Tag: North Korea
No formula for success
The downsides of withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal are all too obvious. But it behooves any conflict management type like me to consider the other side: what does the Administration think it will accomplish, and why do some allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia support withdrawal?
The Administration is saying that its main reason for withdrawing was the sunset clause, that is the expiration of parts of the agreement seven years from now. That sounds silly: why not wait until just before the agreement expires to threaten re-imposition of sanctions in order to negotiate a follow-on agreement? The answer is that Washington is trying to prevent Iran from gaining the economic benefits that will accrue during those seven years.
The Administration’s goal is to squeeze Iran through not only re-imposition of US sanctions but also through secondary sanctions that will dis-incentivize European, Russian, Chinese, and other companies from doing business with Tehran. Proponents of withdrawal believe this will at least limit Iranian capabilities–non-nuclear as well as nuclear–and make Iran less of a threat in the future. Some Americans seem to hope it will even bring the Islamic Republic to its knees, precipitating regime change.
These effects would depend on virtually universal adherence to the re-imposed sanctions. Why would the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese play ball? A well-informed Israeli put it this way, with respect to the Europeans: they fear war with Iran more than they fear re-imposition of sanctions. They will, in other words, go along in order to avoid an American attack on Iran. Even if you believe that–and I doubt it–it leaves Russia and China unconstrained. They are unlikely to be as easily cowed as the Europeans. They and many other countries will gladly do business with Iran, surreptitiously if not openly.
There is thus no reason to believe that sanctions can be made nearly as tight as they were in 2015 when the UN Security Council was unanimous and the nuclear deal was negotiated. Nor do I think the Europeans will buckle easily to American will. They are far more likely to try to sustain the agreement, which is what Iranian President Rouhani is saying he wants to do as well, so long as Tehran sees the consequent economic benefits.
If the Europeans withdraw, I suspect the Iranians will ramp up their enrichment activity and weapons research so as to reduce their breakout time to well under the one year the nuclear deal was designed to maintain. But Tehran will also want enough transparency through international inspections to ensure that the Israelis and Americans can be reasonably confident they are not actually producing nuclear weapons. It is not in Tehran’s interest for there to be any doubt on that score, since Israel can be expected to react or even pre-empt in kind if it perceives that it might be subject to a nuclear attack.
As for the hope that Iran may be constrained or even fatally weakened by re-imposed sanctions, that day is far off. It suits the Islamic Republic, especially its hardliners, well to have a foreign enemy it can blame for its own economic failures. The public demonstrations of the last year or so occurred precisely because the regime could no longer blame only the foreigners. Nor do I know of any regime that has wanted nuclear weapons that couldn’t find the financial resources to fund the program. North Korea has demonstrated how even a very poor country can do it. Iran will do likewise, no matter what sanctions are re-imposed.
As in many things, Trump has over-estimated his own power and underestimated his enemy. That is not a formula for success.
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BIG mistake
As expected, Donald Trump today announced American withdrawal from the nuclear deal, re-imposition of sanctions, and a threat of sanctions against any country that helps Iran’s economy. He justifies these moves on the basis of Iran’s missile program, support for terrorists and regional behavior, none of which are covered under the agreement.
It is uncertain what will happen next, but it is Tehran’s move. Its main options are
- Maintain the nuclear agreement, along with Europe, China and Russia. That will create an enormous split in the West and discourage allies in Asia from joining with the US in a nuclear agreement with North Korea. It will also provide Iran with the lion’s share of the economic benefits it was promised, at least until the US levies secondary sanctions on European, Russian and Chinese banks and companies that do business with Iran. When the US does that, it will drive the Europeans into the arms of the Iranians, Chinese and Russians.
- Withdraw itself and re-embark on its nuclear weapons program. It is likely not much more than a year from having nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. We won’t know as much as we do today about Iran’s nuclear capability, because the Iranians will likely kick out the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Tehran may try to maintain some level of nuclear transparency, not least because of the risks associated with misunderstanding of its intentions. No one in Iran should want Israel to conclude that a nuclear weapon is being mounted on a missile. We all know how the Israelis would deal with that eventuality.
I’d bet on Tehran choosing Option 1, which provides economic and diplomatic benefit not available in Option 2.
In both options, the US and Israel are losers. Trump has done precisely what the hardliners in Iran have wanted. His pitch at the end of his TV appearance to the Iranian people will fall on deaf ears, crowded out by the chorus of denunciation of the US and its unreliability. Some of the hardliners will want to retaliate against the US in Iraq, Syria, or even in the US.
This is the worst US foreign policy decision since the invasion of Iraq, but with one important difference: the entire intelligence community and a good part of the cabinet believes Iran has been fulfilling the terms of the nuclear agreement and the US is wrong to withdraw. President Bush at least had the lame excuse that the intelligence community told him Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons. This president has no one else to blame for a blatantly BIG mistake.
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The faster the better
The Trump Administration is well into the process of self-destruction. The evidence:
- It can’t decide whether the President himself paid hush money to a porn star or his enforcer/fixer did it without his knowledge.
- The Trump real estate empire disposed of large quantities of cash of uncertain origin in the decade prior to the 2016 election.
- Efforts to negotiate more favorable trade deals with China, Canada and Mexico are bellying up.
- Economic and job growth are slowing and the stock market has stalled.
- Trump has created a lose-lose situation for himself on the Iran nuclear deal and is headed in that direction with North Korea.
Any one of these items would be devastating to most American administrations, but Trump has managed to lower the bar for presidential performance so dramatically it hardly matters at this point.
With regard to items 1 and 2, I’m confident the Special Counsel will find the answers. He has the computers, cell phones and other records of Trump’s personal lawyer. He no doubt also has ample financial records for the Trump enterprises. Let’s wait for his investigation to discover the truth, which I doubt will be pretty.
Trump’s aggressive approach to trade is producing an equally aggressive reaction. The Chinese booted his proposals last week. Mexico and Canada are stiffening their resistance. Trump could end up imposing tariffs that will spark retaliation against American food and other exports, shredding the rural and manufacturing support that was vital to his election. Meanwhile, the trade deficit is up since his election, but no one notices because he makes so much noise.
The same is true for the economy more generally. While the press for some reason continues to laud economic and job growth figures that are no better (and recently worse) than the Obama performance they categorized as “lackluster,” the business cycle is aging and Trump’s initiatives are all inflationary. His tariffs, tax cuts, and overblown budget deficit are generating inflation and will soon cause a rise in interest rates, precipitating a slowdown and likely a recession. This could happen well before the 2020 election, if not before this year’s Congressional contests.
On the nuclear deal with Iran, Trump will either stay in despite his often expressed preference or get out, causing either a major rift with Europe or triggering an Iranian push to get nuclear weapons. That’s a lose-lose. Likewise with North Korea: either he buys what Kim Jong-un is selling, which won’t be the US goal of complete, irreversible or verifiable denuclearization, or he walks away without a Plan B. That too is a lose-lose.
You can’t sell flim flam forever. Sooner or later it all catches with you. That’s what’s happening. The faster the better.
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“Wicked” globalism
“Wicked” is the word wonks use to describe problems that are difficult to solve because they are so complex it is difficult to predict the impact of anything you do, which may cause consequences different from those you intend. That’s what is happening today: the US is facing nuclear issues with both North Korea and Iran that defy resolution in part because they may interact in both predictable and unpredictable ways.
This was not necessary. President Trump has chosen to schedule a decision for withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal for May 12, the date on which Congress requires him to certify whether continuing it is in the US interest. He refused to do that three months ago, without consequences. This time around he says he’ll withdraw if the deal isn’t “fixed” to include ballistic missile and eliminate the expiration clauses. There is no indication that can be done in the time frame available, though the Europeans are trying to back him down by committing to a follow-on agreement. The Iranians, however, show no sign of being interested in that.
Meanwhile, things are moving in the other direction with North Korea, which has expressed some interest in “denuclearization,” though what that means to Kim Jong-un is not yet clear. It almost surely doesn’t mean “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization” that the Americans want. The North Koreans have a long history of reneging on agreements with the international community, but the Trump Administration seems determined to ignore that and instead seek still another one. Trump has already given Kim a big prize: the promise of a meeting that will legitimize Kim’s regime, something he would have criticized ferociously had his predecessor done it. Any agreement will have to involve some concessions from the US, likely on the American military presence in South Korea and maybe elsewhere in Asia.
Israeli President Netanyahu today went on TV to demonstrate that Iran was lying when it claimed not to have a nuclear weapons program prior to 2004. That was already well known. How that is supposed to undermine the agreement concluded in 2015 known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not clear. The JCPOA committed Iran to international inspections that have so far confirmed there is no longer a nuclear weapons program, as well as dismantling of most of Iran’s centrifuges and one of its reactors. The JCPOA looks to many like a good antidote to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Netanyahu’s TV appearance confirmed that.
Trump has nevertheless indicated he will withdraw from it and reimpose unilateral sanctions. That will give Iran the option of sustaining the agreement with the Europeans (thus splitting them from the US and weakening the impact of sanctions) or withdrawing and going hell bent for nuclear weapons. Neither outcome would benefit the US. Withdrawal would also give North Korea good reason to doubt that any agreement with the US concerning its nuclear program will be maintained, though admittedly it already has ample reason for doubts. Iran racing for nuclear weapons would certainly give North Korea more than enough reason to hold on to its own.
This trifecta of likely bad outcomes has not been enough to convince Trump that he should override whatever promises he made during his election campaign. Most Americans support the JCPOA. But Trump isn’t interested in what most Americans think, only what his deep-pocketed donors like Sheldon Adelson think. That’s what Trump meant when he told French President Macron he would withdraw from the JCPOA due to domestic political pressure.
Netanyahu has also ordered airstrikes on Iranian facilities in Syria that reportedly store missiles for use against Israel. Tehran, including the Iranian Supreme Leader, has promised a response, while denying any Iranians were killed. Escalation of the tit-for-tat in Syria could well get out of hand, leading to a still wider war and even the Israeli ground invasion Syrians often warn of. The Americans have shown no interest in joining such an enterprise to drive the Iranians back from the Israeli border, but they likely aren’t saying a loud “no” to it either.
We are at one of those tipping points, like the eve of the Iraq war. The US can barge ahead on its current path, with some predictable negative consequences and likely many other unpredictable ones, though it is hard to think of positive outcomes. Or it can pause, rethink, and try to unravel the global interconnections that make its current course so likely to produce bad results. Globalism has its virtues, but it also has its exceedingly complicated, “wicked,” side. Clarifying problems so they can be solved is a lot better than muddying them, as Trump and Netanyahu both prefer to do.
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Crunch time
Pantelis Ikonomou, a retired IAEA inspector, writes:
For 25 years the international community with its competent institutions led by the world super powers failed to block the nuclear military program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and to impose adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Geostrategic miscalculations or leaders’ inability were probably the cause of the persistent failure. The US has done well to unblock the situation, but major obstacles lie ahead.
Here is a short but characteristic history of facts:
- In 1992, IAEA inspectors found inconsistencies in DPRK’s nuclear declarations. The year after, DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Just one day before the withdrawal was due, the US persuaded DPRK to suspend its decision.
- In December 1993, the IAEA announced that it could no longer provide “any meaningful assurances” that DPRK was not producing nuclear weapons. A US initiative saved the situation again. An Agreed Framework was signed between the US and DPRK in Geneva and the IAEA had to monitor its implementation.
- In December 2002, DPRK tampered with IAEA surveillance equipment. A few days later DPRK requested the immediate removal of IAEA inspectors from the country and announced its withdrawal from the NPT.
- In April 2003, DPRK declared it had nuclear weapons. A renewed US initiative led to the six-party talks (USA, China, Russia, South Korea, Japan and DPRK) on solving the nuclear crisis.
- In the following years, DPRK was repeatedly accused of violating the Agreed Framework and other international agreements. Several UNSC and IAEA resolutions were triggered with strong US leadership.
The upcoming May summit of Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un presents a unique opportunity to overcome a long-lasting failure. The political determination of both leaders is certainly the prerequisite for a decisive agreement on the “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”
Hence, the US will have to deploy a serious negotiating team with technical experts. The successful implementation of a complex final deal will depend on the completeness and clarity of the comprehensive Plan of Action to be compiled. It should cover all issues related to nuclear, missile and sanctions, linked to relevant UNSC and IAEA resolutions, as well as mutual commitments on military presence in the area. Notably, all these agreed actions ought to be verifiable and irreversible.
The partly analogous P5+1 Iran deal (JCPOA), although lacking the DPRK’s nuclear military dimension, offers a carefully elaborated model. Yet, at the same time it represents a time bomb: US withdrawal on May 12, as the President has presaged, would be just before the Trump/Kim summit. If that happens, why should Kim Jong-un trust his negotiating partner?
I would add this:
It makes no sense for the US to withdraw from the Iran deal, since that will trigger either renewal of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program (without IAEA inspectors present) or a dramatic breach with America’s European allies (and possibly both). Trump’s loud criticism of the deal has limited the economic benefits to Iran and gotten the Europeans to start talking about an expanded, follow-on version that would limit Iran’s missile program and extend the timeframe. Trump gains nothing more, and loses a lot, if he withdraws.
If, as this suggests, he stays in the Iran deal, that still does not guarantee Trump success with Kim, who has already gotten the audiences with Presidents Xi, Moon, and soon Trump that give him the legitimacy he craves. Kim’s promise of denuclearization is not new. He promised the same in 2005 and never delivered. The decommissioning of the DPRK’s nuclear test site will grab headlines in the next week or so, but keen observers believe the geology there is now so precarious due to underground nuclear tests that it is already unusable.
Meanwhile the US is reported to be talking with Asian allies about the future of its military presence in South Korea. It is precarious, since it is far too small and vulnerable to do much against a DPRK invasion, but serves as a tripwire for broader US intervention if it comes under fire. Kim will aim to eliminate it entirely once a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War is signed, something Trump may even welcome as he made it clear long ago he doesn’t want to be responsible for the security of our Asian allies and suggested they might want to get nuclear weapons of their own.
May is crunch time for the Iran deal and the Rocket Man/Dotard Summit. Hold on tight. It may be a wild ride.
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Peace picks, April 29 – May 6
- Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis: Searching for Relief | Monday, April 30 | 9:00am – 10:30am | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Please join the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center for a critical discussion on the multiple dimensions of the humanitarian crisis, how it has evolved through time, and what can be done to alleviate the suffering. Featuring speakers Diego Beltrand, Regional Director for South America at the International Organization for Migration; Chiara Cardoletti, Deputy Regional Representative to the United States of America and the Caribbean with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR); Julio Castro, Professor in the Infectious Diseases Unit at the Universidad Central de Venezuela; Michael Fitzpatrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary with the United States State Department; José Manuel Olivares, Representative from the National Assembly of Venezuela; and Susana Raffalli, Venezuelanh humanitarian expert. Moderated by , U.S. News Director for NTN24 Gustau Alegret, with remarks by Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Director Jason Marczak.
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- Oman’s Role in a Turbulent Region | Monday, April 30 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
In the midst of a series of diplomatic crises in the Gulf region, Oman stands out as a widely-respected regional mediator and has also led working groups in China and India on bilateral economic ties as well as maintained cordial relations with Iran. What is Oman’s role in promoting diplomacy, security and stability in the Gulf, and the prospects for Oman’s growing economic ties in the region and around the world? The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host Sayyid Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Oman, to address these pressing questions about Oman’s future. Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein, MEI’s director for Gulf affairs and government relations, will moderate the discussion.
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- Behind the Scenes of Russian Opposition Campaigns | Monday, April 30 | 3:30pm – 5:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
How do you run an election campaign when you know that your candidate will not win? What lessons do the latest campaigns offer for the future? The managers of Alexei Navalny’s and Ksenia Sobchak’s 2018 Russian presidential campaigns will discuss their experience and the future of opposition campaigning in Russia. Featuring Leonid Volkov, Chief of Staff for Alexey Navalny, and Vitali Shkliarov, Senior Adviser to Ksenia Sobchak.
There will be a webcast of this event.
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- Denuclearizing North Korea: Practicalities and Politics | Tuesday, May 1 | 9:00am – 12:00pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register here |
In the aftermath of the inter-Korean summit on April 27, and ahead of planned U.S.-North Korea talks, please join Carnegie for a deep dive on the practicalities and politics of denuclearizing North Korea. With two sessions: Denuclearization Roadmaps at 9:10am – 10:30am, featuring Corey Hinderstein (vice president of international fuel cycle strategies at the Nuclear Threat Initiative), Eli Levite (nonresident senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment), Li Bin (senior fellow working jointly with the Nucelar Policy Program and the Carnegie Endowment), and Toby Dalton (co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment); and Regional, Political, and Diplomatic Dimensions from 10:45am – 12:00pm, featuring Choi Kang (vice president for research and director of the Center for Foreign Policy and National Security at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies), Douglas H. Paal (vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment), Jung H. Pak (senior fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation chair in Korea studies at Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies), and James L. Schoff (senior fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment). Opening remarks by George Perkovich (vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment).
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- Iraq After ISIS: What to Do Now | Tuesday, May 1 | 12:15pm – 1:45pm | New America | Register here |
In 2017, the United States dealt ISIS a devastating blow eliminating its territorial holdings in Iraq and Syria. Iraq, which will hold national elections on May 12th, emerged out of the war against ISIS strong and in an increasingly positive mood. Yet as Iraq looks ahead to a post-ISIS future, numerous challenges lie ahead. In a new policy report, Iraq After ISIS: What to Do Now, Bartle Bull, author and founder of Northern Gulf Partners, an Iraq-focused merchant banking firm, and Douglas Ollivant, (ASU Senior Future of War Fellow with New America and former Director for Iraq on the National Security Council, propose the contours of a positive, forward-looking U.S.-Iraqi relationship. In discussion moderated by Peter Bergen, Vice President and Director of the International Security Program at New America.
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- Eurasia and Afghanistan – A New Era of Regional Cooperation | Wednesday, May 2 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies (Johns Hopkins University) | Register here |
Despite present challenges to global security and the international liberal order, the South/Central Asian region remains a dynamic and fast-changing region and over the past couple of decades and has shown that increased regional cooperation is indispensable to achieving development goals and stability in the region. Four experts on the region – Afghanistan Ambassador to the United States Hamdullah Mohib, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Earl Anthony Wayne, former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and Ambassador to Pakistan Richard Olson, and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel – will analyze the recent progress in regional cooperation, peace process, and the economic integration in broader Eurasian context impacting Afghanistan and Central Asian countries. The discussion will be moderated by Dr. Kent Calder, with introductions by Rohullah Osmani, Visiting Scholar of the Reischauer Center.
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- Japan’s Security Strategy: A Political Update from Nagatacho | Thursday, May 3 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register here |
Please join CSIS for an exchange with Japanese thought leaders on the security policy debate in Nagatacho (a district in central Tokyo where the national parliament, or Diet, is located) and priorities for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Featuring Gen Nakatani (Liberal Democratic Party; Former Minister of Defense), Akihisa Nagashima (Party of Hope; Former Vice Minister of Defense), and Satoshi Morimoto (Takushoku University; Former Minister of Defense), with Sheila Smith (Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, Council on Foreign Relations) and Michael J. Green (Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS).
This event will be webcast live from this page. No registration necessary.
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- Cyber Risk Thursday: Building a Defensible Cyberspace | Thursday, May 3 | 4:00pm – 5:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
This Cyber Risk Thursday, join the Cyber Statecraft Initiative as we engage key experts and stakeholders for a progressive and solutions-oriented discussion on the defensive innovations and methodologies that can helps secure cyberspace and its underlying infrastructure. A conversation with panelists Gus Hunt (Managing Director and Cyber Lead, Accenture Federal Services) and Jason Healey (Senior Fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Atlantic Council). With welcoming remarks by Frederick Kempe (President and CEO, Atlantic Council), opening remarks by John Goodman (CEO, Accenture Federal Services), and introductory remarks by Dr. Joseph Nye (University Distinguished Service Professor, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government).
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- Time for Action in the Western Balkans: Policy Prescriptions for American Diplomacy | Friday, May 4 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
The Western Balkans — Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Albania, and Serbia — are re-emerging as a region of stagnation and instability due to poor governance, the influence of outside forces and tense relations between ethnic groups and neighboring states. A forthcoming report by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and the EastWest Institute highlights the need for immediate, decisive action by the U.S. and the European Union to head off instability and possible violent strife. Please join the U.S. Institute of Peace to hear from the authors of the report — Amb. Frank G. Wisner (International Affairs Advisor, Squire Patton Boggs and former U.S. ambassador to Zambia, Egypt, the Philippines and India), Jonathan Levitsky (Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, and former Counselor to Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations), Amb. Cameron Munter (CEO and President, the EastWest Institute and former U.S. Ambassador to Serbia and Pakistan), and Tom Graham (Senior Fellow and Managing Director, Kissinger Associates, Inc.) — as they present a strategy for the United States and Europe, working in a revitalized partnership, to forestall a downward spiral in the Western Balkans, which could potentially lead to fractured states and widespread instability on Europe’s borders. In conversation with moderator Amb. Sarah Mendelson (Distinguished Service Professor of Public Policy and Head of Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University, and former U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council at the United Nations).
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