Tag: Nuclear weapons
Peace Picks | July 26 – August 1, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Past as Prologue: Revisiting Bernhard-Henri Levy’s 2002 Report on Afghanistan | July 26, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | The Middle East Institute | Register Here
In spring 2002, French philosopher and human rights activist Bernard-Henri Lévy traveled to an Afghanistan newly freed from Taliban control at the request of the French president to assess the conditions on the ground and determine how France could contribute to Afghanistan’s rebirth as a nation. In his subsequent report, Lévy pressed for France to take on a key role in areas ranging from strengthening the rule of law and women’s rights to helping to restore the country’s cultural heritage.
Much has changed over the past two decades and as the U.S. and its international partners prepare to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan, MEI is pleased to announce the launch of a new book, Past as Prologue: Revisiting Bernard-Henri Lévy’s 2002 Report on Afghanistan. The book includes Lévy’s original report (translated into English for the first time) along with a foreword by General (ret.) David Petraeus and an introductory essay by Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum. Following remarks by General (ret). Petraeus and Lévy, a panel of experts will discuss Lévy’s 2002 report and what has happened in the years since. What was once hoped and envisioned for the country? What has actually happened on the ground over the past two decades? How are Lévy’s recommendations relevant in today’s context?
Speakers:
Gen. (ret.) David Petraeus
Former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan; former director, Central Intelligence Agency
Bernard-Henri Lévy
Philosopher, journalist, filmmaker, and public intellectual
H.E. Javid Ahmad,
Ambassador of Afghanistan to the United Arab Emirates; non-resident senior fellow, Atlantic Council
Marvin Weinbaum,
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, MEI
- Transitioning to Non-Oil Economies in the Gulf: Successes, Failures, and the Path Forward | July 27, 2021 | 8:00 AM EST | The Arab Gulf States Institute | Register Here
Economic diversification strategies to wean Gulf economies away from a dependence on hydrocarbon revenue have existed for decades. Ongoing state-led investments in strategic non-oil industries have produced varied results. Recent development initiatives involving culture, renewable energy, and technology-oriented industries appear promising; however, the return on investment is neither immediate nor guaranteed. Proceeds from the oil and gas sector continue to constitute the majority of public sector revenue in Gulf Arab states.
Are overlapping initiatives to develop non-oil industries in the region opportunities for cooperation or competition? With a steady rebound in oil prices since the oil price shocks of 2020, will oil- and gas-producing countries in the Gulf relax economic diversification efforts? Do protests in Oman signal a wider dissatisfaction with the fiscal adjustments implemented since 2020? What does this reveal about the rentier state theory and the nature of economic reform and development in the Gulf?
Speakers:
Talik Doshi
Visiting Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore
Kate Dourian
Non-resident Fellow, AGSIW; Contributing Editor, Middle East Economic Survey; Fellow, Energy Institute
Robert Mogielnicki
Senior Resident Scholar, AGSIW
Clemens Chay
Research Fellow, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore
- Report Launch: Mapping the Human Rights Risks of Facial Recognition Technology | July 27, 2021 | 12:00 PM EST | Register Here
Thanks to a decade of rapid progress in the field of computer vision, facial recognition technology (FRT) has become a commercial product available to almost any government or business in the world. Organizations ranging from law enforcement agencies to independent retail outlets are beginning to integrate FRT into their operations. Proponents hope that facial recognition may support public safety initiatives and improve access to services, but the risk of errors and abuse mean that FRT deployments carry substantial risks to a variety of fundamental rights and freedoms. This is particularly true in the case of nations with weak rule of law.
Speakers:
Marti Flacks
Director and Senior Fellow, Human Rights Initiative
Amy K. Lehr
Senior Associate (non-resident), Human Rights Initiative
- Prospects for Peace and Security in Zimbabwe | July 28, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | The Brookings Institution | Register Here
After 37 years of dictatorship, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe finally resigned on November 21, 2017. For many, his departure and Emmerson Mnangagwa’s rise signaled hope for the politically and economically devastated and once pariah state of Zimbabwe. Today, the increasing political violence and polarization, as well as economic emaciation serve to undermine the ruling administration and highlight the enduring legacies of Mugabe’s reign, even after his death on September 6, 2019.
On July 28, the Africa Security Initiative will host a discussion on U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe and future political course of action. Following the discussion, the panel will take questions from the audience.
Speakers:
George F. Ward
Adjunct Senior Research Analyst, Institute for Defense Analyses
Michelle Gavin
Senior Fellow for Africa Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Dew Mavhinga
Director, Southern Africa, Human Rights Watch
Piers Pigou
Senior Consultant, Southern Africa, International Crisis Group
Michael E. O’Hanlon (moderator)
Director of Research, Foreign Policy; Co-Director, Center for Security, Strategy and Technology, Africa Security Initiative; Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; The Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair
- The Convention on Refugees at 70: A Conversation with Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield | July 28, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | The United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
On July 28th, the world will mark the 70th anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations’ 1951 Refugee Convention, a historic multilateral agreement that clarified the rights of refugees under international law and the obligation of host countries to provide for their protection. The principles enshrined in the Refugee Convention set precedents for the rights, repatriation, and resettlement of refugees that still resonate to this day.
However, these precedents are increasingly under strain amid a changing global context. Driven by violent conflict and insecurity, the world is facing a new displacement crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated displacement trends, pushing healthcare infrastructure to the brink and creating dire economic conditions as countries struggle to contain the virus. Meanwhile, climate change uprooted more than 30 million people—the highest figure in a decade.
Speakers:
Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Lise Grande
President am CEO, U.S. Institute of Peace
- How Modern CIOs Innovate for Impact | July 28, 2021 | 12:00 PM EST | The Atlantic Council | Register Here
Modern Chief Information Officers (CIOs) today drive transformation, connecting the dots between customers, and the tools and infrastructure needed to support them. Not only do they have legacy systems that needed stabilizing, but also, customer demands are accelerating, along with the pace of and changes in technology. In order to cope, modern CIOS will need to address concerns with a matrix of technology, people, and customer needs in mind.
Join us for a GeoTech Hour, co-hosted by David Bray and Jamie Holcombe discussing how to drive cultural change for enterprises and discuss what it is like to steer, lead, and shape IT and organizations in the federal realm.
Speakers:
Sally Grant
Vice President, Lucd AI
Nagesh Rao
Chief Information Officer, Bureau of Industry and Security, United States Department of Commerce
David Bray, PhD
Director, GeoTech Center, Atlantic Council
Jamie Holocombe
Chief Information Officer, United States Patent and Trademark Office
- Nuclear Security Policy in an Era of Strategic Competition | July 28, 2021 | 1:30 PM EST | The United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has relied on diplomacy and the maintenance of its nuclear enterprise as a means of strategic deterrence. However, 30 years later, Russia and China are pursuing the maintenance and modernization of their nuclear weapons and systems — and the current U.S. construct is ill-suited to this new, complex geopolitical environment.
The Congressional Nuclear Security Working Group, co-chaired by Rep. Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE) and Rep. Bill Foster (D-IL), is a bipartisan caucus dedicated to facilitating awareness and engagement on the urgent threats posed by the prospect of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. The caucus goals include strengthening nuclear safeguards, securing fissile material and preventing the misuse and spread of sensitive nuclear materials and technologies.
Speakers:
Rep. Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE)
U.S. Representative from Nebraska
Rep. Bill Foster (D-IL)
U.S. Representative from Illinois
Lise Grande, moderator
President and CEO, U.S. Institute of Peace
- Jordan’s Digital Future: A Conversation with Jordanian Minister of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship | July 29, 2021 | 9:00 AM EST | The Wilson Center | Register Here
Join the Middle East Program for a conversation with His Excellency Ahmad Hanandeh, Minister of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship in Jordan, who will describe Jordan’s journey to becoming a regional tech leader, and strategy to using digital transformation as a means of recovering form the coronavirus pandemic.
Speakers:
Ahmad Hanandeh
Minister of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
- Unlocking the Potential of U.S. Offshore Wind | July 29, 2021 | 12:45 PM EST | The Bipartisan Policy Center | Register Here
Achieving domestic and international climate goals will require a dramatic expansion of energy production from zero-carbon resources. Offshore wind has an important role to play in that expansion and a robust domestic industry will create jobs, advance manufacturing and tap a growing global market. Realizing this potential, however, will not be easy for a host of reasons, some of which are common to the early large-scale deployment of most new energy technologies and some of which have to do with the unique characteristics and demands of offshore wind.
Speakers:
David J. Hayes
Special Assistant to the President for Climate Policy
Bobby Jindal
Former Governor of Louisiana
Bill White
Vice President, Offshore Wind, Avangrid
Lesley Jantarasami (moderator)
Managing Director, BPC Energy Program
- Is the U.S. Really Leading the World in Hypersonic Munitions? | July 29, 2021 | 2:00 PM EST | The Heritage Foundation | Register Here
Hypersonic weapons travel more than five times the speed of sound, enabling them to close on targets in ways that could significantly impact the next major armed conflict. Realizing their potential, Russia and China have well-developed programs and have likely fielded operational hypersonic weapons. In contrast, the U.S. has yet to complete testing on its first such munition.
Join Dr. Mark Lewis, one of America’s leading experts in this field, as he confronts the offensive potential, defensive challenges, and myths surrounding hypersonic munitions.
Speakers:
Dr. Mark Lewis
Executive Director, Emerging Technologies Institute, NDIA
John Venable
Senior Research Fellow for Defense Policy
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Better jaw jaw than war, but the strategic risks are real
Former IAEA Inspector Pantelis Ikonomou writes:
The sixth round of the Vienna negotiations aimed at restoring the multilateral Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA) were halted last week. At the same time, the temporary technical agreement between the IAEA and Iran, intended to enable the revival of the Iran deal, expired. Iran denies any obligation to provide an answer on the fate of this accord. Stalemate or death of JCPOA? Will this open the door to an additional de facto nuclear weapon state?
Judging intentions is difficult. Learning from facts has mostly proven wise. Some relevant facts are outlined below.
The development of the current North Korea and Iran nuclear challenges show similarities. The key common shortcoming of the world powers in dealing with these two challenges is that we (ineffectively) talk but they (strategically) continue. Equivalent lessons could also be learned from the earlier “peaceful” nuclear explosion of India in 1974 that has led to about 140 nuclear warheads in its arsenal today and to approximately the same number in Pakistan.
As for North Korea:
I1. n the period 1994–2002 of the “Agreed Framework” implementation, great attention went to terminating the possibility of plutonium production in the Yongbyon reactor while the country’s potential in enriching uranium was neglected.
2. During the years 2003–2009 of the “Six Party Talks,” the US linked other issues to the negotiations instead of concentrating on the main nuclear objective: how to curb fissile material acquisition.
3. Keen observers note the North Korean nuclear program “nuclear progress slowed significantly during times of diplomacy and accelerated during times of isolation, sanctions and threats.”
Result: Creation of an additional de-facto nuclear weapons state, North Korea, with an estimated number of 20 to 30 nuclear warheads in its arsenal, including thermonuclear capacity.
As for Iran:
- The crisis began in 2003 when IAEA inspectors identified a possible military dimension in Tehran’s civilian nuclear program. From 2003 to 2012, despite twelve IAEA and two UNSC resolutions culminating in trade and economic sanctions, Iran continued its non-compliance with obligations under the international Safeguards Agreement. Tehran regarded nuclear activities as its inalienable national right.
- This dangerous escalation was halted by the JCPOA in July 2015, after almost a decade of complex and sensitive diplomatic negotiations between the six world powers (the five UNSC permanent members plus Germany) and Iran. This Agreement stipulated obligations on both sides: termination of critical nuclear activities as well as limits to certain installed equipment, material stockpiles and uranium enrichment levels in Iran in exchange for lifting of sanctions.
- This honeymoon period lasted until May 2018 when US withdrew from the JCPOA and started reimposing sanctions. In January 2020, after the killing of Iran’s General Qasem Soleimani, Tehran changed its stance towards JCPOA. Progress achieved through the Agreement was then reversed.
- In February 2021, Iran’s parliament passed a law on terminating the JCPOA, including the associated voluntary implementation of the rigorous Additional Protocol (AP) to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.
Result: Increased instability and volatility in the region.
“What is next?” is the justified question. A few practical reflections:
- An eventual positive conclusion of the Vienna talks on the revival of JCPOA will not automatically bring definitive relief. The damage done after 2018 to the Iran deal cannot be verifiably restored quickly. Notwithstanding the professionalism and objectivity of the IAEA, restoration of the Agreement will require enormous effort, high additional costs, as well as the continuous and smooth cooperation of Iran’s competent authorities.
- For the successful revival of JCPOA the recently expired temporary arrangement between Iran and the IAEA needs to be extended immediately. Re-establishing the inspectors’ continuity of knowledge of Iran’s nuclear program is sine qua non for the IAEA to be able to draw the necessary broader conclusions on the exclusively peaceful character of Iran’s nuclear program.
- In case the JCPOA is not renewed, monitoring Iran under its IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement without the AP in place would perpetuate unresolved issues relating to questionable findings of materials, locations and activities. This unfortunate situation would create problems not only with Iran but also with other states in the region, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, who are being called to satisfy the same universal safeguards criteria.
The omens for stability and security of the world are not encouraging while the responsibility of the parties involved is growing larger.
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Stevenson’s army, June 24
WSJ says new intelligence assessment says Afghan government could collapse as soon as 6 months after US withdrawal.
In testimony Wednesday, Gen. Milley was less pessimistic. Austin and Milley told a Senate hearing last week they believe there is a “medium” risk of terrorist groups regaining strength in Afghanistan, saying it could happen in two years. Presumably President Biden considers these risks acceptable. This reminds me of the Nixon & Kissinger view that they needed a “decent interval” between the end of US combat in Vietnam and the collapse of Saigon. Here’s some of the evidence: Wikipedia; the Nixon tapes; and Kissinger’s handwritten notes. Here’s another summary.
In other news, the debt ceiling looms with no clear plan.
Earmarks are popular.
And SAIS prof Vali Nasr says an Iran deal is possible.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, June 20
[Mark Twain was onto something when he wrote: “When I was a boy of 14, my father was so ignorant I could hardly stand to have the old man around. But when I got to be 21, I was astonished at how much the old man had learned in seven years.”]
New Yorker has several archived pieces on fathers.
Glenn Kessler explains the difference between substantive foreign policy amendments and “messaging amendments.“
Paul Kane explains the House dilemma over whether to meet or campaign.
David Sanger explains, counter-intuitively, that the election of a hard-line president may open a brief window for reviving the JCPOA.
Charlie also writes:
What should be done when a government agency does a poor job on one of its key missions? Cutting funds sends a strong message but may also feed a spiral of decline. Adding money may be wasteful. Imposing more oversight and regulation may expose problems earlier, but it may also stultify its operations. Good governance is filled with trade offs and dilemmas.
The New York Times magazine has an excellent article on the Centers for Disease Control, “Can the CDC Be Fixed?” It recounts many of the missteps CDC made in responding to the pandemic, but also makes these points:
- The C.D.C. we have is hardly a monolith: Some of its many pockets are bursting with innovation; others are plagued by inertia. But scientists and administrators who have spent decades working with and for the agency say that three problems in particular affect the whole institution: a lack of funding, a lack of authority and a culture that has been warped by both. Some of these problems come down to politics, but most are a result of flaws in the agency’s very foundation.
- Today the C.D.C. is both sprawling in its reach and extremely constrained in what it can do. It consists of more than a dozen centers, institutes and offices and employs more than 11,000 people in all, in a gargantuan roster of public-health initiatives — not just infectious-disease control but also chronic-disease prevention, workplace safety, health equity and more.
- The C.D.C.’s multibillion-dollar annual budget is both too small — it has barely kept pace with inflation in the last two decades — and subject to too many restrictions. Around half of the agency’s domestic budget is funneled to the states, but only after passing through a bureaucratic thicket. There are nearly 200 separate line items in the C.D.C.’s budget. Neither the agency’s director nor any state official has the power to consolidate those line items or shift funds among them.
- The C.D.C. is resistant to change, slow to act and reluctant to innovate, according to critics. The agency’s officers are overly reliant on published studies, which take time to produce; and are incapable of making necessary judgment calls. Agency departments are also deeply siloed. “We are really good at drilling down,” Darrow says. “But terrible at looking up and reaching across.”
Sadly, similar complaints could be made of several U.S. government agencies, including DHS and DOD. My advice is to acknowledge the conflicting pressures and try to balance between extreme remedies.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The Biden-Putin professional wrestling match
President Biden and Russian President Putin will meet Wednesday in Geneva. Biden has a long-standing distaste for Putin, whose behavior in recent years will have made Biden even more critical. Since their last meeting in 2011, Putin invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea, had a leading opposition figure murdered just outside the Kremlin, deployed troops and aircraft to Syria to support dictator Assad with a wide array of war crimes, tried to murder an ex-Russian intelligence agent in Great Britain, tried to murder and then jailed another opposition leader on trumped-up charges, backed Belaruan autocrat Lukashenko after he engineered massive election fraud, and is now busily shutting down what remains of political opposition and civil society in Russia. That is on top of the many episodes of election interference in the US in favor of Donald Trump, Russian hacking of US government cyber systems, and Russian tolerance for cyber ransom attacks that have several times closed important American companies.
It is no surprise there will not be a joint press conference after the Putin/Biden summit. While there may be some positive news on specific issues like arms control, climate change, or the Iran nuclear deal, the atmospherics surrounding this meeting are 180 degrees opposite from President Trump’s attempted lovefest with Putin in 2018, when he said at a joint press conference that he believed Putin’s denials of election interference and not the unanimous rejected the unanimous view of American intelligence agencies.
The choreography leading up to next week’s summit has been careful, perhaps even masterful. Biden, committed to rekindling traditional American alliances, met first in Cornwall with UK Prime Minister Johnson, then rallied the G7 (that’s Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, as well as the UK and the US) to focus on China and cybersecurity, and next week he will meet first with America’s 29 NATO allies before confronting Putin. Unlike his three predecessors, Biden does not want a “reset” with Putin. He wants to confront him where needed but leave the door open to cooperation on specific issues and even improved relations overall if Putin stops his perfidies.
But Biden knows he won’t. Putin has been in many ways a successful President. Russians often give him credit for revival of their pride and their aspirations to great power status after the economically difficult Yeltsin period. His personal popularity is low at the moment, but he is committed to holding on to power by autocratic if democratic means fail. Russian parliamentary elections in September (and the presidential election in 2024) will be far from free and fair. There is not much the Americans can do about that. Even getting Alexei Navalny out of jail is more than they have managed so far.
Putin will want to use the meeting with Biden to shore up his domestic support. He can do that best by being confrontational. Biden, who has much stronger domestic support, will want to do the same thing. He will want to be seen as calling Putin out on election hacking, cybersecurity, and repression of the Russian opposition. Neither bodes well for the occasion. This summit is likely to be like “professional” wrestling: more theater than real, staged for TV and radio, but still with some possibility one or the other protagonist gets hurt.
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Stevenson’s army, June 2
Ransomware is big business. New Yorker explains how it works and how payments are negotiated.
Israel is asking for extra military aid.
Fred Kaplan lists the laws limiting military freedom of speech.
Bloomberg says Iran expects nuclear talks to continue in July.
Late addendum:
Summertime means more time to read books stacked in my study. Here’s another book worth checking out.
For me, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was the two weeks of American crisis decision-making detailed by Graham Allison, Bobby Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and Ted Sorensen. Now we have a superb account that includes what was happening in Moscow, and on the ground in Cuba.
Serhii Plokhy, a Ukrainian-American history professor at Harvard, has written Nuclear Folly. Instead of the typical story of smart decisions that avoided nuclear war, Plokhy says he wants to tell about the many mistakes that came close to making that catastrophe a reality. And there were many, at the strategic and operational levels.
Graham Allison explored the bureaucratic behaviors and missteps over U-2 flights that were foolishly cancelled when needed and carried out when they were quite provocative and Navy blockade rules that almost triggered a Soviet nuclear exchange. Plokhy shows the same for the Soviet military.
His basic conclusion is that Kennedy and Khrushchev deescalated the crisis because both feared nuclear war. Both overcame strong pressure to risk actual combat.
Plokhy also details Kennedy’s extraordinary efforts to keep secret the fact that he agreed to withdraw medium-range Jupiter missiles from Turkey as part of the deal. The media seized on the narrative that Kennedy won by being tough while Khrushchev backed down. In fact, there was a deal which gave important concessions to both.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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