Tag: NATO
Stevenson’s army, December 31
– CFR lists the big anniversaries coming in 2023.
– Dan Drezner gives his list of the best writing on political economy in 2022.
– NYT on effects of polling on the 2022 elections.
– Defense News on Sweden & Finland’s efforts to get into NATO.
– WOTR on Turkey’s policies toward Russia and Syria.
Best wishes for 2023. CS
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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A 10 point peace outline for the Western Balkans
Veton Surroi writes:
In the last week of 2022, the Western Balkans again produces narratives about unfinished conflicts and about those that are expected to happen. I will not go delve into the explanation neither why nor since when nor who is responsible. The fact that this is happening 21 years after the last war (North Macedonia), 23 years after the NATO historic intervention in Europe (Kosovo and Serbia) and 28 years after the first genocide in Europe after World War II (Bosnia and Herzegovina) speaks for itself. It also speaks that there are many ways for perpetuation of conflict and war, but that the way of peace has not yet been found. And in the hyper-production of scenarios for one or the other solution (how to remove the barricades, how to solve the constitutional impasse in this or that country, how to unlock the ethnic veto…) here is a (perhaps) simple ten-point outline for peace for the entire region of the Western Balkans.
1. The six countries of the Western Balkans (WB6) will become (in 2028) part of the European Single Market, with equal access rights to the four European freedoms. They will be equal to the rights enjoyed today by non-EU countries, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland.
2. In order to gain the right of access to the single European Market, the Six Western Balkans must establish (in 2024) the space of the four European freedoms in their own region, i.e. establish the Common Regional Market. It is not about free trade, because that we more or less have. This is about inter-institutional agreements for a shared space.
3. Those WB6 countries that are prepared for EU membership on their own merits will be invited to sign the accession. The six partners are responsible for the preparation of the WB6 for entry into the four European freedoms (that is, group integration into the European Common Market) and at the same time for integration based on their own merits for membership in the EU (based on the regatta principle, where the first the one who is the most prepared) . The principle of regatta and that of “big bang” group action are mutually conditioned.
4. The European Union, in addition to ambitious transformative funds (such as that of the Green Agenda), will establish the Fund for Peaceful Cohesion in the Western Balkans, directed towards the infrastructural, economic, cultural and other cohesion of the Western Balkans. The money of the Fund will also be used to achieve the two concentric circles of the four European freedoms, the Common Regional Market and the Common European Market.
5. Kosovo and Serbia will establish inter-institutional relations derived from the needs of establishing the common regional market and the single European market. The legal format of inter-institutional relations will be equal for all WB6 Six.
6. Kosovo and Serbia will negotiate and agree on the powers of the “protecting state”. This will regulate, according to the best European standards, the necessary role of Serbia for the protection and development of the Serbian people and Serbian culture in Kosovo. At the same time, the role of Kosovo will be regulated for the protection and development of the Albanian people and their culture in the Preshevo Valley and other parts of Serbia.
7. The WB6 will actively participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Countries that are ready for NATO membership and want to do so in 2028 will receive an invitation for membership. The six countries of the Western Balkans, regardless of their status as NATO members or not, will sign the Western Balkan 6 Cooperation and Security Agreement 2028.
8. The six countries of the Western Balkans will establish Common Memory Centers in their capitals under the direct sponsorship of their governments. In all these centers, the memory will be built for the civilian victims of the war, those “on the other side”. The Culture Centers will also serve as points of knowledge of the cultures of the “other side”.
9. The six countries of the Western Balkans will build the compact of the rights of the non-majority peoples, relying on the best practices of the region (such as the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001). The basis of the compact will be the non-territorial rights of the non-majority peoples, that is, the rights that are equivalent wherever the non-majority citizens live.
10. The Roma language will be the language in official use in the municipalities where x percent of the Roma population lives. The sixth of the Western Balkans will create the joint institutional body for the unification and standardization of the Romani language in the region.
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Trump is history, Trumpism is not
Donald Trump has embarked on a massive campaign to monetize his presidency. It is not only the NFT playing cardsj. It is also Truth Social (his social media site that caters to right-wing white supremacy and other extremisms), the political funds he collects for challenging election results and supporting extemist candidates (but spends mostly on himself and his family), and the millions his Gulfie friends are loaning him and investing in his golf courses. Most of this will fail, like his much-vaunted steaks. But he’ll come out enriched, which is ultimately the only purpose he is serious about.
He needs the cash
He is going to need the money. His company has already been convicted of tax fraud. He faces more or less a dozen other investigations. Several of which seem close to bringing charges against him. Today the House committee investigating the January 6 attack on The Capitol will recommend that the Justice Department bring serious, unprecedented criminal charges against Trump. He is a cheapskate when it comes to hiring lawyers and stiffs many of them. But even two or three indictments will generate enormous legal bills. Not to mention the likelihood that his tax cheating will end with hundreds of millions in penalties.
No he won’t be president again
No, this man is not going to be President of the United States again. He has led his party into three losing elections: 2018, 2020, and 2022. What loyal GOPer would want to see a fourth? A large part of the Republican Party is already abandoning him, including Senate Minority Leader McConnell and lots of other members of Congress. Those who aren’t are mostly extremist flakes and committed thieves. Americans are looking for compromise, not further polarization. Serious money and media will steer clear. Florida Governor De Santis is already beating Trump in the polls. He won’t be the only serious contender.
But the alternatives are all tainted
But De Santis, Texas Governor Greg Abbott, Texas Senator Ted Cruz, former Vice President Mike Pence and others are all tainted with Trumpism. Of the top 10, the Washington Post lists only New Hampshire Governor Sununu as leaning hard against Trump. Whoever is nominated (it won’t be Sununu) will have to satisfy the Trump wing of the party. It will turn out for the primaries while many more moderate people stay home. The Trumpians want to block immigration, make voting more difficult, reduce constraints on police violence, cut taxes for the wealthy, ban abortion and gay marriage, challenge election results, and prevent the government from taking necessary public health measures.
American elections are not predictable
These are not positions the American public generally supports. But there is nevertheless no predicting the outcome of the 2024, any more than there was in 2022. There is a large part of the electorate that votes not on particular issues, but rather on the “direction” of the country. Concern about the future direction of American democracy gave the Democrats an edge this year, compared to what would normally be expected in a mid-term election with the economy in trouble, high inflation, and the President under 50% approval. Who knows how the economy and American democracy will be faring in 2024?
Some continuity in foreign policy
Does any of this make a difference to foreign policy, which after all is the main concern of peacefare.net? We don’t really know, though there are indications within the Republican Party that support for Ukraine, NATO, and especially the EU is soft, sympathy with Russia rampant, enthusiasm for Netanyahu’s Israel and Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia higher than in the Biden Administration, and hostility to Xi Jinping’s China marginally stronger.
That said, there has been a good deal of continuity in foreign policy between Trump and Biden, on Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and even China, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. It isn’t easy to pursue a pro-democracy foreign policy in the Middle East, or in China for that matter. Whether that signals a return to bipartisan foreign policy “at the water’s edge” is not yet clear. Trumpism will have to be thoroughly obliterated for that to happen. But it could happen.
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Stevenson’s army, November 28
– Ukraine aid slows arms to Taiwan.
– NATO uneasy with US hard-on-China push
– Ukraine fighting wears out its artillery.
And here’s news abut Taiwan’s elections this wekeend:
Taiwan’s ruling tough-on-China party gets clobbered
Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen stepped down as leader of the ruling Democratic Progress Party after it lost big to the opposition Kuomintang party, or KMT, in Saturday’s local elections. As expected, the KMT, which has long favored closer ties with Beijing but denies being pro-China, swept the polls across most big cities. The DPP had tried to turn the election into a referendum on protecting Taiwan’s democracy from Chinese encroachment, but it didn’t work: Voters responded better to the KMT’s pitch about prioritizing local issues such as COVID and the economy. Meanwhile, the upstart Taiwan People’s Party — seen as a rising alternative to the DPP and KMT — turned heads by capturing Hsinchu, known as the self-ruled island’s Silicon Valley because it is home to many semiconductor companies. The result ups the ante ahead of the 2024 presidential election, when voters will likely be more worried about China’s growing threat. A KMT victory would be welcomed by Beijing, but success in local elections doesn’t necessarily mean it’ll do well in 2024. After all, in early 2020, the DPP recovered from a similar local election defeat to reelect Tsai in a landslide.
Charlie added later:
Reuters says US may send missile with 100-mile range to Ukraine.
Dan Drezner has praise for Biden foreign policy.
He doesn’t like Biden’s trade policy, but the Politico weekly trade newsletter notes how carefully the administration is consulting with stakeholders over new rules.
Two GOP Members have bill to drive “wokeness” from the Pentagon. Their plan.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, November 16
Both my internet service and I have been out of commission the last few days, so I’ve missed lots of Stevenson’s army and other things. I’ll try to keep up now:
– Polish deaths blamed on errant Ukrainian air defense missile.
-New Congress will have almost 100 military veterans.
– Congressional commission on China urges trade policies. It’s new annual report is here.
– GAO hits US military aircraft readiness.
-Chicago prof says Russia sanctions are doing long term damage.
– Russia lost UN GA vote on Ukraine.
– Lawfare argues for repealing 2002 AUMF.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Where the line is drawn matters
I am going to go out on a limb. Broadly speaking, the Ukraine war can end with three outcomes:
- Complete Russian withdrawal from the 2013 borders of Ukraine.
- Partition of Ukraine, with Crimea and perhaps some other slices of the south and east annexed by Russia.
- Russian victory.
Note that these are outcomes. They say nothing about the path, which could include war, political change in Moscow or Kyiv, or negotiations. Outcome 2. looks much more likely today than 1. or 3., but there really is no telling. Let’s assume for current purposes that Russia remains under the control of Putin, or someone with similar territorial ambitions. Let’s also assume that a pro-EU government remains in Kyiv. What are the implications from the American perspective of these possible outcomes?
Complete Russian withdrawal
Complete Russian withdrawal would leave Ukraine still at risk. It would want to join the EU, for which it has already applied, and NATO. The former is a real possibility, provided Ukraine reforms its politics and economy to qualify. But the latter is unlikely. It would require all NATO members to agree. Several will be reluctant.
This circle can be squared, as it has been during wartime. NATO would need to provide security guarantees to Ukraine ensuring the kind of support Ukraine has received since February. This would ideally include not just ammunition and equipment, but also training, intelligence, logistics, funding, and political solidarity. A Ukrainian win will not be cost free.
Partition
The costs will be higher if Ukraine is partitioned. Putin would claim victory. Russia would be an even greater continuing military threat. NATO would need to arm “rump” Ukraine to repel another potential Russian invasion and repress the kind of “hybrid warfare” Moscow would continue to conduct inside Kyiv-controlled territory. NATO would also need to counter Moscow’s intensified hybrid warfare campaigns in member state Hungary or non-member state Moldova.
Partition of Ukraine would also encourage Moscow to expand its support for partition elsewhere, especially the Balkans. There Serbian President Vucic would welcome expanded Russian support for his “Serbian world” efforts, which entail de facto or de jure partition of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kazakhstan, where there is a large Russian population, might also be at risk.
Russian victory
Russian victory, achieved by either military or political means, would entail the incorporation of all of Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence. Kyiv would be, like Minsk, subject to Moscow’s suzerainty. It would loyally follow Moscow’s foreign policy directives. Russia would likely garrison troops in Ukraine, which would be mostly disarmed.
Ukraine’s subjagation would put not just Hungary and Moldova at risk from hybrid warfare but also Poland, the Baltics, and other NATO members (possibly Romania and Slovakia) from Russian conventional as well as unconventional attack. Maintaining NATO solidarity would become more difficult as Moscow threatens these newer neighbors while leaving the older NATO members untouched.
Where the line is drawn matters
American diplomacy since the end of the Cold War has aimed for a Europe “whole and free.” That isn’t happening. The Ukraine war is drawing a new line. The question is whether that new line will go through or encompass Ukraine. If it does, NATO will pay a higher price. The cost will be lower, but still substantial, if Ukraine as a whole can complete its Western ambitions.
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