Tag: NATO
Macedonia and Greece, again
Longstanding friend and now deputy prime minister for european integration of Macedonia Teuta Arifi stopped by SAIS this morning for a chat. That naturally set me thinking about Skopje’s problems again. It is hard to find anyone in Washington who remembers, but Macedonia was for years a source of considerable anxiety here, because of its potential to create the conditions for a generalized war in the Balkans, including between NATO members Greece and Turkey. This was why the United States, in an inspired moment of coercive diplomacy, issued in December 1992 the “Christmas warning” to Slobodan Milosevic to lay off Macedonia. The UN deployed its one and only explicitly “preventive” peacekeeping mission, UNPREDEP, there in 1995.
Considering its potential for precipitating difficulty, Macedonia has been remarkably successful in extracting itself from dicey situations. As the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved, it became independent in September 1991 without war, a fate Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia did not escape. It weathered Milosevic’s expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Albanians from Kosovo in 1999. In 2001, it suffered a near breakdown into civil war as Albanian insurgents presented a military challenge. That ended with the Ohrid agreement, whose implementation has gone a long way to consolidating the Macedonian state and ensuring equality among its citizens.
One problem has proven insoluble: Greece objects to Macedonia calling itself Macedonia. Many years of UN mediation have failed to resolve the problem, though some claim the differences have narrowed. Macedonia is called The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (The FYROM) in the UN General Assembly. In 1995, Greece and The FYROM signed an interim agreement allowing that name to be used for membership in other international organizations. Earlier this month, the International Court of Justice found Greece in violation of the accord, in particular when it blocked The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Bucharest Summit in 2008.
That should have settled the matter, but it has not, yet. Greece hasn’t budged. Its former ambassador in Washington has suggested publicly that Athens should renounce the interim accord rather than fulfill its provisions. Skopje says it is offering to meet any time, any where to discuss the name issue.
I am biased on this question. I believe countries and people have a right to call themselves what they want. The notion that Macedonia’s preference for that name implies territorial designs on Greece is risible. It does however reflect a claim to cultural and historical affinity with Alexander the Great, a monumental statue of whom may or may not now grace Skopje, even if ethnic Macedonians are mainly of Slavic descent. The Slavs were late comers to the Balkans, entering about a millenium after Alexander.
Why would an American, other than one of Greek, Macedonian or Albanian heritage, care about all this? The main reason is that Greece’s veto of Macedonia’s entry into NATO is holding up the expansion of euroatlantic institutions. With the important exception of Croatia’s accession to the EU now scheduled for July 1, 2013, NATO and EU expansion are stalled. Keeping that process moving is vital to maintaining peace and stability in the Balkans. The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Summit in Chicago next spring, along with Montenegro, would reassure the region and help nudge Serbia in the euroatlantic direction, even if it never decides to join NATO.
So what should Greece do? Be gracious. You lost in court. You’ve got far bigger problems with the euro and your economy. Unload this one. Go back to the negotiating table and hammer out a solution. Or step aside and allow The FYROM (and Montenegro) to enter NATO in Chicago. The technocratic government in Athens may not have the political mandate to do this, but neither does it run the sorts of risks that a more political government would face.
I’ll be surprised, but delighted, if my advice is taken.
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Please, Athens, prove me wrong
Is Greece in the Balkans? Of course the answer geographically is yes. But its leaders now have to decide whether it is still culturally part of the Balkans–where many games are zero sum, with one side’s loss being the other’s gain. Or whether Greece has really become part of Europe, where at least in good times a rising tide is expected to lift all boats.
The occasion is today’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision that Athens violated a 1995 “interim accord” when it blocked Skopje’s entry into NATO at the Bucharest summit in 2008 under the awkward name “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” The court went on to decline to order Athens not to do it again, saying:
As the Court previously explained, “[a]s a general rule, there is no reason to suppose that a State whose act or conduct has been declared wrongful by the Court will repeat that act or conduct in the future, since its good faith must be presumed”
How I wish that such presumption were justified!
These are not good times for Europe in general, but especially not for Greece. It is paying a high price for fiscal profligacy. Many in Europe are still expecting a formal default on its sovereign debt, followed by who knows what: exit from the euro? German receivership? Greeks are furious at their government for the austerity it has been forced to impose and what many regard as the unfair distribution of the burdens of fiscal adjustment. The kind of growth that might lift Greece out of its debt trap seems nowhere in the forecasts.
I’m afraid this will not put Athens in a mood to do the right thing by Macedonia: accept it for NATO membership as The FYROM and go back to the negotiating table with renewed determination to find a more permanent solution. We have the unfortunate and recent precedent of Serbia, which also recently lost its case when the ICJ advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence breached no international prohibition. Did Serbia change its tune? No. It simply said the ICJ had answered the wrong question (a question posed, yes, by Belgrade).
Please, Athens, prove me wrong: show us all that you have left behind the beggar-thy-neighbor politics of the Balkans and instead want to demonstrate truly European credentials by unblocking membership in NATO for The FYROM. That in turn would allow Montenegro an invitation to enter as well, giving renewed vitality to the Alliance and reenergizing the Balkans to proceed with the many reforms the Euro-Atlantic institutions require.
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Montenegro, shield of the West
That is, of course, super-hyperbole: Montenegro is a tiny country of fewer than 620,000 people whose virtues include a beautiful coastline along the Adriatic and willingness since the late 1990s to be counted in the growing pro-democracy, pro-Europe camp in the Balkans. It can lay reasonable claim to being the most ethnically integrated (and varied) country in the region (only 45% of the population self-identifies as “Montenegrin” tout court).
The postage-stamp sized country gained independence from its union with Serbia, the last remnant of Yugoslavia, in 2006 and has since made good progress. It is now a candidate for membership in the European Union but will not complete the 35 chapters of the membership process for some years.
Montenegro’s leadership would like to bring it into NATO, even if only 40% of the population is currently in favor (30% are undecided). But the Montenegrins hesitate: the Americans are telling them it will be difficult to do this in May at the NATO summit in Chicago. They are excessively respectful of American advice. Neither NATO nor the EU is in an expansive mood in this era of euro-schlerosis (or worse) and difficulties pursuing the Alliance war in Afghanistan. That is unfortunate for the NATO, which has so far benefited from its investment in enlargement.
The Montenegrin military numbers a bit over 3000. A couple of dozen participated in NATO’s Afghanistan mission and others have joined UN mission in Liberia and Cyprus as well as the EU naval mission off Somalia. Podgorica (that’s the charming capital, once known as Titograd) is well-intentioned, but its capacities are miniscule.
Still, it would be a good idea for Montenegro to get fully read and to press for NATO membership, and for NATO to think about opening the door. Why? First, as one keen Balkan-watcher notes, Montenegro is first in line, so if it is shut out none of the other candidates can come in. This would be particularly problematic if Macedonia, which is fully qualified for NATO membership but blocked by Greek objections to its name, were to manage somehow to get itself unblocked. That could happen: either because Athens and Skopje come to an agreement on the name (unlikely) or because the International Court of Justice decides that Skopje–under an agreement with Greece signed in 1995–is entitled to come into NATO under its awkward UN designation: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (The FYROM).
The ICJ decision on that question issued today may, or may not, open the door for Macedonia to enter NATO as The FYROM. The court decided that Greece had violated the agreement but said it could not order Greece to allow The FYROM into NATO. Such respect for sovereignty seems almost quaint. But what it does is to leave the issue, once again, up to Athens, which so far has shown no inclination to put this issue behind it. Let’s hope Greece makes a wiser decision this time around.
There are more than tactical reasons for admitting Montenegro to NATO. It would help to convince all the non-NATO, non-EU members in the Balkans that they really do have an opportunity to join the West, even if they may have years more of preparation before they fully qualify. It would raise the ante with Serbia, where the majority of the population opposes NATO membership. And it would help to insulate Montenegro against any instability that arises in either Bosnia or Kosovo, where things are still not fully settled.
With an active push, NATO membership is at least possible for all of these countries far sooner than EU membership is likely for any of them. Chicago is an opportunity to keep the Balkans and NATO moving forward at minimal cost in these uncertain times.
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There are worse fates
The annual EU Forum, a confab sponsored by the Paris-based European Union Institute for Strategic Studies and SAIS’s Center for Transatlantic Relations, convened Thursday and Friday in Washington to focus American and European luminaries on the thing we all call the Arab Spring, even though we know it started last winter, varies from country to country and may not have results as upbeat as the appellation implies. Almost entirely missing from the day and a half conference were Arab voices. This was an opportunity for the “the West” to put its heads together, not for the revolutionaries or the oppressive regimes to offer their narrative.
They were nevertheless much present in the minds of the participants, who leaned towards enthusiasm for the values of the protesters, as well as their energy and determination, while worrying about the impact on Western interests. The three big areas of worry arise from
- the Islamists: what do they really mean by sharia law? will they really play fair in democracy?
- increased Arab support for the Palestinians: will it make the Israel/Palestine equation even more difficult to solve?
- sectarianism (will it lead to civil wars and possible spillover to other countries, especially in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen?
Underlying all was a sense that the West has precious few resources with which to respond effectively to the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, to the continuing repression in Syria and Yemen, or to the reforms in Jordan and Morocco, never mind the still solid autocratic regimes in the Gulf or the fragmented polity in Palestine. No one seemed to feel Western credibility or influence was strong, especially in light of the long-standing support (and arms) both Europe and the U.S. had given to Arab autocracies in the past (and continue to provide to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and others even now). And everyone was aware that the Chinese, Turks, Brazilians, Indians and other emerging powers will play increasing roles in the Middle East, offering contracts and aid on terms far less complex and burdensome than those of the West.
The Europeans nevertheless came with a strong sense that the Middle East is their “southern neighborhood” and they need to up their game in response to changes that will affect their interests directly, whether through immigration, economic interdependence, oil and gas supplies, contracts, investment and myriad other ties. Precisely what they are going to do about it was not clear, and there was a strong sense that European policy on the Arab Spring has been re-nationalized. The British and French in particular are carving out their own distinct approaches, taking advantage of their forward role in the NATO military action against Qaddafi, while other countries are lagging and the EU itself is still contemplating the interior walls of the Berlaymont.
The Americans would like to focus more on Asia, not only Afghanistan/Pakistan but also China and North Korea as threats to national security. It was clear to all that Europe would not share this Asian interest to the same degree, but yesterday’s talk of Chinese financing to back the euro might change a few minds on that score. The problem for the Americans is that the Asian challenge requires a very different set of policy instruments from the Arab Spring, which apart from Egypt and Yemen Washington might rather leave primarily to the Europeans (no one of course says this quite so bluntly, but if you follow the money that is what they mean). Everyone expects, though, that NATO will remain somehow important and in the end the only real military instrument capable of effective power projection available to the Europeans.
There were lots of other points made. Trade and investment are far more important than aid. We need to be talking not only with secular women but also with Islamist women. Liberal economic reform, associated in Egypt and other countries with the old regimes, is in trouble, at least for the moment. Civil society in the Arab Spring countries needs Western support, but it should not be done through governmental channels but rather by nongovernmental organizations like the American National Endowment for Democracy (and the talked about European Endowment for Democracy). Western conditionality should focus on transparency and accountability rather than specific policy prescriptions.
I could go on, but I trust the sponsors will be doing a far better job of writing up in due course, and tweets are available from EUISS for those really interested. Bottom line: the West is fading even as its values spread. There are worse fates.
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A step in the right direction
Nadim Shehadi argues in The Guardian
Syrian political society will emerge and show its real face only after the regime is gone, and not before. This will not be a phoenix rising from the ashes, rather a battered society that will be trying to find its way after a long and dark period.
Until then, he advises we stop calling the opposition “the opposition” (because doing so legitimizes the regime) and lower our expectations to about as close to zero as possible, since no Syrian can reveal his true political identity without serious risk.
Fortunately, the Syrian opposition seems not to be taking Shehadi’s advice. Instead it formed a Syrian National Council on Sunday in Istanbul, whose chair outlined its purposes:
…[to] achieve the goals of the revolution to topple the regime, including all of its components and leadership, and to replace it with a democratic pluralistic regime.
Admittedly, this is not yet much of a program, and the people ready to speak openly for the Syrian National Council at present appear all to be expatriates, even if it is claimed that the Local Coordinating Committees that organize demonstrations inside Syria were represented in Istanbul.
But it is vital that the Syrians create something that can be viewed internationally and internally as a legitimate alternative to Bashar al Assad. If diaspora Syrians can help provide the alternative, all the better, even if their role is likely to decrease in the future.
No one watching the course of events in Libya and Egypt can doubt the importance of minimal coherence and legitimacy in the leadership of a rebellion. Libya had such a body, now called the National Transitional Council and recognized widely as the legitimate governing authority. Egypt did not. As a result, the protesters acquiesced in turning over the transition to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which has proven an infelicitous choice from the perspective of those who forced Hosni Mubarak to step down.
The Syrian National Council has a tough job ahead. Some Syrians have begun to take up arms against the regime, which has not hesitated to use indiscriminate force against the protesters. They cannot expect foreign military help. NATO is in no mood for another Libya. There is no demand for it in the Arab world, and the Russians won’t let a Security Council resolution authorize it because of their longstanding alliance with Syria, which includes a naval base at Latakia. While sanctions are taking their toll on the Syrian regime, Iran is doing what it can to relieve its friends in Damascus and ensure that they survive.
Syria is a complex society, with ethnic, sectarian and religious divisions that the Assad regime has long exploited to prevent the emergence of a united opposition. It will not be easy to keep Kurds and Arabs, Sunni and Shia, Christiansand Muslims on the same wavelength. That a reasonably united opposition appears now to be emerging is significant, even if Shehadi is correct that the real, battered face of Syria will only emerge after the Assad regime is gone.
Here is a recent (September 28) Al Arabiya report on the demonstrations in Syria:
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One hand
My stake-out of a Tripoli mosque during noon-time prayers yesterday led to a conversation with a professor of forensic science. Admittedly my sample is infinitesmal and my sampling technique highly biased: I need someone who speaks English (my years of studying Arabic produced little) and is willing to talk with a foreigner. Very few randomly approached Libyans speak passable English, and my Arabic is truly primitive.
The sermon focused on unity, the professor said. “One hand” is the metaphor used both here and in Egypt. This includes all Libyans, he said, referring explicitly to the Catholic church around the corner, not just Muslims. The biggest threat to unity comes from tribalism, which my professor (against conventional wisdom) thought strong even in Tripoli, where there are occasional wall posters advising against it. The sermon asked people to be patient and to support the new authorities, who would bring greater prosperity.
Libyans are at pains to emphasize their gratitude to NATO. My professor thought that without NATO the rebels would surely have lost to the regime. He and other intellectuals who sided with the February 17 revolution would have been hung, or even chopped into pieces. He and others are grateful.
Many people did lose their lives in the six months of fighting. Perhaps 2-3000 lie in mass graves in Tripoli and elsewhere. Some were burned alive in containers doused with gasoline. DNA analysis will be possible, but there is little capacity to conduct it in Libya. They are just starting to organize the effort, hoping that instructions to leave the mass graves undisturbed are followed.
Then there is Abu Saleem, the notorious prison where Qaddafi ordered a massacre of more than 1200 prisoners in 1996. Their remains, too, need to be identified. Both in Benghazi, where the court house square hosts a big display on the Abu Saleem massacre, and here in Tripoli there is a vivid memory of the event and a strong feeling that justice has to be done on behalf of the victims.
As in so many Muslim countries, the religiosity on display in Tripoli Friday had little to do with going to mosque, where not much more than a handful of classically thawb-dressed men seemed to attend noon-time prayers in my neighborhood, though I understand there was a big crowd in Martyrs’ square for prayers with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. Just as important are the pervasive sounds and symbols of Islam: the call to prayer (but if they are doing the early morning adhan I am missing it), the star and crescent moon that appears on the “independence” flag and therefore on most revolution paraphenalia, and women covering at least their hair (well over 90%). I imagine Islam is also present more or less constantly in both public and family life.
The natural question is whether Islam will take a political form in Libya. The Muslim Brotherhood is far weaker than in Egypt, but some of the militias and their leaders are explicitly Islamist. I have no way of telling whether they will gain traction in the nascent political arena. I imagine that they will to some extent, even if every Libyan I’ve asked about this so far says no.
One hand cannot endure forever if Libya is to be a democracy, or even a proto-democracy. The emergence of parties and factions will be an important test for the revolution, as the fingers on that one hand start to point in different directions.
But for the moment, unity is still producing results: the UN General Assembly acceptance of the NTC to occupy Libya’s seat and yesterday’s at least partly successful attacks on Qaddafi’s holdout towns of Sirte and especially Bani Walid.
We’ll have to wait to see what tomorrow will bring, but last night all of Tripoli was down at Martyr’s square to show support for the NTC and commemorate the hanging eighty years ago of Omar Mukhtar, Libyan hero of resistance to the Italians. Ironic therefore that many Libyans today dream of visiting Italy, admire the Italians and make a very fine caffe’ ristretto as well as a half-decent pizza rustica. Strange that a decent ice cream, even of the packaged (confezionato) kind, seems impossible to find. That’s one of my religious devotions. Maybe in the New Libya.
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