Tag: Nuclear weapons
Stevenson’s army, June 24
WSJ says new intelligence assessment says Afghan government could collapse as soon as 6 months after US withdrawal.
In testimony Wednesday, Gen. Milley was less pessimistic. Austin and Milley told a Senate hearing last week they believe there is a “medium” risk of terrorist groups regaining strength in Afghanistan, saying it could happen in two years. Presumably President Biden considers these risks acceptable. This reminds me of the Nixon & Kissinger view that they needed a “decent interval” between the end of US combat in Vietnam and the collapse of Saigon. Here’s some of the evidence: Wikipedia; the Nixon tapes; and Kissinger’s handwritten notes. Here’s another summary.
In other news, the debt ceiling looms with no clear plan.
Earmarks are popular.
And SAIS prof Vali Nasr says an Iran deal is possible.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, June 20
[Mark Twain was onto something when he wrote: “When I was a boy of 14, my father was so ignorant I could hardly stand to have the old man around. But when I got to be 21, I was astonished at how much the old man had learned in seven years.”]
New Yorker has several archived pieces on fathers.
Glenn Kessler explains the difference between substantive foreign policy amendments and “messaging amendments.“
Paul Kane explains the House dilemma over whether to meet or campaign.
David Sanger explains, counter-intuitively, that the election of a hard-line president may open a brief window for reviving the JCPOA.
Charlie also writes:
What should be done when a government agency does a poor job on one of its key missions? Cutting funds sends a strong message but may also feed a spiral of decline. Adding money may be wasteful. Imposing more oversight and regulation may expose problems earlier, but it may also stultify its operations. Good governance is filled with trade offs and dilemmas.
The New York Times magazine has an excellent article on the Centers for Disease Control, “Can the CDC Be Fixed?” It recounts many of the missteps CDC made in responding to the pandemic, but also makes these points:
- The C.D.C. we have is hardly a monolith: Some of its many pockets are bursting with innovation; others are plagued by inertia. But scientists and administrators who have spent decades working with and for the agency say that three problems in particular affect the whole institution: a lack of funding, a lack of authority and a culture that has been warped by both. Some of these problems come down to politics, but most are a result of flaws in the agency’s very foundation.
- Today the C.D.C. is both sprawling in its reach and extremely constrained in what it can do. It consists of more than a dozen centers, institutes and offices and employs more than 11,000 people in all, in a gargantuan roster of public-health initiatives — not just infectious-disease control but also chronic-disease prevention, workplace safety, health equity and more.
- The C.D.C.’s multibillion-dollar annual budget is both too small — it has barely kept pace with inflation in the last two decades — and subject to too many restrictions. Around half of the agency’s domestic budget is funneled to the states, but only after passing through a bureaucratic thicket. There are nearly 200 separate line items in the C.D.C.’s budget. Neither the agency’s director nor any state official has the power to consolidate those line items or shift funds among them.
- The C.D.C. is resistant to change, slow to act and reluctant to innovate, according to critics. The agency’s officers are overly reliant on published studies, which take time to produce; and are incapable of making necessary judgment calls. Agency departments are also deeply siloed. “We are really good at drilling down,” Darrow says. “But terrible at looking up and reaching across.”
Sadly, similar complaints could be made of several U.S. government agencies, including DHS and DOD. My advice is to acknowledge the conflicting pressures and try to balance between extreme remedies.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The Biden-Putin professional wrestling match
President Biden and Russian President Putin will meet Wednesday in Geneva. Biden has a long-standing distaste for Putin, whose behavior in recent years will have made Biden even more critical. Since their last meeting in 2011, Putin invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea, had a leading opposition figure murdered just outside the Kremlin, deployed troops and aircraft to Syria to support dictator Assad with a wide array of war crimes, tried to murder an ex-Russian intelligence agent in Great Britain, tried to murder and then jailed another opposition leader on trumped-up charges, backed Belaruan autocrat Lukashenko after he engineered massive election fraud, and is now busily shutting down what remains of political opposition and civil society in Russia. That is on top of the many episodes of election interference in the US in favor of Donald Trump, Russian hacking of US government cyber systems, and Russian tolerance for cyber ransom attacks that have several times closed important American companies.
It is no surprise there will not be a joint press conference after the Putin/Biden summit. While there may be some positive news on specific issues like arms control, climate change, or the Iran nuclear deal, the atmospherics surrounding this meeting are 180 degrees opposite from President Trump’s attempted lovefest with Putin in 2018, when he said at a joint press conference that he believed Putin’s denials of election interference and not the unanimous rejected the unanimous view of American intelligence agencies.
The choreography leading up to next week’s summit has been careful, perhaps even masterful. Biden, committed to rekindling traditional American alliances, met first in Cornwall with UK Prime Minister Johnson, then rallied the G7 (that’s Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, as well as the UK and the US) to focus on China and cybersecurity, and next week he will meet first with America’s 29 NATO allies before confronting Putin. Unlike his three predecessors, Biden does not want a “reset” with Putin. He wants to confront him where needed but leave the door open to cooperation on specific issues and even improved relations overall if Putin stops his perfidies.
But Biden knows he won’t. Putin has been in many ways a successful President. Russians often give him credit for revival of their pride and their aspirations to great power status after the economically difficult Yeltsin period. His personal popularity is low at the moment, but he is committed to holding on to power by autocratic if democratic means fail. Russian parliamentary elections in September (and the presidential election in 2024) will be far from free and fair. There is not much the Americans can do about that. Even getting Alexei Navalny out of jail is more than they have managed so far.
Putin will want to use the meeting with Biden to shore up his domestic support. He can do that best by being confrontational. Biden, who has much stronger domestic support, will want to do the same thing. He will want to be seen as calling Putin out on election hacking, cybersecurity, and repression of the Russian opposition. Neither bodes well for the occasion. This summit is likely to be like “professional” wrestling: more theater than real, staged for TV and radio, but still with some possibility one or the other protagonist gets hurt.
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Stevenson’s army, June 2
Ransomware is big business. New Yorker explains how it works and how payments are negotiated.
Israel is asking for extra military aid.
Fred Kaplan lists the laws limiting military freedom of speech.
Bloomberg says Iran expects nuclear talks to continue in July.
Late addendum:
Summertime means more time to read books stacked in my study. Here’s another book worth checking out.
For me, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was the two weeks of American crisis decision-making detailed by Graham Allison, Bobby Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and Ted Sorensen. Now we have a superb account that includes what was happening in Moscow, and on the ground in Cuba.
Serhii Plokhy, a Ukrainian-American history professor at Harvard, has written Nuclear Folly. Instead of the typical story of smart decisions that avoided nuclear war, Plokhy says he wants to tell about the many mistakes that came close to making that catastrophe a reality. And there were many, at the strategic and operational levels.
Graham Allison explored the bureaucratic behaviors and missteps over U-2 flights that were foolishly cancelled when needed and carried out when they were quite provocative and Navy blockade rules that almost triggered a Soviet nuclear exchange. Plokhy shows the same for the Soviet military.
His basic conclusion is that Kennedy and Khrushchev deescalated the crisis because both feared nuclear war. Both overcame strong pressure to risk actual combat.
Plokhy also details Kennedy’s extraordinary efforts to keep secret the fact that he agreed to withdraw medium-range Jupiter missiles from Turkey as part of the deal. The media seized on the narrative that Kennedy won by being tough while Khrushchev backed down. In fact, there was a deal which gave important concessions to both.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Deal likely, but can it go any farther than rollback?
This discussion of the possible return of the US to the Iran nuclear deal was convened by the Middle East Institute May 26, as US-Iranian talks in Vienna entered their fifth round. Participants analyzed the prospects for a deal between the US and Iran and its implications for the region’s security. The panel discussed the possibility of expanding on the original JCPOA, as well as broader regional security dynamics and specifically their implications for Iraq. They agreed a new JCPOA seems to be imminent. However, the question remains whether it can be used to reduce Iranian influence in the region and if it should.
The speakers were:
Amb. (ret.) Rend al-Rahim
Co-founder and President
The Iraq Foundation;
former Iraqi Ambassador to the US
Michael Rubin
Resident Scholar
American Enterprise Institute
Ali Vaez
Iran project Director
International Crisis Group
Alex Vatanka (moderator)
Director, Iran Program
Middle East Institute
A mutually beneficial deal?
All speakers agreed that a deal appears imminent. Ali Vaez pointed out that sequencing will remain an issue, but that the largest problems will likely be solved at the 11th hour. Iranian or Israeli brinkmanship is unlikely to derail the negotiations. This was shown by their continuation after the attack on the Natanz facility and Iran’s announcement that it would start enriching to 60%. Rubin believes Congress should be asked to ratify the agreement. Congress might prove more concerned about brinkmanship than the negotiators in Vienna. Ali Vaez expects that the deal will be announced right after the Iranian presidential elections. In this way, the result will not influence the popularity of conservative candidates. At the same time, Rouhani would still be responsible for the deal’s implementation, meaning he can serve as a scapegoat for any of its shortcomings: a win-win for conservatives in Iran.
The speakers disagreed on whether more than the original JCPOA should be on the table. Ali Vaez argued that a return to the original deal is needed to build trust after the unwarranted American abandonment of the deal under president Trump. Ambassador al-Rahim, however, said she does not believe that any further progress can be made after this deal. Just like after the initial JCPOA’s conclusion, no further deals – for example on ballistic missiles – will be forthcoming. Michael Rubin argued that some important issues need to be addressed. In this ‘JCPOA+’ framework, attention needs to be paid to the role of the IRGC in Iran’s economy. Rubin emphasized that any easing of sanctions could go to the IRGC’s economic wing, rather than benefiting the Iranian people in dire need of economic relief. In fact, lifting sanctions without addressing the IRGC’s entanglement in the economy would only aid in its projects throughout the region.
Thinking about a new Middle Eastern security arena
This brought the discussion to the second point of disagreement: the level of Iranian influence that is desirable. Ambassador al-Rahim outlined the difference in strategic visions between Iran and the US. According to her, the US fails to use its potential in the region (for example through the Iraqi Strategic Dialogue). Instead it focuses on disengaging and setting up a post-US strategic order. The US needs to consider whether it is content with leaving Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon under Iranian influence, with an Israeli-Gulf alliance hegemonous over the rest of the region. Iran, as Rubin pointed out, meanwhile sees itself as a pan-regional power, not merely Shia. It is unlikely to accept such a limited sphere of influence. He emphasized that there are ways of resisting Iranian influence without major US investments. Regional countries need to be armed to do so themselves.
Ali Vaez also sees these problems, but challenges the US to consider how much Iranian influence is acceptable. If the US and its allies are content only when Iranian influence in Iraq is zero, then the goal is simply unrealistic. Should we consider influence in a country like Iraq as zero-sum, as Israel and the Gulf appear to do? Also, can we expect Iran to disarm while we are arming its neighbors to the tune of billions of dollars? A regional détente with concessions from all sides is his preferred means of lowering tensions. Ambassador al-Rahim contends that Tehran sees its influence as zero-sum too. If it is allowed to have any influence, it will aim for total influence. Furthermore, she contends that Iran did have zero influence in Iraq before 2003. Its entanglement in Iraqi power structures is not unavoidable she thinks. She and Vaez agree that both Washington and Tehran should agree that Iraq needs to be allowed to be its own sovereign country. Recent Shia protests in Iraq show that the population shares this desire.
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Peace Picks | May 24-28, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Africa Day at the Atlantic Council: A vision for the African Century | May 25, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
In celebration of Africa Day, which marks the founding of the African Union, and to introduce the new Africa Center team and vision under Director Ambassador Rama Yade, the Atlantic Council is launching its African Conversations Series. The series aims to shine a light on high-profile US officials’ connections to the continent and engagement with Africa policy.
High-profile US officials speak to US-Africa policy under the Biden administration, spotlighting Africa’s strategic importance and dynamic outlook.
Speakers:
The Hon. Dana L. Banks
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Africa, National Security Council
James L. Jones, Jr.
Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council
H.E. Hilda Suka-Mafudze
Ambassador to the United States, African Union
The Hon. Linda Thomas-Greenfield
Representative to the United Nations, US Department of State
Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council
Rama Yade (moderator)
Africa Center Director, Atlantic Council
2. Reshore, Reroute, Rebalance: A U.S. Strategy for Clean Energy Supply Chains| May 25, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | CSIS | Register Here
This event is a presentation and discussion of the new CSIS report Reshore, Reroute, Rebalance: A U.S. Strategy for Clean Energy Supply Chains. Asrenewable energy technologies mature and get deployed at scale, there is a greater need to think strategically about this system. Reshore, Reroute, Rebalance argues that the United States can apply some of the mental models, tools, and institutions used for conventional energy sources to think about supply chains in clean energy—and, in doing so, grow its economy and boost its national security.
Speakers:
Nikos Tsafos (Introduction)
Interim Director and Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, CSIS
Sarah Ladislaw
Senior Associate (Non-resident), Energy Security and Climate Change Program, CSIS
Laszlo Varro
Chief Economist, International Energy Agency
3. In Search of Peace for Afghanistan: Historical Perspectives | May 26, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Last month’s announcement that all U.S and international troops will leave Afghanistan before September 11, 2021 has sparked intense debate over the country’s future after over four decades of near-continuous conflict. Deteriorating security conditions, uncertainty over the level of international engagement moving forward and political instability pose great risks to the fragile peace process and the prospects for a sustainable political settlement. Many analysts have compared the current moment to the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, an alarming parallel given the years of civil war and Taliban rule that followed.
These issues are at the heart of a recently published book by the Kakar History Foundation and Heart of Asia Society titled In Search of Peace for Afghanistan: Historical Letters of President Najibullah and Dr. M. Hassan Kakar — A Collection of Essays. This essay collection considers the correspondence between the former Afghan president and one of the country’s leading scholars regarding Afghanistan’s post-Soviet future and the lessons that can be drawn as the country navigates the U.S. troop withdrawal. Several of the contributing authors to this book will reflect on Afghan politics and the country’s relationship with the international community as U.S. troops withdraw.
Speakers:
Amb. Lakhdar Brahimi (Keynote)
Former U.N. Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Syria; former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria
Amb. Richard Olson (Introduction)
Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace; former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
Belquis Ahmadi
Senior Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace
Robert Crews
Professor of History, Stanford University
Kawun Kakar
Executive Director, Kakar History Foundation
Amb. Janan Mosazai
Former Ambassador of Afghanistan to Pakistan and China; Co-Founder and Vice President, Heart of Asia Society
Omar Sharifi
Country Director, American Institute of Afghanistan Studies
Omar Sadr
Assistant Professor of Political Science, American University of Afghanistan
Dipali Mukhopadhyay (Moderator)
Senior Expert, U.S. Institute of Peace
4. Re-balancing U.S. Security Engagement with Arab States | May 26, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
The Biden administration’s desire to reduce the U.S. presence in the Middle East is just the latest attempt by an American president to pull out of the region, and yet the legacy of U.S. entrenchment in the Middle East continues to draw it in. To what extent has the heavily militarized nature of U.S. engagement with Arab states met its goals for regional peace and self-reliance? Can the United States draw down its military presence, reduce security assistance, and be more selective about arms sales without sacrificing critical interests and American jobs? What would less securitized U.S. policies mean for competition with China and Russia in the region?
Speakers:
Chris Murphy (Keynote)
Senator for Connecticut, US Senate; Member, Foreign Relations Committee; Chairman, Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism
Frederic Wehrey
Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Michele Dunne
Director and Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Kim Ghattas
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
David Schenker
Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Jalel Harchaoui
Senior Fellow, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime
5. Deal or No Deal: US-Iran Talks and Implications for the Middle East | May 26, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Most signs at the moment suggest that US-Iran nuclear negotiations are making incremental progress. There might be a deal, which would have to include the US lifting some of the sanctions on the country, while the government of President Hassan Rouhani is still in place. Alternatively, the talks can drag on for months more to come. What is undeniable is that the prospects of a revived nuclear agreement to be sustainable is best served by broadening the US-Iranian dialogue as quickly as possible. A number of issues will continue to pit American and Iranian interests against each other. On this list of disagreements, US-Iran competition in Iraq is among the most contentious.
Can Iraq provide a platform for the US and Iran to co-exist? What other high-stake regional areas of competition could be impacted depending on the outcome of the US-Iran negotiations?
Speakers:
Amb. (ret.) Rend al-Rahim
Co-founder and President, The Iraq Foundation; former Iraqi Ambassador to the US
Michael Rubin
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute
Ali Vaez
Senior Advisor to the president; Iran project Director, International Crisis Group
Alex Vatanka
Director, Iran Program, Middle East Institute
6. MEI Lebanon Policy Conference – Breaking the Lebanese Political Logjam | May 26, 2021 | 11:15 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
How can Lebanon overcome the domestic and international obstacles to forming a truly independent, reform-minded government? Is such a government even possible with the current political establishment? Which political scenarios are the most likely to unfold in the weeks and months ahead? How far has the Lebanese protest movement come since October 2019? How can an increasingly busy United States and international community support the people of Lebanon in their quest for real change? Where does Lebanon even fall on the international community’s list of priorities?
Speakers:
John Alterman
Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program, CSIS
Paul Salem
President, Middle East Institute
Maha Yahya
Director, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Christophe Abi-Nassif (Moderator)
Lebanon Program Director, Middle East Institute
7. China in the Middle East: What Lies Ahead? | May 27, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Watch Here
Conflict and instability in the Middle East show no signs of abating. Recent jousting between Israeli and Palestinian forces, the ongoing war in Yemen, and continued Saudi Arabia-Iran friction threaten to further destabilize the region. Though President Biden is attempting to restore coherence in the U.S. approach to the Middle East, his administration remains focused on responding to the pandemic domestically and on countering China in the international arena. Beijing, for its part, appears intent on playing a larger role in Middle Eastern affairs. It continues to foster stronger ties with regional countries through its Belt and Road Initiative and securing cooperation agreements, such as the twenty-five-year investment deal with Iran. How will China’s growing influence in the region affect the interests of the United States and other actors?
Speakers:
He Wenping
Professor at the Institute of West Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Karim Sadjadpour
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Paul Haenle
Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy
8. Women and Iran’s Presidential Elections: What Role Will They Play? | May 27, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Iranian women emerged as a force of change in 1997 after they voted overwhelmingly for Mohammad Khatami, bringing to power a reformist cleric. Although candidates and political parties have issued plans to improve their status to win their votes, women have seen little improvement in their rights at home and in society. Many see the country’s civil code and constitution, which were written based on Islamic Law after the revolution, as the source of discrimination.
Nevertheless, women’s role in the presidential elections on June 18 remains crucial. Will they vote and who will they vote for? What are their concerns? Or, will they stay away from the polls in a sign of protest to create a legitimacy crisis for the regime?
Speakers:
Roya Boroumand
Executive Director, The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center
Fatemeh Haghighatjoo
CEO and co-founder, Nonviolent Initiative for Democracy; Iranian scholar; women’s rights advocate
Susan Tahmassebi
Director, FEMENA; women’s rights activist
Nazila Fathi (Moderator)
Non-resident scholar, MEI
9. The Gulf Cooperation Council at 40 | May 27, 2021 | 10 AM ET | The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington | Register Here
As the GCC marks its 40th anniversary, what has been the organization’s real impact on its member states, the Gulf, and international relations? Is the GCC living up to its potential to foster regional economic integration? Can the organization still function as an effective forum for cooperation on defense and security issues, despite political divisions among its members? Will the January signing of the Al Ula agreement ending the crisis with Qatar help to build back trust and collaboration?
Speakers:
Abdullah Baabood
Chair of the State of Qatar for Islamic Area Studies and Visiting Professor, School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University
Matteo Legrenzi
Professor of International Relations, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice
Emma Soubrier
Visiting Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Kristin Smith Diwan (Moderator)
Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
10. Next Steps for U.S. Policy in the Ongoing Crisis in the Middle East | May 27, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Center for American Progress | Submit questions Here
The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas has had devastating human costs and exposed long-time vulnerabilities and inequities among Palestinians and Israelis. The Biden administration has stepped up its engagement to work toward ending the conflict, but what steps should the United States take to address the underlying conditions that led to this latest violence?
Speakers:
Ghaith Al Omari
Former Palestinian Authority adviser; Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Ezzedine C. Fishere
Former Egyptian diplomat; Senior Lecturer, Dartmouth College
Brian Katulis
Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
Ofer Zalzberg
Director of the Middle East Program, Herbert C. Kelman Institute
Mara Rudman (Moderator)
Executive Vice President for Policy, Center for American Progress; former U.S. Deputy Envoy for Middle East Peace
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