Tag: Nuclear weapons

It keeps getting worse

The problem today is not Charlottesville. The problem is the White House, starting at the top. The President can’t bring himself to denounce white supremacists, or even to say that Nazi flags have no legitimate role in American politics, even if the constitution protects their display. His acolytes likewise willfully ignore white supremacists who have killed many more Americans since 9/11 than Islamist extremists have.

If you put America first and want to protect its citizens, you would deal with the violent protesters in Charlottesville first and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria later. Or at least you would pay some attention to denouncing the thugs who think you are their leader–they gleefully shout “Heil Trump”–and skip the bromides about unspecified violence and vague “unity.”

You would also want to maintain America’s international credibility. Trump has spent the week shredding it. After threatening North Korea with “fire and fury” and claiming we are “locked and loaded,” it appears virtually none of the necessary preparations for military action against Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programs have been taken. Forces have not been deployed, civilians have not been evacuated, and the Pentagon is denying that the use of force–notably not yet authorized by Congress–is imminent.

To top it off, Trump threatened military action also against Venezuela, where we would almost surely be better off to let nature take its course in ending President Maduro’s shambolic governance.

Trump’s threats are not credible, which means it will be far more difficult to mount a credible threat in the future. We are already at the point that many in the US government are ignoring the president: the Pentagon is not implementing his ban on transgender people, Secretary of State Tillerson is trying to stifle talk of war with North Korea, Republicans in Congress are heading towards a compromise on maintaining Obamacare. Other governments are laughing at Trump’s obsession with undoing whatever his predecessor did. If Trump fails to follow through on his threat against North Korea, and the North Koreans continue to test missiles and nuclear weapons, how much credibility will the United States have in the future?

Of course it is possible Trump will follow this week’s bluster with a cruise missile attack on North Korea, hoping to reproduce the applause he got after the attack on a Syrian air base in April and distract attention from the investigation of Russian interference in the election. But that attack was a one-off that has had little impact. Assad has continued to use small quantities of chemical weapons and to prioritize attacks against the relatively moderate opposition in Syria. A similar one-off against North Korea would predictably have no serious impact on its well-dispersed and hidden missile and nuclear programs.

Nor will many applaud. North Korea might strike back, most likely against Guam, but possibly also against Seoul or even Tokyo. How long do we think America’s friends and allies will remain friends and allies if Washington is seen as having started a war from which they will suffer the most? What are the odds that NATO could be held together once the Europeans conclude the President is rash, unreliable, and likely to provoke adversaries?

The Europeans can be sure of one thing, however: the adversary Trump will never provoke is Vladimir Putin. The reason is increasingly apparent: Russian money sustains Trump’s real estate empire, which was likely used to launder ill-gotten gains of Putin’s best friends. Trump can never turn on Putin, lest Putin pull the plug on Russian financing. This is blackmail, not collusion. We needn’t worry too much about Trump intentionally coming to blows with Moscow, which is using its leverage over the President to gain advantages in Syria.

Can Ukraine be far behind? My guess is that the Administration is busily trying to cut a deal on Ukraine, one that it could argue should lead to lifting of the sanctions on Russia. Fortunately, sharp eyes in Congress will examine any such proposition. It will be difficult for Trump to sell the Ukrainians short, the way he did the Syrian opposition.

The United States matters to friends, allies, and enemies less today than at any time during my lifetime, which corresponds to the entire post-World War II period. The damage to our web of alliances, our international credibility, and our position of leadership in the past seven months is gigantic. Generals Mattis, Kelly, and McMaster are proving incapable of blocking the President from his worst instincts. The only relief will come when Trump is gone. But none of us can tell when that might be. It keeps getting worse.

PS: It got worse within minutes of my publishing this piece. Trump said, in response to a car plowing into peaceful counterprotesters: “We condemn in the strongest possible terms this egregious display of hatred, bigotry, and violence on many sides. On many sides.”

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North Korea has the upper hand

I won’t have time this morning to write about President Trump’s foolish “fire and fury” threat against North Korea, which provoked a specific Pyongyang threat against the US territory of Guam. In any event, I wouldn’t do better than Robert Litwak, who had intelligent things to say about the issue this morning on NPR: 

Secretary of State Tillerson is wandering around the world saying the US wants to talk with North Korea, while the President blusters. That isn’t a good way to get the diplomacy going, because the North Koreans have a better alternative to a negotiated solution (BATNA) than we do: they need only continue their nuclear and missile programs and be prepared to launch a conventional artillery attach on Seoul if we start to act. In the game Trump is playing–military threat–North Korea has the upper hand.

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Counterbalancing Iran

On Wednesday, Senator Christopher Coons (D-DE) paid a visit to the Middle East Institute to deliver a keynote address entitled “Challenges in U.S.-Iran Foreign Policy.” The senator’s speech highlighted the importance of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and maintaining a balance of power in the Middle East to counter Iranian influence.

Despite its flaws, the JCPOA has succeeded in its primary objectives: freezing Iran’s nuclear program, supporting global counter-proliferation efforts, and opening channels of communication to prevent the escalation of hostilities between the United States and Iran. While decrying Iran’s abysmal human rights record and acknowledging that several members of Congress seek to undo the landmark agreement, Coons insisted that commitment to the JCPOA is the United States’ best bet to contain the Iranian nuclear threat and prevent direct conflict.

“We should only walk away,” countered the senator, “when there is clear cause to do so.”

Coons was adamant that “calls for regime change or war with Iran are reckless.” One needs look no further than Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya to see examples of failed U.S. initiatives in the region. Moreover, regime change raises the threat of a power vacuum and jihadi forces ready to fill it.

Conditioning US-Iran relations is a delicate project. Ultimately, concerns about the spread of Iranian influence in the Middle East must inform the US stance on governments and organizations as diverse as Iraqi Kurdistan and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

In particular, the impending September 25 referendum on Iraqi Kurdish independence presents a minefield for American rhetoric and policy: the referendum, if approved, would weaken the integrity of the Iraqi state and shift the country’s Sunni-Shia sectarian balance to a Shia majority, increasing Iran’s clout. Yet the argument for Iraqi Kurdish self-determination is compelling, and Kurds have been strong regional allies in the fight against the Islamic State.

Additionally, announced Coons, the GCC feud must be put to rest. It weakens the Middle East’s strongest anti-Iran bloc and American ability to counter Iranian sway.

The Senator pins hopes for the future of US-Iran relations on Senate Bill 722: the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017. The bill, which has stalled in the House of Representatives following a constitutional challenge, would impose non-nuclear sanctions on Russia and Iran to punish Iran for “unacceptable non-nuclear behavior,” including support for the Assad regime in Syria, threats to Israel, and antagonism towards U.S. allies in the Gulf. The senator also advises American diplomats to negotiate a successor agreement to the JCPOA, which will be critical as sunset clauses in the existing agreement go into effect.

Crucially, American officials must restrict their antagonism to the Iranian government—not the Iranian people. The May 19 Iranian presidential elections, which re-elected moderate candidate Hassan Rouhani, indicate that Iranians want a less repressive regime and a more open society. President Trump’s Muslim ban and inflammatory rhetoric do nothing to serve American interests—they only stoke anti-American sentiment among the Iranian people.

Given the results of the presidential election and the tentative success of the JCPOA, the Trump administration would be foolish to sabotage relations with Iran.

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No, Turkey isn’t going nuclear

The issue of Turkey’s nuclear intentions has generated speculation: Is Turkey Secretly Working on Nuclear Weapons? | The National Interest

Pantelis Ikonomou, a former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspector, writes: 

  • Does Turkey aspire for nuclear weapons?
  • Is Turkey’s ambitious civilian nuclear program the cover for a military aim?

These tough questions arise when Turkey’s nuclear energy program is viewed in the perspective of other factors. Turkey has signed bilateral agreements that in principle cover the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Those with Russia and Japan include clauses related to enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. These have raised concerns about nuclear ‘’weaponization.’’ In addition, Turkey’s is determined to achieve regional political hegemony along with its latest advances in military industry, missile development and space technology. The nuclear cooperation of Turkey with Pakistan and A. Q. Khan’s network in the 1980s adds another significant dimension.

A state like Turkey that adheres to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would have two routes to developing nuclear weapons:

  1. “Sneak-out” by trying to carry out clandestine activities related to nuclear weapons development (as were the cases of Iraq 1991, Romania 1992, North Korea 1993, Libya 2004 and lastly Iran 2006).
  2. “Breakout” of its Safeguards Agreement (as North Korea did in 2003) by using advanced components – enrichment or reprocessing – of its civilian program for military purposes.

Both options would cause severe international responses, but more importantly neither is currently feasible.

Turkey, as a signatory of the NPT is subject since 1982 to the Safeguards inspection regime of the IAEA, whereby the ‘’correctness’’ of its State Declaration is continuously verified. Since 2001 Turkey has also accepted the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards agreement that provides for confirmation of the ‘’completeness’’ of the State Declaration. This confirmation stems from a “broader conclusion” drawn from implementation of rigorous and unrestricted monitoring and verification based on State-specific parameters, relevant satellite imagery and reliable third-party information.  The broader conclusion for Turkey has been drawn annually since 2012 and confirms the ‘‘absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole.’’ Sneak-out is not a viable option.

So far as break-out is concerned, Turkey’s State Declaration to the IAEA includes only two small research reactors, one of them inactive, and one pilot fuel fabrication plant on an experimental level.

Turkey has decided for two Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) projects of four reactor units each for electricity production. One project is to be built and operate at Akkuyu and the other at Sinop.

The Akkuyu project officially started in 2007, but its progress is unusually slow. Although the agreement between Turkey and Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) to build, operate and own (BOO) the NPP was signed in May 2010, final approval of the site license was granted in February 2017 and application for the construction license of the first reactor at Akkuyu was submitted in May 2017. Turkey has also signed a preliminary protocol with Rosatom to acquire a 49 percent stake in the Akkuyu NPP, which will further delay the pre-construction process. Turkey plans to commission the first reactor at Akkuyu at the centenary of the Turkish Republic in 2023 and the second in 2024.

The Sinop project has practically not yet started. Since May 2013, when the relevant cooperation agreement between Turkey and Japan was signed, no application for site licensing has been submitted.

The overriding fact is that there are no NPPs in operation or under construction in Turkey. Likewise, there are no nuclear materials, facilities and activities related to any dual use capability.

If Turkey’s ambition were to achieve nuclear-weapons capability through “breakout,” an advanced civilian nuclear program including enrichment and reprocessing capabilities would be the decisive prerequisite. They do not exist and are an improbable long-term hypothesis. Moreover, the “sneak-out” option of a concealed military nuclear program would be practically not achievable under continued IAEA comprehensive Safeguards measures, including country specific monitoring of the Additional Protocol.

Turkey’s nuclear armed capability shouldn’t be a real concern. It is rather an induced fear, or even a destructive phobia.

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Peace picks July 10-14

  1. Zapad 17: Implications for NATO and the United States | Tuesday, July 11 | 9:00 am | Atlantic Council | Register Here | As NATO steps up its exercises in the Baltic Sea region, Russia is preparing to launch a major exercise in mid-September to test the readiness and capabilities of its air, sea, and ground forces in northeastern Europe. Zapad is a recurring exercise which has included forces from both Russia and Belarus, and serves as a high-profile training event close to NATO territory. Join the Atlantic Council and the Ministry of Defense of Estonia for a public discussion on the implications of Zapad 17.
  2. Challenges in U.S. Iran Policy | Wednesday, July 12 | 12:30 – 5:30 pm | Middle East Institute | Register Here | Join the Middle East Institute for a conference to examine the outlines of U.S. policy toward Iran, addressing its overall goals, the strategies pursued, and metrics of success. Panels will include: “Assessing the Threat, Calibrating a Strategy” (1:30 – 2:45 pm), “Challenges in Syria and Iraq” (3:00 – 4:15 pm), and Challenges in Yemen, Lebanon, and Afghanistan” (4:15 – 5:30 pm). Senator Christopher Coons (D-DE), member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and proponent of the U.S. – Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, will give the keynote address.
  3. The War on ISIS: The Forgotten Need for Congressional Authorization | Wednesday, July 12 | 9:30 – 10:30 am | Wilson Center | Register Here | While there is a broad consensus for pursuing ISIS aggressively, the legal grounds upon which the president can expand the use of military force against ISIS are more tenuous. In recent years, the executive branch has justified its actions by pointing to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) – legislation signed into law days after the 9/11 attacks. Is Congress abdicating its authority to authorize wars to the executive branch? Senator Jeff Flake (R-AZ), Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA), and Jane Harman (director, president, and CEO of the Wilson Center) will comment.
  4. The July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey: One Year On | Thursday, July 13 | 9:00 – 11:00 am | Turkish Heritage Organization | Register Here | Last year’s failed coup attempt, carried out by a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), took a considerable toll on the Turkish nation and created enormous domestic, regional, and international risks. Following the death of more than 200 Turkish civilians, the Turkish government declared a state of emergency that is still in effect. Ankara has requested the extradition of suspected mastermind Fethullah Gulen from the U.S., further complicating the already strained relationship between the two NATO allies. Join THO and a distinguished panel of experts including Ambassador James JeffreyMark HallCliff Stearns, and Mujeeb Khan for a look at the July 15 coup attempt one year later. Discussion will be moderated by Alexi-Noelle O’Brien Hosein.
  5. A New Nuclear Review for a New Age | Thursday, July 13 | 12:15 – 1:30 pm | Hudson Institute | Register Here | The contemporary nuclear environment is very different from that which immediately followed the Cold War. A New Nuclear Review for a New Age, a recent study published by the National Institute for Public Policy, provides timely recommendations for how the United States must respond to the changes and adapt its nuclear posture to deter enemies, assure allies, and limit damage in the event deterrence fails. The Hudson Institute will host a discussion with the director of the study, Dr. Keith Payne, and contributing authors Dr. Matthew Kroenig and Rebeccah Heinrichs.
  6. Regime Change in Iran: From the 1953 Coup to the Trump Policy Review | Thursday, July 13 | 12:00 pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here | The Atlantic Council presents a panel discussion featuring Sanam Naraghi-AnderliniMalcolm Byrne, and Bruce Riedel on new US government documents released about the 1953 CIA-backed coup that deposed Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and reinstalled Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The discussion will look at the ramifications of the coup for the Iranian people and US-Iran relations and analyze the impact of revived regime change rhetoric among some politicians and advisers seeking to influence the policies of the Trump administration toward Iran and the Middle East at large.​ Barbara Slavin, director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council, will be moderating.
  7. Post-ISIS Iraq and Syria: Avoiding Chaos | Friday, July 14 | 10:00 am – 12:30 pm | Middle East Policy Council | Register Here | Join the Middle East Policy Council for a conference featuring Ambassador James Jeffrey, former ambassador to Turkey and Iraq; Dr. Denise Natali of the National Defense University; Mr. Wa’el Alzayat, former Syria Outreach Coordinator for the U.S. Department of State; and Dr. Paul Salem of the Middle East Institute. Ambassador Richard J. Schmierer, former ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman, will be moderating.
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The world in 2394 words

I spoke this afternoon at the 10th Summer School for Young Diplomats in Kolasin, Montenegro. Here are the speaking notes I prepared on “Global Security Challenges: New Developments and Future Trends.”

 

  1. It’s a pleasure to be here, especially in these beautiful mountains. While I’ve been to Montenegro a few times in the past, this is my first visit since it became a NATO ally. That betokens enormous progress. I can only wish all your countries as much success as Montenegro has had over the past twenty years or so.
  1. That teaches an important lesson in international affairs: if you keep going in the right direction, you will eventually get there.
  1. I’ve been asked to talk about geopolitical challenges. I’ve got my own ideas about what they are, but I’d like your ideas as well. So let me ask you to write one on each stickie—no more than a phrase is needed.
  1. My own list of current geopolitical challenges from a Washington perspective is this: the United States, the Middle East, Islamist extremism, Russia, and China as well as nuclear nonproliferation and climate change. That should keep us busy for the next hour and a half.

Washington

  1. First Washington. It is a geopolitical challenge for many countries, because of its global political and economic influence, its enormous capacity for power projection and because of its still ongoing political transition.
  1. Many of you will wonder how the new Administration will affect your country’s interests. I can’t hope to cover the entire world, but let me say a few things that may help you to work out the implications for your own country.
  1. President Trump was elected on an explicit promise to “make America great again,” which implies greater attention to American interests in dealing with the rest of the world.
  1. It also implies reduced attention to American values, especially democracy and human rights. The Administration appears to be applying a double standard: if you are America’s friend, you need not fear Washington will criticize your internal political behavior.
  1. Presidents Erdogan, Sisi, and Duterte can testify to that, as can Kings Salman of Saudi Arabia and Abdullah of Jordan.
  1. But if you are President Castro of Cuba or Supreme Leader Khamenei, you can anticipate sharp rebukes from the U.S., and possibly sanctions or other restrictive measures.
  1. The new Administration has also prioritized the use of military instruments over diplomacy and international aid. While its budget proposal was dead on arrival in Congress, where at least some aspects of diplomacy and aid have strong supporters, you can still expect less diplomacy and less money.
  1. The only exceptions to this rule so far have been North Korea, where the conventional artillery threat to Seoul and much of South Korea makes American military action unlikely, and the Middle East, where the president has committed his son-in-law and two of his personal lawyers to negotiating peace. I don’t know anyone in Washington who thinks they will be successful, but they may make some progress on confidence-building measures. I’ll return to North Korea later.

Middle East

  1. As I am already wandering into the Middle East, let me go there. It has been clear for some time, though few will say it out loud, that American interests there are declining. We need less oil from the Middle East while other countries are taking more, the top non-proliferation issue there is under control for a decade or more, and our allies there want military assistance but not much more.
  1. By far the most important interest the U.S. has today in the Middle East is terrorism. The current Administration wants to deal with it as a military problem: the objective is to kill Al Qaeda and the Islamic State and get out.
  1. This was precisely the approach intended by George W. Bush in Afghanistan: kill Al Qaeda and get out. It failed because we couldn’t find all of Al Qaeda. The President changed his mind because we were sure it would return if we left.
  1. In Syria, this approach faces the same difficulty, as it virtually guarantees that there will be a continuing Sunni insurgency, not to mention its metastases elsewhere in the world.
  1. That’s where all of you come in: with ISIS on the verge of defeat in Iraq and Syria, it is not attracting so many foreign fighters, who were the focus of much attention in recent years. Nor is the question of terrorist financing as important as once it was.
  1. The bigger issue is now home-grown terrorism, perhaps inspired or encouraged by fighters returning from Iraq or Syria. In the Balkans, for example, I would now regard this as a big problem, as it is in Europe and the U.S. as well.
  1. There are two important strategies in dealing with homegrown terrorism: making sure that people are not marginalized but rather have a stake in their own governance and society; and not overreacting to terrorist threats or attacks, as overreaction is precisely what they intend to provoke.
  1. Right-wing terrorism kills more Americans than Islamic extremism, even counting 9/11.
  1. We need to avoid the kind of overreaction that the Administration’s travel ban on 6 Muslim countries represents.

Iran

  1. In the Middle East, the Americans will focus next on the Iranian threat.
  1. That threat is real. Iran has vastly expanded its influence in the region, not so much because of the nuclear agreement but rather due to its support for proxy forces, which long predates the nuclear deal: Hizbollah in Syria as well as Lebanon, Hashd al Shaabi in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Palestine.
  1. The reaction, led by the Saudis, has also been vigorous, making much of the Middle East a battleground for sectarian conflict and even splitting the Gulf Cooperation Council. Qatar just won’t give up the good relations with Iran that enable both countries to exploit the largest natural gas field in the Middle East.
  1. Turkey’s Muslim Brotherhood leadership has chosen to side with Qatar and Iran, undermining the American effort to construct an anti-Iran alliance that includes the majority Sunni states of the Middle East as well as Israel.
  1. To sum up on Iran: it has gained a lot of ground in recent years, not least due to the American invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the civil wars it has exploited in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The Americans have not yet figured out what they want to do about it, though my best guess is that they will in due course want to confront Iranian ambitions.

Russia

  1. Russia is another geopolitical challenge, not only in the Middle East.
  1. Putin’s Russia is using all the instruments of national power at its disposal to challenge the Americans and re-assert its status as a superpower, except for a direct force-on-force military clash that Moscow knows it would lose.
  1. The Russians are sending ships and planes to provoke NATO allies and sympathetic neutrals, they have invaded Ukraine with only a thin veneer of deniability, they are bombing Syrian moderate opposition, they are selling weapons to Egypt, supporting General Haftar in Libya, and using Sputnik News and Russia Today as propaganda tools.
  1. They are also interfering in elections, conducting cyberattacks, and plotting and conducting assassinations.
  1. None of this has provoked much reaction yet from either the Americans or Europeans, apart from Ukraine-related sanctions and a few tit-for-tat aircraft incidents.
  1. Inexplicably to me, Putin has a lot of admirers in the US, especially among the Republicans and certainly in the Trump Administration, which has made no secret of its desire to get along better with Moscow.
  1. We’ll have to wait and see what comes of the first Trump/Putin meeting on the margins of the G20 Summit tomorrow and Saturday in Hamburg.
  1. The American receptiveness to Putin may surprise many of you. It surprises me. I can’t really explain it in conventional national interest terms.
  1. I think it is related to ethnic nationalism: Trump is what we are calling these days “white nationalist”; Putin is a Russian nationalist. The two admire each other.
  1. But Russia is a declining regional power with an economy no larger than Spain’s and based largely on energy resources whose value has declined dramatically. It’s only real international capability is to make life difficult for people who want to run serious democracies.
  1. We are going to need to learn to live with that, responding to it in ways that block the worst consequences and nudge Moscow in more productive directions, but at the same time not accepting the Russian claim to superpower status.

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