrit:
Our international partners have already met key Kosovo demands regarding the investigations of Special Prosecutor Clint Williamson into the Dick Marty Report. Unfortunately, Serbia has tried all propaganda means to use Dick Marty to re-write the history of Kosovo war and also to return the issue of Kosovo under the UN. There were more than 10 formal requests by Serbia to the UN to deal with allegations from the Dick Marty Report, but now it’s clear that these allegations will be investigated by a Kosovo court, within Kosovo’s law and Constitution, with international legal staff supporting our Special Court – stated today for Danas Petrit Selimi, Kosovo’s Deputy Foreign Minister, who Pristina media regard as the person who is leading public relations efforts in the cabinet of PM Hashim Thaci.
Selimi says that “because Kosovo wants a credible and transparent process that will close once and for all this chapter,” a special chamber will be set up in a European country, with a bilateral agreement between Kosovo and that country, in order to enable international judges and prosecutors to conclude any process that might arise from the EULEX investigation.
“Now it’s clear that no UN court but rather a Kosovo court with international staff will work to deal with any accusations made against any Kosovo citizen. Kosovo setting up a Special Court will also ensure to distance the liberation and independence movement in Kosovo from any individuals that might have engaged in criminal activities.” – stated Selimi for the Danas interview.
Danas: Will the allegations made against senior members of the Kosovo government have an impact on the election agenda in Kosovo? It’s known that Marty also accused Prime Minister Thaci of organ harvesting?
Selimi: A major part of the allegations are science fiction and this will be proven by the investigations. But some allegations are very serious, and Kosovo will open a Special Court to deal with these. As we will apply for membership tothe Council of Europe in near future, it’s also important for Kosovo’s society and state to show it can deal with it’s own rotten apples. We know that even Nelson Mandela’s ANC had its own criminals. Unfortunately any guerrilla resistance can attract bad people with bad intentions. That is why it’s important that Kosovo parliament approves the creation of Special Court and the President extends the EULEX mandate for the final two years: to silence once and for all those keen to systematically attack Kosovo’s reputation. NATO intervention in Kosovo and the KLA uprising marked the single most successful Western intervention, which helped both Serbia and Kosovo move towards European future. The Special Court dealing with the Dick Marty allegations will cement Kosovo’s legitimacy as a modern, European state. We should not fear but rather fully embrace the creation of the court, knowing that the families of civilian victims on both sides, not only Albanian, need answers about their beloved ones.
Danas: Do you expect that the principle of the “reserved places” in the Parliament will be preserved?
Selimi: The Ahtisaari Plan asked for Kosovo to have “reserved seats” for two mandates for minorities, which gave them up to 1/4 of all seats in Kosovo Parliament, despite having only 5% of the population. This type of positive discrimination was needed to ensure Kosovo Serb leaders would join Kosovo institutions after independence. This formula is now automatically transformed into “guaranteed seats” which enable Serbs to have minimum 10 MP seats. The extension of the old formula is possible and is being supported by Prime Minister Thaci and the international community, but right now there is simply no 2/3 majority in the Parliament to support this extension of “reserved seats.”
Danas: Do you think it is feasible to form the Kosovo’s armed forces soon?
Selimi: The Kosovo Armed Foces have already been formed, as a result of recent National Security Strategy, written with the support of the US and other NATO allies. Parliament will confirm this decision soon, but during the next year we will see creation of dynamic, defensive force that will provide Kosovo with an important element of the security architecture in the Balkans. The Kosovo Parliament was also been accepted as an observer in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, hence we will move firmly towards NATO integration. So Kosovo’s multi-ethnic army is not only feasible, but it’s a reality of a fundamental and irreversible state-building project that is unfolding every day.
Danas: The President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolic mentioned the possibility of the creation of a new resolution on Kosovo that would be adopted by the Serbian Parliament. In your opinion, what would be the significance of such a document?
Selimi: Any documents, resolutions, constitutions approved by Serbian institutions since 1999 have no bearing on Kosovo. The Serbian Parliament can declare that Mars is part of Serbia, but the reality on the ground and the historic Brussels Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia prove that there is a state called Kosovo, it’s a neighbor of Serbia, and we both must normalize relations if we want to become members of EU.
Danas: What should be the main topics in the next phase of the Brussels dialogue?
Selimi: We must implement all agreements, including complete closure of all justice and police institutions of Serbia in north Kosovo and full integration into the Kosovo constitutional system. All new agreements will slowly but surely cement the separate roads of Kosovo and Serbia towards EU membership, which in the end will only be possible when both countries recognize each other’s existence. This will be sine qua non of our future political dialogue.
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Passover wandering
Like 70% of American Jews, I spent last night at a Seder, celebrating the story of liberation from pharaoh. Here are some of the thoughts that were on my mind.
Three years ago I wrote with enthusiasm about the Passover of Arab liberation. Two years ago Syria seemed already in the midst of ten plagues and ruled by a pharaoh who wouldn’t let his people go. Last year I thought things in the Middle East better than expected.
This year I’ve got to confess things are a mess, not only in the Middle East but also in Ukraine.
The war in Syria rages on. Israel/Palestine peace negotiations are stalled. Both sides are pursuing unilateral options. Egypt is restoring military autocracy. Libya is chaotic. Parts of Iraq are worse. The only whisper of good news is from Morocco, Yemen and Tunisia, where something like more or less democratic transitions are progressing, and Iran, where the Islamic Republic is pressing anxiously for a nuclear deal, albeit one that still seems far off.
In Ukraine, Russia is using surrogates and forces that don’t bother wearing insignia to take over eastern and southern cities where Russian speakers predominate. It looks as if military invasion won’t be necessary. Kiev has been reduced to asking for UN peacekeeping troops. NATO can do nothing. Strategic patience, and refusal to recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea and any other parts of Ukraine it might absorb, seems the best of a rotten bunch of options.
This is discouraging, but no one ever promised continuous progress. Even the Israelites wandered in the desert. Everyone forgets the part about getting stuck in one lousy oasis for 38 of those years. Freedom is not a one-time thing. It requires constant effort. There are setbacks. And there are breakthroughs.
Americans face their own liberation challenges. While the past year has seen giant strides in acceptance of gay marriage, there have been setbacks to the right to vote. Money is now speech and corporations are people, according to the Supreme Court. I’ll believe that when a corporation gets sent to prison and banks start accepting what I say as a deposit. The right to bear arms continues to expand, but not my right to be safe from those who do, except by arming myself. In Kansas City Sunday a white supremacist and anti-Semite allegedly shot and killed three people at Jewish facilities, all Christians.
The plain fact is that liberation, as Moses discovered, is hard. It requires persistence. There are no guarantees of success. The only directions history takes are the ones that people compel it to take. Some of those people are genuinely good. Others are evil. Sometimes they are both, as son Adam’s piece on LBJ this week suggests. There may be a right side and a wrong side of history, but it seems difficult for many people to tell the difference.
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A potent symbol
Montenegro’s Prime Minister Djukanovic is in DC today (and yesterday) to plump for his country’s NATO membership. His talking points were good (extrapolated from what he said):
- Montenegro has prepared well and meets the membership criteria, even if its population is still more or less evenly divided on the proposition;
- an invitation to NATO at the September Summit in Cardiff will have a positive impact on Balkans regional stability, including by encouraging Bosnia and Serbia to move in the same direction;
- the Alliance needs to send Russia a strong message about its willingness and ability to expand and defend its members in response to the Ukraine crisis.
The trouble of course is that Montenegro is tiny (Google says 621,081). However meritorious its candidacy, it is hard to see Montenegrin membership in NATO as a serious response to Russian malfeasance or even to regional instability.
Cardiff requires a broader vision , with an invitation to Montenegro as one component. How to frame this broader vision is the issue. Here are some possibilities:
- the Alliance could explicitly state its intention to invite, when they are ready, all the remaining Balkans non-members (Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia in addition to Montenegro) to join;
- the intention could be broadened to all European democracies, including not only the Balkans but also Moldova, Sweden and Finland as well as Ukraine and Georgia;
- it could even include some non-European democracies, like Colombia, which cooperates closely with the Alliance.
3. is a stretch. 2. risks provoking further Russian reaction in what it regards as its “near abroad,” even if much of it has been said before. It would also potentially saddle NATO with members whose defense would be difficult (especially Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia). In this era of constrained resources and retrenchment, the Alliance should be looking for members whose net contributions will be positive, not negative. I’d plunk for 1., which is neither a stretch nor likely to provoke the Russians, who will campaign against NATO membership for Serbia and Bosnia (as they are already doing in Montenegro) but can do little more than that.
The Balkans owe their current democratic institutions to NATO action. Kosovo in particular sees things that way. More than ninety percent of its population supports NATO membership, which isn’t possible right away because the six-year-old country is just now beginning to build its armed forces. The Albanians of Macedonia are likewise heavily in favor of NATO membership, which they regard as a guarantee of Skopje’s continued adherence to democratic norms (and decent treatment of its Albanian citizens). The ethnic Macedonians are not far behind. The only thing that holds Macedonia back is Greek refusal to accept it as an Alliance member. Bulgaria’s echo of Greek objections will fade quickly if Athens changes its mind.
Serbia and Bosnia are more equivocal. NATO bombed Serbs in both countries–notably Bosnia towards the end of the war there and Serbia in the 1999 conflict over Kosovo. Nevertheless, the current leadership in Belgrade seems to be ready to at least start down the path towards NATO. Membership for Montenegro would encourage them to do so. Once Serbia embarks, it will make no sense for the Serbs in Bosnia to hold back, especially as the Serb units of the Bosnian army are reputedly highly professional and won’t want to suffer exclusion from the club.
So far as I am aware, Montenegro and Macedonia are the only fully qualified NATO aspirants at the moment. Macedonia would have to enter as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as provided for in a 1995 interim agreement between Athens and Skopje, whose applicability to NATO membership has been confirmed by a decision of the International Court of Justice. The merits of the case aside, getting The FYROM into NATO will require some heavy political lifting by the United States and Germany, which will need to convince Athens to drop its objection.
In addition to stating its intentions, the Alliance should add substance to its vision by advancing each of the Balkans aspirants as far as possible along the path towards membership. What this means for each country would vary, but the clever bureaucrats at NATO headquarters can figure it out. If Sweden or Finland wants to take some additional steps towards membership, that would be icing on the cake.
A substantial Balkans/Scandinavian move towards NATO would shore up the Alliance’s flanks. It would be a serious diplomatic blow to Moscow, one for which it has no ready diplomatic or military response. All the countries involved would be net contributors to the Alliance. The move would help stabilize the Balkans and give Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia hope for the future. It would demonstrate that aggression in Ukraine has real costs and give contemporary substance to traditional US sloganeering about “Europe whole and free.”
Montenegro is tiny, but wrapped in the right package it could become a potent symbol of an alliance prepared to pursue its ideals, come what may.
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