Tag: Nuclear weapons
Proliferation without borders
Dr. Pantelis Ikonomou, a former IAEA Safeguards inspector asks:
After 30 years of service as a senior officer in the International Atomic Energy Agency, the world’s watchdog for nuclear weapons non-proliferation and disarmament, an organisation that primarily you, US and Russia, created and continue to support, I dare to address to both of you a rhetorical question:
“How could an international nuclear safeguards inspector comprehend and explain to the stunned public your recent nuclear behavior, in particular your withdrawal from the bilateral Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty that you achieved in 1987 on prohibiting the development and deployment of a wide range of nuclear weapons?”
In March 2018 President Putin stated that nuclear weapons are essential for his county to maintain its position as a great world power. In order to convince the international community, he presented the terrifying capabilities of new Russian nuclear weapons that could target any place on the planet without been detected, thus, rendering nuclear deterrence a useless myth.
Six months later, in October 2018, President Trump replied that the US would unilaterally withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, claiming that Russia does not comply with its obligations.
Moscow rejected the accusations, blaming Washington for refraining from the negotiations on the extension beyond 2021 of the New START treaty, which controls strategic nuclear weapons.
In a continuous blame game the Russian president warned that any deployment of intermediate range missile by the US in Europe will force Russia to respond equally. Moreover, he made it terrifyingly clear that the increase nuclear threat could «result to the global destruction of human civilization and perhaps even of our planet».
Europe reacted immediately urging INF’s survival. The treaty’s elimination will turn Europe into a launcher and target of the ‘’new and modern’’ nuclear weapons of both the US and Russia, respectively. Furthermore, the European strategic objective of an autonomous defense policy will become difficult to achieve.
China, knowing that it will become the target of new US intermediate-rang nuclear missiles deployed in Japan and South Korea, immediately and firmly excluded its possible involvement in a new multilateral INF treaty, which eventually could embrace China’s nuclear adversary, India.
Several nervous countries, such as Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, maintain active programs to develop intermediate ballistic missiles suitable for carrying nuclear weapons.
If the two super powers, the US and Russia, assisted by the rest of the NPT nuclear weapons states (China, UK and France) won’t proceed to the creation of a new international INF treaty, they will owe the world answers to vital geopolitical questions:
- Do the US and Russia not realize that their nuclear policy contradicts their basic NPT undertaking (Article VI) «…to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament…»?
- Do they not recognize the immediate risk of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East and north-east Asia?
- Is North Korea not enough?
- Why do they risk their own loss of global geostrategic primacy?
- Is it possible that they ignore the increasing global nuclear threat?
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Little by little is too little
On July 8 the United States Institute of Peace hosted a panel discussion titled “The North Korea Sanctions Regime a Year After Singapore.” The panel featured Dan Wertz, Program Manager at the National Committee on North Korea, Joshua Stanton, a DC-based lawyer who played a significant role in North Korea sanctions, Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, a member of the UN Panel of Experts (Resolution 1874) dealing with North Korea, and Elizabeth Rosenberg, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Frank Aum, former Senior Advisor for North Korea at the Defense Department, moderated the discussion.
Stanton views the history of US leadership on North Korea issues as many “instant gratification policies” instead of better thought out and more effective long-term policies. North Korea is highly dependent on access to US financial systems because of the status of the dollar. Since many North Korean transactions have to go through US banks, financial sanctions blocking transactions and freezing North Korean accounts can be highly effective.
Stanton believes the conversation on sanctions relief is coming about two years too early. More pressure on the Kim regime is needed so that he has a diplomatic incentive to work with the US. Even small sanctions relief is enough for North Korea to catch a breather and continue the status quo. The argument that North Korea can’t survive without nuclear weapons and therefore won’t give them up is ahistorical, according to Stanton, because North Korea has survived for decades without nuclear weapons and can continue to do so. The threat to North Korea is mainly internal.
On possible sanctions relief, Stanton clarifies that Congress has set strict rules dependent not only on issues such as nuclear disarmament and denuclearization but also contingent on human rights, human trafficking, and other issues. The current direction in congress is towards stricter rules for sanctions relief, with the goal of complete, verifiable and undisputed denuclearization of North Korea. The US has to work together with its allies to set up financial sanctions that pressure Pyongyang while at the same time allowing transactions for non-military purposes that benefit the North Korean people. Humanitarian aid should be given to North Korea regardless of political or military actions since it benefits the poor and starving civilians, a point all the panelists agreed on.
Kleine-Ahlbrandt notes that the goal of the UN sanctions regime is to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear and missile programs and prevent the proliferation of WMDs. Sanctions shouldn’t be the objective, which is to catalyze what she calls “effective dialogue.” At the same time the negative impact of sanctions on the economy and civilian population of North Korea should be limited. The UN sanctions regime is broad, but member states have insufficiently implemented the sanctions and evasion tactics by North Korean entities and individuals have undermined compliance. North Korea currently has full access to the international financial system through complicit foreign nationals, a network of agents, and cyberattacks aimed at financial institutions.
Wertz views the sanctions as having a threefold purpose: signaling to North Korea that provocative actions such as missile tests come at a cost, constraining progress on WMDs and other military capabilities, and coercing North Korea through sanctions pressure to make concessions and abandon the nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. Coercion is difficult because translating economic pressure to political actions is difficult. UN sanctions, which are focused on the missile and nuclear programs, can be modified if political consensus is reached within the UNSC on whether North Korea’s behavior warrants relief.
US sanctions are trickier since they are premised on a broad range of topics from WMDs to human rights, cyber-attacks, currency counterfeiting and more. The executive branch has some leeway on how it administers individual sanctions or waives them on a case by case basis, but to lift sanctions as a whole the White House has to certify to Congress that North Korea has made significant progress on several of the issues listed. This divergence of US and UN sanctions could potentially lead to a clash if North Korea abandons its nuclear program but doesn’t improve on human rights or other issues.
Wertz suggests that a program of phased sanctions relief in return for meaningful concessions on the nuclear program could be in the US interest down the road and lists five principles for sanctions relief:
- Any trade of sanctions relief for North Korean nuclear concessions should be premised on the ultimate goal of denuclearization but should also make sense on its own terms.
- The US should start with the sanctions that have the least direct connection to the nuclear program and can be most easily adjusted and snapped back.
- The US shouldn’t ease up on measures intended to deny hard currency to North Korea until it can guarantee the money won’t be funneled to military programs.
- Sanctions relief should be structured in a way that pushes North Korea towards an open economy and minimal respect for labor rights.
- If sanctions relief goes forward the United States and allies should continue to enforce sanctions that haven’t been lifted, but not expand the scope of sanctions.
Rosenberg suggests the lack of compliance with sanctions is in part because many individuals or companies don’t understand or know about the rules. Awareness and compliance protocols in industries other than finance are rare. Before sanctions are removed, Rosenberg says it is valuable to think about what unwinding sanctions could look like. Sanctions shouldn’t be lifted as an incentive; behavioral change has to happen before sanctions are lifted because they are in place for specific concerns. Instead more work should be put into establishing communication and cultural as well as diplomatic exchanges as incentives, none of which require sanctions relief.
Rosenberg also warns that a “little-by-little” approach to removing sanctions in exchange for limited progress doesn’t work. North Korea’s track record of cheating on sanctions means incremental change might create a façade behind which North Korea can do as it pleases. The only politically viable way ahead for the US is major sanctions relief after North Korea makes major and verified progress on denuclearization.
Here is the video of the event:
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Two can play
President Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran is generating a “smart pressure” campaign in return. Tehran can’t limit American ability to export oil and gas or pay for imports, but it can threaten Gulf shipping, move towards enriching uranium to levels required for nuclear weapons, and convince at least some trading partners to pay for Iranian exports in ways that circumvent US sanctions. Both Europe and Iraq are planning to use “special purpose vehicles” to do just that, the latter likely with the implicit approval of the US since it desperately needs Iranian electricity this summer.
Trump is feeling the impact. He has dropped the insistence on talking about missiles and Iran’s regional behavior, but Tehran is still not yielding to his begging to re-open nuclear talks. Nor is it inclined to give Trump the kind of photo-op flattery that North Korea’s Kim Jong-un has learned gets the President to soften his stance. Maximum pressure has unified Iran’s fractious ruling elite behind a policy of defiance and disdain, tempered however with caution. While prepared to endure an American strike, and return the blow by more or less surreptitious means, Tehran knows it cannot sustain a real war against the US.
Trump can’t sustain a long war either. Another lengthy Middle Eastern war would end his chances for re-election, as Fox star Tucker Carlson has advised. Trump has done nothing to prepare popular opinion for it and would face substantial opposition in Congress, where quite a few Republicans as well as most Democrats are prepared to claim he lacks the legislative authority needed to go to war. The existing authorization to use military force (AUMF) covers only Al Qaeda and its affiliates. That has been stretched to cover the Islamic State, which did in fact emerge out of Al Qaeda’s erstwhile Iraqi affiliate. But no one serious reasonable thinks it can cover war with Iran. Trump will have to use an implicit “self-defense” authorization if he decides to strike Iran.
So the shadow-boxing continues, with the unavoidable risk of escalation. But there are serious possibilities for negotiation as well. It should be clear by now to all but the most hawkish in both Tehran and Washington that the alternative is a war from which neither capital can reasonably hope to emerge victorious. Trump may still hope for some spectacular photo-op: a visit to Tehran perhaps? But Supreme Leader Khamenei seems incapable of the kind of political acrobatics that Kim has successfully pursued to get the President of the United States to confirm his otherwise doubtful legitimacy.
A quieter, perhaps clandestine diplomacy is required: talks about talks, perhaps in Oman or Qatar. A few confidence-building measures like release of prisoners. A humanitarian gesture or two. A more or less explicit understanding about the limits of what each side is prepared to tolerate, both in political rhetoric and the use of military force. Iran will try to make it to November 2020 without going farther than that, knowing that if Trump loses a Democratic administration would want to reenter the nuclear agreement of its own free will.
That is what Trump should do as well. But he can’t without Iranian cooperation in hiding the concession under a photo-op or some sort of fig leaf revision of the agreement. So we’re stuck with a pressure campaign, which two can play.
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The Americans get desperate
I did this interview for Turkey’s TRT World yesterday, on Trump and Iran:
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The time is ripe
When adversaries square off, as the US and Iran have done in recent weeks, they sometimes reach a point at which they think escalating to violence can get them no more than what they hope to get at the negotiating table. If both reach that point within the same time frame, talking becomes a serious alternative to escalating. That is the “ripe” moment at which it is worth considering whether there is a “way out” that will do better for both than resorting to violence.
President Trump has reached his ripe moment. He is saying he is ready to meet with Iran to discuss one subject: nuclear weapons. He has dropped Secretary of State Pompeo’s 12 preconditions, he has forgotten about Iran’s missiles as well as its involvement in Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and Iraq, and he called off military retaliation against Iran for its shoot-down of an American drone. He even tried to given Tehran an “out” by suggesting the downing of the drone was not properly authorized. The man is begging for negotiations with Iran.
The Iranians are hesitating, for several reasons. They want the US back in the nuclear deal and the associated relief from sanctions before talking to Washington. Tehran knows that Trump is erratic and doesn’t want to be the next victim of his decisionmaking. The Iranians may also believe that they can continue to “bleed” the Americans with little risk of retaliation, because they know neither the US public nor the Congress is prepared to sustain a new war in the Middle East. There will also be some in Tehran, especially the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, that want to continue expanding the nuclear program, with a view to eviscerating the nuclear agreement even if Iran doesn’t formally withdraw from it.
My sense though is that the time is ripe for at least clandestine talks between Iran and the US, likely focused initially not on the nuclear deal but rather on release of prisoners. That accomplished, with more or less simultaneous but unilateral releases, the adversaries could proceed on to other matters, including some relief from sanctions while talks continue. That will be a requirement for the Iranians. The Europeans would certainly appreciate loosening of sanctions, as would the Chinese, Turks, Iraqis and many others. Getting them to support Washington in any future nuclear negotiation should be a high priority for Trump. They won’t do it while the sanctions continue to make their trade and investment impossible.
The Iranians will fear that any negotiation will have to tighten the nuclear agreement, or extend it. But they have surely seen how incapable of negotiating any serious agreement the Trump administration is. The renegotiation of the South Korea free trade pact generated little. The NAFTA negotiation produced a modest update. The North Korea negotiations have produced nothing. President Obama had as one of his chief negotiators a Nobel-prize winning physicist who was then Secretary of Energy. Trump’s Secretary of Energy wouldn’t know a nuclear reactor from a coal-burning plant.
Tehran should also understand that there are only a very few serious US objections the the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). First is that it didn’t cover missiles or Iran’s regional interventions. Those issues are going to require a long conversation, and President Trump has dropped them from the agenda, at least for now. Even if started tomorrow, talks on missile and regional issues are unlikely to be completed before the next US election, when Tehran certainly hopes to see elected a more reliable, even if no more friendly, president.
Second is that the JCPOA “sunset,” or ended, at various times in the next decade or more. That too is a conversation that could drag on, but there may be some relatively easy pickings in that department. Iran has good reason to make it clear to Israel and Europe, its two most concerned neighbors, that nuclear weapons are not its objective, even in the long term. Israel has first strike capabilities that make a nuclear Iran a dangerous place to live. Europe is an important trade and investment partner with potential to enormously ease Iran’s desperate economic situation.
All that Trump really needs from Iran in the short term is to rename and extend the JCPOA so that he can claim proprietary rights. The technical aspects are likely to remain unrevised. As Evelyn Farkas suggests, the Trump/Iran Nuclear Adjustment (TINA) need be no more than a JCPOA 2.0. US sanctions might stay in place during talks, but their application to third countries would have to be at least suspended. The Iranians are serious people and will understandably hesitate to be sucked in to an agreement with a notoriously unreliable negotiating partner. But when the moment is ripe and the way out is better than war, it is a mistake to pass up the opportunity.
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Trump gets it right
President Trump got it right last night for once: he called off a disproportionate retaliatory attack on Iran. It would not, he said, have been proportionate, because it would have killed perhaps 150 Iranians in response to the Iranian downing of an unmanned drone, albeit a big and expensive on. The Iranians have claimed that a manned aircraft accompanied the drone but that they chose not to shoot it down. That public claim likely made it harder for the Americans to proceed, as the implied threat is clear: next time they won’t hesitate.
There is still a possibility of US retaliation. We may never know what Trump does, since retaliation might be covert. In addition, Washington can certainly down Iranian drones, which won’t be as big as the $180 million dollar behemoth Tehran targeted. But keeping things proportionate and giving the Iranians no excuse for further escalation is important. The Americans need to convince the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese that Iran is a threat to world oil supplies, not that the US is at fault for escalating a dangerous conflict unwisely.
The best opportunity to do that is this weekend’s G20 meeting in Osaka. The opportunity is mutual. The Europeans, Russians, and Chinese will also have an opportunity there to convince President Trump that if he wants Iran back at the negotiating table he’ll need to provide some relief from sanctions, at the very least. Tehran says it won’t talk with the Americans until they are back in the nuclear deal, but that is asking too much. They’ll need to settle for a gesture of some sort. After all, talking to the Americans doesn’t necessarily mean giving them anything substantial.
President Trump is capable of sudden 180 degree turns. Erratic comes naturally to him. He did it with Kim Jong-un. He can do it with President Rouhani. He’ll have to if he wants to get anything out of the Iranians, who are a lot more stalwart than he is. He is still bad-mouthing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but that is mainly because it was an Obama achievement. He could rename it and add a few bells and whistles. Then go out and sell it as brand new, the way he did the North American Free Trade Agreement.
We are still a long way from that. But last night Trump got it right. Even a stopped clock is correct twice a day. I’m glad this was the moment. Now is the time to climb down the escalatory ladder, not up.
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