Tag: NATO
The 90 day ultimatum
United States Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice used today’s passage of UNSC Security Council resolution 2043 authorizing deployment of 300 UN observers to Syria to issue an ultimatum: the Syrian government needs to fully comply with the six-point Annan plan or else.
Or else what? The explicit threat was not to renew the observer mission. But Rice was trying to imply more than that:
…let there be no doubt: we, our allies and others in this body are planning and preparing for those actions that will be required of us all, if the Asad regime persists in the slaughter of the Syrian people.
There are not a lot of good options out there. A Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing Thursday revealed few. Tightening sanctions is one, but the Russians resisted including that in the resolution. Maybe they will be willing to do it if Damascus continues to defy the Security Council for another 90 days. An arms embargo is another. But arms embargoes are normally enforced against a country, not only a government. The Russians are unlikely to allow one to pass that applies to Damascus but not the Free Syria Army. While I am not in favor of a violent uprising, it would be profoundly unjust to deny Syrians the means to defend themselves.
Then there is the option Rice was presumably trying to imply: military action, by NATO and/or a coalition of the willing. I still see little prospect of this happening, though three more months of Syrian government defiance could change the picture.
Unfortunately what the 90-day ultimatum does in the meanwhile is to give Bashar al Assad a three-month hunting license. It is now in his interest to get the observers in as quickly as possible, since no military action can be taken while they are deployed in Syria. He’ll try to use the 90 days to bag as many protesters as possible. It would have been far better to deploy them with no fixed time limit, or with a shorter one requiring re-authorization by the Security Council. The reports the Secretary General is required to make every 15 days are a useful mechanism to keep international attention focused on implementation of the Annan plan, but they don’t provide the same leverage that a shorter authorization would have done.
That said, the key is to get the Syrian army out of artillery range of population centers. Randa Slim wisely reminds us that local leaders in Syria have the capacity to put hundreds of thousands–maybe millions–into the streets if peace protests are permitted, as required by the Annan plan. This she suggests would be a game changer.
I agree. Syria needs no more than a couple of days of relative peace for the people to show unequivocally and peacefully their preference for Bashar al Assad’s departure. If the observers can help to give them those days, their deployment will be worthwhile. If not, withdrawal in 90 days will be the right move. But then it will be incumbent on the Obama Administration to have a plan for what comes next.
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By any other name, still Macedonia
Zara Bozinovska of the Skopje daily Dnevnik asked some questions. I replied. I’ve touched up the questions a little, just to make them a bit more accessible to English-speaking readers.
Q: Some time ago you stated that Chicago summit is an opportunity to correct the injustice that is done to Macedonia in Bucharest [at the 2008 NATO Summit, when Greece blocked Macedonian membership]. Two months before the NATO gathering, do you think there is a chance to change anything in terms of Macedonia’s membership?
A: It isn’t looking good. Greece, preoccupied with its financial problems, has remained indifferent to the International Court of Justice decision. The Americans, while supportive of Macedonia, have not to my knowledge done anything substantial to change the situation. I may still hope for a solution, but I am not seeing one emerging.
Q: What can be changed and how injustice could be corrected if [the] NATO Secretary General, as well as senior U.S. officials repeat that there is no NATO membership until the name is resolved, calling [for] consensus in decision making?
A: Obviously one possibility is to solve the name issue. The parameters by now are well known. But I haven’t seen any flexibility either in Athens or Skopje. The other possibility is to convince Athens to allow NATO membership as The FYROM, as required by the interim accord and the ICJ decision.
Q: Do you think that consensus is stronger than injustice?
A: Consensus is the NATO rule. Yes, I suppose it appears stronger than injustice at this particular moment.
Q: What should Macedonia do in [the] next two months, given that on its side [Macedonia] has the judgment of the Hague Tribunal. How we can use that judgment?
A: My view is that the NATO issue should be solved under the interim accord, in accordance with the ICJ decision, not in the UN talks on the name, which may go on forever. But neither Washington nor NATO seems to agree with me. If I am correct, the right address for Skopje is Athens, not New York.
Q: What do you think, why Greece keeps the Hague judgment on low level?
A: Because they lost.Q:
Q: You said that Skopje should stop knocking on the door of ambassador Nimetz and to address directly Athens to convince the [its] authorities to allow admission to NATO under reference FYROM. How can we convince them for an issue that cannot be resolved 20 years, especially when both sides accuse each other constantly?
A: Maybe it would be best to stop accusing and start negotiating. That starts with this question: what does Greece need that Macedonia can provide?
Q: What is the impact of the current situation and the crisis in Greece? Does Greece just use the crisis as an excuse for failure to solve the issue or it really cannot think of the name issue?
A: The financial crisis does make it difficult for Greek politicians to think about the name issue. It also gives them a good excuse for not doing so. Not to mention upcoming elections.
Q: Why do you think that the Macedonian-Greek name dispute is one of the most uninteresting problems stemming from the breakup of former Yugoslavia? Uninteresting and long last[ing], as you said…
A: Uninteresting because I think Macedonians have a right to call themselves whatever they want. If Skopje and Athens reached an agreement tomorrow to call you Martians, would anyone pay any attention to it? Would the language you speak suddenly become “Martian”? Long-lasting because it involves identity issues on both sides. And we know how difficult identity issues are, especially in the Balkans.
Q: Recently we witnessed several interethnic incidents in Macedonia, but also in the neighborhood. In Kosovo, the Macedonian flag was burned, and the same happened in Albania. Is there a danger of a new crisis in the region?
A: There is growing pan-Albanian sentiment in the Balkans, due to Serbia’s unrelenting opposition to Kosovo’s independence and continued control of north Kosovo, Kosovo’s difficulty moving forward on its path to the EU, as well as the difficulties Macedonia is facing getting into NATO and proceeding with its EU candidacy. It would be far better to solve these problems than to allow the current situation to fester.
Q: Who is behind these incidents, do you think that they may be organized by one center?
A: I really don’t know.
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FUBARistan
The military also uses the term “goat rope,” which might be more appropriate to Afghan conditions. Whichever. This war has endured beyond the point at which we can expect results commensurate with the enormous effort involved.
The weekend’s news is particularly discouraging. Afghans killed two Americans advising the Interior Ministry. Ambassador Crocker has sent a back channel cable calling for more troops and military effort to deal with safe havens in Pakistan. Violent, even deadly, protests of the burning of Korans by American troops continue.
But it is not just today. These incidents are symbolic. We haven’t got the kind of relationship with the government in Afghanistan required for a proper counter-insurgency effort. That would require a clean, authoritative regime ready to risk its own and fully committed to the fight. Karzai and his minions are lacking in all those respects. It would also require the Americans to know something about Afghan sensitivities. We are manifestly lacking in this important respect. The Afghans are tired of the foreign presence. Nor have we got the kind of backing in Pakistan that war requires of an ally and massive aid recipient.
It is not, as Ryan Crocker suggests, a question of fatigue. He is right to say we shouldn’t quit because we are tired of the effort, provided the effort can produce the results we want. I don’t see much chance of that any longer.
It is time to cut our losses. This is what the Administration is trying to do under the guise of negotiations with the Taliban, but on a timeline that would waste the better part of another three more years and who knows how many hundreds of American lives. Accelerating the turnover of primary security responsibilities to the Afghans will still leave many Americans exposed to the kind of murderous impulse or plan that led to the losses at the Ministry of Interior. Embedded advisers are the most exposed of all our personnel.
There are two main arguments against accelerating the withdrawal to the end of this year: the Afghans need the time to prepare, and the President needs to avoid an American retreat/defeat before the November election. Both arguments are so reminiscent of Vietnam that it is hard for someone like me who opposed that war to give them a fair hearing. I’ll leave that to others.
Still, we have to recognize that early withdrawal from Afghanistan could have highly negative consequences. These include renewal of the civil war, with the Uzbeks and Tajiks of the Northern Alliance clashing with Pushtun Taliban in the south, a fight that the Taliban won in the 1990s. Assuming the Northern Alliance attracts most of the Afghanistan National Army and gets U.S. and Indian support while Pakistan backs the Taliban, the outcome might be different this time. Stalemate and partition would be a distinct possibility.
There is also a real possibility that early withdrawal will put Pakistan’s stability at risk, as the Taliban move their safe havens into Afghanistan and Al Qaeda takes up the cudgels against Islamabad, whose nuclear weapons are both an attractive target and a good reason for the Americans to stay involved. If I really thought staying almost three more years would improve our odds in managing this problem, I suppose I might try to get us to stay longer. But the problem could arise no matter how long we stay in Afghanistan, which seems either unwilling or unable to protect itself from extremist dominance in parts of the south and east.
I don’t really think we’ll “abandon” Afghanistan, if only because the Republicans would make a lot of political hay out of an early withdrawal and whatever chaos ensues. But I’ve yet to meet an ordinary citizen who cares much about our troops or civilians in Afghanistan, including those politicians who see Islamic terror behind every tree. I do care, and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that we are wasting their courage in an effort that is bound to fail.
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Bear apparent
The Russian role in the Balkans has long been of great concern to some of my Western-oriented friends there, even though it arouses little interest in Washington, DC. Milan Marinković tries to explain why it is important:
Russian Ambassador to Serbia Aleksandr Konuzin is chiefly known for incidents he occasionally makes. His public warnings to Belgrade as to the consequences Serbia will face should it dare to join NATO no longer raise eyebrows.
The more aggressive stance Konuzin takes, the more popularity he wins among Serbs. At a recent pre-election convention of the Serbian progressive party (SNS), Konuzin was a guest together with several Western diplomats. Even though SNS declares itself pro-EU, the party stalwarts booed the Westerners in attendance but greeted Konuzin with a standing ovation.
According to opinion polls, SNS is the most popular party in Serbia and the main rival to the currently ruling Democratic party (DS) of President Boris Tadic in the forthcoming elections. SNS’s possible rise to power could afford the Kremlin an opportunity to further increase its influence in Serbian politics.
Serbia hopes to benefit from the risky tactic of balancing between Moscow and Brussels. In 2008 Belgrade sold its oil monopoly NIS to Russian state-owned behemoth GAZPROM – many believe in return for Russia’s support on Kosovo. Whatever was behind the decision, the transaction has allowed Moscow to pursue its interests in Serbia more assertively.
The monopoly in energy supplies is one of several levers Russia has at its disposal. Others include various historical ties between the two nations, most notably religious and cultural ones. Serbia is dubbed “little Russia” in the Balkans. Russophilia is widespread among Serbs, which facilitates lobbying for Russia’s interests. The most active pro-Kremlin lobbyists in Serbia are senior officials of conservative nationalist parties along with several prominent members of the dominant faction within Serbian Orthodox Church – by far the most influential (nominally) non-governmental institution in the country.
At this point, Serbia is not counted among top priorities of Russian foreign policy. Russia plans to expand its sphere of influence in concentric circles. Moscow is currently looking to consolidate its power in the former Soviet Union’s periphery in order to set the stage for a prospective “Eurasian union.”
The second phase of Russia’s geopolitical expansion would involve ex-member states of the Warsaw Pact from Central and Eastern European. Serbia – and Balkans in general – most likely are scheduled for the third round. Until then, the Kremlin will seek to maintain the level of influence it already has in Serbia and will not hesitate to augment it whenever an opportunity presents itself. Keeping Serbia out of NATO is a vital part of this strategy.
The natural counterbalance to Russian power in the Balkans is Turkey. The two countries already compete in Bosnia. Belgrade and Ankara have significantly strengthened bilateral relations in recent years, as Serbia wants to attract Turkish investment. Pro-Russian circles in Serbia vehemently oppose Turco-Serbian rapprochement as harmful to Serbia’s national interests.
Russia’s Balkan aspirations could be undermined by the country’s internal constraints. Moscow is already facing serious challenges, such as growing discontent over corruption and social inequalities, as well as seething Islamist militancy in the Caucasus region. Whether Russia will manage to regain its old glory and continue to expand its influence in the Balkans largely depends on how it deals with its own domestic issues.
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A rose is a rose
Gertrude Stein might just as well have said “Macedonia is Macedonia.” The trouble is, the Greeks don’t like to hear it.
This is one of the least interesting problems resulting from the breakup of former Yugoslavia. Its “Republic of Macedonia,” one of six republics that constituted Socialist Yugoslavia, became independent in 1991. But Greece, its neighbor to the south, objected to the use of “Macedonia,” claiming that appellation belongs exclusively to Greece and its use by the northern neighbor implied territorial claims to Greek territory. The newly independent country entered the United Nations as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (last time I was there it was alphabetized under “T” on the voting board at the UN General Assembly).
Athens and Skopje signed an “interim accord” in 1995 supposedly regulating the issue, but Greece claims Macedonia (oops, The FYROM) has violated it while the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided last December that Greece had definitely violated it by blocking The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. There is an opportunity to correct this injustice at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May. Efforts to resolve the issue have been ongoing since the early 1990s in UN-sponsored talks, mediated since 1994 by New York lawyer Matt Nimetz.
Macedonia already has a pretty good deal on the name issue. Just about everyone calls the country by the name Skopje prefers, and many countries (including the U.S.) have formally recognized it as the “Republic of Macedonia.” Greece does not, but why should anyone care about that?
The unfortunate answer is that Athens can veto Skopje’s membership in NATO as well as any further progress towards membership in the EU. Macedonia is already a candidate for EU membership but hasn’t got a date for the start of negotiations, which is an important milestone that Athens is holding hostage.
NATO membership is also important to Macedonia, which counts itself as part of the West and has deployed troops to Afghanistan under NATO command. Alliance membership is a goal sought by both Albanians (who constitute about one-quarter of the population) and Macedonians. It also, by the way, should end any lingering Greek fears of irredentist claims to its territory by Skopje.
The problem for Macedonia is the veto, not the name. While there is virtue in continuing the effort to resolve the name issue, it might be wise for Skopje to stop pounding on Matt Nimetz’s door this spring for a solution to a problem Athens has but Skopje does not. Skopje needs to go directly to Athens and mount a serious effort to convince Greece to allow it into NATO under the interim accord as The FYROM. The ICJ decision requires nothing less.
A Macedonian joked with me recently that he would personally push a statue of Alexander the Great that has offended Greek sensibilities from Skopje to the Greek border if Athens would allow Macedonia into NATO in Chicago. I doubt Athens is interested in the statue, but the joke points in the right direction. Skopje needs to find out what Athens needs that Macedonia can provide. If the government won’t discuss the issue of NATO membership, then Macedonia should find thinktanks and academics in Greece who will.
At the same time Skopje should be working with the Macedonian and Albanian American communities to make sure that the mayor of Chicago, once right hand to President Obama, raises this issue with the White House. So far it is studiously avowing support for Skopje but doing nothing to pry open the NATO door. Vice President Biden, when he was a senator, opposed use of “Macedonia,” which is too bad since he holds the Balkans portfolio.
Greece is vulnerable at the moment because of its parlous financial situation, but no one in Brussels or Washington wants to kick Athens while it is down. Greek Americans are well-organized and an important voting constituency. Macedonia has a “stick” it can’t really use. It needs to find some other way to put the squeeze on, or “carrots” that are attractive enough in Athens to open the NATO door. Then they can go back to not resolving the name issue at the UN for another 15 years or so, by which time everyone will have forgotten why it once seemed important.
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Plan B
Yesterday a treasured Twitter follower described me as optimistic on Syria, because I saw some promise of a serious transition in the current draft UN Security Council resolution. The caveats did not fit in 140 characters: I was optimistic if the draft resolution were to pass and if the Americans, Europeans and Arab League continued to insist that Bashar al Assad step aside and allow the transition to begin.
Today it is clear that the first of my caveats has not been realized: the Russians and Chinese have both voted against, with 13 other members of the Security Council voting in favor. This is a real setback, heading us into scenarios 2 or 4 of my previous post on how bad things could get: the regime wins or civil war. We’d be lucky now to get into scenario 1: divided sovereignty, with some areas held by the opposition.
Moscow and Beijing will no doubt sell the vetoes back home as necessary to defy the U.S. and stop Western imperialism of the sort that took down Muammar Qaddafi in Libya. In fact what they have done is to protect Bashar al Assad at a moment when he is killing more of his own people than ever. Over 200 are reported to have lost their lives in overnight shelling of a neighborhood in Homs, an epicenter of the uprising. Yesterday’s commemoration of the father’s slaughter of people in Hama thirty years ago has sadly led to ferocious confirmation that the son is struck from the same mold.
What is to be done now? Some will propose military intervention without Security Council approval. That was done in Kosovo, where the UN blessed the outcome in Security Council resolution 1244 even if had not blessed the intervention before it happened. I doubt the U.S., NATO or the Arab League have the stomach or resources for that. If they had wanted to do that, they would not have allowed a vote at the Security Council.
They are much more likely to feed the violent opposition to the regime by arming and perhaps training the Syrian Free Army, which appears to have liberated parts of the country but is unable to hold them if the unfree Syrian army strikes back. Encouraging the Syrian Free Army will unfortunately put the country on the path to civil war, with frightening consequences for minorities and secularism if the rebels win and even worse consequences for the Muslim Brotherhood if they lose. And terrible consequences for everyone if the fighting is prolonged.
Far preferable in my view would be a return to nonviolent protest, with Arab League observers once more deployed in an effort to protect demonstrators from the worst abuses. Certainly the situation has deteriorated badly since the Arab League monitors were confined to quarters. Getting them out into the main contested areas as soon as possible would at least provide the eyes and ears required to communicate what is going on to the rest of the world, even if Bashar al Assad now seems unlikely to accept restraints.
President Obama this morning issued a statement that includes this:
The Syrian regime’s policy of maintaining power by terrorizing its people only indicates its inherent weakness and inevitable collapse. Assad has no right to lead Syria, and has lost all legitimacy with his people and the international community.
I agree that Assad has no right to lead Syria and has lost legitimacy, but unfortunately it does not follow that the regime’s collapse is inevitable. No doubt even a defeated UNSC resolution, when the vote is 13 to 2, confirms a loss of international legitimacy. But the father also lost legitimacy and nevertheless survived for many years thereafter, successfully passing power to the son.
What the United States, Europe and the Arab League need to do now is to keep up the pressure by maintaining and tightening sanctions, redeploying the observers if it is safe enough to do so and encouraging continued nonviolent protest in forms (boycotts in particular) that do not expose large numbers of people to the regime’s violence. They also need to consider new measures: blockade of arms shipments? extension of the financial sanctions used against Iran to Syria? Reinforcement of the Arab League observers?
Yesterday’s worldwide demonstrations focused on Syria’s embassies abroad. The next round should focus on Russia’s and China’s.
Some of the bodies from the massacre in Homs that the regime says didn’t happen:
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