Tag: NATO
Is Turkey going to war in Syria?
My Twitterfeed got spun up yesterday about NATO’s article 4 consultations, triggered by Syria’s shelling of a village in Turkeythat killed five Turks (all female apparently, including children). Turkey responded by shelling inside Syria and NATO issued a condemnation. Damascus apologized for its shelling, saying it won’t happen again. Par for the course.
More interesting, but little covered so far, is that Turkey’s parliament met today to authorize military operations inside Syria. These have almost surely occurred already clandestinely. Stories of dozens of Turks captured in Syria suggest as much. Now Turkish military operations in Syria may become overt, as they are in Iraq. I can’t find statistics, but Turkish air and artillery operations against Kurdish guerrillas in Iraq seem to occur on about a weekly basis, or maybe more frequently. The Turkish parliamentary action may portend a major escalation of international involvement in Syria, necessarily involving NATO and the United States, as its critics have feared.
Is this wise?
Certainly it might help to level the playing field for the Syrian opposition, which is suffering repeated bombing raids by the Syrian air force, not to mention Syrian army shelling by artillery and tanks. But any serious shift in the balance of power would likely require that the Turks attack the Syrian air defense system, which is reputedly a reasonably capable Russian one. Otherwise, Turkish military action will be limited to relatively ineffectual artillery bombardments, which won’t help much and will likely provoke a Syrian response in kind.
The Turks have long pondered a “safe area” along their border inside Syria, to limit the flow of refugees into Turkey proper. But they have not wanted to take down the Syrian air defense system on their own. I imagine they can do it, but it is clearly an act of war, one they will be reluctant to indulge in without UN Security Council authorization. Turkey will also need some pretty strong backing from the United States and other heavy hitting NATO members to take it on. American drones have already been playing an intelligence-gathering role, one the Turks will want to increase if they decide to take serious military action.
If they do, they can expect Syria to strike back assymetrically by supporting Kurdish guerrilla activity inside Turkey, something that is already on the rise. That would likely intensify Turkish military action targeted against Syrian Kurds. The spiral of violence is not likely to much farther than that, because Syrian capabilities are limited, especially given the current demands on Damascus’ security forces from inside Syria. In any event, no one in the Asad regime will care too much if the Turks are hitting the Kurds in northeastern Syria, possibly driving more of them into Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan will presumably welcome them. Baghdad will not.
So I don’t see the possibility of Turkish military action against Syria as leading to an unlimited spiral of violence, but it would definitely represent an escalation and spreading of the conflict with important implications for the United States, NATO allies and Iraq. If Turkish military moves result in a rapid end to the Asad regime, that could be a good thing. If they don’t but instead enlarge and amplify the conflict, that would be a very bad thing.
Mendacious
As regular readers will have noticed, I’ve avoided writing about the Balkans lately. There are a lot more interesting things going on elsewhere in the world. But Greece’s decision to put stickers reading “recognized by Greece as FYROM” over the MK on newly issued Macedonian license plates is too fine an opportunity to pass up.
Greece is doing this allegedly under the 1995 interim agreement with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), whose application for NATO membership Athens has blocked, first in Bucharest in 2008. Greece repeated its move more recently in Chicago this year, despite an International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision unequivocal in finding Greece in violation of the agreement in Bucharest.
Where I come from, if you want to apply an agreement you have to fulfill its terms yourself first. Greece understands this perfectly well and accused Macedonia of being in violation of the interim agreement during the ICJ proceedings. Its accusations were found to lack serious merit. Now Athens, having been found in violation, is seeking to apply the agreement it refused to apply in Chicago.
Words fail me. Mendacious maybe. They have apparently failed Skopje as well, which in the initial press report is said to be weighing its response. That’s wise. There is really no point in aggravating the situation further, tempting though it may be to do so.
But I’m not a government. I’m a blogging/tweeting professor and can suggest anything I like. I only risk hate tweets and emails. Maybe a sticker to cover the GR on Greek plates that reads “Southern Macedonia”? Or one that says “I am Greek traveling in a country whose name I don’t accept”? Ethnic Macedonians and Albanians with Greek license plates would have to be exempt from that one. Or one that declares “interim agreement be damned”?
Here in DC, most license plates read “taxation without representation,” because residents of the District of Columbia pay Federal taxes but have a representative in Congress who can’t vote in plenary (and no senators–even states smaller in population than DC are entitled to two).
Slogans of all sorts grace the license plates of most cars in the United States. I’ve always thought it unimaginative of Europeans not to use that bit of valuable real estate on the back of a car for something edifying. My favorite proposal (it isn’t reality) was for Wisconsin, a big dairy producing state: “eat cheese or die” (New Hampshire’s plates really do read “live free or die”).
Greece of course has bigger problems these days than the “MK” on its northern neighbor’s license plates. It would do well to save a few euros by cutting the funding for those “recognized as FYROM” stickers. It would do even better to stop violating an agreement it wants to apply and allow FYROM to enter NATO.
Nikolic starts well, now let’s have fun
Tomislav Nikolic’s inauguration as President of Serbia went well: he pledged Serbia to a European future, committed himself to resolving regional problems through dialogue and promised future prosperity in return for hard work. He did not of course repeat his controversial remarks of recent days seeming to justify the Serb assault in the early 1990s on the Croatian town of Vukovar and his denial of genocide at the Bosnian town of Srebrenica.
He did however necessarily commit himself to
protect the Constitution, respect and safeguard the territorial integrity of Serbia and try to unite all political forces in the country in order to identify and implement a common policy on the issue of Kosovo-Metohija.
This means that he maintains Serbia’s claim to all of Kosovo, despite loss of control over 89% of its territory and more or less the same percentage of its population. As required by the constitution, he denies the validity of the 2008 declaration of independence and recognition by 90 sovereign states.
The key question for today’s Serbia is whether and how Nikolic resolves the contradiction between his commitment to a European future for his country and his commitment to holding on to Kosovo. No Serb politician wants to admit that this contradiction exists, but it does and they all know it. Twenty-two European Union members have recognized Kosovo’s independence. They will be unwilling to accept Serbia into their club unless it accepts Kosovo’s sovereignty and establishes “good neighborly relations” with the democratically validated authorities in Pristina.
Belgrade has been inclined to put off any resolution of this contradiction for as long as possible. That is understandable. It involves a trade-off that is unappetizing: either give up Kosovo, or give up the EU.
But the failure to make a clear choice distorts judgment on other issues important to Serbia’s future: relationships with Russia, the United States and NATO as well as Serbia’s relationship with Kosovo’s Albanian citizens (Kosovo’s Serb citizens will presumably choose to remain Serbian citizens, though some have also accepted Kosovo citizenship).
The United States and the EU have been reluctant to press Serbia hard on its choice between the EU and Kosovo, for fear of undermining former President Boris Tadic and strengthening Nikolic’s more nationalist forces. It might appear that there is no longer need for that reluctance with Nikolic in the presidency. But there is a real possibility that Tadic will become prime minister and lead the first government of Nikolic’s mandate. That would enable Serbia to renew its diplomatic manipulation of the West on the Kosovo vs. EU issue.
Nikolic in the past has been more inclined to advocate partition of Kosovo than to give up all claim to it. This proposition won’t go anywhere. The Americans and the Europeans are solidly against it, because it would precipitate a domino-effect of partitions in Macedonia, Bosnia, Cyprus and perhaps farther afield. The Kosovars would ask for the Albanian-majority area of southern Serbia in trade, something Belgrade would not want to offer. More importantly: it is not in the interest of most Serbs who live in Kosovo (outside the northern area Serbia would hope to claim). The Serbian church, whose important sites are all in the south, is solidly opposed.
I’ll hope that Nikolic defies the odds and gets courageous about Kosovo: it is lost to Serbian sovereignty. All politicians in Belgrade, including Nikolic, understand that, but no one wants to accept responsibility for it. Some of my Serb Twitter followers and email correspondents assure me there is not a chance in hell Nikolic will: that’s why they voted for him. They want him to choose Kosovo over the tarnished EU.
They may well be correct, but I’ll wait to see what Nikolic does. His first test will be implementation of the agreements already reached with Pristina. Tadic did precious little to make them operational. If Nikolic wants to stick his predecessor with responsibility for them, he’ll demand that they be implemented by a newly named prime minister, whether it be Tadic or someone else from his Democratic Party.
Nikolic could also change Serbia’s policy on United Nations membership for Kosovo, thus forcing Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic to preside in his new position as General Assembly president over Pristina’s acceptance into the UN. Watching that would be worth almost any admission price.
I’m not holding my breath for any of this to happen. Just saying it would be fun.
Greece is defeating its own purposes
Nikos commented on my previous post urging Athens to export stability:
An article from 2.150 A.D.: “Northern Mexico wants to join NATO with the name Virginia. We must hear those peoples voice because they have the right for self-determination. Recognizing them by this name means also that every Virginian that lived there the last thousand years is only Virginian and they never have been Americans there. Including the eight Presidents that born there and any other historical figure that Americans demand as their own. Virginians are no Americans and the opposite. And ancient Virginians were no Americans also. The history of Virginia is the history of the Former Mexican Republic of Virginia. And some day Virginians (Mexicans) will have the historical right to take Virginia state into their territory because it is their right.”
This is a little example which can make Americans see the problem with the Greek view. I chose this example because this page is American. With the use of our imagination we can think other examples with other American states or other countries. But still it will be a minor example because Macedonia (Greek, Ancient) is many more for the Greeks of what is any American state for Americans. I’ve tried to be brief here. Dozens of books have been written which they cannot fit in a comment.
Let me assure you, Nikos, that your example rings hollow to American ears: we would take it more as a risible compliment than anything else. Only those terribly insecure in their own identity and uncertain of their capacity to defend their own territory would object. If this Virginia were ready to contribute seriously to NATO defense capabilities, it would be welcomed with open arms.
As for the supposed territorial ambitions of your neighbors, I’ve yet to find a FYROMer who thinks one inch of Greece will ever become part of their territory. There are surely more Mexicans who would like to recover parts of Texas, New Mexico and California than FYROMers who want a piece of Greece. Moreover, the best guarantee that it will never happen is of course NATO membership, which requires that all such problems be resolved.
Greece has nevertheless done what its political leadership thought best at the NATO Summit and blocked any consideration of The FYROM’s membership. This is not only a clear violation of the International Court of Justice decision but it also increases ethnic tension in Macedonia and puts at risk of partition Kosovo and Bosnia as well as Cyprus. Should I mention that everyone in the world except Greece calls the country whose capital is Skopje “Macedonia”? It’s a habit that neither its inhabitants nor the rest of the world will give up easily, especially if the practice continues for another decade or two.
Some day there will no doubt be a political leader in Greece who recognizes how counter-productive Athens’ resistance to The FYROM becoming a member of NATO is, but it is not clear that either Skopje or anyone else will see any reason to accommodate. The sooner Greece comes to recognize that it is defeating its own purposes, the less damaged those purposes will be.
Block that kick!
A correspondent sent me this English translation of the transcript of Greek political leaders meeting on May 16, published on the Greek presidency website. Any corrections to the translation will of course be welcome:
Kamenos (Independent Greeks): Mr. President, we would like to have clear guidance from this Council of political leaders under your presidency on how to handle the issue that might arise with Skopje joining NATO at the Chicago Summit under the name “Macedonia”. I would like that we express our opinion that in this process we have even the option to veto the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to join NATO under the name “Macedonia”.
Kamenos: I would like to reopen the issue, whether there is a a possibility to give a direct order even for a veto to stop the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from joining NATO under “Macedonia”. So far I don’t have an answer. I ask again mr. President.
Venizelos (PASOK): There will be, there will be.
Kamenos: All right then.
Venizelos: Regarding the important questions that were raised, as you know, the agenda of the NATO Summit does not include the question of admitting Skopje. So, there is no question of enlargement. And if there are any questions raised at the sidelines of the Summit, they will be dealt with according to our national strategy and the arguments that also include (our response to the) verdict of the International Court of Justice to the Hague. So, our arguments need to be more intelligent then the ones we gave in 2008 (Bucharest NATO Summit).
Samaras (New Democracy): Of course. We mustn’t back down from Bucharest.
Venizelos: Obviously. All we need to do is reinforce our arguments in a way that is, shall I say, more skillful and intelligent.
Kamenos: But is using the veto to last possible weapon? This is what I’m asking?
Venizelos: Yes, yes.
President Papoulias: I think that Kamenos speaks of the possibility that the Skopje issue is added to the Summit agenda…
Venizelos: Yes, all right.
Papoulias: …Because right now it is not.
Venizelos: On the other hand, the reaction after the Hague verdict was very friendly toward Greece and our positions. I say this because I dealt with the issue as defense and finance minister.
Tsipras (SYRIZA): Regarding NATO, if Ms. Papariga will let me speak so I don’t have to take the floor again, I would like to make the same point as Mr. Venizelos. To the best of my knowledge, the Summit Agenda is determined unanimously by the NATO members, and it doesn’t include the issue of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. So, unless there is some surprise, which is not common practice in such occasions, there is no serious problem. I believe that our position, that should be followed by the interim Government, is the position that we also held so far regarding this important issue, that we, as a country, want the name issue to be dealt with a mutually acceptable solution with a geographic qualifier. There is no need to go into this any longer. Regarding the NATO summit, I think we are covered by the fact that this issue is not on the agenda.
Papariga (Greek Communist Party): Because this issue is not on the agenda, there is no need for discussion. If it does suddenly appear on the agenda, the one who is going (to Chicago) will put a veto so it will not be discussed, because there is no official Greek Government. Our position is known, let’s not discuss it now, before the elections.
Kouvelis (Democratic Left): There is no need to open non-existing questions. It is not on the agenda. We have a specific strategy as a country. In any case it needs to be stopped. And it is possible to be stopped. We will be there to resist, if someone wants to put it on the agenda. But, today we have two facts: primarily, the national strategy and also the fact that the issue is not on the agenda.
Samaras: We are discussing this in case there is a surprise.
Kouvelis: That’s what I said.
Samaras: In case of a surprise there should definitely be a veto. We are not even discussing that.Venizelos: Agreed. These things are understood without saying.
Kouvelis: These things are understood Mr. Samaras.
It is rare that one gets a transcript of political leaders planning to violate a decision of the International Court of Justice. But it is also curious that they are discussing the admission of “Macedonia” to NATO. Everyone I’ve discussed the issue with, including those who call themselves “Macedonians,” agrees that Skopje can only enter NATO at this point as The FYROM, in accordance with the 1995 interim agreement.
At least Greece’s representatives in Chicago on Sunday and Monday will have something to do that the country’s political leadership, busily preparing for financial apocalypse, thinks worthwhile. Even though there is no ball in play, they are ready to block that kick!
Time for Athens to export stability
I spent a good part of yesterday on one of my least favorite topics: the name of the country whose capital is Skopje.
I started it with yesterday’s post. The NATOniks on Twitter then told me how out of it I was to think that the Alliance could spare the seconds needed to admit Skopje as a member. After all, it has a hefty agenda: Afghanistan, where it will decide what has already been decided, and smart defense, where it will decide something that will not be implemented. Enlargement, they said, is just not part of the narrative. They also suggested nothing, absolutely nothing, would change Greece’s veto of Macedonian membership.
What about a phone call from the President of the United States asking Athens to stand down in his hometown of Chicago at the NATO Summit there this weekend? It would be The FYROM* entering NATO, not “Macedonia,” in accordance with a 1995 agreement the parties to this “name” dispute signed (and Greece violated, according to the International Court of Justice, when it blocked The FYROM’s entry to NATO at the last summit in Bucharest). Athens, after all, might find it useful to build up some credits in Washington.
One of my Twitter friends suggested yesterday that Greece had won the ICJ case because the court declined to order Greece not to repeat what it had done in Bucharest. Here I need only cite what the Court said, citing a previous decision:
“[a]s a general rule, there is no reason to suppose that a State whose act or conduct has been declared wrongful by the Court will repeat that act or conduct in the future, since its good faith must be presumed”
Misreading this as suggesting the ICJ did not find Greece in the wrong is beyond my ability.
By the end of the day, I was having a perfectly reasonable conversation with Greeks interested in resolving the issue, and seemingly willing to think about The FYROM membership in NATO, if only that does not entail postponing a solution to the name issue forever. That is a reasonable concern, one that could be met by taking the issue to arbitration if it is not solved within a specified time frame. I imagine there are half dozen other solutions that people brainier than I am will think up. It is important also to note that Greece can block Macedonia’s process of gaining membership in the EU at any stage, so it will not have given up all its leverage if it allows The FYROM into NATO.
Greece today is in an uncomfortable position. It is in clear violation of an ICJ decision and is exporting instability to its neighbors and friends. It is going to be really hard to prevent the export of economic instability, since the electorate is rejecting austerity and causing real problems for the Euro and the European Union that will ripple far and wide. Check out your 401k today to see what I mean.
But the export of political instability is avoidable. Ethnic tension in Macedonia is on the increase, in part due to failure to get into NATO. This is a treasured goal of its Albanian population, one of whose political leaders told me last summer that it was vital to his ability to contain and counter growing pan-Albanian sentiment. Pan-Albanianism is also growing in Kosovo, where Belgrade makes no secret of its desire to partition the North, so that it can hold on to the largest single concentration of Serbs in Kosovo (even if most of them live farther south).
Partition in Macedonia and Kosovo would lead quickly and irrevocably to partition in Bosnia, and guess where else? Cyprus. Thus, Greece’s resistance to Macedonian membership in NATO and refusal to recognize Kosovo are politicies that risk undermining one of Athens’ most cherished goals: reunification of Cyprus.
The first law of holes is to stop digging. Athens has a real stake in the unity and territorial integrity of The FYROM, Kosovo, Bosnia and Cyprus. Greece should quietly reverse its position and allow The FYROM into NATO at Chicago, provided it gets a firm commitment to resolve the name issue within a defined time frame. That would clear one problem and gain Athens a good deal of credit. Then I’ll want to talk with Greek friends about recognizing Kosovo, which would remove still another issue that risks precipitating partition in Cyprus.
It is time for Athens to export stability.
*The FYROM, for the uninitiated, is “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” the name by which the country entered the United Nations and many other organizations soon after independence.
PS: I thought you all would enjoy this reaction from one of my Twitter followers: “Greece is and always was a lighthouse of stability in the region. NATO member, EC member, EU zone member and u claim instability?”