Tag: NATO
What if Gaddafi holds on?
The Atlantic Wire has usefully assembled all the occasions on which Muammar Gaddafi has indicated he will step down. Obviously that hasn’t happened, and it may not, malgré Juppé. The question is what do we do if he continues to hold on to power in Tripoli and the rebels are unable to make real headway in taking territory? What is plan B?
Failure is definitely an option, at least in the near term. While the rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) in Benghazi has not lost any ground in weeks, it hasn’t gained much either. It is managing more or less to administer the territory it does control, where street crime is down, local councils have been set up and humanitarian assistance is delivered. Electricity and water are still ample, but fuel and medicine is reportedly low in some areas.
The NTC is viewed as legitimate outside of Tripolitania (Tripoli and the western portion of the country), not least because it is not claiming to be a government-in-waiting but only a stopgap until a full interim administration with representation from the whole country can be formed after a ceasefire takes effect. Its roots are particularly strong in Cyrenaica (the eastern portion of the country, where Benghazi is located).
If Gaddafi manages to hold on to Tripoli and there is no ceasefire, my guess is the NTC will need to do more than it currently plans. This creates a great moral hazard: the more we help the NTC to govern the country separately from Gaddafi, the greater the likelihood Libya will split into two (or more) pieces, something that most in the international community would find highly objectionable.
What would be needed then is a concerted effort to broaden participation in the NTC and keep its governing structure as open as possible to eventual reformulation. This might mean incorporating more prominent representatives from Tripoli, creating a Tripoli administration-in-exile and maintaining some degree of consistency between how Cyrenaica and Tripolitania are governed. It would mean maintaining insofar as possible those infrastructure networks that still function across the front lines between Gaddafi’s forces and the rebels.
It will also likely mean finding a way to get at least some of Libya’s oil and gas flowing again. This will not be easy: oil company lawyers are rightfully cautious about property rights, which would remain “sketchy,” as my kids say, if Gaddafi is still around. I gather it is legal to buy from Arab Gulf Oil, which is under rebel control. A mechanism for depositing revenues into a UN or other fund, with transparent and supervised drawdown by the NTC, might help get the oil and gas moving again.
The question of currency is likely to arise sooner or later. Libyans seem still to be using Gaddafi-era dinars, but what if they run short in areas outside Gaddafi’s control, or if people lose confidence and want a substitute? Issuance of a new currency would be a big step in the direction of dividing Libya. It would likely be better to allow euro-ization or dollarization to proceed according to market forces, something that has worked reasonably well in a number of conflict situations.
The UK-led International Stabilisation and Response Team, which visited Libya May 20-June 30), has prepared an excellent draft report on what to do once a ceasefire is in place. Is it time to consider more deliberately what happens if there is no ceasefire?
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Rebel leader big hit in wonk world
I confess I was distracted during the visit to DC this week of Mahmoud Gebril ElWarfally, interim prime minister of the Transitional National Council of the Libyan Republic. But he unquestionably performed well: on NPR, in the New York Times, and at Brookings. I imagine also at the White House, where he met with National Security Advisor Tom Donilon.
Gebril, as most seem to call him (and as the New York Times spells his name), has to his credit University of Pittsburgh degrees in political science and strategic planning (MA and PhD respectively) as well as more than two decades of making a living in the Middle East as a leadership trainer, after which he served in the Gaddafi regime as head of the National Economic Development Board. Sophisticated and urbane are the usual adjectives, the kind of Libyan who had enough to say to merit occasional mention in U.S. embassy cables made available by you know who.
Washington was warm and fuzzy on the occasion of his visit, but it did not immediately give him what he was looking for: recognition as the legitimate head of government in Libya, money (from Gaddafi’s frozen stash of $34 billion) or a meeting with the President. I imagine some in Libya may see this as less than half a loaf, but it really isn’t too bad. The United States has the annoying habit of recognizing countries, not governments, so it is hard for Washington to treat Gebril the way he would have liked until he gets to Tripoli. Congress is working on legislation to free up at least some of the money, and Gebril is not actually the top dog in the Interim National Council. That glory belongs to its Chair, Mustafa Mohammed Abdul Jalil, so a call on the president might have created as many problems as it solves. A presidential drop-by to Donilon’s office would have been nice though.
Still, Gebril did okay. Compliments to the Harbour Group. NATO has intensified its efforts, so maybe on his next visit he’ll get more of what the rebellion certainly deserves: unequivocal support from Washington. The sooner we are finished with Gaddafi, the better off Libya and North Africa generally will be.
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Getting Gaddafi out also requires diplomacy
Tony Cordesman’s tirade against the half-hearted effort NATO is making against Gaddafi’s forces in Libya is all the rage today on my twitter feed. I don’t really disagree with anything he says, but I hope his piece does not distract attention from what really matters: the effort to get Gaddafi out of Tripoli and out of Libya, preferably to someplace that will keep him on a short leash.
Cordesman is of course correct that intensifying the military effort is an important part of the effort to get him to leave. But it should not be the only thing we are doing.
It is hard to write about this because whatever is happening is necessarily out of the public eye. While there are rumors of Washington and London looking for a place to park the Gaddafi family, it is to be expected that we won’t know where that is until the time comes. I trust London and Washington will be prepared to ensure that the family has access to the financial resources it might need to live a prosperous life, though not one in which it can continue to hire a mercenary army (or suborn its hosts). Immunity from prosecution for war crimes and crimes against humanity is not available (to anyone), but I trust the country that takes the Gaddafis will not be a state party the International Criminal Court.
The problem of course is that Gaddafi may not go. Military means have proven repeatedly and frustratingly ineffective against individuals, whether they be Ratko Mladic (an accused Serbian war criminal), Charles Taylor (who was finally snagged by his Nigerian hosts), Saddam Hussein (who wasn’t captured for more than six months after the U.S. occupied Iraq) or Laurent Gbagbo (the recently surrendered former president of Ivory Coast). Nor is American intelligence much good at predicting where foreign leaders will be so that they can be snagged by the specially trained Special Forces that do that kind of thing.
But if there is something that needs doing besides the intensified military effort that Tony Cordesman recommends, it is an intensified diplomatic effort to get him out of there. I take the Libyan Foreign Minister’s attempt to suggest that Gaddafi might be ready to retire in place, allowing free and fair elections, as a pretty clear sign that the Colonel is feeling the pressure. But it would be foolish to fall for that as a solution. He has to go if Libya is to be free. Even then, it will have a long road ahead.
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Mil ops are clear, what about civ ops?
The U.S. military is clear enough about what it is doing in Libya (sorry the slides are not all shown in the video):
It is good Coalition partners are picking up about half the burden. I’m not a mil guy, but I am particularly interested in hearing that they are hitting communications. Experience in Bosnia and Kosovo suggests that is important in shifting the strategic balance. Once Gaddafi’s forces are cut off from his command and control, it is doubtful whether they will continue the fight.
That said, this effort has a civilian dimension as well. Relief supplies are starting to move into rebel-held areas. Hillary Clinton says Gaddafi loyalists are in touch with the State Department:
The most important civilian pieces are the ones we are not likely to see any time soon:
- What is being done to ensure that the Transitional National Council is fully representative of the whole country and ready to take over governance if the opportunity presents itself;
- Intelligence cooperation with the rebels;
- Discussions with Gaddafi-friendly places about offering him refuge;
- Diplomatic efforts to keep the Arab League on side, or at least not too loudly opposed to the intervention;
- Planning for the difficult post-war stabilization and reconstruction phase.
The only diplomatic piece that has been visible the last couple of days is the quarrel over who will command and control the Coalition operation, a role the U.S. wants to pass off. It seems now that will go to NATO. You don’t want to delve into the intricacies of that debate, which involves French, Turkish and NATO scholasticism that would please only medieval monks.
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It should stop only with Gaddafi at the exit
While the rest of the world focuses on current military operations, I’d like to focus again on the critical, but not yet urgent, question of when the military effort against Gaddafi should stop.
As Neal Ascherson points out in The Guardian this morning, the problem in Libya is Gaddafi. UN Security Council resolution 1973 does not recognize that. It calls for “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, and Hillary Clinton (among others) has been at pains to reiterate that regime change is not the objective.
This matters because it could determine when the military effort against Gaddafi comes to a halt. Arab League Secretary General, and putative presidential candidate in Egypt, Amr Moussa is already trying to distance himself from the military effort due to alleged civilian casualties. Pressures of this sort will build over the next several days, as Gaddafi is sure to make all sorts of claims about the damage the air attacks are doing.
Resolution 1973 provides precious little guidance on when to stop, beyond the overall purpose of protecting civilians. Yesterday’s statement from the Paris meeting of those states that want to be counted as constituting or supporting the coalition of the willing provides more:
Muammar Gaddafi and those executing his orders must immediately end the acts of violence carried out against civilians, to withdraw from all areas they have entered by force, return to their compounds, and allow full humanitarian access.
If this is fully operative, it is hard to see how Gaddafi could survive in power, as “those executing his orders” certainly include not only the military under his command but also the internal security forces. If they were to withdraw “from all areas they have entered by force,” he would have no means of continuing to control most of Libya, as arguably this phrase could even apply to Tripoli but certainly applies to Zawiya in the west and the towns his forces have taken in the last ten days in the east as well.
In practice, the international community often compromises on issues of this sort, as it comes under enormous public pressure to stop a one-sided military campaign. The military “coalition of the willing” includes not only leaders France and the UK but also Canada, Denmark, Italy, Spain and Norway in addition to the United States. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar, slow on the draw, are thought to be getting ready to contribute combat aircraft. I can only imagine how strong the internal political pressures in several of these countries will be against continuing the military campaign a week from now.
If the campaign stops too early, with Gaddafi still in place and controlling a substantial part of the country, it will be difficult to implement the peace in a way that preserves Libya’s territorial integrity and gives it an opportunity to become a more normal state than it has been for more the four decades. If the campaign stops too late, it will leave Libya in shambles.
At least as much wisdom is required to know when to stop as was required in deciding to start, but getting Gaddafi out should certainly be an important factor in the calculus. I trust American diplomats are working as hard on that as they did on the remarkable Resolution 1973.
PS: I expected pressures to build, but not as fast as this morning, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen said on Meet the Press: Qaddafi staying in power is “certainly potentially one outcome,” adding the UN-approved airstrikes “are limited and it isn’t about seeing him go.” I stick by what I said above: he should be at the exit door before we stop. We don’t need another half-baked result that burdens us for years to come.
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Actions now count more than words
While Tripoli’s Foreign Minister had initially announced acceptance of UN Security Council resolution 1973 and implementation of the ceasefire it called for, Colonel Gaddafi’s spokesman has rejected it:
Tripoli’s forces apparently continued to fight, entering Benghazi in tanks as well as activating “sleeper” cells in the still rebel-held city.
None of this should surprise: Gaddafi’s penchant for duplicity is legendary. What is disturbing is the lack of readiness on the part of those taking on the responsibility to enforce Resolution 1973 militarily. President Obama set out explicit redlines in his speech yesterday that have already been crossed. Militarily, it is much harder to do something about a tank in the streets of Benghazi than in the desert sands surrounding it. French and British planes are said to be beginning their efforts today–they need to make haste.
What should they do? We are past the point at which the no fly zone (NFZ) is an adequate response. Resolution 1973 authorizes all necessary means to protect civilians. I’ll leave it to the military planners–if they’ll work quickly–to decide what actions will have the biggest effects, but in addition to obvious targets like armored vehicles I would think taking out the supply convoys for Gaddafi’s force moving east would be both appropriate and effective. A tank doesn’t run long without fuel, and soldiers need water. And there shouldn’t be many civilians in a military supply convoy.
There is also the question of Tripoli’s command and control. So long as it is giving orders to attack civilians, it is a legitimate target. The responsibility to protect will mean little if Gaddafi continues to defy the Security Council. Taking out communications facilities can be amazingly effective–ask the Bosnian Serb Army, which turned and fled once its communications nodes were bombed by NATO in 1995. Even if Gaddafi is not there, it may be symbolically important to destroy his main bunker at Bab Al Aziziya. It might even be wise to give warning, if there is concern about collateral damage. Once Gaddafi is on the run, maintaining control of Tripoli is going to be very difficult for him. Saddam, remember, fell from power well before he was captured.
Of course none of this should take place without a parallel diplomatic effort to enforce the sanctions more vigorously and get Gaddafi out of Libya. The sooner he leaves, the better. Neither Libya nor those enforcing 1973 will benefit from extended military action.
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