Tag: North Korea
Played
The Iran nuclear deal was an exchange: relief from sanctions in exchange for a halt and partial reversal of Iran’s uranium enrichment and plutonium capabilities. While President Obama made it clear the US would no longer actively seek overthrow of the Islamic Republic, there was no guarantee of that policy’s continuity. Nor was there a deal on Iran’s regional behavior, though Obama clearly hoped that would moderate as Iran’s economy recovered from sanctions and its people stopped rallying around the flag and instead sought rising living standards and more foreign contact.
That process had barely begun–with economic protests and criticism of Iran’s foreign adventures–when President Trump withdrew the US from the deal earlier this month. The protests are petering out as Iran seeks some way of continuing the nuclear deal with Europe, Russia, and China.That will be difficult because US “secondary” sanctions will force most major European companies to abandon business with Iran. But so far at least the EU seems determined to find a way. There is no reason to believe that Moscow, Beijing, and importantly New Delhi (India is a major importer of Iranian hydrocarbons) will not find a way of continuing to do business with Tehran.
Secretary Pompeo has announced the US list of demands to renew negotiations, with the aim of full diplomatic recognition, which is code for no more efforts to overthrow the regime. No one thinks Iran will even begin thinking about meeting those conditions. The US tried for decades to torpedo the Islamic Republic. There is no reason to believe the Trump Administration’s efforts in that regard will strike fear into the hearts of the ayatollahs. Quite to the contrary: the Supreme Leader thrives on American hostility. Trump is doomed to failure in dealing with Iran: either the nuclear deal will be maintained because the Europeans find a way to defy US sanctions, or Tehran will return to pursuing all the technology it needs to build and launch nuclear weapons.
He is heading in the same direction with North Korea. Once again, he is offering guarantees of regime survival and economic prosperity in exchange for “denuclearization.” The trouble is both National Security Adviser Bolton and Vice President Pence have hinted that without an agreement the US will pursue a Libya option, which the North Koreans interpret not unreasonably as Kim Jung-un meeting the same fate as Muammar Qaddafi, who was slaughtered after giving up his rudimentary nuclear program by Libyan rebels who had Western support. Not to mention one other difficulty: Kim is one of the most brutal dictators on earth. Does the US really want to be guaranteeing his permanence in power? Trump obviously doesn’t mind, any more than he minds offering the Islamic Republic the same deal.
Of course Kim would have no reason to believe any US guarantees, even with an American ambassador in Pyongyang. The change in US approaches to Iran and North Korea between Obama and Trump as well as the Trump Administration’s incoherence and inconsistency would make even a fool hesitate to rely on Washington. Kim is no fool. He will do nothing irreversible to his nuclear and missile programs, knowing full well that Trump can guarantee nothing. So when he yesterday blew up at least part of his country’s nuclear testing facilities in front of Western TV crews, you can be sure whatever was destroyed was now worthless to him.
Kim will propose a phased approach to “denuclearization.” If the phases include giving up his existing nuclear weapons, that will only be at the end of a long process, which he can ensure will never be reached. In the meanwhile, Kim will achieve many of his objectives. He has already put himself on a par with the President of the United States. Any early meeting, next month or thereafter, will confirm his equal status and legitimacy, both internationally and domestically.
While mumbling about a possible postponement, Trump appears desperate for a meeting to give him a chance to claim his first foreign policy success. Hence his touting rumors of a Nobel Prize that the Norwegians will not be interested in giving him. The North Koreans know a sucker when they see him. Kim is playing Trump, successfully.
PS: Somebody got Trump smart. Less than an hour after I published this, he withdrew from the Dotard/Rocket Man Summit. That was the best he could do: he was in way over his head.
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Peace picks, May 21 – 27
- After ISIS, Will Iraq’s Elections be the Next Step to Stability? | Monday, May 21| 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm | US Institute of Peace | Register Here
On May 12, Iraqis go to the polls to elect members of a new national parliament. This is the fourth election since the fall of Saddam Hussein, but the first since the military rollback of the Islamic State-declared caliphate. The country’s new leaders will be faced with the challenge of rebuilding, stabilizing, and healing their country as the United States and the West continue to decrease their military presence.
Join us on May 21 for a provocative town hall debate with foreign policy experts Kenneth Pollack, from the American Enterprise Institute, the National Defense University’s Denise Natali, and USIP’s Sarhang Hamasaeed, moderated by Joshua Johnson of the public radio program 1A. The discussion will focus on how Iraq’s leaders can overcome years of sectarian violence and find unity, as well as what a future alliance with the West may look like.
- North Korea and the Fine Print of a Deal: A View from Congress | Tuesday, May 22 | 9:00 am – 10:00 am | US Institute of Peace | Register Here
The United States is engaged in high-stakes negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program as the White House prepares for the summit between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. But nuclear capabilities and missiles are not the only items on the negotiating table. An eventual settlement could include some difficult concessions and require significant oversight and legislative action on the part of Congress. In addition to a potential restructuring of U.S. forces in South Korea, a grand bargain could result in a range of due-outs for Congress, from sanctions relief and economic incentives to multilateral political arrangements.
Two Members of Congress and military veterans, Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA) and Representative Steve Russell (R-OK), will examine the importance of this ongoing diplomatic effort, possible outcomes of negotiations, and the role they hope Congress plays in the coming months at USIP’s third Bipartisan Congressional Dialogue on May 22.
- What Lies Ahead for Afghanistan: The Various Scenarios | Tuesday, May 22 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm | The Middle East Institute | Register Here
The way forward in Afghanistan seems as unclear as it has ever been. An outright military victory against the Taliban and other insurgent groups appears to be unachievable. The prospect of insurgents overrunning the country soon appears similarly unlikely. At the same time, a negotiated peace seems presently improbable. At least on terms outlined by the Kabul government and international community, the Taliban shows little interest in reconciliation. The long-term commitment of the United States and its coalition partners to an indefinite military presence and financial support cannot be taken for granted.
After nearly 17 years of fighting and state building in Afghanistan, we are still asking how conflict ends and what the endgame for Afghanistan looks like.
To discuss possible scenarios, the Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host an expert panel. MEI’s Director of Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, Marvin G. Weinbaum, will moderate the discussion with Javid Ahmad, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center; Courtney Cooper, an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Seth Jones, director of the Transnational Threats Project and a senior adviser for the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic International Studies.
- The Implications of the US Embassy Move to Jerusalem | Tuesday, May 22 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | The SETA Foundation at Washington DC | Register Here
On Monday, May 14, 2018, the US officially opened its embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. The move, which had been delayed by Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama, was announced by President Donald J. Trump on February 23. While Trump’s announcement was welcomed by Israel, it was condemned by Palestinian leaders and other US allies in the Middle East.
Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC on May 22 for a timely discussion on what the move of the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem means for future US policy in the region, how US allies and adversaries will react to the move, and what it means for the Israel-Palestine peace process. Panel includes Geoffrey Aronson (President, The Mortons Group), Lara Friedman (President, Foundation for Middle East Peace), Ghaith al-Omari (Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute), Kadir Ustun (Executive Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC). Moderated by Kilic B. Kanat (Research Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC).
- Can Power-sharing Arrangements Deliver Peace? | Thursday, May 24 | 10:00 am – 12:00 pm | US Institute of Peace | Register Here
Power-sharing arrangements are often touted as a means to address conflict between two parties. But practitioners and policymakers alike agree that the foundation for such arrangements requires considerable strategy and planning, including articulating clear objectives and expectations. Under what conditions do power-sharing arrangements work? What are the key ingredients to help unity governments succeed? Do power-sharing arrangements build political trust by delivering to citizens?
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace for a discussion exploring these critical questions. By exploring recent research in the Philippines, the panel will consider the effects a power-sharing peace agreement has on citizens’ trust in the national government, helping policymakers better understand how to build political trust in the aftermath of intrastate conflict. Panel includes Rosarie Tucci (Director, Inclusive Societies, US Institute of Peace), Susan Stigant (Director, Africa Programs, US Institute of Peace), Caroline Hartzell (Professor, Political Science Department, Gettysburg College), Matthew Hoddie (Associate Professor, Towson University), and Joseph Eyerman (Director, Center for Security, Defense and Safety, Research Triangle Institute International).
- America First, Europe alone? | Thursday, May 24 | 2:00 – 3:30 pm | Brookings Institution | Register Here
For the first 16 months of the Trump administration, European governments have sought to work closely with the United States, rather than opposing it publicly. However, differences over the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris Climate Accord, trade, and the nature of sovereignty have led some observers to predict the end of the Atlantic alliance. On May 24, the Brookings Institution will convene an expert panel to discuss the trajectory of trans-Atlantic relations; whether the allies can bridge the gaps that divide them; how important Europe, and particularly the European Union, is to the Trump administration; and whether European states can and will fend for themselves.
The discussion will feature Brookings’s Robert Bosch Senior Fellows Amanda Sloat and Constanze Stelzenmüller, and Kenneth R. Weinstein, president and CEO of Hudson Institute. Edward Luce, Washington columnist and commentator for the Financial Times, will moderate the discussion.
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North Korea bites back
Here, via @JChengWSJ, is North Korea’s statement on the prospective Summit between Presidents Trump and Kim:
This tirade is aimed not at Trump but at Bolton, who over the weekend cited the “Libya model,” by which he seems to have meant the access Qaddafi provided to his nuclear and chemical weapons programs when he committed to abandoning them. But of course the North Koreans remember what happened to Qaddafi thereafter. They are trying to signal to Trump that his hawkish National Security Adviser is not with the program, which has to include Kim Jong-un’s survival, hoping that Trump will throw “regime change” Bolton under the bus.
Bolton may be what provoked Pyongyang’s ire, but the statement is clear enough on other issues: it rejects the standard American versions of what “denuclearization”means as well as the notion that North Korea can be bought off with economic benefits, an idea Secretary of State Pompeo has been touting. It essentially says that Washington needs to end its belligerence towards North Korea, possibly by removing troops from South Korea as well as signing a peace treaty formally ending the Korean war, without clarifying precisely what Pyongyang is prepared to provide in return, but the implication is some sort of limit on, but not abandonment of, its nuclear weapon and missile programs. The zero option is out, the North Koreans are saying.
This is far short of what the US has wanted, and far short of what it had achieved in the Iran nuclear deal that Washington has abrogated. The North Korean statement, however, was made only in the name of a vice minister of foreign affairs, which is far from the top of the hierarchy. There is certainly the possibility that Kim will be more forthcoming at a summit.
But I wouldn’t bet on it. Just the fact of the Rocket Man/Dotard Summit is an enormous “get” for North Korea, as it puts Kim on an equal footing with the US President, confirming the North Korean leader’s legitimacy both domestically and internationally.
Kim needs a successful summit only if he needs sanctions relief. That is not yet clear. A lot depends on whether China and Russia are prepared to keep tightening the screws. Their annoyance with US withdrawal from the Iran deal, Moscow’s peeve at US sanctions, and Beijing’s concern about bilateral trade issues will all factor in to their willingness to continue the united front against North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.
Trump and Bolton are nowhere near Kim’s diplomatic league. Their skills were honed on Fox TV, where they rarely face any opposition. They are used to saying what they feel like and having everyone nod yes. Kim knows how to bite back.
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Peace picks, May 14 – May 20
- The Fallout from Trump’s Decision on the Iran Deal | Monday, May 14 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
May 12 is the deadline for President Trump to renew sanctions waivers under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In January, he vowed to pull out of the JCPOA unless European nations met his demands for new pressure on Iran’s ballistic missile program, more stringent inspections of Iran’s military installations and a commitment to extend curbs on the Iranian nuclear program beyond the terms of the nuclear deal. The Future of Iran Initiative, the Global Business and Economics Program, and the Middle East Security Initiative invite you to a discussion of the ramifications of Trump’s decision on the likely responses of Iran and US European allies as well as the consequences for non-proliferation and conflict in the Middle East. A conversation with Axel Hellman (Policy Fellow; European Leadership Network), Elizabeth Rosenberg (Director, Energy, Economics and Security Program; Center for a New American Security), Ali Vaez (Iran Project Director; International Crisis Group), and David Mortlock (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center; Atlantic Council). Moderated by Barbara Slavin (Director, Future of Iran Initiative; Atlantic Council), with keynote remarks by David O’Sullivan (Ambassador and Head, European Union Delegation to the United States).
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- How to Talk to North Korea | Monday, May 14 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here |
As a possible Trump-Kim summit draws closer, join Carnegie for a conversation about what negotiating with North Korea is really like. Previous U.S. negotiators and experts will talk about what lessons have been learned in previous rounds of talks, and what the United States should know going forward. The New York Times’ Mark Landler will moderate. Panel includes Suzanne DiMaggio (Director and Senior Fellow, New America), Robert L. Gallucci (Professor, Georgetown University), Christopher Hill (Professor, University of Denver), and Daniel Russel (VP for International Security and Diplomacy, Asia Society Policy Institute)
- US Policy Towards Iran: Strategic Options | Monday, May 14 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am | Bipartisan Policy Center | Register Here |
The president’s decision on the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has dominated the discussion in Washington. But recent events also reinforce the need for an American strategy for the broader challenge posed by Iran. Returning some measure of stability to the increasingly fractured Middle East—a vital and enduring U.S. national security interest—requires confronting the spread of Iranian influence.
Join us on May 14 for a discussion on Iran’s influence in Syria and Iraq, and the release of a report from the Task Force on Managing Disorder in the Middle East on U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Strategic Options. Fireside chat includes Amb. Eric Edelman (Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey) and Jake Sullivan (Former Director of Policy Planning, U.S. State Department and Former National Security Advisor to the Vice President). Panel includes Amb. James Jeffrey (Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Iraq), Mary Beth Long (Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), Denise Natali (Director, Center for Strategic Research at the Institute for National Strategic Studies) and Blaise Misztal (Director of National Security, Bipartisan Policy Center). Moderated by Arshad Mohammed (Diplomatic Correspondent, Reuters).
A Tale of Two Elections: Recapping the Polls in Lebanon and Iraq | Tuesday, May 15 | 12:00pm – 2:00pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
As Lebanon holds its first parliamentary elections in nine years and Iraq paves a way forward in the aftermath of the war against ISIS, many questions remain as to what the political future holds for both countries. The parliamentary elections in Lebanon on May 6, and in Iraq on May 12, serve as a barometer for transparency, inclusion, and the political realities in both countries. The polls have raised pressing political and governance issues such as how to overcome sectarianism, corruption, and economic stagnation in order to encourage further openness and plurality. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a panel discussion to examine these issues. MEI’s Bilal Y. Saab and Paul Salem will be joined by Abbas Kadhim (SAIS), Omar al-Nidawi (Gryphon Partners), and Bilal Wahab (WINEP) for a two-hour panel event moderated by MEI’s director for conflict resolution and the Track II Dialogues initiative, Randa Slim.
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5. Cuba: Post-Castro Transition | Wednesday, May 16 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
In April, Miguel Díaz-Canel became the 19th President of Cuba and the first in over 40 years who was not a member of the Castro family. This appointment — not election — of a new Cuban president raises a number of important questions about the future and stability of the regime. In a post-Castro era, Cuban politics will likely change, though the direction and magnitude of those changes remains to be seen. On May 16, Hudson Institute will host a panel to explore these issues and discuss the possibility of a democratic transition on the island. Panelists will include Eduardo Ulibarri, a Costa Rican journalist, diplomat, university professor, and international consultant; Hector E. Schamis, a teacher at Georgetown University’s Center for Latin American Studies and Democracy & Governance Program; and Ambassador Jaime Daremblum, senior fellow and director of Hudson Institute’s Center for Latin American Studies.
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6. Decision Point: Iran, the Nuclear Deal, and Regional Stability | Wednesday, May 16 | 1:00pm – 2:30pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement will have far reaching implications for U.S. policy; the trans-Atlantic alliance; non-proliferation efforts; and even on regional stability – particularly in the Israeli-Lebanese-Iranian-Syrian arena. Indeed, those implications may go far in defining the U.S. posture in the region for years to come. Join us as four veteran analysts and policy advisers on the Middle East assess the implications of the president’s decision, including on U.S. foreign policy in the region at large. Featuring speakers Robert S. Litwak (Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies, Wilson Center), Michael Singh (Managing Director and Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Ray Takeyh (Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations), and Tamara Cofman Wittes (Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution). Moderated by Aaron David Miller (Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center), with introductory remarks by Jane Harman (Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center).
There will be a live webcast of this event.
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7. Turkey’s Early Elections | Wednesday, May 16 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | SETA Foundation | Register here |
On June 24, Turkey will hold its first presidential and parliamentary elections under the new presidential system that was adopted in the 2017 constitutional referendum. In the presidential race, several political parties have nominated their own candidates, while in the parliamentary elections, several parties have formed alliances to gain the majority in the legislature. The winner of the presidential election will form the first Turkish government under the new presidential system for the next five years. The parliamentary makeup will be of critical importance in the transition to the new system. Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC for a timely discussion on Turkey’s upcoming June elections, current coalitions, political party dynamics, and the future of Turkish politics. With speakers Ihsan Aktas, President, GENAR Research and Polling; Nebi Mis, Director, Domestic Policy, SETA Foundation; and Murat Yesiltas, Director, Security Policy, SETA Foundation; with moderator Kilic Bugra Kanat, Research Director, SETA Foundation.
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8. The Risk of Interstate War(s) in the Middle East | Thursday, May 17 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Middle East Institute | Register here |
While armed nonstate actors and proxy militias have been grabbing most headlines in recent years, the risk of interstate war in the Middle East is rising at an alarming rate. Tensions between Israel and Iran have boiled over several times in recent weeks in Syria, risking a serious escalation between the two countries. Iranian-supplied missiles have been launched from Houthi-held areas in Yemen targeting Riyadh and other Saudi towns and cities, risking an escalation between the two regional powers. Tension also persists between the United States and Iran as the Trump administration moves away from the JCPOA. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces are flying missions in a crowded air and military space; the risk of escalation there between the two superpowers also cannot be discounted. How high is the risk of interstate war in the Middle East? What are the dynamics of these various tension axes? How could the United States and other regional and international powers help avert such potential outbreaks? The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a panel featuring Martin Indyk of the Brookings Institution, Kenneth Pollack of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), MEI’s Bilal Y. Saab, Julianne Smith of the Center for New American Security (CNAS) to discuss these mounting tensions and how best to address them. MEI’s senior vice president for policy research and programs, Paul Salem, will moderate the discussion.
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9. Decentralization in Tunisia — Empowering Towns, Engaging People | Thursday, May 17 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register here |
Tunisia’s first ever democratic local elections in May are a crucial step in the country’s efforts to devolve power from the national to the local level. In their latest paper, Decentralization in Tunisia: Empowering Towns, Engaging People, Carnegie Fellow Sarah Yerkes and Vice President for Studies Marwan Muasher argue that if done right, decentralization will both empower local actors and introduce a new political class outside of the country’s traditionally dominant political parties. Successful decentralization requires strong political will from central government officials, who must demonstrate their commitment to participatory local governance both on paper and in practice, and from local officials who must build trust with their constituents, provide opportunities for citizen engagement, and prevent the recreation of ineffective institutions at the local level. With the participation of Carnegie Senior Vice President for Studies Thomas Carothers and PBS NewsHour’s P.J. Tobia in the first session (10:05 – 10:45); Director of the Tunisian Institute of Elected Officials Elyès Ghanmi, independent consultant on local and international governance Laura J. Hogg, and programmes director at the Jasmine Foundation and researcher at Sciences Po Paris Intissar Kherigi with Sarah Yerkes and Marwan Muasher in the second session (10:50 – 12:15).
A light lunch will follow.
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10. The Transatlantic Alliance and the Western Balkans | Thursday, May 17 | 10:30am – 12:30pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register here |
Amid a growing number of foreign policy rifts between the United States and the European Union, the Western Balkans remains one region where the new US administration has identified an opportunity for close cooperation with Brussels. As European political leaders convene in Sofia for the Western Balkan Summit, we will talk about the past and present challenges to transatlantic cooperation in the Western Balkans and how these might be overcome. As European political leaders convene in Sofia for the Western Balkan Summit, we will talk about the past and present challenges to transatlantic cooperation in the Western Balkans and how these might be overcome. The timing for such a discussion is critical, given the renewed secessionist threats in the region and the need for a joint US and EU response to grapple with this challenge. A conversation with Lord Paddy Ashdown, Member of the House of Lords and former High Representative and EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ms. Marsaili Fraser; former Head of the Political Department of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Mr. James O’Brien, Vice Chair of Albright Stonebridge Group and former Special Presidential Envoy for the Balkans; moderated by Dr. Majda Ruge, Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins SAIS.
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11. Politics and Economics in Putin’s Fourth Term | Friday, May 18 | 9:45am – 11:00am | Atlantic Council | Register here |
As Vladimir Putin begins an unprecedented fourth term as president of Russia, his country stands at a critical crossroads. With a volatile economy and an increasingly authoritarian government, the country is facing high levels of political and economic uncertainty. At this event, Vladimir Milov, Russian opposition politician and economist, will join a panel of US-based experts to discuss the political and economic future of Putin’s Russia. Featuring Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center Dr. Anders Åslund and David M. Rubenstein Fellow at the Brookings Institution Dr. Alina Polyakova, with moderation by Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center Ambassador John Herbst.
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12. Can Inclusive Peace Processes Work? Strategies for Meeting Resistance to Inclusion | Friday, May 18 | 10:00am – 11:30am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Too often, peace processes only include dueling parties — leaving women; religious, indigenous, and ethnic groups; youth; and survivors of violence excluded from critical discussions that shape the future landscape of a country. Yet, sidelining their voices often results in a resurgence of conflict and fails to achieve comprehensive or sustainable peace. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and Conciliation Resources for a discussion on overcoming challenges to inclusive peace processes and negotiated settlements. The research draws on case studies and local perspectives with local partners from Colombia, Bougainville and Nepal, exploring how inclusion is negotiated in war to peace transitions, common barriers to and trade-offs between inclusion and stability, and types of external and internal support that have been effective. In three segments: Presentation of Findings with Zahbia Yousuf (Senior Advisor, Peace and Transition Process, Conciliation Resources) and Sophia Close (Senior Advisor, Gender and Peacebuilding, Conciliation Resources); Application and Experiences on the Ground with Deepak Thapa (Director, Social Science Baha; Kathmandu, Nepal) and Rosa Emilia Salamanca (Director, Institute for Social and Economic Research and Action; Bogota, Colombia); and Policy Implications with Esra Cuhadar (JR Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace) and Jennifer Marron (Peace Process Advisor, Bureau of Conflict Stabilization and Operations, Department of State). With moderator Rosarie Tucci (Director, Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace) and introduction by Nancy Lindborg (President, U.S. Institute of Peace).
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No formula for success
The downsides of withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal are all too obvious. But it behooves any conflict management type like me to consider the other side: what does the Administration think it will accomplish, and why do some allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia support withdrawal?
The Administration is saying that its main reason for withdrawing was the sunset clause, that is the expiration of parts of the agreement seven years from now. That sounds silly: why not wait until just before the agreement expires to threaten re-imposition of sanctions in order to negotiate a follow-on agreement? The answer is that Washington is trying to prevent Iran from gaining the economic benefits that will accrue during those seven years.
The Administration’s goal is to squeeze Iran through not only re-imposition of US sanctions but also through secondary sanctions that will dis-incentivize European, Russian, Chinese, and other companies from doing business with Tehran. Proponents of withdrawal believe this will at least limit Iranian capabilities–non-nuclear as well as nuclear–and make Iran less of a threat in the future. Some Americans seem to hope it will even bring the Islamic Republic to its knees, precipitating regime change.
These effects would depend on virtually universal adherence to the re-imposed sanctions. Why would the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese play ball? A well-informed Israeli put it this way, with respect to the Europeans: they fear war with Iran more than they fear re-imposition of sanctions. They will, in other words, go along in order to avoid an American attack on Iran. Even if you believe that–and I doubt it–it leaves Russia and China unconstrained. They are unlikely to be as easily cowed as the Europeans. They and many other countries will gladly do business with Iran, surreptitiously if not openly.
There is thus no reason to believe that sanctions can be made nearly as tight as they were in 2015 when the UN Security Council was unanimous and the nuclear deal was negotiated. Nor do I think the Europeans will buckle easily to American will. They are far more likely to try to sustain the agreement, which is what Iranian President Rouhani is saying he wants to do as well, so long as Tehran sees the consequent economic benefits.
If the Europeans withdraw, I suspect the Iranians will ramp up their enrichment activity and weapons research so as to reduce their breakout time to well under the one year the nuclear deal was designed to maintain. But Tehran will also want enough transparency through international inspections to ensure that the Israelis and Americans can be reasonably confident they are not actually producing nuclear weapons. It is not in Tehran’s interest for there to be any doubt on that score, since Israel can be expected to react or even pre-empt in kind if it perceives that it might be subject to a nuclear attack.
As for the hope that Iran may be constrained or even fatally weakened by re-imposed sanctions, that day is far off. It suits the Islamic Republic, especially its hardliners, well to have a foreign enemy it can blame for its own economic failures. The public demonstrations of the last year or so occurred precisely because the regime could no longer blame only the foreigners. Nor do I know of any regime that has wanted nuclear weapons that couldn’t find the financial resources to fund the program. North Korea has demonstrated how even a very poor country can do it. Iran will do likewise, no matter what sanctions are re-imposed.
As in many things, Trump has over-estimated his own power and underestimated his enemy. That is not a formula for success.
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BIG mistake
As expected, Donald Trump today announced American withdrawal from the nuclear deal, re-imposition of sanctions, and a threat of sanctions against any country that helps Iran’s economy. He justifies these moves on the basis of Iran’s missile program, support for terrorists and regional behavior, none of which are covered under the agreement.
It is uncertain what will happen next, but it is Tehran’s move. Its main options are
- Maintain the nuclear agreement, along with Europe, China and Russia. That will create an enormous split in the West and discourage allies in Asia from joining with the US in a nuclear agreement with North Korea. It will also provide Iran with the lion’s share of the economic benefits it was promised, at least until the US levies secondary sanctions on European, Russian and Chinese banks and companies that do business with Iran. When the US does that, it will drive the Europeans into the arms of the Iranians, Chinese and Russians.
- Withdraw itself and re-embark on its nuclear weapons program. It is likely not much more than a year from having nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. We won’t know as much as we do today about Iran’s nuclear capability, because the Iranians will likely kick out the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Tehran may try to maintain some level of nuclear transparency, not least because of the risks associated with misunderstanding of its intentions. No one in Iran should want Israel to conclude that a nuclear weapon is being mounted on a missile. We all know how the Israelis would deal with that eventuality.
I’d bet on Tehran choosing Option 1, which provides economic and diplomatic benefit not available in Option 2.
In both options, the US and Israel are losers. Trump has done precisely what the hardliners in Iran have wanted. His pitch at the end of his TV appearance to the Iranian people will fall on deaf ears, crowded out by the chorus of denunciation of the US and its unreliability. Some of the hardliners will want to retaliate against the US in Iraq, Syria, or even in the US.
This is the worst US foreign policy decision since the invasion of Iraq, but with one important difference: the entire intelligence community and a good part of the cabinet believes Iran has been fulfilling the terms of the nuclear agreement and the US is wrong to withdraw. President Bush at least had the lame excuse that the intelligence community told him Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons. This president has no one else to blame for a blatantly BIG mistake.
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