Tag: North Korea
Peace picks, August 12-16
Just a few events in DC during a quiet mid-August week:
1. Between War & Peace: Do We Need New Tools For Messy Transitions?
| Date | Tuesday, August 13, 2013 |
| Time | 9:30 – 11 a.m. |
| Location | 1111 19th Street NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20036 |
The office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction issued its final lessons learned report earlier this year. Among the recommendations was a call for establishing a new U.S. Office for Contingency Operations, for planning and implementing the diverse activities required in post-conflict deployments, not necessarily of the scale or purpose of the Iraq situation. Our panel will discuss the requirement for such a capability in the U.S. system, consider options to achieve greater planning and execution effectiveness, and also look at what tools and processes reside in the UN system.
Speakers:
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
James A. Schear, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations
William Durch, Stimson Senior Associate and Co-director of the Future of Peace Operations program
Moderator:
Ellen Laipson, President and CEO, Stimson Center
2. How Perception Dictates Actions in Ambiguous Situations: Game Theory Analysis of the Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Jung Joo Kwon, Korea Foundation Junior Scholar, will present the results of her research conducted at the Wilson Center on the third North Korean nuclear crisis. Arguing that the perception of decision-makers plays as an important role in determining policy agenda as factors such as internal, external and systemic settings, Kwon suggests that it is important to analyze how perceptions and images are formed. Game theory provides a valid analytical tool to explore the decision-making process in international relations in general and in the case of North Korea in particular. Through game theory analysis, Kwon identifies the patterns of perception/misperception around the third North Korean nuclear crisis in order to understand the shift of powers and policies at the time.
James Person, Senior Program Associate with the History and Public Policy Program, will chair and comment on Kwon’s discussion.
Jung Joo Kwon is presently a Korea Foundation Junior Scholar in residence at the Wilson Center. Kwon is completing a master’s degree in International Affairs and Governance at the University of St. Gallen St. Gallen, Switzerland, working on a thesis entitled “Escaping Middle Income Trap in Asia through the National Innovative Capacity: Focused on the Case of South Korea.” She previously earned a Master’s of Arts in International Management from the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, and a Bachelor’s of Arts in Business Administration from Hanyang University.
Location:
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The cat is out of the bag
President Obama yesterday announced in Berlin his intention to negotiate with Moscow a reduction of up to one-third in strategic nuclear weapons and an unspecified reduction in tactical nukes deployed in Europe. This ranks as bold, and good. It will certainly be welcomed in Germany and the rest of the European Union, where nuclear weapons have never been popular. The Russians will be reluctant, as they have come to view tactical nuclear weapons as part of their defense against superior Western forces (the opposite was true during the Cold War). As my SAIS colleague Eric Edelman notes, they are also concerned about Chinese, French and British nuclear forces, which could be increased even as Washington and Moscow draw down.
There is also the question of whether we can maintain the credibility of our nuclear deterrent if we draw down to 1000 strategic nukes. My sense is that this is more than adequate for the purpose, but Eric doubts that. He worries about the credibility of our “extended” nuclear umbrella, which covers selected allies. I’d certainly be prepared to hear their complaints, if they have any. My guess is that most of our allies would like to see a further drawdown of nuclear forces.
Former Defense Secretary Bill Perry in a powerful piece about his own personal journey to advocating elimination of nuclear weapons makes a crucial point: Read more
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Ten things the president should be doing
Herewith my short list of ten international issues more worthy of presidential attention than the issues that are getting it this week:
- Drones: Apparently the President is preparing to address how and why he uses them soon.
- Syria: Secretary of State Kerry and the Russians are ginning up a peace conference next month, while Moscow strengthens Syrian defenses against Western intervention.
- Iraq: The Syrian war is spilling over and posing serious challenges to the country’s political cohesion.
- Egypt: President Morsi is taking the Arab world’s most populous country in economically and politically ruinous directions.
- Israel/Palestine: With the peace process moribund, the window is closing on the opportunity to reach a two-state outcome.
- Libya: The failure to establish the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force leaves open the possibility of further attacks on Americans (and on the Libyan state).
- Afghanistan: The American withdrawal is on schedule, but big questions remain about what will be left behind.
- Pakistan: Nawaz Sharif’s hat trick provides an opportunity for improved relations, if managed well.
- Iran: once its presidential election is over (first round is June 14, runoff if needed June 21), a last diplomatic effort on its nuclear ambitions will begin.
- All that Asia stuff: North Korean nukes, maritime jostling with China, Trans-Pacific Partnership, transition in Myanmar (how about trying for one in Vietnam?), Japan’s economic and military revival…
In the good old days, presidents in domestic trouble headed out on international trips. Obama doesn’t seem inclined in that direction. He really does want to limit America’s commitments abroad and restore its economy at home. Bless him. But if things get much worse, I’ll bet on a road trip.
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Sweeten the pot
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS) and the Iran Project this week presented a joint report on the strategic options available for dealing with Iran, compiled with input from former senior national security officials and experts on Iran. The event featured:
–Carla Hills: Chairman and chief executive officer of Hills & Company, International Consultants
–Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering: Career Ambassador; former ambassador to Israel, Russia, India, El Salvador, Nigeria and Jordan
–Dr. Jim Walsh: Research Associate as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program (SSP)
–Ambassador James Dobbins: Director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center
This is what they think needs to happen:
1. Time to recalibrate
The time has come for Washington to recalibrate its policy of simultaneously putting pressure on and engaging with Iran. The US should emphasize direct diplomatic engagement with Iran with the same fervor it has pursued its international alienation. Time is running out. The more time passes, the less satisfactory a potential nuclear deal will be for both parties. The sooner a nuclear deal is reached the sooner the US and Iran can engage in a broader dialogue on regional issues. Use of military force would entail serious difficulties and implications, while upping the ante on negotiations carries new promise.
The US should pursue bilateral relations with Iran beyond the context of the multi-lateral P5+1 negotiations. Ambassador Pickering insisted on the importance of establishing respect and mutual trust between the two parties: Iran needs to stop perceiving all US policy as a ploy for regime change, while the US needs to stop viewing Iranian intentions solely through the lens of nuclear weapons. To reach a deal the Iranians should accept a peaceful and civil nuclear program monitored by the IAEA, while the US will have to relax the sanctions and allow Iran to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.
2. Towards a nuclear deal
The report does not propose a magic formula for the resolution of the nuclear problem. It eschews tactical considerations in favor of addressing the broader issue: a lack of emphasis on diplomacy. Walsh argued the overemphasis on details encourages incrementalism, stating the P5+1 “play small ball” when they negotiate (unsuccessfully) on 20% enrichment. The difficulty the parties are encountering in overcoming small issues suggests progress cannot be made without greater trust and respect.
But how do two conflicting countries earn each other’s trust and respect?
Walsh suggests breaking the “cycle of expectations.” As a Bostonian, he had empathy on his mind. He felt Iran’s recent earthquakes offer an opportunity for more than just expressions of sympathy. Donating relief aid in an unexpected demonstration of empathy could help melt away some of the mistrust.
3. Pursuing the diplomatic track
Ambassador Pickering believes the time for negotiations is ripe even for the Iranians. If Iran truly opposed negotiating on the nuclear issue, they would have stopped agreeing to P5+1 talks. But for real progress, Ambassador Dobbins suggested the US sweeten the offer on sanctions relief. The sanctions regime would be difficult to reinstate should Iran not comply with a deal. However, offering a temporary suspension of (some, or all) sanctions would allow the US to easily and unilaterally reinstate them.
Although difficult, cooperation with Iran is possible. As Bruce Laingen, US Chargé d’affaires during the 1979 hostage crisis put it during Q&A: “if we can negotiate with Pyongyang, we can negotiate with Iran.”
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“I don’t bluff”
Secretary Kerry told the American Chamber of Commerce in Seoul last week, apropos of “denuclearizing” North Korea:
We are prepared, as we have said, and the President – if there’s one phrase that sticks out in me that the President has used with me a number of times, beginning with when I was talking to him about this job and taking it on and I wanted to be certain that I wasn’t misrepresenting him anywhere in the world about his position with respect to Iran or elsewhere, he said to me very simply, “I don’t bluff.” And I think that those who have seen him execute on his promise that if he had actionable information he would do what he needed to do with it, even if it meant crossing another country’s border and taking action, we saw with respect to Usama bin Ladin that the President doesn’t bluff.
This is pretty dramatic stuff. No wonder the intelligence community gets spun up about the reliability of varying estimates. While the American press gets agitated about a missile test, Kerry is telling us the Americans will go to war if they have to to prevent North Korea from weaponizing its nukes or Iran from obtaining them.
That’s at least how I interpret what Kerry said. The two situations differ however in important ways. America’s South Korean allies are discouraging the Americans from acting. The risks to Seoul from a North Korean artillery attack are serious. Some of America’s Israeli allies are contentiously urging them on in private, even while kissing and making up in public.
The common denominator, no matter who urges what, is that diplomatic solutions would be far better than military ones, but getting satisfactory diplomatic solutions depends on a credible threat of military force. The two situations are not entirely independent of each other. North Koreans are certainly watching what the US does with Iran. And the Iranians are watching what the US does with North Korea.
This puts President Obama on the spot. The international success of his presidency depends on blocking Iran from getting nuclear weapons and preventing North Korea from weaponizing the ones it already has. Either development would be a serious threat to the United States and its allies, leading to nuclear arms races in East Asia and the Middle East. I’m not at all convinced that there is necessarily a diplomatic solution either with Iran or North Korea. But I’m sure the President is correct to try to exhaust the diplomatic options before resorting to uses of force that predictably would have unpredictable consequences.
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Beijing needs to reign in Pyongyang
North Korea’s announcement that it plans to reopen its plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon clarifies at least one reason for its belligerent statements in recent weeks. It will take some years to restart the reactor, which was partly dismantled in a 2007 deal that Pyongyang has in effect renounced. Kim Jong-un is however making it clear that North Korea intends to remain a nuclear weapons power. He (rightly) perceives that the United States would like to see his regime collapse and his people liberated. Nuclear weapons are his security guarantee.
It is doubtful he can be bought off this idea. Pyongyang has appointed a (relatively) “reformist” prime minister, one likely at least to continue the liberalization of the agricultural sector that has reduced economic pressure on the regime in recent years. The people of North Korea are used to extraordinarily harsh conditions. It does not take much to make them feel better off.
The White House is making it clear it sees no signs of preparation for war on the part of Pyongyang. The American deployments of aircraft during the ongoing military exercises with South Korea are intended to back Seoul but also restrain it from precipitating a conflict.
So should we forget about Pyongyang and turn our attention back to Iran? No. Iran is apparently going to be well behaved on nuclear issues at least until its election in June. South Korea will be under enormous pressure to respond if the North were to attack. Even if both sides remain restrained, the Americans have a serious problem with North Korea, which has threatened to attack the United States with nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to forget about the threat just because the capability does not exist today.
How long will it take to acquire the capability? It is hard of course to tell, but easy to picture that in ten years Pyongyang could have both the missiles and the nuclear weapons to strike Japan if not the United States. I’d be surprised if there weren’t someone in the Pentagon suggesting that it would be better to deal with that threat now rather than wait. If North Korea attacks the South, Americans and Koreans may be surprised at the extent and force of the response.
War on the Korean peninsula is a frightening proposition, even if a strike on North Korea’s missile and nuclear facilities were 100% successful. Pyongyang would presumably respond with a massive artillery barrage against Seoul, which is well within range. Who knows what the Chinese would do. Last time there was war in Korea they threw their full weight behind the North. South Korea is a major economic power these days that could suffer massive damage. Spread of conflict to Japan and Taiwan is not inconceivable.
Even if the prospects are not good, we are thrown back to the need for diplomacy to restrain North Korea. That’s where Beijing comes in. The Chinese don’t like the idea of a nuclear North Korea. They are terrified of anything that would open the door to a massive flow of refugees from the hermit kingdom. As next door neighbors and allies, it is up to Beijing to reign in Kim Jong-un. If they fail to do so, the consequences could be catastrophic.
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