Tag: North Korea
Ample warning
The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (CIO/DPRK) held a public hearing at Johns Hopkins SAIS in Washington, DC October 30-31. Established in March, the CIO/DPRK has since convened in Seoul, Tokyo, and London to receive testimony from first-hand witnesses and experts. The Commission is mandated to present findings and recommendations to the UN Human Rights Council in March 2014.
Chairperson Michael Kirby, former Justice of the High Court of Australia, and Sonja Biserko, founder and president of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, led this hearing.
Kirby recently told the BBC that despite his 35 years of experience as a judge listening to cases “which somewhat harden one’s heart,” testimonies heard by the CIO have brought him to tears.
There were tears in the room on last Wednesday as the Commission collected anecdotal evidence from two witnesses who have defected from the DPRK. Twenty-five-year-old Jin Hye Jo recounted the deaths by starvation of her grandmother and two younger brothers, the trafficking of her older sister, and the alleged extrajudicial execution of her father by security forces. Because her father was born in China, her family was suspect in the eyes of the state. This placed them firmly in the “wavering class,” the middle rungs of North Korea’s elaborately hierarchical caste system known as songbun. Her father therefore had no choice but to work for low pay in the mines, and her family went chronically hungry while government leaders were driving BMWs and drinking high-end whiskey. Jin crossed into China four times—and was repatriated four times, enduring imprisonment and torture “almost to death”—before finally obtaining the protection of the UNHCR in Beijing on her fifth attempt in 2006. She, her mother and her younger sister have settled in the US. Read more
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The other North Korean challenge
I don’t write much about North Korea, because I don’t know a lot about it. But I’m convinced it poses a potentially enormous challenge on two fronts:
- as a nuclear power
- as a collapsed state
Bruce Bennett’s presentation on the second challenge at Heritage Foundation October 17 strikes me as generally well-informed, even if might quarrel on details (I don’t much like the idea of airdropping humanitarian assistance, for example). So I’m posting it here, along with a link to his RAND study on Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse. Those who think the United States doesn’t need a capacity to plan for and deal with weak, fragile or collapsed states–in this case in cooperation with South Korea–should take note:
As Bennett points out, the issue is not whether we would want to intervene, but whether we would have to in order to avoid serious risks to our own national security as a result of North Korean collapse. It is clear that any intervention would have to be a combined military/civilian operation.
I am hoping to have a post up soon on the UN-mandated Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Public Hearing, held here at SAIS this week. Human rights violations are a clear warning sign of state collapse.
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Peace picks, October 7-11
A wide array of interesting events this week (be aware of possible event cancellations due to the government shutdown):
1. A New Look at American Foreign Policy: The Third in a Series of Discussions
Monday October 7 | 12:00pm – 1:00pm
The Heritage Foundation, Lehrman Auditorium, 214 Massachusetts Avenue NW
For decades, libertarians and conservatives have been at odds over American foreign policy. But perhaps a conversation is possible today between classical liberals and conservatives on the nature of American foreign policy. Some are trying to find a “middle way” that is less doctrinaire. At the same time the “neo” conservative phase of hyper military interventionism is a spent force in conservative circles. Therefore, the time may be ripe for an open and honest conversation among some libertarians and conservatives about the future of American foreign policy. It may be possible a new consensus could be found between Americans who consider themselves classical liberals and traditional conservatives on the purposes of American foreign policy.
Join us as Heritage continues the discussion regarding this question, what the dangers and opportunities are and whether they afford an opportunity to take a “new look” at American foreign policy.
For decades, libertarians and conservatives have been at odds over American foreign policy. But perhaps a conversation is possible today between classical liberals and conservatives on the nature of American foreign policy. Some are trying to find a “middle way” that is less doctrinaire. At the same time the “neo” conservative phase of hyper military interventionism is a spent force in conservative circles. Therefore, the time may be ripe for an open and honest conversation among some libertarians and conservatives about the future of American foreign policy. It may be possible a new consensus could be found between Americans who consider themselves classical liberals and traditional conservatives on the purposes of American foreign policy.
Join us as Heritage continues the discussion regarding this question, what the dangers and opportunities are and whether they afford an opportunity to take a “new look” at American foreign policy.
More About the Speakers
Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D.
Distinguished Fellow, The Heritage Foundation
Randy E. Barnett
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center
Marion Smith
Visiting Fellow, B. Kenneth Simon Center for Principles and Politics, The Heritage Foundation
Hosted By
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Lemonade
President Obama has had more than his share of lemons lately:
- the British parliament defeat of participation in military action against Syria,
- Russian President Putin calling the conclusive report of the US intelligence community indicting Bashar al Asad for chemical the August 21 chemical attack “utter nonsense,”
- Congress asking good questions and pestering for more consultations, and
- the UN Secretary General asking that he await the report of the chemical weapons inspection team.
He has now surprised us all with the oldest trick in the book: when you have nothing but lemons, make lemonade.
This makes a lot of sense. Insisting on a Congressional resolution of approval puts the Congress on the hook and meets the letter and spirit of the law, which is what a University of Chicago constitutional law professor should want to do. A successful resolution will quiet his critics and compensate for the loss in London, putting the Brits and opponents in Congress to shame. The UN time line for completing its technical work seems to be less than two weeks, so its conclusions should give the lie to those who claim chemical weapons were not used. An opportunity to upbraid Putin during the G20 Summit in Saint Petersburg September 5/6 should be welcome.
Trouble is, lemonade is not what is needed in Syria. Bashar al Asad may well read delay as lack of resolve and even use chemical weapons again. What does Obama do then? Rush the resolution through Congress, or go ahead without waiting? The part of the Syrian opposition most friendly to US interests may be disquieted, while extreme Islamists profit from the US delay by pointing to American unreliability. While the President said nothing about it in the Rose Garden, he should be accelerating assistance to the Free Syrian Army in ways that give it more confidence of US backing.
Lemonade is also not what US credibility needed. This may be a temporary problem, so long as the Congress approves military action and the Administration delivers a serious blow. But friends and enemies in the region and beyond will be calculating what this means for them: the Israelis first and foremost, but also the Turks, Iranians, Russians and North Koreans. Friends will be discomforted. Enemies may take heart.
The President is also at risk. If the defeat in the British parliament dealt a blow to David Cameron, a defeat in the US Congress would pull the rug out from under Barack Obama. I trust he is confident he can win, but until he does his prestige is on the line. A loss would leave him hurting just as Congress turns to a budget fight that promises to be a real bruiser.
So turning to Congress is smart, even ingenious, but not without serious risks. But proceeding apace without satisfying Congress had serious risks as well. So lemonade is on the menu, whether it is what you wanted or not.
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Peace picks, August 12-16
Just a few events in DC during a quiet mid-August week:
1. Between War & Peace: Do We Need New Tools For Messy Transitions?
| Date | Tuesday, August 13, 2013 |
| Time | 9:30 – 11 a.m. |
| Location | 1111 19th Street NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20036 |
The office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction issued its final lessons learned report earlier this year. Among the recommendations was a call for establishing a new U.S. Office for Contingency Operations, for planning and implementing the diverse activities required in post-conflict deployments, not necessarily of the scale or purpose of the Iraq situation. Our panel will discuss the requirement for such a capability in the U.S. system, consider options to achieve greater planning and execution effectiveness, and also look at what tools and processes reside in the UN system.
Speakers:
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
James A. Schear, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations
William Durch, Stimson Senior Associate and Co-director of the Future of Peace Operations program
Moderator:
Ellen Laipson, President and CEO, Stimson Center
2. How Perception Dictates Actions in Ambiguous Situations: Game Theory Analysis of the Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Jung Joo Kwon, Korea Foundation Junior Scholar, will present the results of her research conducted at the Wilson Center on the third North Korean nuclear crisis. Arguing that the perception of decision-makers plays as an important role in determining policy agenda as factors such as internal, external and systemic settings, Kwon suggests that it is important to analyze how perceptions and images are formed. Game theory provides a valid analytical tool to explore the decision-making process in international relations in general and in the case of North Korea in particular. Through game theory analysis, Kwon identifies the patterns of perception/misperception around the third North Korean nuclear crisis in order to understand the shift of powers and policies at the time.
James Person, Senior Program Associate with the History and Public Policy Program, will chair and comment on Kwon’s discussion.
Jung Joo Kwon is presently a Korea Foundation Junior Scholar in residence at the Wilson Center. Kwon is completing a master’s degree in International Affairs and Governance at the University of St. Gallen St. Gallen, Switzerland, working on a thesis entitled “Escaping Middle Income Trap in Asia through the National Innovative Capacity: Focused on the Case of South Korea.” She previously earned a Master’s of Arts in International Management from the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, and a Bachelor’s of Arts in Business Administration from Hanyang University.
Location:
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The cat is out of the bag
President Obama yesterday announced in Berlin his intention to negotiate with Moscow a reduction of up to one-third in strategic nuclear weapons and an unspecified reduction in tactical nukes deployed in Europe. This ranks as bold, and good. It will certainly be welcomed in Germany and the rest of the European Union, where nuclear weapons have never been popular. The Russians will be reluctant, as they have come to view tactical nuclear weapons as part of their defense against superior Western forces (the opposite was true during the Cold War). As my SAIS colleague Eric Edelman notes, they are also concerned about Chinese, French and British nuclear forces, which could be increased even as Washington and Moscow draw down.
There is also the question of whether we can maintain the credibility of our nuclear deterrent if we draw down to 1000 strategic nukes. My sense is that this is more than adequate for the purpose, but Eric doubts that. He worries about the credibility of our “extended” nuclear umbrella, which covers selected allies. I’d certainly be prepared to hear their complaints, if they have any. My guess is that most of our allies would like to see a further drawdown of nuclear forces.
Former Defense Secretary Bill Perry in a powerful piece about his own personal journey to advocating elimination of nuclear weapons makes a crucial point: Read more
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