Tag: Nuclear weapons
Stevenson’s army, October 21
– Erdogan wants nuclear weapons.
–China, Russia & Iran plan joint naval exercises.
–Russian hackers are busy in Europe.
– WSJ says Trump now plans residual force in Syria to protect oil.– WaPo, fact-checks Trump claim that Saudis will pay for extra US forces.
– State fights back.
– New book by Mattis speechwriter describes first Pentagon briefing for Trump.
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Find a way out
It would be hard to add much to what others have written justifying impeachment of President Trump. Certainly any Democratic president doing what Trump has done would have long ago been impeached, including by the current Democratic-controlled House. The only serious argument against impeachment is the Republican-majority Senate’s unwillingness to convict and remove him from office. That argument can be countered: without impeachment, Trump will be able to run in 2020 claiming (convincingly only to his die-hard supporters) that even the Democrats have not found anything he did that was wrong.
Underlying many of Trump’s impeachable offenses is one big one: he has erased the line between public and private interest. The usual American definition of corruption is use of public office for private gain. If you erase the line between public and private interest, nothing is corrupt: you can use government funds to have military air crews, security people, and White House staff stay at hotels you own. You can favor diplomats and business people who patronize your resorts. You can play inordinate amounts of golf on government time, you can give classified information to foreigners you regard as friends, and of course you can pressure a foreign government to investigate already debunked allegations against your likely opponent in the next election.
Trump has no concept of the public interest. He is all about himself. This is the essence of his character: narcissism. Morality, principles, norms, standards, and procedures are all irrelevant. Facts are what he determines them to be. Global warming isn’t happening. A hurricane headed up the East Coast of the US will hit Alabama. Relationships are what he says they are. He is in love with Kim Jong-un, who is good because he sends Trump nice letters despite the blatant cruelty of his ferociously dictatorial regime. Good people are people who are good to Trump. One day that is John Bolton. Bad people are people Trump doesn’t like. A few weeks later that is again John Bolton.
Right now Trump is focused on Iran. He shows no sign of understanding that he caused the current crisis with Iran by withdrawing from the nuclear deal. Iran is bad. So maximum pressure, mainly through sanctions, is justified, even if they affect food and medicine, even if America’s European allies won’t join in, and even if the result is a devastatingly accurate missile attack on Saudi oil production facilities. The failure of the US to live up to its obligations, undertaken by a previous president, doesn’t matter to Trump. He doesn’t like that previous president and is unconcerned with moral standing or legality.
What counts is only what Trump defines as reality: the Iranians are bad and the nuclear deal is bad, though he is hard put to identify why except that it expires. So he withdrew, making the constraints on Iran expire even faster than they would have under the deal. Only W’s invasion of Iraq comes close to hurting American standing in the world and international interests as much as withdrawal from the nuclear deal. Trump doesn’t care about American standing and interests but only about his own personal gratification. The crowds at his rallies roar approval, and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Salman concur, when Trump denounces the nuclear deal. That’s enough.
I’d much rather see Trump impeached for his failed approach to Iran than for a dumb phone call implying a cut off of Congressionally appropriated funds if Ukraine doesn’t do as asked. But impeachment for mishandling Iran isn’t likely, so next best would be an exit from the escalatory spiral with Tehran. The Iranians are still offering a way out: “permanent for permanent” as Foreign Minister Rouhani puts it: permanent lifting of sanctions in 2023 by the US Congress in exchange for a permanent bar on Iran obtaining nuclear weapons, written into law. Jason Rezaian. who knows Iran far better than I do, thinks something much more modest is all that can be done: lifting of sanctions that affect food and medicine in return for freeing of US prisoners in Iran.
Whichever: the important thing is to find a way out. The Trump Administration is about to enter an intense period of investigation with impeachment all but certain. The risks that domestic political pressure will incentivize a desperate president to do stupid things are going to be very high. The important thing is to find a way out of the escalatory spiral with Iran so that doesn’t happen.
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Peace Picks | September 23 – 27
1. How to Avoid the Arab Resource Curse | September 23, 2019 | 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM | Georgetown University-Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 3700 O Street, N.W., 241 Intercultural Center (ICC), Washington, DC 20057, USA | Register Here
For over eighty years the Arab region has been deriving massive wealth from its natural resources. Nevertheless, its economic performance has been at the mercy of ebbs and flows of oil prices and its resources have been slowly depleting. The two critical questions are why and how Arab countries might escape the oil curse.
Institutions and Macroeconomic Policies in Resource-Rich Arab Economies focuses on the unique features of the Arab world to explain the disappointing outcomes of macroeconomic policy. It explores the interaction between oil and institutions to draw policy recommendations on how Arab countries can best exploit their oil revenues to avoid the resource curse. Case studies and contributions from experts provide an understanding of macroeconomic institutions (including their underlying rules, procedures and institutional arrangements) in oil-rich Arab economies and of their political economy environment, which has largely been overlooked in previous research.
The volume offers novel macroeconomic policy propositions for exchange rate regimes, fiscal policy and oil wealth distribution that is more consistent with macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability. These policy reforms, if implemented successfully, could go a long way in helping the resource-rich countries of the Arab region and elsewhere to avoid the oil curse.
Join CCAS for a book launch of the new volume, “Institutions and Macroeconomic Policies in Resource-rich Arab Economies,” featuring editors and contributing authors to the book.
Featuring
Joseph Sassoon (Discussion Chair) Professor, School of Foreign Service and History Department, Georgetown University
Ibrahim Elbadawi (Contributing Author) Minister of Finance and Economy, Republic of Sudan (joining via video call)
Shanta Devarajan (Contributing Author) Professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Hoda Selim (Volume Co-editor) Research Fellow, Economic Research Forum
Nada
Eissa (Discussant) Associate Professor,
McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University
2. A Climate of Concern: What Climate Change Means for Food Security and Political Stability in Africa | September 25, 2019 | 9:00 AM – 10:30 AM | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Please join the CSIS Global
Food Security Project for a discussion with a panel of experts on the
relationship between climate change, political instability, and food security
using current events on the African continent as a lens. The emerging consensus
is that climate change poses significant national security
threats. However, specific linkages between climate change and
political instability are still opaque. As climate change reshapes the
agricultural landscape across Africa, there is concern that higher food prices
and falling yields will lead to widespread urban unrest and catalyze
participation in armed extremist movements.
Preceded by a keynote from Senator Bob Casey (D-PA), the discussion will
examine how climate change is interacting with demographic trends in Africa to
both heighten risks associated with agriculture in rural areas and those
associated with dependence on global markets in urban areas. Our panelists will
explore several issues such as how averting crisis in the face of climate
change and food insecurity will require:
- Better incorporation of agricultural production and food prices—both global and local—into risk assessments.
- Reinvestment in agricultural and transport infrastructure to reform global agricultural trade to make it more climate-resilient for consumers and producers in the developing world.
- Opportunities
to work with regional governments to develop more inclusive responses to manage
political and economic instability.
FEATURING
U.S. Senator (D-PA)
Vice President for Policy, U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP)
Director & Practice Head, Africa, Eurasia Group
Erin Sikorsky
Deputy Director, Strategic Futures Group, National Intelligence Council, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Professor, Korbel School of
International Studies (University of Denver) & Director, Sié Chéou-Kang
Center for International Security and Diplomacy
3. Beyond the Brink: Escalation Dominance in the U.S.-China Trade War | September 25, 2019 | 2:30 PM – 5:00 PM | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
The U.S.-China trade war is unprecedented in size, scope, and importance. The potential economic costs of the conflict—and any decoupling it prompts—are enormous, not only to the United States and China but to the global economy. Nearly 18 months since escalation began, the path to resolution is still unclear.
In this event, senior experts will discuss the state of U.S.-China trade relations today and roll out a major CSIS report on escalation dynamics in economic conflict. The event will draw on game theory as well as observations of real-world escalation to help policymakers manage economic conflict with China.
Agenda:
Welcome
and Presentation of Findings
Matthew P. Goodman
Senior Vice President and Simon Chair in Political Economy, CSIS
Expert Panel Discussion
Scott Kennedy
Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS
William Reinsch
Senior Adviser and Scholl Chair in International Business, CSIS
Claire Reade
Senior Counsel, Arnold & Porter
Stephanie Segal
Senior
Fellow, Simon Chair in Political Economy, CSIS
4. Syria Study Group Releases Final Report | September 26, 2019 | 2:30 PM – 4:30 PM | U.S. Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here
Well into its ninth year, the conflict in Syria is a devastating humanitarian tragedy and a source of regional instability with serious implications for U.S. national security. Last year, Congress directed USIP to facilitate the bipartisan Syria Study Group (SSG) in order to examine the current state of the conflict and make recommendations on the military and diplomatic strategy of the United States going forward.
The release of the SSG’s final report follows months of extensive consultations across a broad range of stakeholders and experts, as well as travel to the region. It represents the consensus of all twelve Congressionally-appointed SSG members and offers a bipartisan roadmap for the way ahead.
Please join the Syria Study Group for a panel
discussion and presentation of the final report’s assessments and
recommendations. The event will include a keynote address from Senator Jeanne
Shaheen (D-NH), who spearheaded the creation of the bipartisan study group.
Stay tuned for additional speaker updates. The list of SSG members can be seen here.
5. The Future of Nuclear Arms Control | September 26, 2019 | 12:15 PM – 1:30 PM | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave NW | Register Here
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is pleased to invite you to a discussion on The Future of Nuclear Arms Control with Mrs. Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland, and Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Prime Minister of Norway, of The Elders.
Founded by Nelson Mandela, The Elders are a group of former heads of state and senior United Nations officials who work together for peace, justice and human rights. Robinson and Brundtland will present some of the key insights and recommendations for minimizing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons contained in the recent paper, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
Following the brief presentation, George Perkovich will lead a discussion with Robinson and Brundtland and then open the floor for dialogue with audience participants. A lite lunch will be served.
6. Governing in a Post-Conflict Country in Transition | September 27, 2019 | 10 AM | Johns Hopkins University – Kenney-Herter Auditorium 1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20036 | Register Here
Since 2011 and the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, Libya has been going through a difficult and often violent transition. Mr. Serraj, the head of Libya’s Presidential Council and Prime Minister, who assumed office at the end of 2015, will share with us his experience in governing in such difficult post-conflict circumstances, the prospects for the future of Libya, and what the US and International Community can do to help.
Mr. Faiez Sarraj was born in Tripoli, Libya, in 1960. He currently serves as the President of the Presidential Council of Libya and the Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord.
Mr. Sarraj began his political career as a member of the National Dialogue Committee and he was elected to the House of Representatives for the District of Andalus in the city of Tripoli.
Mr. Sarraj had previously worked in the Libyan Social Security Fund, Department of Project Management. He served as a consultant in the Utilities Engineering Consultancy Office in Libya and worked in the private sector for an engineering project management firm. Moreover, Mr. Al-Sarraj worked as the chairman of the Housing Committee in the House of Representatives in Libya and was a member of the Energy Committee in the House of Representatives.
7. War Crimes in Syria: Identifying Perpetrators and Seeking Justice | September 27, 2019 | 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM | Middle East Institute, 1763 N Street NW Washington, District of Columbia 20036 | Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a joint panel with the Pro-Justice to launch the new book, Blacklist: Violations Committed by the Most Prominent Syrian Regime Figures and How to Bring Them to Justice.
Blacklist identifies and provides detailed information on nearly 100 individuals accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria over the past eight years. The book also sheds light on the crimes themselves and outlines potential political and judicial avenues available to bring the perpetrators to justice.
A panel of experts will delve into prospects for promoting transitional justice and accountability in Syria as part of any post-conflict scenario.
Speakers:
- Anne Barnard is a New York Times journalist who covers climate and environment for the Metro desk.
- Wael Sawah is the president and director of Pro-Justice.
- Charles Lister is a senior fellow and director of the Countering Terrorism and Extremism program at the Middle East Institute.
- Joyce Karam (moderator) is the Washington Correspondent for The National, a leading English daily based in Abu Dhabi, and an adjunct professor at George Washington University, school of Political Science.
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Confrontation intensifies
On September 12, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) hosted a panel discussion entitled, “As Maximum Pressure and Maximum Resistance Max Out, Where’s the Confrontation with Iran Headed?”. The panel consisted of Ali Alfoneh, Senior Fellow at AGSIW, Dina Esfandiary, International Security Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Kirsten Fontenrose, Director for Regional Security, Middle East at the Atlantic Council. The discussion was moderated by Hussein Ibish, Senior Resident Scholar at AGSIW.
Since President Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, Washington has pursued a strategy of “maximum pressure,” largely through intensifying economic sanctions. Iran has responded with “maximum resistance,” mostly with low-intensity, and sometimes deniable, military provocations. Signs are growing that both strategies have maxed out and further escalation could lead to consequences unwanted by either side. Where do both parties go from here and can these strategies work?
Fontenrose argued that theoretically, the US policy of maximum pressure can work. The rationale beyond this is that every country has a finite amount of resources to dedicate to defense and domestic needs. The use of sanctions squeezes Iran and forces them to make difficult decisions. The US has a limited number of coercive tools. By maxing out sanctions, the Washington avoids using kinetic activities that could escalate potential conflict. Alfoneh and Esfandiary agreed that the US has not set clear goals for their use of sanctions. If the US established clear goals, Iran might respond in kind.
President Trump will benefit electorally if he is able to have a summit with Supreme Leader Khamenei. Alfoneh predicted that Trump will use increased tensions with Tehran to negotiate a deal that mirrors the JCPOA. By doing so, Trump would signal to his supporters that he can resolve global conflict. Esfandiary responded that Iran has no reason to trust the US. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iran was abiding by the JCPOA, but the Trump Administration tore it up. Fontenrose agreed that trust building will be required before acceptable concessions can be made by either side.
Iran has few choices aside from continuing its low-level provocations. Alfoneh brought up an article published in an Iranian economic newspaper a month after the US left the JCPOA. The Supreme National Security Council outlined its strategy to counteract US sanctions. First, the impact of the sanctions will not be palpable because of trade deals with European countries and China. Second, Iran will limit the level of their obligations in the JCPOA. Third, if nothing works and Iran’s economy continues to fail, Tehran will provoke a crisis in the Persian Gulf. Iran clearly and publicly announced its plans and has followed through with the strategy.
The panel discussed the significance of John Bolton’s dismissal as the national security adviser. Fontenrose said that the Republicans will not allow Trump to choose someone who will threaten the election. Bolton’s hawkish tendencies could scare off voters. Brian Hook, the State Department’s point man on Iran, is on the short list of potential replacements. Hook is a known as a hawk in the international community and his appointment would signal to Iran that the US will continue to squeeze its economy.
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Bolton and Trump unleashed
John Bolton and Donald Trump were always an odd couple: the one a consistent hawkish interventionist and bureaucratic operator in mustachioed professorial guise, the other an erratic big-talking little-stick narcissistic braggart. They found common cause on withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) maximum pressure against Iran, thus trading the 10-year delay in Tehran’s ability to build a nuclear weapons for less than one year, but as soon as the President started looking for negotiated settlements with Tehran, Pyongyang, and the Taliban, Bolton resorted to undermining Trump’s efforts. Ironically, Bolton was fired only a few days after he won his battle against the Afghanistan agreement.
Zal Khalilzad was trying to do the right thing: exchange the withdrawal of US troops Trump wants before the November 2020 election in exchange for Taliban promises
a) to negotiate a political settlement with the Kabul government and
b) not to harbor international terrorists.
The reported deal involved withdrawal only to the number of Americans in Afghanistan at the end of the Obama Administration, and the Taliban promises would have been hard to enforce. But it was a start.
Bolton didn’t want the withdrawal at all. But that’s not what blew up the agreement. It was Trump: he apparently decided he wanted a meeting with the Taliban at Camp David, with the president himself trying for a better deal in the role of closer. This was a terrible idea, in particular a few days before 9/11. The Taliban however never agreed to come to the US, so Trump cancelled the non-existent meeting, supposedly because of the death of an American soldier. That isn’t credible, since more than a dozen Americans died during Zal’s negotiations without any dramatic American reaction. Negotiating in the absence of a ceasefire is always a dubious proposition.
Poor Zal is left holding the bag. We’ll know when he abandons hope: he’ll resign. In the meanwhile, Afghan President Ghani, who is competing in a presidential election September 27, is breathing a sigh of relief–he wants the US troops to stay–and Bolton has the satisfaction of watching the US re-escalate the air war, even as he looks for a tell-all book deal and a cushy spot in the private sector. Unleashed, he will also no doubt become a cheer leader for military action against Iran and support for Israel’s annexations.
The President is also unleashed. He is desperate for some sort of international triumph before the election only 14 months hence. The Chinese are holding their own in the tariff war, the Middle East “deal of the century” has evaporated, the North Koreans are thumbing their noses, and Iran is demanding sanctions relief in exchange for deigning to talk with Washington. Trump is left with little alternative in Afghanistan but escalation and unilateral withdrawal, unless Zal succeeds in putting Humpty Dumpty back together again.
Everyone wants to know how US foreign policy will change as a result of Bolton’s firing. I focus mainly on the Balkans and the Middle East. On the latter, it is clear enough that Trump will back the Jewish state to the hilt, no matter who the next national security adviser is. He will also likely try to complete the US withdrawal from Syria, over Pentagon objections. He’ll continue to support the war in Yemen, unless the UAE and Saudi Arabia fall out so catastrophically that there is nothing left to support.
The Balkans is a bit harder to predict, as the Administration has been less than clear about its approach. Bolton was open to a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo that would have destabilized the entire region, likely killing two Clinton birds with one stone: rump Kosovo might have become the eastern province of Albania and Bosnia might have descended into chaos as Republika Srpska tried to secede. But there is no guarantee Bolton’s successor won’t take a similar approach. Ethnonationalists of a feather flock together. An American serving a white nationalist president is always going to give Balkan nationalists a hearing.
Here is the podcast I did with Mark Goldberg shortly after writing this piece.
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Trump caves on Iran
President Trump has apparently agreed in principle to a meeting with Iran’s President Rouhani. Best bet is that this might occur at the United Nations in September or October. The big question is what the conditions are: has Trump offered sanctions relief and has Rouhani agreed to talk about the detailed provisions of the nuclear deal, Iran’s missiles, or Iran’s behavior in the region? The answer to the former is clearly yes; the answer to the latter is that there is no evidence Rouhani has agreed to discuss any of these matters. Trump has caved.
It has been clear for some time that Trump was begging for a meeting with the Iranians, who have resisted unless promised sanctions relief. He now says he wants a discussion of missiles as well as extension of the nuclear deal (aka the sunset clauses). He has made it explicitly clear that Iran can hope for economic relief and that he is not looking for regime in Tehran. Both are major concessions. The latter, a no regime change pledge, was a prelude to President Obama’s negotiations with the Iranians and one that will displease many in the Trump Administration, especially National Security Advisor Bolton.
If the sunset clauses of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) were the major issue, it would have been much wiser to stay in the agreement than to renege on it. Missiles were never part of the JCPOA. There was no reason to withdraw from it on that basis. Trump is essentially retreating from the more extreme positions held in the Administration, which regard the JCPOA as fundamentally flawed (and therefore extension would not be desirable) and the Iranian regime as an illegitimate one that should be replaced before any further negotiations.
Trump did not mention Iran’s regional behavior. This could of course have been an unintentional omission. Surely the Israelis, the regional Sunni powers, and America’s Iran hawks will be unhappy about it. On the merits it is the most important issue right now. Iran is actively involved in arming and training militia forces in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. This is not an issue that should be ignored, though once again: the US would have been better off had we raised the issue while still a party to the JCPOA.
Only time will tell whether the meeting with Rouhani will actually come off, but President Trump is clearly ready and willing, despite Iran’s regional behavior and Israeli resistance to the JCPOA. He has decided to cut and run. But he is erratic, vulnerable to pressure, and may change his mind.
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