Tag: North Korea
Retreat from Afghanistan
The United States has decided to retreat from Afghanistan, promising a complete withdrawal within 14 months if the Taliban keep their commitments, including to not allowing international terrorists to operate from territory they control. The agreement was signed Saturday in Doha.
This is a necessary, even if less than glorious, end to US participation in a war that has gone on far too long. Eighteen years after toppling the Taliban regime in the aftermath of 9/11, the diminishing returns are insufficient to keep the US committed, especially in an election year. America and its NATO allies are leaving the field to the Afghan government and its opponents, which will now be expected to negotiate a political settlement, after a major prisoner exchange.
Everything now depends on the intra-Afghan political settlement. Negotiations on this agreement are supposed to start on March 10. Will it protect the human rights many Afghans have come to enjoy? Will women be forced out of politics and girls out of school? Will minorities suffer as they did under the previous Taliban regime? Will the margins of freedom of speech and religion shrink? Will politics continue in the semi-democratic direction they have taken for two decades, or will a religious autocracy be restored, especially in the countryside from which it has never entirely disappeared.
There can be no doubting President Ashraf Ghani’s commitment to maintaining what he can of liberal, modern Afghanistan. But he will need to compromise with a potent insurgency that backs Taliban political demands. Few think the Taliban can overrun or seize Kabul, but they can certainly displace the Afghan security forces in many provinces and bring enormous pressure to bear on the capital once the Americans are gone. After the Soviets left, their guy lasted three years in power, but he eventually ended up tortured and hung from a “traffic control box.” I imagine Ghani, who literally wrote the book (or at least a very good book) on statebuilding, will not wait around for that to happen.
Are all the Americans really leaving? I doubt it. I suspect Washington has insisted on some remaining, covert presence for counter-terrorism forces. The Taliban, though religious extremists like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, unlike them do not have ambitions beyond Afghanistan. All three jihadist forces compete for the same political space inside Afghanistan, so it is not completely unreasonable to think the Taliban might secretly welcome the Americans doing their dirty work for them by killing their jihadi competitors.
Only time will tell whether the peace agreement with the Taliban will hold and some sort of political settlement among the Afghans will emerge. The Taliban have good reason to keep the peace during the American withdrawal, which is supposed to slow if they don’t. But they have little incentive to compromise with Ghani once the Americans are gone, unless the Afghan security forces do much better in fighting them than has so far been the case. US and UN sanctions on the Taliban are supposed to come off early in the process.
With this agreement, President Trump gets some bragging rights on foreign policy that he has lacked. Nothing else he has tried has worked: there is no nuclear or missile agreement with North Korea, Iran is not returning to the negotiating table despite “maximum pressure,” Venezuela is still in the hands of President Maduro, only Israel has welcomed the Middle East “deal of the century,” and the trade war with China has failed to produce progress on the main issues, even if a mutual but partial stand-down of tariffs has attenuated some of its worst impacts on Trump’s farming supporters. Trump needs this Afghanistan agreement more than the Taliban and gave up a lot to get it.
For the sake of the Afghans, let’s hope it holds.
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Making retreat sound good
The United States is getting ready to retreat from Afghanistan. After more than 19 years of war following the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks, Washington has reached an agreement for a seven-day lull in attacks (not a formal ceasefire), after which the Taliban will negotiate a broader peace with Afghanistan government officials supposedly acting in their personal capacities. The US will reduce its presence from 13,000 troops to below 9,000 within months, whether or not the Afghans reach an agreement. Other arrangements remain secret but presumably include some sort of Taliban pledge not to provide safe haven to international terrorists as well as commitments on human rights, though these are likely to be vague, unenforceable, and perhaps worthless.
What this amounts to is US retreat from a theater in which more than about 2500 American military have lost their lives, and something like 10 times that number have been wounded. President Trump will vaunt this as fulfilling his campaign promise to end endless wars, but a substantial number of troops will remain at risk. The Afghanistan government may survive in Kabul, but the Taliban already control about 18% of its districts and contest another 48%:
US withdrawal and refocus on counterterrorism will likely increase those percentages, unless the Afghan security forces demonstrate much greater capability than they have to date.
At this point, there isn’t much of an alternative. The American public, pliable as it is on use of force in a crisis, doesn’t want recommitment to the fight in Afghanistan. President Trump has long been impatient with the war there. The Democrats don’t like it either. It has been clear since last fall’s abortive agreement, which Trump cancelled at the last minute due to renewed violence, that the American envoy, Zal Khalilzad, had no mandate or desire to press the Taliban for more than a decent exit and commitment to staving off Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.
The Taliban see them at least in part as rivals for establishing Islamic governance, so there may be some reason to hope that they won’t quickly provide the kind of safe haven that Osama bin Laden enjoyed in the 1990s. Taliban ambitions mainly focus on restoring the Islamic Emirate inside Afghanistan, not projecting power beyond or provoking further intervention. They may even be prepared to fight the more internationally minded jihadis, if only to keep the Americans from renewed activity.
Afghanistan’s President Ghani, however, will have a lot to worry about once the Americans have drawn down. New York and Washington will not be at immediate risk, but Kabul will be. The population there may not want the Taliban to return, but history suggests the government has a hard time defending itself from insurgents in the countryside. Factiousness is endemic in Afghanistan. Ghani is not a man who compromises readily, and he wrote the book on Western-style statebuilding: Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World. Protecting the human rights of women, minorities, and Afghans committed to real democracy is going to be a tall order.
This is not the first of Trump’s retreats. He settled for little in the renegotiation of NAFTA, caved on the tariff war with the Chinese, backed off denuclearization of North Korea, all but abandoned the opposition to President Maduro in Venezuela, and floated a peace plan for Israel and Palestine that dropped like a stone. While he remains verbally belligerent to Iran, he thankfully seems to have given up on the drive to war. He has little to nothing to show for his belligerence and bravado on the world stage, where he is regarded more as buffoon than champion, except in Israel and Russia.
Being able to claim that he has ended the long war in Afghanistan will stand Trump in good stead with those who know nothing about Afghanistan during the coming election campaign. The flim-flam man will make a necessary retreat sound good.
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Stevenson’s army, February 10
– The administration will propose a 6% cut in domestic spending, despite agreement earlier this year on a higher figure. Pre-release backgrounders brag that foreign aid will be cut 20%. [This is progress: the past 2 years,the administration wanted 30%, which Congress rejected.]
– In what looks like a further effort to privatize veterans programs, the administration wants to deny access to regular military hospitals to retirees and family members.
– David Sanger says North Korea has tripled its internet use,allowing it to escape sanctions via the dark web.
-WaPo reports a story I’ve told in class: how Biden and Republicans tried to amend the 2002 AUMF for Iraq with more restrictive provisions, only to be outmaneuvered by Cong. Dick Gephardt [D-Mo], House Democratic leader, in payback for the 2001 AUMF, when the Sernate forced the House to approve language limiting the authorization to those actually connected to the 9/11 attacks.
– Dan Drezner says the administration’s 5G strategy is confused and not working.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Acquitted, not exonerated
You’ll be hearing a lot next week about how the Senate is exonerating President Trump of false charges brought by the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives. Nothing could be further than the truth. Senator Lamar Alexander had the temerity to speak the truth:
There is no need for more evidence to prove that the president asked Ukraine to investigate Joe Biden and his son, Hunter; he said this on television on October 3, 2019, and during his July 25, 2019, telephone call with the president of Ukraine. There is no need for more evidence to conclude that the president withheld United States aid, at least in part, to pressure Ukraine to investigate the Bidens; the House managers have proved this with what they call a ‘mountain of overwhelming evidence.’ …It was inappropriate for the president to ask a foreign leader to investigate his political opponent and to withhold United States aid to encourage that investigation. When elected officials inappropriately interfere with such investigations, it undermines the principle of equal justice under the law….
The question then is not whether the president did it, but whether the United States Senate or the American people should decide what to do about what he did. I believe that the Constitution provides that the people should make that decision in the presidential election that begins in Iowa on Monday.
It was Alexander’s judgment (contained in the areas I’ve marked with…) that what Trump did, including in refusing all requests for documents and testimony, did not rise to the level required for removal from office.
If Alexander and other Republican Senators believe that the President is guilty as charged , they should have no problem with a motion of censure against the President, denouncing his undermining of the principle of equality before the law and warning him off from further efforts to enlist foreign help in the 2020 election.
Failing that, it seems to me the Democrats need a way of expressing their displeasure at the State of the Union address Tuesday. They might “take a knee,” for example, but then a lot of them might not be able to get up. Other possibilities come to mind: wearing black armbands in mourning for American democracy, turning their backs as the President enters the room, walking out as soon as he claims exoneration, or boycotting the event altogether. I rather like the idea of a boycott or walkout, but either would leave Speaker Pelosi alone with her adversaries, as she formally invited the impeached President to address the Congress and will preside over the event.
No doubt impeachment alone is a stain on Donald Trump’s presidency and ample warning for any normal politician against seeking or accepting foreign assistance in the next election. But Trump is a man who feels no shame, so that hardly matters. What matters, as Senator Alexander suggests, is how Americans vote in November. I am already convinced he will lose the popular vote, likely by a margin wider than the 2.8 million or so votes he lost it last time. New York and California, which voted against him in 2016 by wide margins, will tilt even more heavily to the Democrats, if only because the Trump tax cut actually raised taxes on many voters in states with high state income taxes.
Trump can however still win in the Electoral College, which gives a voter in a less populous state like Wyoming several times the weight in choosing the president than a voter in New York or California. This powersharing arrangement with less populous states was a necessary distortion of “one-person, one-vote” in forming the Union in the 18th century. It is now a grossly unfair anachronism that is difficult to fix, as it requires either a constitutional amendment or approval by more states of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact. Neither is going to happen before November.
Americans supported impeachment by a narrow margin. Now the Democrats have to make lemonade from the lemons of their defeat in the Senate. Defeating Trump in the election will require either winning back Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan (which Hillary Clinton lost by less than a total of 80,000 votes), or beating him Florida and Texas, where the 2016 results were close and demographic trends favor the Democrats but not yet by enough to make victory there likely.
Trump’s trade wars have brought little benefit and much harm to the US, the economy is slowing, the Administration’s main foreign policy initiatives (with North Korea, Venezuela, Iran, and Israel/Palestine) are failing, its immigration and voter suppression policies are racist, America’s allies are hedging, and a candidate who promised withdrawal from the Middle East as President is sending more troops there. Failure to hold Trump accountable in November would be an inexcusable error. He should not be acquitted again.
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Economic sanctions work, but…
The continued use of US economic sanctions against Iran, Venezuela, North Korea and Cuba was the focus for a Brookings panel, Economic Sanctions: Assessing their use and implications for U.S. foreign policy on January 27. Moderated by James Goldgeier, Robert Bosch Senior Visiting Fellow, the panel included Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow Center for Middle East Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Jung H. Pak, Senior Fellow Center for East Asia Policy Studies, and Ted Piccone, Nonresident Senior Fellow Security and Strategy.
Four Case Studies
Maloney believes the US uses sanctions in tandem with diplomacy with Iran, but usually is not joined by others. Two changes have occurred that altered the effectiveness of sanctions on Iran:
- After the 9/11 attacks, US sanctions became more targeted and were no longer only trade sanctions.
- The energy market has shifted with increased production outside the Persian Gulf.
US sanctions have not achieved their political goal of a dramatic reversal of core Iranian policy, but rather have only impacted the economy. Maloney argues that economic sanctions are effective in countries that already have dysfunctional economies, allowing the sanctions to compound structural problems.
Pak, an expert on North Korea, claims that the US only started piling on sanctions on North Korea since 2016, focused on sectors like seafood, iron, oil. The targeted sanctions of 2005 on Banco Delta Asia, which was helping facilitate North Korean illicit financing measures, led to serious economic problems. This sanction signaled to other banks and investment funds that doing business with North Korea was risky.
Piccone emphasizes that Cuba is an example of ineffective US sanctions, since they did not achieve their specified target of dislodging the Communist regime and removing Castro from power even if they were successful in stifling the economy. The US failed with Cuba sanctions to gain multilateral support. Due to the devastated economy, Cubans suffered and migrated: over 10% of the Cuban population lives outside Cuba, with the majority residing in the US.
Piccone contrasts Cuba sanctions with Venezuela, where the US shifted from targeted sanctions to sectoral ones, particularly on oil and gas. These sanctions amplified many of Venezuela’s existing economic problems. Sanctions effectiveness is closely tied to how dependent a country is on the US.
All panelists emphasized that even economically ‘successful’ sanctions can still be rendered ineffective if the political goals behind the sanctions are not realized.
Credibility is important
Maloney underlines the importance of sustaining credibility with regards to sanctions. Even before the May 2019 JCPOA withdrawal, Iran felt that the US was not upholding its side of the deal, as there continued to be new sanctions placed on the country.
All the panelists noted how muddled sanctions can be when the US makes exceptions for a program like the JCPOA, but maintains other sanctions related to support for terrorism and human rights violations. Maloney suggests that these remaining sanctions deter international banks and investors and reduce investment in Iran. The US withdrawal from the agreement undermined US credibility. Piccone adds that the inconsistencies between US administrations only further confuse the aims of sanctions, particularly in the case of Cuba.
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Pompeo is a failure
Here is Secretary of State Pompeo in an interview with Mary Louise Kelly of NPR that demonstrates unequivocally his unfitness for office:
First he defends withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran nuclear deal), which has led inexorably to Iran acquiring more of the materials required for nuclear weapons. In self-defense, he simply asserts “we’ll stop them,” with no evidence whatsoever. That’s because there is none.
Then he declares himself happy with the Administration’s Ukraine policy, which he claims the State Department controls, and says he has defended every single State Department official. This despite the fact that he has not defended several officials who testified in Congress and that Rudy Giuliani was conducting Ukraine policy outside State Department channels.
In any event, listen to the end, since Kelly then reports on a subsequent conversation with the Secretary, in which he berates her for asking about Ukraine in ways that are simply unacceptable, even if unsurprising. No one should expect this Administration to show even minimal respect for a media professional. It prefers the hacks at Fox News who do its bidding.
Pompeo, again not surprisingly, also has bigoted views on Muslims and counts right-wing extremists among his greatest admirers. That may seem obscure or irrelevant to many Americans, but stop a moment to consider how the 1.8 billion Muslims on earth look at a country that has a bigot as Secretary of State.
The simple fact is that Pompeo is not qualified to lead American foreign policy, which is failing in the most important challenges he faces. In addition to precipitating Iran’s return to pursuit of nuclear weapons, the Administration is presiding over a stunning array of failures:
- North Korea continues to produce nuclear weapons and improve its missiles.
- Venezuela’s President Maduro continues in power.
- Russia continues to occupy a good slice of Ukraine.
- Iran and Russia are winning back control of Syria for President Assad.
- Iraqis are pushing back against the presence of US troops.
- The American “deal of the century” for Israel and Palestine stands no chance of acceptance by the Palestinians.
- The trade war with China has been suspended with few gains, in order to provide American farmers some relief before the 2020 election.
I could go on, but the overall picture is clear: “America First” foreign policy has failed, often because it has amounted to “America Alone.” Our major European allies (that’s now France and Germany, with the UK out of the European Union) are no longer cooperating voluntarily with the US. They can do better withholding cooperation and only giving in when they can get something in return from a transactional president. A few weaker reeds like Poland, Hungary, Italy as well as post-Brexit Britain may be more on board with this Administration, but mainly because of their own nationalist domestic politics. The sense of shared mission to make the world safer for democracy has evaporated. Its now every country for itself.
Lots of us, including me, thought Pompeo might be a relative success compared to his disastrous predecessor, Rex Tillerson. But succeeding as Secretary of State in an administration as wrong-headed about the world as this one just isn’t possible. It will take a decade or more to rebuild US influence in the world once Trump is out of office. Two decades or more if he wins a second term.
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