Tag: NATO
Thinking ahead to New Libya
Some will be surprised that Gaddafi’s Foreign Minister announced an immediate ceasefire in response to the UN Security Council resolution. This is no surprise. Gaddafi’s forces hold most of Libya–a ceasefire in place favors them, not the rebels. Moreover, Gaddafi likely hopes to prevent strikes from taking down his air defenses, the necessary prelude to real enforcement of the “no fly, no drive” zone.
In the meanwhile, his forces continue to fire on rebels in Misrata. That too should be no surprise.
What is surprising is that NATO is apparently behind the curve in getting organized for the air campaign. The UK and France are expected to take the lead. U.S. NATO Ambassador Ivo Daalder tweets: “#NATO will meet this morning to discuss #UNSCR 1973 authorizing “all necessary means” to protect civilians in #Libya. Busy days.” I should say so. Why isn’t all this ready?
There is real peril here. If Gaddafi perceives that there is a window of opportunity to advance further, he may well take it. Anticipating negotiations, he’ll want to control as much territory as possible.
On the rebel side, the military effort is looking weak and exhausted. Let’s hope they are better at the negotiating.
What they need is for Gaddafi to leave Libya. This he will do if he sees a real threat in Tripoli, either from demonstrators or from those within his regime who are starting to see the handwriting on the wall. Demonstrators who braved the streets this morning were shot for their courage. I assume he’ll do the same to any of his inner circle who turn on him. This is a situation in which a few brave souls count for a lot.
President Obama is to speak on Libya at 2 pm. He has reason to vaunt American diplomacy’s success at the Security Council last night. But he likely also wants to make it clear that this is not a U.S. operation. I won’t be surprised if he says UK, France and others will take the lead on military operations.
Who is working on the post-war efforts? Libya is a country without a state. It is going to need a lot of help–not money–once Gaddafi is gone.
Who is going to maintain law and order? How will revenge killings be prevented? How will accountability for past crimes be pursued? Are the Libyan courts and prisons functioning? How will state property be protected from regime elements who will try to walk away with it? Is there a social safety net that needs to be rescued quickly? How will a new constitution be written? Will foreign workers be invited back, or should Libyans fill their jobs? Lots of questions for a post-Gaddafi government.
The Benghazi Transitional Council looks like the best bet for a new government, but is it fully representative? Will Tripoli embrace it? How can it be made more so? What about local governance? Can the Gaddafi-era local committees be used, or reconstituted with different people?
Who will take the lead in supporting all this in the international community? The Americans and Europeans have clearly maxed out their state-building capacity. What about the Arab League? UN?
Of course there is also a possibility that a new dictator will emerge from the wreckage of the old regime or from the ranks of the rebels. But it is hard to see how Libyans who have tasted freedom are going to be stuffed back into an autocracy. Libya is going to need help getting it together after this war.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Fewer troops, more politics
The Center for American Progress weighs in with another report that advocates reducing military efforts in Afghanistan. This one should go on that shelf I suggested you clear: it makes a good, strong argument for an improved political and diplomatic strategy.
While trying to avoid criticism of the Administration, the report is forceful and clear in faulting current efforts for failing to define a clear political end-state for Afghanistan and for giving Afghanistan a higher priority than it deserves in the hierarchy of threats to U.S. national security.
The report fails however to ask or answer explicitly that vital question: “is Karzai worth it?” But it gives a clear enough implicit answer: no, not unless he cleans up a good deal, and even then there is a compelling need to decentralize, thus reducing his control, enlarging the political pie and enabling more local power brokers access to a slice. Failing that, CAP would have us withdraw both troops and money more quickly than currently planned.
Where the report fails to convince is in arguing that troop drawdown and increased political and diplomatic effort are compatible. When did we ever manage that trick in the past? It gives ample examples of problems the troop presence creates, but do we really think thinning out in Helmand and Kandahar before making more progress is going to improve the situation there?
The report is big on leverage, conditionality and benchmarks: give the Afghans things we want them to do, and cut funding (or the troops) if they don’t do them. There may well be too much money in Afghanistan (we are spending several times the country’s GDP), but conditionality and benchmarks have rarely worked well elsewhere (certainly not in Iraq). It is not clear why they would work much better in Afghanistan.
So yes to more politics and diplomacy, but so long as we are willing to ignore the question “is Karzai worth it?” we’ll likely do better not drawing down the troops too fast.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Brilliant policy vs. real world resistance
Writing in the Christian Science Monitor, SAIS colleague Kurt Volker welcomes the results of the NATO Summit but wonders whether the real world will permit serious implementation.
RSS - Posts
