Tag: North Korea
A better way
North Korea’s third nuclear weapons test yesterday raises three questions:
- Why are they doing this?
- What difference does it make?
- How should the rest of the world respond?
Why does North Korea develop nuclear weapons?
If you believe what Pyongyang says, the answer is clear: to defy and threaten the United States, which the North Koreans see as their primary enemy. But this should not be understood as a classic state-to-state conflict. North Korea poses, at least for now, little military threat to the United States. But Pyongyang believes Washington wants to end its dictatorship (I certainly hope there is some truth in that–even paranoids have enemies). The North Koreans see nuclear weapons as a guarantee of regime survival. No one wants to run the risk of regime collapse if the regime holds nuclear weapons, for fear that they could end up in the wrong hands. NATO attacked Libya only after Qaddafi had given up his nuclear program. So the North Koreans view nuclear weapons as guaranteeing regime survival.
What difference does it make?
South Korea and Japan have reason to be nervous about North Korea’s nuclear weapons and improving missile capability to deliver them. But it is going to be a long time before North Korea can seriously threaten the US with nuclear weapons. And the US holds a capacity to respond massively.
The larger significance of the North Korean nuclear program is the breach it puts in the world’s nuclear nonproliferation regime, which has been remarkably successful in limiting the number of nuclear powers, especially in Asia. But Taiwan, South Korea and Japan face real difficulty in maintaining their abstinence if North Korea is going to arm itself and threaten its neighbors. There are not a lot of worse scenarios for the world’s nonproliferation regime than an expanded nuclear arms race in Asia, where China, India and Pakistan are already armed with nuclear weapons.
How should the rest of the world respond?
This is where the issues get difficult. There are already international sanctions on North Korea, which has managed to survive them so far with a bit of help from Iran on missile technology and China on economic ties. More can be done, especially if the Chinese crack down on illicit trade across the border. But the North Korean objective is juche (self-reliance), so tightening sanctions may help rather than weaken the regime.
The Economist last week suggested the efforts to block the nuclear program have failed and that the international community should instead now focus on regime change, by promoting North Korean travel, media access, Church-sponsored propaganda and trade. This would mean a partial reversal of the efforts to isolate North Korea and a new strategy of building power centers that might compete with the regime, especially among the growing class of entrepreneurs and capitalists operating more or less illicitly in North Korea.
We are not good at reversals of policy. But the failure of our decades-long attempts to isolate the Castro regime in Cuba is instructive. Communism did not fall in Eastern Europe to sanctions. It fell to people who took to the streets seeking a better life, one they learned about on TV and radio as well as in illegally circulated manuscripts. Isolation alone seems unlikely to work. Isolation of the regime with a more concerted effort to inform and educate the people might be a better approach.
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Keeping an eye on Asia
Trying to catch up on my Asia reading, as things are heating up there:
- The Japanese scrambled jets last week in response to a Russian violation of airspace over the Kuril Islands.
- China has been pressuring North Korea not to conduct an announced nuclear test.
- Tokyo is complaining that Chinese radar “locked on” to Japanese ships, a step generally associated with initiating an attack, in the East China Sea (where the two countries dispute sovereignty over the Senkaku/Daioyu islands).
The smart money is still betting that China and Japan won’t go to war over uninhabited islands that Japan administers but China claims. There have been recent rumblings of a possible accord between Russia and Japan on the Kurils. It is of course welcome that China should restrain its North Korean friends from defying the UN Security Council again with another nuclear test. It is unclear whether Beijing will succeed.
The US Navy, facing budget and reducing its presence in the Middle East, has found a useful “hegemon” and bully in China. In the mist of preparations for the Quadrennial Defense Review, naval advocates would like to regain at least some of the budget momentum they lost when Mitt Romney–a strong naval advocate–was defeated for the presidency.
But that doesn’t mean the needs are not real. America’s ships are vulnerable, even to Iranian never mind Chinese cruise and other missiles. Washington has a lot of obligations in Asia: to Japan, to Taiwan, the Philippines, to South Korea. It also has some relatively new friends to oblige: Vietnam and Burma in particular. It is not going to be easy to meet all the needs in a severely constrained budget environment.
Those who complain about US inattention to Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and even the Balkans need to remember how many other commitments need to be fulfilled. Asia represents an important slice of the future of world economic growth. It also represents a serious risk of armed conflict on a scale that would have global consequences. We may not all be able to pivot to Asia, but we should keep an eye on it.
And I just realized: I am in Asia today, in Antalya, Turkey. Maybe that’s why my eyes have turned east, though the East I am writing about here lies thousands of miles away. Here’s the scenery from my hotel room:
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Prevent what?
Most of us who work on international affairs think it would be much better to use diplomacy to prevent bad things from happening rather than waiting until the aftermath and then cleaning up after the elephants, which all too often involves expensive military action. But what precisely would that mean? What do we need to prevent?
The Council on Foreign Relations survey of prevention priorities for 2013 was published last week, just in time to be forgotten in the Christmas rush and New Year’s lull. It deserves notice, as it is one of the few nonpartisan attempts to define American national security priorities. This year’s edition was in part crowd-sourced and categorizes contingencies on two dimensions: impact on U.S. interests (high, medium, low) and likelihood (likely, plausible, unlikely).
Syria comes out on top in both dimensions. That’s a no-brainer for likelihood, as the civil war has already reached catastrophic dimensions and is affecting the broader region. Judging from Paul Stares’ video introduction to the survey, U.S. interests are ranked high in part because of the risk of use or loss of chemical weapons stocks. I’d have ranked them high because of the importance of depriving Iran of its one truly reliable ally and bridge to Hizbollah, but that’s a quibble.
CFR ranks another six contingencies as high impact on U.S. interests and only plausible rather than likely. This isn’t so useful, but Paul’s video comes to the rescue: an Israeli military strike on Iran that would “embroil” the U.S. and conflict with China in the East or South China seas are his picks to talk about. I find it peculiar that CFR does not treat what I would regard as certainly a plausible if not a likely contingency: a U.S. attack on Iran. There are few more important decisions President Obama will need to make than whether to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Certainly it is a far more challenging decision than whether to go to war against China in the territorial disputes it is generating with U.S. allies in Pacific. I don’t know any foreign policy experts who would advise him to go in that direction.
It is striking that few of the other “plausible” and high-impact contingencies are amenable to purely military responses:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attack
It is not easy to determine the origin of cyberattacks, and not clear that a military response would be appropriate or effective. The same is also sometimes true of mass casualty attacks; our military response to 9/11 in Afghanistan has enmired the United States in its longest war to date, one where force is proving inadequate as a solution. It is hard to imagine any military response to internal instability in Pakistan, though CFR offers as an additional low probability contingency a possible U.S. military confrontation with Islamabad “triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations.”
In the “moderate” impact on U.S. interests, CFR ranks as highly likely “a major erosion of security in Afghanistan resulting from coalition drawdown.” I’d certainly have put that in high impact category, as we’ve still got 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and a significant portion of them will still be there at the end of 2013. In the “moderate” impact but merely plausible category CFR ranks:
- a severe Indo-Pakistan crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by a major terror attack
- a severe North Korean crisis caused by another military provocation, internal political instability, or threatening nuclear weapons/ICBM-related activities
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- continuing political instability and emergence of a terrorist safe haven in Libya
Again there are limits to what we can do about most of these contingencies by conventional military means. Only a North Korea crisis caused by military provocation or threats would rank be susceptible to a primarily military response. The others call for diplomatic and civilian responses in at least a measure equal to the possible military ones.
CFR lets two “moderate” impact contingencies languish in the low probability category that I don’t think belong there:
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- renewed unrest in the Kurdish dominated regions of Turkey and the Middle East
There is a very real possibility in Riyadh of a succession crisis, as the monarchy on the death of the king will likely move to a next generation of contenders. Kurdish irredentist aspirations are already a big issue in Iraq and Syria. It is hard to imagine this will not affect Iran and Turkey before the year is out. Neither is amenable to a purely military response.
Most of the contingencies with “low” impact on U.S. interests are in Africa:
- a deepening of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that involves military intervention from its neighbors
- growing popular unrest and political instability in Sudan
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- renewed ethnic violence in Kenya surrounding March 2013 presidential election
- widespread unrest in Zimbabwe surrounding the electoral process and/or the death of Robert Mugabe
- failure of a multilateral intervention to push out Islamist groups from Mali’s north
This may tell us more about CFR and the United States than about the world. Africa has little purchase on American sentiments, despite our half-Kenyan president. All of these contingencies merit diplomatic attention, but none is likely to excite U.S. military responses of more than a purely emergency character, except for Mali. If you’ve got a few Islamist terrorists, you can get some attention even if you are in Africa.
What’s missing from this list? CFR mentions
…a third Palestinian intifada, a widespread popular unrest in China, escalation of a U.S.-Iran naval clash in the Persian Gulf, a Sino-Indian border crisis, onset of elections-related instability and violence in Ethiopia, unrest in Cuba following the death of Fidel Castro and/or incapacitation of Raul Castro, and widespread political unrest in Venezuela triggered by the death or incapacitation of Hugo Chavez.
I’d add intensification of the global economic slowdown (high probability, high impact), failure to do more about global warming (also high probability, delayed impact), demographic or financial implosion in Europe or Japan (and possibly even the U.S.), Russian crackdown on dissent, and resurgent Islamist extremism in Somalia. But the first three of these are not one-year “contingencies,” which shows one limit of the CFR exercise.
I would also note that the world is arguably in better shape at the end of 2012 than ever before in history. As The Spectator puts it:
Never has there been less hunger, less disease or more prosperity. The West remains in the economic doldrums, but most developing countries are charging ahead, and people are being lifted out of poverty at the fastest rate ever recorded. The death toll inflicted by war and natural disasters is also mercifully low. We are living in a golden age.
May it last.
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The EU kicks the can
Carl Bildt, Sweden’s long-time and much-followed Foreign Minister, tweeted earlier this week from the General Affairs Council of the European Union:
Finally everything done. Cyprus presidency, Stefan Füle and Cathy Ashton moved all EU enlargement issues successfully forward. Off we go.
I wondered at the time what this meant. Now I know.
It meant nothing: no date for Serbia or Macedonia to begin accession talks, no date for Kosovo to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement. Croatia’s membership next year is expected to proceed on autopilot (with some corrections in Zagreb’s course requested) and Montenegro will continue accession talks. Albania still awaits for a date to start accession negotiations.
Admittedly it is difficult to get too excited about anything in the Western Balkans these days. Syria is imploding. Egypt is turning its judicial system over to religious supervision. Iran is making progress towards nuclear weapons. North Korea is successfully launching a longer-range ballistic missile, disguised as a space-launch vehicle. Afghanistan and Iraq are teetering. Al Qaeda is setting up shop in Mali. The euro is going down the tubes. Who cares what the Greeks want to call Macedonia or whether the former belligerents who run Serbia and Kosovo get dates to begin negotiations (Belgrade for accession, Pristina for a Stabilization and Association Agreement) with Brussels?
The people who live in those places do, that’s who. However insignificant the Balkans look these days from Washington, which is busy with its own domestic quarrels above all else, the region is important to those who inhabit it and has the potential to make life difficult for the rest of us, as it has proven repeatedly over the past 100 years.
A closer reading suggests that things might unfreeze in Brussels in the spring. Macedonia at least can expect a framework for negotiations then, provided it delivers on reforms in the meanwhile. Likewise Serbia, which is asked specifically for
…irreversible progress towards delivering structures in northern Kosovo which meet the security and justice needs of the local population in a transparent and cooperative manner, and in a way that ensures the functionality of a single institutional and administrative set up within Kosovo.
Also important is
…the agreement of the two Prime Ministers to work together in order to ensure a transparent flow of money in support of the Kosovo Serb community…
While couched in the EU’s usual obscurantist language, we see emerging here a detailed understanding of the real challenges that have so far blocked reintegration of the north with the rest of Kosovo. Bravo to the EU for acknowledging them!
Some of the same perspicacity is evident in the discussion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the EU finds the need to reiterate
…its unequivocal support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU perspective as a sovereign and united country enjoying full territorial integrity.
It’s not good news when Brussels kicks off this way, though I’d be the first to admit that its subsequent suggestions of what needs to be done to fix the problem are thoroughly inadequate.
Pristina gets a pat on the back for its engagement in the talks and language identical to that addressed to Belgrade on northern Kosovo, plus a recommendation to develop an outreach plan.
Don’t get me wrong: it is correct for the EU to insist on specific reforms and benchmarks in dealing with the Western Balkans. Unfortunately, it is still true that conditionality is what moves things forward in many of these countries. In most of them, I expect the EU carrot will bring real changes, albeit in fits and starts. The most concerning is Bosnia, where the EU acknowledges the challenges to sovereignty that Milorad Dodik and Republika Srpska pose but fails to offer adequate responses and continues to quarrel with Washington over whether the High Representative should stay or go.
The EU has kicked the can down the road. The best we can hope for is a spring thaw.
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Who’s afraid of North Korea?
The North Korean launch of a satellite has spooked the experts. Many thought the rocket wasn’t ready or anticipated its failure. Things seem to have gone quickly and smoothly, a stark contrast to previous attempts.
Lots of countries can launch satellites. All the other current nuclear weapons states can do it. Why so much concern about North Korea? There are two reasons:
- North Korea is North Korea;
- the UN Security Council has prohibited Pyongyang from testing long-range missiles.
Pyongyang has repeatedly shown itself ready and willing to use force, mainly against South Korea, which is pretty much the only enemy it can reach with its current arsenal. Preoccupied with its own survival, the regime is bellicose and provocative towards not only the South but also towards Japan and the United States.
Even paranoids have enemies. Tokyo and Washington are no friends of Pyongyang and would be delighted to see the regime there tumble. Short of that, they would like to see it constrained. They have been successful twice in convincing the Security Council to levy tough requirements on North Korea.
The military threat to the United States from North Korea is not the principal problem. Even with this successful missile launch, it will be decades before Pyongyang is capable of seriously threatening any of its neighbors other than Seoul. The United States is safe from North Korean nuclear weapons for a good while into the future.
But North Korea’s belligerence is destabilizing regionally. Between North Korean belligerence and Chinese nationalism, Tokyo is not wrong to think about how it needs to beef up its defense capabilities. Even the Chinese have objected to the satellite launch, which most experts believe is a thinly veiled missile test.
Also important is the weight and prestige of the UN Security Council. There are many countries that do not stick to the letter of what the UNSC decides. But the (Chapter VII) resolutions on North Korea are unusually explicit and forceful on the ballistic missile issue:
- 1718 (2006) “Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile”;
- 1874 (2009) “Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology.”
Note that slight shift in language, obviously intended to include something like a satellite launch, which uses ballistic missile technology even if some might say a launch vehicle is not a “missile.” North Korean defiance, which extends also to many other aspects of these two resolutions, risks convincing others that the UNSC is a paper tiger.
So now it is up to the Security Council to respond. I imagine it will find a way to tighten sanctions or other measures against Pyongyang, an approach that has not worked overly well in the past but still checks the “we did something” box. It is in fact hard to think of anything else to do. No one should today be afraid of North Korea except South and North Koreans, who suffer mightily under the Kim regime. They may have to suffer more now that the regime boasts longer-range missiles with which to frighten its neighbors.
PS: For the Korean speakers among you (translations welcome), here is the official announcement (via @shanghaiist):
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Wisdom, not resolve
I’m in Atlanta this week for Thanksgiving, which Americans will mark tomorrow with parades, running races, a giant meal, lots of football (watching and playing) and much debate on the issues of our day, from cranberry sauce recipes to the state of world affairs. Some will go to church, but most will mark the day entirely at home–or in a relative’s home–with marathon culinary preparations, a lengthy and leisurely afternoon meal and a long denouement of talk, napping and TV, in my family followed in the late evening by a giant turkey sandwich, on white toast.
I mention these things because close to 50% of my readers are non-Americans, only some of whom will have enjoyed the Thanksgiving experience first hand. To my knowledge, the holiday is entirely a New World phenomenon. Canada has its own version, celebrated last month. Of course lots of cultures express thanks in both religious and non-religious ways, but I wonder if any have made it quite the major event that the North Americans have. Readers should feel free to enlighten me.
Americans certainly have a great deal to be thankful for. We are slowly climbing out of a lingering recession, we’ve gotten through the difficult quadrennial drama of presidential elections without the uncertainties that have sometimes plagued the process, our troops are out of Iraq and moving out of Afghanistan, and there is no existential threat on the horizon, even if there are many less dramatic challenges. We are the solution to our own worst problems, which focus on the relatively mundane questions of what the government should spend money on and where it should find the revenue needed.
The world is not in such good shape. While statistics show that the overall frequency of war is down, the catalogue is full of long lasting conflicts and their devastating impacts on people: the revolution and civil war in Syria are getting on to marking two years, Israel and Palestine have been in conflict one way or another for 65 years, the Afghanistan/Pakistan war is dragging into its 12th year, and I don’t know how to determine when the war against al Qaeda in Yemen, the war against its affiliates in Somalia or the war in Eastern Congo began. Then there are the more recent conflicts: northern Mali and the all but defeated revolution in Bahrain. And there are the wars that might come: perhaps against Iran, in the South or East China Seas, on the Korean peninsula or between South Sudan and Sudan.
I can’t claim that most Americans will be thinking about these disasters as they give thanks for their own blessings. They are more likely to be thinking about Breezy Point and Hoboken, two communities that hurricane Sandy devastated early this month. We’ve still got tens of thousands homeless and some without power weeks later. Those who turn to America for help–and many do–are going to find us preoccupied these days with our own needs. I suspect this will not be just a short-term phenomenon, but a longer-term effort to put our own house in order, limiting commitments abroad and prioritizing them in accordance with America’s own interests.
This will sound ungenerous to non-Americans, who may bemoan American interference but also look to the U.S. to step in to help stop the Gaza fighting and turn to Washington when other disasters strike. We will continue to do what we can where vital American interests are at stake, but it will be healthy if we are a bit less committed and rely on others rather more than we have in the past. Our withdrawal–retrenchment is what some call it–will not be absolute. It has to be calculated and calibrated. Good judgment, not ideology, should be its guide.
That is one of the many reasons I am grateful to the American people for re-electing President Obama. I don’t always agree with his judgment–I’d rather he did more on Syria, for example–but he is thoughtful and cautious in ways that fit our current circumstances. Managing the relative decline in American power and constructing a global architecture that will limit conflict and provide space for those who choose to live in free societies to prosper are the great challenges of the coming generations. Wisdom, not resolve, is the essential ingredient to meet them.
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