Tag: Nuclear weapons
Getting back to the nuclear deal is the best option, the sooner the better
Iran is arguably already a threshold nuclear state. American withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, aka Iran nuclear deal) in 2018 has allowed Tehran to enrich uranium to 20%, develop more advanced centrifuges, and likely make other technological process. It is now well within one year of being able to fabricate a nuclear weapon. What difference does that make?
Not much, yet. Possession of nuclear weapons is not a major factor in today’s geopolitics, because they are unusable. As Richard Burt put it a decade ago:
The currency of power has changed from [nuclear] military power to economic, technological competitiveness.
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1230/the-new-geopolitics-why-nuclear-weapons-no-longer-serve-us-interests
Israel’s growing power in the Middle East is not due to its nuclear weapons, which represent a guarantee of its existence rather than a means of projecting power. Arab states are now cozying up to Israel because of its economic and technological prowess, built on top of its military strength. Nuclear weapons have given Pakistan a means of deterring a conventional Indian invasion but have not made Pakistan India’s equal even within South Asia. India is by far the greater economic and technological power. Russia’s resurgence as a great power is not based on its nuclear weapons, which Moscow possessed in the 1990s when it was an economic basket case, but rather on its economic recovery and willingness to project conventional military force into Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria as well as hybrid warfare in the Balkans, Belarus, and elsewhere.
Nuclear weapons are still important for deterrence, but they do little more than guarantee mutual destruction.
So what’s wrong with Iran getting nuclear weapons, or the technology to make and deliver them within a few months time? The answer lies in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, not in Israel. Iran becoming a threshold nuclear state will inspire, if it has not already, its regional rivals to do likewise. Both President Erdogan and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have both said as much. I’d guess Turkey is technologically capable on its own. Saudi Arabia may need to buy experts and technology abroad, but it is capable of doing so. Once four countries in the Middle East go nuclear, the risks of intentional or accidental nuclear warfare rise exponentially.
Bilateral deterrence works reasonably well, judging by experience not only with the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States but also with India and Pakistan, India and China, as well as China and the US. Multilateral deterrence poses much more complex issues, especially with countries that lack second strike capabilities and are geographically proximate. Preparation for launch of Iranian missiles that might (or might not) carry nuclear weapons could trigger responses not only from Israel, which in its submarines has second strike capability, but also from Turkey or Saudi Arabia, depending on the crisis du jour. Miscalculation is a key factor in war. The odds of a mistake are much higher the more countries are involved.
The question remains: can the world manage with Iran as a nuclear-threshold or even a nuclear country? The answer is yes, at least for a while, but that circumstance will not be in Iran’s favor. If it fails to negotiate a return to the JCPOA, the US will tighten its economic sanctions and apply them with more vigor. Israel will continue its “dirty war” of cyber attacks and assassinations of Iranian scientists. Europe and the UK will go along with the Americans, as their financial institutions and companies have too much to lose by displeasing Washington. Moscow won’t want Iran to go nuclear, but its companies may well be prepared to surreptiously help Tehran evade sanctions. Beijing may do likewise, as it has much to gain from acquiring Iranian oil at sanctions-induced relatively cheap prices.
The negotiations on return to the JCPOA adjourned Friday without progress and bitter words from both Washington and Tehran. Failure of the negotiations, whose aim is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state, will thus aggravate East/West tensions and vastly complicate US relations with both Russia and China, which won’t take kindly to the tightening of sanctions. Iran’s economy, already well on the way to ruin, will deteriorate further. Israel will find its dirty war progressively more difficult and less effective as the Iranians learn how to counter it. Washington will want try to restrain Ankara and Riyadh from acquiring all the technology needed for nuclear weapons but will find it increasingly difficult to do so.
Getting back to the nuclear deal is the best option. The sooner the better.
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Stevenson’s army, November 22
[This is the 58th anniversary of the assassination of President Kennedy.]
– FT has more on the Chinese hypersonic missile test.
– WSJ says US thwarted secret Chinese project in UAE.
– US warns allies of Russia attack on Ukraine.
– WaPo says DOD reviews NATO exercises, concerned they may be too provocative.
-NYT says Iranian nuclear programs revive despite Israeli attacks.
-Carnegie analysts see clash between US security and democracy interests.
– Sudan’s PM restored to position.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Taking political risks and settling for less than you want
Mohammad Lotfollahi of the Iranian newspaper Etemad asked questions. I replied on Thursday:
Q: Iran, the P5 + 1 and the United States will begin talks on reviving the nuclear deal in late November. What do you think is the main reason for the ineffectiveness of the previous six rounds of talks?
A: Iran has wanted firm guarantees that the US would never again leave the agreement. No US government can guarantee that, except by ratification of an agreement in the Senate, which political circumstances do not permit. The US has wanted Iran to agree to talk about regional issues, which Tehran has been unwilling to do.
Q: Many in the media have criticized Iran for delaying its return to talks, but while Biden continues to pursue of maximum pressure policy, everyone has forgotten about Trump’s withdrawal from the deal. Isn’t America to blame for the current situation?
A: Yes. I don’t think anyone doubts that Trump’s withdrawal is the cause of the difficult current situation.
Q: One of the stories often repeated by opponents of the JCPOA is that it offered “maximum concessions” and led to a “bonanza” for Iran. How do you see JCPOA? Is this still a win-win agreement for everyone?
A: Iran did get serious benefits from the deal, which were cancelled when the US withdrew. The EU, US, Russia, and China also benefited. I believe it was a win-win.
Q: The United States wants Iran to be flexible in its negotiations. But in practice, it does not show any flexibility under the pretext of democracy and separation of powers in America. Doesn’t this hurt the negotiations?
A: It may, but you can’t convince the US to give up democracy and separation of powers.
Q: Is there basically an agreement that both major US parties agree on?
A: No, not so far as I can see. The Republicans are mostly committed to maximum pressure, which hasn’t worked. The Democrats liked the original deal, which was working.
Q: How much does the element of time affect the success of future negotiations? Are the concerns about losing the JCPOA non-proliferation benefit if the negotiation process is prolonged real and serious?
A: Yes. Iran is acquiring know-how, especially for enrichment of uranium, that it will be impossible to erase. Delay is the enemy of nonproliferation.
Q: What is your proposal to get out of the current impasse? Is there a way to defuse tensions and reach an agreement?
A: Sure there is. Both sides will have to settle for less than they want and take political risks in doing so.
Q: Israel threatens to launch a military attack on Iran. Israel even has nuclear weapons and is not a member of the NPT. Isn’t the West’s attitude towards Iran and Israel an example of a double standard?
Q: The entire nonproliferation regime is based on a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear states. Iran chose to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapons state. Israel has not signed it. Both exercised their sovereign rights, presumably because the choices they made best served their national interests. Tehran continues to say it will never develop nuclear weapons. The main issue is ensuring verification of that commitment. Israel has no obligation to verification one way or the other.
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Deterrence is absurd and risky, disarmament difficult but necessary
Pantelis Ikonomou, a former IAEA nuclear inspector, writes:
The use of nuclear weapons is at the core of NATO security policy. At the same time, their role continues to increase in the national strategy of all nine nuclear-armed states, both the five Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) (USA, Russia, China, UK and France), as well as the four non-NPT de facto nuclear weapon possessors (India, Pakistan, North Korea), and allegedly Israel. They all appear committed to retaining nuclear capacity for the indefinite future by adding new nuclear weapon systems or modernizing the existing ones, pledging at any opportunity that they retain a strong nuclear deterrence.
The rationality of nuclear deterrence is based on two fundamental characteristics of today’s advanced nuclear weapon systems: a) the capability of instantaneous counterattack and b) the immense destruction power they possess.
Thus, an intentional nuclear first strike should not be launched as a pre-emptive surprise attack to destroy the adversary’s nuclear weapon arsenal because the attacker would not survive either. The logical consequence of this reality is that the nuclear capacity of each nuclear weapon possessor establishes the definite deterrence to an adversarial nuclear first strike.
However, as in mathematics so in the nuclear world, there is no second without a first. The No-First-Use nuclear postures of the five NWS plus India include a critical footnote: the right to a pre-emptive nuclear first strike against any armed attack that would threaten their vital security interests, whether nuclear or conventional.
Additionally, two more nuclear first-strike possibilities arise from:
- The First-Use doctrines of North Korea (DPRK), Pakistan, and Israel. For DPRK, to pre-empt a regime decapitation. For Pakistan, as a desperate necessity against India’s Kashmir policy, and for Israel, as the strategic national survival choice.
- The probability of launching a nuclear weapon by accident, miscalculation, or a malicious/terrorist act. This probability is steadily increasing, as the nuclear arsenals are maintained, modernized, and eventually growing.
The continuously existing possibility of a nuclear first strike, for whatever cause, will instantaneously trigger a counter response. This makes the possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence only, i.e. for a forced second strike, a dangerous absurdity.
This situation fully reflects a dead-end reality, described in the game theory as the Nash equilibrium. Solving the Nash equilibrium in the nuclear deterrence analogy would require cooperation of the antagonists (an oxymoron condition) yet the only solution: lowering all armed-raised-hands before shooting at each other. In other words, abstaining from the absurdity of being the first attacker, the necessity of being the responder, or the danger of either side committing an error.
Moreover, maintaining weapons for strengthening states’ geopolitical objectives inspires would-be proliferators. While the NPT was in force since 1970, proliferation took place successfully in four non-NPT states: India, Pakistan, DPRK, and allegedly in Israel. Additionally, four more NPT states attempted proliferation: Romania (by 1989), Iraq (by 1991), Libya (by 2003), and “very likely” Syria (by 2011) [re: “Global Nuclear Developments”, by P. F. Ikonomou, Springer 2020, 4.4 Syria 2011-2020, page 55].
History also suggests that nuclear deterrence was again and again ineffective. Common irony: nuclear weapon holders after World War II lost several wars they entered; the UK at Suez (Egypt), France in Algeria, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the US in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Likewise, the UK and France could not hold on to their colonial possessions despite having nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union collapsed while sitting on the world’s largest ever nuclear arsenal.
In conclusion:
Nuclear deterrence is dangerous. It does not establish strategic stability, but rather prolongs global uncertainty, maintaining the possibility of two-party nuclear standoffs, single acts of despair and survival, or an accident, error, or terror. Pursuing weapons that can never be used without destroying your own country is irrational, dangerous, wasteful, and pointless.
Maintaining nuclear weapons for attaining geopolitical objectives inspires would-be proliferators.
Nuclear deterrence without attempting global and complete nuclear disarmament is nothing but a nebulous political stalemate. Global nuclear disarmament is not an easy process. It cannot be quick, quiet nor cheap. It is an extremely complex task, but it must be pursued before the last human error occurs.
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Stevenson’s army, November 4
-For a couple of decades, Congress has asked DOD to send an annual report on Chinese military power. The latest was released Wednesday. Here’s WaPo’s summary.
– The real power in the House is in the Rules Committee, which is making its own changes to the Budget Committee compendium bill.
– Fred Kaplan predicts a compromise on the purpose of nuclear weapons.
– A congressman suggests” 9 eyes” sharing intelligence, which is obviously more than 5.
-WaPo reports a cyber retaliation.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, November 3
– Big night for GOP. It will have consequences, but observers are divided. Good summary from WaPo.
– Administration argues over “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons.
– Joe Nye says we shouldn’t call competition with China a cold war.
– Sen. Hawley, whose defense staffer was at our brownbag, has new bill for Taiwan aid.
– Good resources: while looking for something else, I discovered excellent recent CRS report on NSC and UVa site listing key staff in WH and NSC.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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