Tag: North Korea
You won’t find any of this on Amazon
Hanukkah, an apocryphal festival if there ever was one, starts this evening. In my family, we expected gifts each night. Here’s my wish list:
1. Release of those arrested post-election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
2. A serious civilian government in Egypt ready to restrain the security forces and fulfill the ideals of the revolution.
3. International Criminal Court indictment of President Saleh of Yemen.
4. Turnover of power in Damascus to the Syrian National Council.
5. A transition in North Korea that opens the door to peaceful reform.
6. An end to military action in the Nuba Mountains and resolution of Sudan’s disputes with the South.
7. Quick and peaceful formation of a new government in Baghdad.
8. Success in negotiations with the Taliban that allows accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops.
If you think this is grand, just wait until you see what I ask for the twelve days of Christmas!
Half the world
The goal of this National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security is as simple as it is profound: to empower half the world’s population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence, and insecurity. Achieving this goal is critical to our national and global security.
Those are the opening lines of the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security unveiled yesterday at Georgetown University by Secretary of State Clinton. My friends at Inclusive Security asked me if I would blog on it–I hope they won’t be too disappointed in the results.
The plan is impeccably right-minded: it makes engagement and protection of women central to U.S. policy, complements existing efforts, establishes inclusion as the norm, emphasizes coordination and declares U.S. agencies accountable for implementing the plan. Nothing wrong with any of that.
The problem is that women are not often the problem. Only in rare instances do they join armed groups, chase civilians from their homes, rape and pillage or commit other war crimes. Men do most of these things, and men generally order these things done. When the time comes to make peace, the people you need at the negotiating table are the ones who control the ones with the guns.
The people you should want at the negotiating table are the ones without guns: victims, male or female, who have a stake in ending war and building peace. But only rarely are they brought in, mainly because the guys with guns don’t want them there. In my time working on the Bosnian Federation in the 1990s, I can’t recall an occasion on which a woman was in the room during a negotiation as a representative of one of the “formerly warring parties.” But neither was there ever a man in the room who hadn’t been a belligerent, who just wanted a normal life, who thought the safety and security of his family was more important than ethnic identity. Constituents for peace are a threat to belligerents, who want all the cards in their own hands, not in someone else’s.
This does not explain why women aren’t used as mediators. Of the current State Department special envoys and representatives who report directly to Hillary Clinton, only four of twenty-one are women, if I am counting correctly. Seven of the ten who do not report directly to the Secretary are women. Certainly these are higher numbers of women than at times in the past, but that 4/21 is not exactly smashing the glass ceiling. The UN, which naturally reflects not only American values, has never used a woman as a chief mediator, according to the report.
While I would be the last to quarrel with the need to protect women from sexual and gender-based violence during and after conflict, as well as their right to resources during recovery from violence, it is in the conflict prevention section that I think the report says some really interesting things. Let me quote at some length:
…gender-specific migration patterns or precipitous changes in the status or treatment of women and girls may serve as signals of broader vulnerability to the onset or escalation of conflict or atrocities. This focus will help to ensure that conflict prevention efforts are responsive to sexual and gender-based violence and other forms of violence affecting women and girls, and that our approaches are informed by differences in the experiences of men and women, girls and boys. Further, we will seek to better leverage women’s networks and organizations in activities aimed at arresting armed conflict or preventing spirals of violence.
Finally, the United States understands that successful conflict prevention efforts must rest on key investments in women’s economic empowerment, education, and health. A growing body of evidence shows that empowering women and reducing gender gaps in health, education, labor markets, and other areas is associated with lower poverty, higher economic growth, greater agricultural productivity, better nutrition and education of children, and other outcomes vital to the success of communities.
I’m not sure I am completely comfortable with the notion that women and girls are the canaries in the coal mine, but the notion that women’s employment, health and education, often viewed as the softer side of peacebuilding, are in fact central to the enterprise is one that I think has real validity. If Afghanistan has any chance at all of coming out all right from the last decade of hellish conflict, it is because of what has been done on health and education, two of the relative success stories in an otherwise bleak picture. Education is one of the failed sectors in Bosnia, where its segregation has helped to sustain ethnic nationalists in power. The role of women in North Korea, where they are increasingly responsible for providing livelihoods from small gardens, is likely to be fundamental.
We won’t really know if this “action plan” is effective for another year, or perhaps two or three. It is probably too much to hope that the forcefulness and clarity of purpose with which it was prepared will blow away the barriers that have stood for so long. But if it enables America to tap more of its own talent as well as draw on constituencies for peace in conflict-prone countries, it will have served a useful purpose.
North Korean winter: stability or discontent?
As regular readers will know, North Korea is not my thing, even if I have a good deal of experience on nuclear nonproliferation issues. The last time I posted a piece devoted to it was more than a year ago, though I’ve mentioned it more often as an American priority. In the wake of Kim Jong-il’s death, the best I can do is offer a summary of what I think obvious.
North Korea is a priority for the U.S. because of the risks its nuclear weapons program poses, both for proliferation and for targeting America and its allies in South Korea and Japan. Kim Jong-il’s regime managed to test something like nuclear weapons twice (in 2006 and 2009), was developing longer-range missiles and is thought to be on the verge of acquiring substantial quantities of enriched uranium. North Korea has already been involved in murky missile and nuclear technology trade with Pakistan and Iran.
The first American concern will be short-term stability. The Obama Administration is quite rightly indicating that it is watching the situation and consulting with Seoul and Tokyo, but it would be a mistake to say or do anything that could provoke military action by Pyongyang, which readily perceives threats and uses attacks on the South both to rally internal support and to extract assistance from the international community.
This will put Washington for the moment on the same wavelength with Beijing and Moscow, which fear instability. China in particular is concerned about millions of refugees crossing its border. It will also worry that the Americans intend to take advantage of Kim Jong-il’s death to liberate North Korea and reunify it with the South. That is something Seoul says it wants and the Americans would be hard put not to support, but the process by which it happens could be dramatically problematic as well as costly. China does not want a reunified, Western-oriented, strong Korea on its border.
A great deal now depends on what happens inside North Korea. The New York Times quotes an unnamed American military source:
Anyone who tells you they understand what is going to happen is either lying or deceiving himself.
I would be deceiving myself. So I won’t try to tell you I understand what is going to happen. Things to watch for? Whether calm prevails for the next week or so, whether the funeral comes off on December 28 without signs of tension in or with the army, whether the succession to Kim Jong-un is orderly, whether food prices remain more or less stable, whether there are military maneuvers against the South. So far, the announcements out of the North suggest things are under control.
Past the next few weeks, Washington will need to decide what to do. In a remarkable but little remarked shift of policy, the Americans–who had said they would not meet with North Korea bilaterally unless it gave up its nuclear weapons programs–began meeting bilaterally with the North Koreans in 2006 as soon as they tested a nuclear weapon. Now they say they won’t return to the six-party talks (involving China, Russia, Japan, and the Koreas) unless than the talks are substantial (which means progress can be made on nuclear issues).
My guess is that we’ll see talks, but with a few months delay. North Korea is not as desperate as once it was. It will not want to rush into international talks before settling its domestic situation. The regime will want to reconsolidate itself and bargain with the five other parties from a position of strength, which likely means continuation of the nuclear and missile programs in the interim.
The wild card could be the North Koreans themselves. If protests start, the regime will crack down hard. There are signs the security forces are deploying to prevent trouble. Markets are closed. North Korea is a brutal dictatorship far beyond the imagination of Tunisia or Egypt, where protests have felled long-ruling presidents. Could this be the winter of discontents?
PS: Written before Kim Jong-un became the designated successor, but still of interest: Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea – Council on Foreign Relations.
PPS: Just imagine what these people will do the day they are free to do as they like:
What threatens the United States?
The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week. What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?
Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:
- a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
- an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
- a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations
Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)
The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources
Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:
- a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
- rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
- a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
- a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
- a mass casualty attack on Israel
But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:
- political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
- rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
- growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action
Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
- renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
- an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh
And some non-military threats:
- heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
- political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
- political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
- an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
- violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan
I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats. But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones. And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.
And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note: the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.
Next week’s peace picks
I am speaking tomorrow about the evolution of democracy in the Balkans (2 pm) at the AID Democracy and Governance conference at George Washington University, but I am not sure that really ranks among the week’s peace picks. Here is a still immodest list of the week’s best, which includes two other events at which I’ll be participating:
1. Syria Under Growing International Pressure
A CENTER ON THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE AND SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY EVENT
Turkey, the Arab League, the United Nations and the European Union (EU) have escalated pressure on Damascus in an effort to isolate and punish the Syrian regime for its continuing repression of protesters. With the death toll now exceeding 4,000 civilians, Turkey and the Arab League recently joined the U.S. and the EU in imposing wide-ranging sanctions against Syria—a coordinated, international move considered inconceivable just six months ago.
Tuesday, December 13, 2011
3:00 PM to 4:30 PM
Saul/Zilkha Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
Contact: Brookings Office of Communications
Email: events@brookings.edu
Phone: 202.797.6105
RELATED CONTENT
Getting Serious about Regime Change in Syria
Michael Doran and Salman Shaikh
The American Interest
July 29, 2011
The Arab Awakening : America and the Transformation of the Middle East
Kenneth M. Pollack, Daniel L. Byman, Pavel K. Baev, Michael Doran, Khaled Elgindy, Stephen R. Grand, Shadi Hamid, Bruce Jones, Suzanne Maloney, Jonathan Pollack, Bruce Riedel, Ruth H. Santini, Salman Shaikh, Ibrahim Sharqieh, Ömer Taşpınar, Shibley Telhami, Sarah Yerkes and Akram Al-Turk
November 18, 2011
America’s Strategic Goals in the Middle East and North Africa
Michael Doran
Foreign Policy
August 22, 2011
Introduction
Kate Seelye
Vice President
The Middle East Institute
Moderator
Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Panelists
Murhaf Jouejati
Professor of Middle East Studies
National Defense University
Andrew J. Tabler
Next Generation Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Ömer Taşpınar
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
2. Kosovo’s President: What does She Represent?
A discussion with
Her Excellency
Atifete Jahjaga
President of Kosovo
Moderated by
Daniel Serwer,
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Visiting Scholar, Conflict Management Program , SAIS
Wednesday, December 14, 2011
10:00 am – 11:30 am
Kenney Auditorium
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Co-sponsored by the Center for Transaltantic Relations and
Conflict Management Program, SAIS
3. Incomplete Security Sector Reform in Serbia: Lessons for Democratic Transition
Wednesday, December 14, 2011
2:00– 3:30 pm
Room 500
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
with
Jelena Milić
Director, Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies,
Belgrade, Serbia
Comments by
Daniel Serwer
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Vedran Džihić
Moderator
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Jelena Milić, director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, will give an insight into the problems of the security reform in Serbia since the time of the Milosevic regime and democratic changes in 2000 until today. She will discuss the importance of transitional justice for security sector reforms as well as the consequences of current gaps and problems in the reform for Serbia. As the security sector reform is critical for the successs of all post-conflict and democratization efforts the event will outline possible “lessons learned” for democratic transition of regions like North Africa. Finally, Jelena Milić will elaborate on the implications of the recent European Council’s decision on Serbian EU-candidacy bid.
4. Proactive Deterrence: The Challenge of Escalation Control on the Korean Peninsula
Washington, DC 20008
After the attacks last year by North Korea on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island, the difficult debates continue over the best way South Korea should respond to these types of strikes by North Korea and on ways to deter them in the future. Fears arise that miscalculating the response to North Korean aggression could quickly escalate into war.
And even though South Korea and the U.S., along with other allies, would likely be able to defend South Korea and eventually reunify the Korean peninsula through force, the outbreak of war will likely have huge human, economic, and developmental costs for South Korea. Thus, proper deterrence mechanisms and response procedures are needed.
Please join KEI for a luncheon discussion with Abraham Denmark, Senior Advisor, CNA. Mr. Denmark will discuss his Academic Paper Series report on some of the issues involved with preemptive self-defense and proactive deterrence by South Korea. He will also present some possible policies for South Korea and the United States that could mitigate the potential for accidental escalation while sustaining deterrence over North Korea. We hope you will join us for this interesting event.
A light meal will be served.
To RSVP for this event, please click here.
5. Combating Botnets: Strengthening Cybersecurity Through Stakeholder Coordination
Friday, December 16, 2011
1:30 PM to 3:30 PM
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
Presenters
Bruce McConnell
Counselor to the National Protection and Programs Directorate Deputy Under Secretary
U.S. Department Of Homeland Security
Ari Schwartz
Senior Advisor to the Secretary on Technology Policy and Member of the Internet Policy Task Force
U.S. Department of Commerce
Panelists
Jamie Barnett
Chief of the Commission’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
Federal Communications Commission
Sameer Bhalotra
Deputy Cybersecurity Coordinator, National Security Staff
The White House
Yurie Ito
Director, Global Coordination
JP CERT
Michael Kaiser
Executive Director
National Cyber Security Alliance
Brent Rowe
Senior Economist
This week’s peace picks
As the weekly “peace picks” post has been taking me too long to assemble, and this week I’ve let it slide until Monday morning, I’m going to try doing less formatting and more cutting and pasting. As always, best to check the sponsoring organizations’ websites for registration, cost, RSVP and other information. And don’t forget the Middle East Institute’s annual conference at the Grand Hyatt November 17. The week is heavy on Afghanistan:
2. Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People
Webcast: This event will be webcast live beginning at 9:30am on November 15, 2011 at www.usip.org/webcast.
On November 15, the U.S. Institute of Peace will host the Washington launch of The Asia Foundation’s “Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People” — the broadest, most comprehensive public opinion poll in the country. The report covers all 34 provinces, with candid data gleaned from face-to-face interviews with more than 6,000 Afghan citizens on security, corruption, women’s rights, development, the economy, and negotiating with the Taliban.
This marks the seventh in the Foundation’s series of surveys in Afghanistan; taken together they provide a barometer of Afghan public opinion over time. With support from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the findings help inform national leaders, scholars, donors and the policymaking community focused on Afghanistan and the region. Join USIP and The Asia Foundation for a presentation of this year’s findings, and analysis of what the seven years of findings indicate for Afghanistan’s recent past, and the country’s future.
This event will feature the following speakers:
- David Arnold, introduction
President
The Asia Foundation - Tariq Osman, panelist
Program Director, Kabul
The Asia Foundation - Sunil Pillai, panelist
Technical Adviser, Kabul
The Asia Foundation - Sheilagh Henry, panelist
Deputy Country Representative, Kabul
The Asia Foundation - Andrew Wilder, moderator
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Programs
United States Institute of Peace
3. Can Less be More in Afghanistan? State-building Lessons from the Past to Guide the Future
USIP, November 17, 10-noon
Ten years after the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan initiated a new, post-Taliban order, the success and sustainability of the international community’s ambitious state-building project is being questioned. Though billed as transformative, it is unclear whether the state-building investments and reforms of the past decade can be sustained, or will represent a job half-done.
With the Afghan engagement now at a critical juncture, marked by the convening of another Bonn conference in early December, international donor assistance budgets to Afghanistan are declining, prompting a need to look back as well as forward. Why has deeper and broader engagement been repeatedly attempted despite concern that many efforts have had limited and sometimes counter-productive effects? How can lessons from the past help to identify reasonable ways forward? Please join USIP for a discussion with a panel of leading experts to discuss this important topic at a critical juncture in the state-building history of Afghanistan.
- Astri Suhrke, panelist
Senior Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute
Author, When Less is More: the International Project in Afghanistan - J. Alexander Thier, panelist
Assistant to the Administrator and Director, Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs
U.S. Agency for International Development - Michael Semple, panelist
2011-2012 Carr Center Fellow
Harvard Kennedy School
- Andrew Wilder, moderator
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Programs
United States Institute of Peace
4. Afghan Perspectives on Post-Transition
-
Thursday, Nov 17, 2011 | 10:30 am – 11:30 am
The Center for Strategic and International Studies presents
Afghan Perspectives on Post-Transition
featuring remarks by
Mr. Mohammad Haneef Atmar
Former Afghan Minister of Interior
Sponsored by ANHAM
Thursday, November 17, 2011
10:30AM – 11:30AM
CSIS B1 Conference Center
CSIS 1800 K. St. NW, Washington, DC 20006
CSIS will present the first in a series of speeches and Q&A sessions on perspectives for Afghan governance and issues following the 2014 transition. Our speaker for this first event is Mr. Mohammad Haneef Atmar. Mr. Atmar served as one of Afghanistan’s leading Ministers during his terms in office as the Minister of Interior (2008-2010), Minister of Education (2006-2008) and as Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (2002-2006). We hope you can join us or send a representative.
November 17, 2011 | 1:00 pm – 2:30 pm | ||||
Please join the Better World Campaign, the United Nations Association of the USA and National Capital Area Chapter for a panel discussion on Sudan & South Sudan: United States and United Nations Engagement with
Princeton Lyman U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and Francois Grignon UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations moderated by Peter Yeo Thursday, November 17, 2011 1:00– 2:30 p.m. 2103 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC a light lunch will be served R.S.V.P. |