Tag: North Korea
Hardliners
There isn’t much more to be said about President Trump’s recent appointments than that: future Director of the National Economic Council Alan Kudlow, National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are all harder line on trade, North Korea and Iran than their more “adult” predecessors. Ditto the new lawyers Trump is bringing in to the White House to protect himself from Special Counsel Mueller. Joe DiGenova is an attack dog, not serious legal practitioner. The only adult left is Secretary of Defense Mattis, whose days could be numbered, if only because Pompeo and Bolton will push him in directions he doesn’t want to go.
What can we, and the world, expect for the next year?
In a word: conflict. Even if Trump doesn’t follow Bolton’s advice to go to war against both Iran and Korea, the president is likely to pull the plug on the Iran nuclear deal and use his proposed meeting with Kim Jong-un to set up a casus belli. These moves will at the very least strain relations with US allies in Europe and Asia, reducing American influence on both continents and creating openings for Russia and China to fill vacuums there.
Trump has already precipitated sharp falls in the stock market with his announcement of aluminum and steel tariffs as well as his intention to impose tariffs on a broad range of Chinese goods. The tariffs, massive budget deficit, and tax cuts are all inflationary moves, on top of an economy that has been performing close to capacity pretty much since Barack Obama took office in 2009. The Fed will react by increasing interest rates to slow the economy and preempt inflation. The end of the long recovery from the 2008 financial crisis is in sight.
Tighten your seat belts one more notch. Trump is also likely to fire Special Counsel Mueller, who has clearly breached the President’s red line, drawn to protect himself from any inquiry into his finances. That’s where the crux of the Russia investigation lies: Trump’s real estate empire is highly dependent on hot Russian money, which Putin controls. That’s why Trump fears him. The legal team Trump is assembling is not one that could capably defend Trump in court or even prepare him for an interview with Mueller. The President thinks he is immune. His only defense will be offense.
On top of all this, three different women are going public with their stories of sexual encounters with Trump, Cambridge Analytica is facing accusations that it abused personal data and violated campaign finance laws (with some eyes wide shut from Facebook), and relations between the Trump campaign and the United Arab Emirates as well as the Russian intelligence service are coming into focus. Any one of these scandals would be headline news were it not for everything else going on. Distraction is one of Trump’s main tactics.
What does it all add up to? A sharp decline in American prestige and power has already begun: we are overspending on conventional military hardware in a period of cyber and other nonconventional threats, we are blowing up a thriving economy, we are risking two catastrophic wars, we are challenging trading and investment partners with a weak and ineffectual tariff attack, and Trump is embarrassing the country with salacious sexual, financial, and intelligence scandals.
Russian President Putin and Chinese President Xi are laughing at a president who inflicts more damage on America than they could ever imagine doing. American allies are panicking. Trump is making America small again. His hardliners will now make things worse.
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Opportunity or trap
Pantelis Ikonomou, a former IAEA nuclear safeguards inspector, writes:
US President Trump suddenly decided to accept a meeting with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un. Was it an erratic reaction to a long-lasting deadlock? Or was it conscious cutting of the Gordian knot, a well-planned move towards the solution of the nuclear crisis?
Whichever, it undoubtedly represents a fundamental change in the basic US prerequisite “no dialogue without promise of complete denuclearization.” This now turns into “dialogue to achieve denuclearization.”
This change will be understood, at least by North Korea, as US policy tuning toward reality: recognizing the fact that military elimination of the country’s nuclear capabilities would be a tragic operation with no winner. Nuclear deterrence, which North Korea has long struggled for and finally achieved, has become Kim Jong-un’s strongest negotiation card.
Fifteen years after North Korea left the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) the US, as the leader of the six-party effort to solve the constantly escalating nuclear crisis, is now facing an unprecedented challenge: to negotiate a lasting end to this grave nuclear crisis. The road is not short and presents crucial obstacles, quite different from those encountered in the Iran deal. It is worth anticipating a few of them:
- While North Korea will seek recognition as a Nuclear Weapons State with a status equivalent to that of India and Pakistan, the US will call for North Korea to terminate all its nuclear tests and related nuclear activities with a possible military dimension.
- Agreement on waiving of UN and US sanctions in exchange for a verifiable and irreversible implementation of the agreed outcome.
- Accomplishing a new balance between two basic theses: “denuclearize the Korean Peninsula” and “removing the threat (US nuclear umbrella included) until Pyongyang feels secure.”
However, if president Trump’s sudden decision was just an erratic reaction distant from any rational concept or strategy, then he is walking into a risky trap, even a dangerous situation with a deeply uncertain outcome.
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From bad to worse
President Trump’s choice of CIA Director Pompeo to replace Secretary of State Tillerson, tweet-fired summarily this morning, bodes ill.
Tillerson was a bad Secretary of State: notoriously out of touch with the President and the White House, he gutted both people and positions at his department, losing talent and capacity at a breathtaking pace. His views were nevertheless more sensible than Trump’s on many issues: Joyce Karam on Twitter pointed out that they differed on Iran, Russia, climate change, Qatar, trade and Jerusalem. I’d add North Korea to that list. But that only increased the incoherence of the Trump Administration, which is setting records for inability to sing from the same sheet of music.
Pompeo is made of different stuff. He mostly agrees with Trump’s radical views, in particular on Iran (he advocated bombing) and North Korea (he wants regime change, though he has presumably saluted for the one-on-one meeting with Kim Jong-un). He differs from Trump mainly on Russia, where he is much harder-nosed than a president who can’t bring himself to criticize Vladimir Putin even for attempted murder with nerve agent in an allied country. He is unlikely to be much friendlier to State Department personnel than his predecessor, but he will carry more weight at the White House. Pompeo is no dummy: he was first in his class at West Point and editor of the Harvard Law Review before going into business and eventually wining a Congressional seat in Kansas.
Pompeo’s replacement at the CIA will be Gina Haspel, the current deputy director and the first woman to be nominated as director. After 9/11, she is reputed to have run a CIA prison that tortured prisoners and to have ordered destruction of videotapes documenting the torture. She appears to have spent her entire career as a professional in the clandestine service, so little more is known about her. It is reasonable to expect continuity at CIA, but in any event we know little about what goes on there until well after the fact. It is likely that she will represent the views of the Agency’s professional analysts and operators, who are good at warning about all the things that can go wrong.
Trump is in a mood to surround himself with people who agree. Pompeo may not be a “yes” man–more likely he just shares the President’s far-out opinions. That raises again the question about how long National Security Adviser McMaster will last. He has been out of sync with Trump on North Korea, Iran, and Russia, three of today’s most pressing issues. Defense Secretary Mattis is a bit less contrary, and too weighty to fire without consequences.
Admittedly we are near the bottom of the barrel. But in my view, Pompeo and Haspel are in no way improvements. More likely we are going from bad to worse.
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Peace picks, March 12 – March 18
- Thinking the Unthinkable: War on the Korean Peninsula | Tuesday, March 13 | 9:00am – 12:00pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |
The possibility of a U.S. military strike against North Korea to prevent Pyongyang from acquiring the capability to hit the United States with a nuclear weapon has stimulated debates about North Korea’s intentions. Is Kim Jong-un’s primary goal deterrence against U.S. invasion? Or does he have a much more offensive agenda, such as the unification of the Korean Peninsula through the use of force? Analysis of North Korea’s intentions has profound implications for what policy responses are required to thwart the regime’s ambitions and get ahead of its tactical maneuvers designed to reach those goals. On March 13, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings will host leading U.S. experts to explore the possibility of an offensive-minded North Korea and its policy implications, and assess the humanitarian, economic, political, and logistical costs of a military conflict on the Korean peninsula. Featuring Sue Mi Terry (Senior Fellow, CSIS), Mara Karlin (Professor, Johns Hopkins SAIS), and Bruce Klingner (Senior Research Fellow, the Heritage Foundation), among others.
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- Egypt’s Private Sector In Challenging Regional Environment | Tuesday, March 13 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register here |
Egypt has embarked on a comprehensive reform package after signing a 12 billion USD loan agreement with the IMF. The government has passed laws to provide more incentives for both domestic and foreign investors, and US companies are increasing their presence in the country. At the same time, Egypt benefits from several FTA agreements with the Middle East and African countries and serves as an investment hub for multinational companies operating in the region. This panel will address the reforms achieved and those in making and discuss chances to further strengthen US-Egypt relationship. Featuring Tarek Tawfik (President, AmCham Egypt), Steve Lutes (Executive Director U.S.–Egypt Business Council, U.S. Chamber of Commerce), and Dina H. Sherif (CEO & Co-Founder, Ahead of the Curve), among others.
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- Present and future dangers on the eve of Vladimir Putin’s reelection | Wednesday, March 14 | 9:00am – 10:45am | American Enterprise Institute | Register here |
On the eve of his reelection, President Vladimir Putin has the world wondering what else he may do and what the political, diplomatic, and military fallout could be. Will the near-stagnant economy, Western sanctions, and diplomatic pressure lead to a more restrained Russian foreign policy? Or will Putin continue an aggressive, interventionist track to bolster his popularity at home? If aggression against post-Soviet states is key to Putin’s search for legitimacy, which countries are most at risk? And what are the implications for US and European policy? Join AEI for the release of “To Have and to Hold: Putin’s Quest for Control in the Former Soviet Empire,” which details the military, political, economic, and social vulnerabilities of six of Russia’s neighboring countries. To mark the publication, Leon Aron (Director of Russian Studie, AEI) will be joined by Seth Moulton (Congressman for Massachusetts), followed by a panel discussion featuring Agnia Grigas (Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council) and Michael Kofman (Fellow, Wilson Center), among others.
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- The Future of Asia: U.S.-Japan Cooperation in Southeast Asia and Beyond | Wednesday, March 14 | 9:15am – 10:45am | Center for American Progress | Register here |
Southeast Asia’s geopolitical profile is on the rise: It’s home to important sea lanes, the site of incredible economic growth, a landing spot for massive amounts of foreign direct investment, and a nurturing ground for a number of burgeoning democracies. Because of its achievements, potential, and geographic importance, Southeast Asia has become a natural point of cooperation between the United States and Japan based on shared values and security interests. However, cooperation in the region is becoming increasingly complex due to democratic backsliding. Now more than ever, it’s critical for the United States and Japan to strengthen their partnership in Southeast Asia to bolster the region’s stability, prosperity, and respect for democratic institutions. Join the Center for American Progress for a discussion with leading Japan-U.S.-Southeast Asia experts to discuss policy pathways the United States and Japan can take to protect democratic institutions and freedoms in Southeast Asia. Featuring Joaquin Castro (Congressman for Texas), Emma Chanlett-Avery (Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service), and Amy Searight (Senior Adviser and Director, Southeast Asia Program, CSIS), among others.
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- Violent Extremism: Historical Patterns and Precedents, Ancient and Modern | Wednesday, March 14 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Middle Eastern history is often portrayed as a succession of empires and political orders harassed and occasionally brought down by violent opponents–usually labeled as terrorists at the time. This was true in ancient times as well as modern. And today’s violent extremist groups resurrect historical narratives and grievances to fuel contemporary conflict. How do 21st century socio-political and geopolitical trends interact with historical ethnic, sectarian, and anti-colonial narratives to fuel the rise of extremist movements? How can we understand these dynamics? How can this understanding contribute to better policy to counter violent extremism? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host a panel discussion on the ancient and modern dynamics of extremist transnational movements featuring Sandra Scham (author of Extremism, Ancient and Modern: Insurgency, Terror, and Empire in the Middle East). She will be joined by Paul Salem (Senior Vice President for Policy Research and Programs, MEI) and Hassan Mneimneh (Director of the Extremism and Counterterrorism Program, MEI). Charles Lister (Senior Fellow, MEI) will moderate the discussion.
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- Politics in the Maghreb: Continuity or Change? | Wednesday, March 14 | 6:00pm – 7:30pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Seven years after the Arab uprisings, the Maghreb Region remains in flux. Once again, Morocco has witnessed large-scale protests, as thousands in the Rif region and in Jerada have held demonstrations to express socio-economic and political grievances amid demands for change. Algeria has been the picture of continuity, but the lack of a clear successor to the ailing president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, clouds its future. Lower hydrocarbon prices has meant that the state is less able to allocate oil rents to the population to maintain stability. Even Tunisia, arguably the success story of the region, is struggling amid political squabbling and protests by marginalized Tunisian youth. The economy remains weak and the unemployment rate is high, leaving much of the country frustrated with the ongoing transition. This panel discussion will bring leading experts together to examine ongoing socio-economic and political issues in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Featuring Amel Boubekeur (Research Fellow, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales and the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris), Maâti Monjib (Patkin Visiting Fellow, Middle East Democracy and Development Project), and Larbi Sadiki (Professor, Qatar University). Adel Abdel Ghafar (Fellow, Brookings Doha Center) will moderate the discussion.
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- Journalism at War: The Evolution of Independent Reporting in Syria | Thursday, March 15 | 11:00am – 12:30pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Prior to the outbreak of protests in Daraa in 2011, media in Syria was state-controlled and heavily regulated. However, in the face of escalating conflict with the Assad regime, independent media outlets emerged that gave voice to Syrian journalists and civil society activists sharing information domestically and to an international audience. Although these new outlets provided hope as state authority weakened, in the seven years since the outbreak of war, journalists attempting to share their stories from within Syria face daunting challenges including uncertain security, difficulty in verifying sources and the absence of a reaction from international audiences. The Middle East Institute is pleased to host a panel discussion to examine this topical issue. Rania Abouzeid (author of No Turning Back: Stories of Life, Loss, and Hope in Wartime Syria) will be joined by Ibrahim al-Assil (Syrian Activist and Scholar, MEI) and Antoun Issa (Director for Public Relations, MEI) to discuss the important role of Syria’s independent media. Uri Friedman (Staff Writer, The Atlantic) will moderate the discussion.
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- The US-Georgia Partnership | Thursday, March 15 | 2:00pm – 4:00pm | Atlantic Council & National Democratic Institute | Register here |
Since emerging from the Soviet Union as an independent state in 1991, Georgia has struggled to maintain its sovereignty in the face of separatist movements and military incursion from Russia. Still, the country has taken steps toward political reform and improved relations with Europe, the United States, and international bodies like the European Union and NATO. Georgia, together with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, were “captive nations” of the former Soviet Union; today, the three countries are still held hostage by Russian interference with their territorial integrity. As Georgia continues to work internally and externally to strengthen its ties to the West, Western powers must also do their part in forming partnerships with states in the region. Join the Atlantic Council and the National Democratic Institute for a discussion on the importance of Georgia’s path forward and the US-Georgia partnership for transatlantic security. Featuring Amy Klobuchar (Senator for Minnesota), H.E. President Giorgi Margvelashvili (Republic of Georgia), and Ambassador Paula Dobriansky (Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard’s Kennedy School), among others.
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- U.S. Leverage in South Asia | Thursday, March 15 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | United States Institute of Peace | Register here |
Following the announcement of a new South Asia strategy in August 2017, the Trump administration has laid out significant policy goals in the region, including preventing the Taliban insurgency from winning ground in Afghanistan, deepening the U.S. strategic partnership with India, and forcing a shift in Pakistan’s security strategies towards its neighbors. Does the U.S. have the necessary leverage and influence over key policy makers in South Asia needed to accomplish its policy goals? Does the U.S. have the means to change the calculations of the major players in the region, given their own conflicting goals and priorities? Join the U.S. Institute of Peace for a forward-leaning conversation as experts discuss the future of the U.S. role in South Asia and opportunities for the U.S. to mold decisions by Afghan, Pakistani, Indian and Chinese players to best achieve American interests. Featuring Anish Goel (Senior Fellow, New America Foundation), Robert Hathaway (Public Policy Fellow, Wilson Center), Tamanna Salikuddin (former Senior Advisor, U.S. State Department), and Jay Wise (Jennings Randolph Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace). Moeed Yusuf (Associate Vice President, U.S. Institute of Peace) will moderate the discussion.
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- The National Security Implications of Withdrawing from NAFTA | Friday, March 16 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | Heritage Foundation | Register here |
Join the Heritage Foundation for a discussion on the national security repercussions of a NAFTA withdrawal and how a strong NAFTA amplifies the U.S.’s regional agenda. Featuring Ben Sasse (Senator for Nebraska), Eric Farnsworth (Vice President, Americas Society/Council of the Americas), and Ambassador John D. Negroponte (Vice Chairman, McLarty Associates), among others.
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Another botched move
Josh Marshall gets it right in this morning’s tweet:
The reality is already pretty clear, though it’ll take a few days for people to admit it. The President accepted a non invitation to a summit with Kim Jong un on an clueless impulse. White House now trying to make it unhappen.
Specifically, the National Security Council, where the adult in charge is General McMaster. He managed to get the White House spokesperson to say “”concrete and verifiable action” is required from Pyongyang before the meeting.
That condition has been nowhere evident in the President’s utterances. Nor is it clear that Pyongyang ever issued an invitation, though a meeting with the US president has been a priority goal for the North Koreans for decades. It is certainly reasonable to try to get them to pay something for it.
Unfortunately the clumsy way the non invitation has been accepted and conditions imposed only afterwards undermines US standing in the matter. Of course we can just fail to schedule the meeting if the North Koreans don’t comply with the conditions, but that will make the US look responsible for the failure. It might be better than the alternative: a meeting without substantive accomplishments that gives the North Koreans what they want and the US nothing but an ego-moment for Trump. But if I had to guess, Donald Trump will want to go ahead anyway, convinced that he can by force of personality bring Kim Jong-un around.
The odds of North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons and missiles are vanishingly small. Unlike Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi, Kim really does have weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. It is difficult to imagine what diplomatic assurances could equal the guarantee they provide that the US will not attack or seek to overthrow the regime. Nuclear weapons are Kim’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement, a pretty good one. He is not going to abandon them completely.
Our best alternative to a negotiated agreement is tightening sanctions. Certainly they have started to bite. But the history of sanctions is clear: their effectiveness decays with time (because the target country learns how to maneuver around them), and you get what you want from them mainly when you negotiate relief, not when you impose them. So they are not a very good alternative to negotiated agreement, but rather an interim means to getting to the negotiation table.
There is another issue with sanctions: they are only effective so long as others join in imposing them. If the US is perceived as responsible for nixing the presidential meeting, China and others won’t necessarily join the tightening. That would make the sanctions ineffective and strain US relations with whoever doesn’t want to play along with us.
Trump has once again botched a diplomatic move. That’s not surprising: his Secretary of State knew nothing of the President’s intentions and the State Department is a wreck. McMaster is trying to impose some discipline and rescue the President from his own bad and irresistible impulses. This is not the way the US government should be operating.
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It ain’t over until Kim Jong-un sings
North Korea has agreed to talks on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as well as suspension of its nuclear and missile tests while the talks proceed. US/South Korean military exercises will continue as scheduled.
So what does Kim Jong-un get? He gets a big prize: a meeting with the US President, by May. For a brutal regime under tight sanctions that fears for its continued existence, that’s a big prize. Once upon a time, the US used to refuse to meet at all with North Korea, except in the context of the “six party talks” (that’s North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the US). Kim can’t take a meeting literally to the bank, but it is not surprising he values a North Korean leader’s first encounter with the US President, especially as the sanctions are biting. The Trump Administration merits credit for that.
Of course we’ve been to talks with North Korea on nuclear issues many times in the past. It’s a history that does not inspire confidence. There have been lots of failures, and even the negotiating successes haven’t lasted. North Korea has notoriously cheated on its obligations, including by selling sensitive technology to other countries. Not to mention that it is a brutal and oppressive dictatorship that treats its own people badly. And we haven’t always been sterling at maintaining our part of the bargains in a timely way. So good as the news is, it would be a mistake to get too excited, as Michael O’Hanlon reminded us just this morning.
That said, blocking or rolling back the North Korean missile and nuclear programs is a worthy goal. The threat to the continental US is still hypothetical, but the threat to US forces and our allies in South Korea, Japan, and Guam is all too real already. So too is the risk that North Korea’s successful nuclear and missile programs will inspire similar programs by South Korea or Japan, thus blowing a big hole in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, which has helped to contain the spread of nuclear weapons to a relatively few countries (in addition to the Perm 5, India and Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa, which gave them up after apartheid ended, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union).
Even a freeze in the North Korean nuclear and missile testing is worth something. Its programs were making far more rapid than intelligence agencies anticipated if we believe what is said in the press. Of course Pyongyang can always restart its testing, whereas we can’t undo a meeting with the President. We can however keep the sanctions in place. We’d best do so. It ain’t over until Kim Jong-un sings a far better tune than temporary suspension of testing.
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