Tag: Nuclear weapons
Gulf jitters
Kuwait University Professor Abdullah al Shayji published Sunday his latest Gulf News commentary criticizing the Iran nuclear deal. I’ve written him this note in response:
I certainly understand your concern about Iranian subversion and terrorism in Bahrain and Kuwait. Your police and prosecution have done well to identify perpetrators of the latest incident and bring them to court quickly for what I trust will be a fair trial.
But I find your position on the nuclear deal ill-founded. Let me innumerate the reasons why, in response to points you make in this piece:
1. You can hardly say it was done behind your backs. We’ve all known about these negotiations for more than two years, and the basic parameters of the deal were made public in April. I don’t know what diplomatic exchanges there were prior to that, but I’d be willing to bet they happened.
2. Your concern about Iran being only 6 to 12 months from a nuclear weapon 15 years from now ignores the fact that Iran was closer than that (3 months according to the Americans) before the April interim agreement. It makes no sense to be more concerned about something that might happen 15 years from now rather than something that had already happened, and is now being reversed.
3. I would join you in hoping the Administration will calm Gulf jitters, but I would also suggest that the Gulf states need to cooperate more in order to counter Iran militarily in the region and through vigorous law enforcement at home. The failure of the GCC to get serious about integrating its capabilities and collaborating seriously, especially in Syria, is a source of considerable disappointment in Washington.
4. You suggest that Gulf jitters could lead to a nuclear arms race. Rapid Iranian progress on nuclear technology over the last decade and more did not, so it is hard to understand how a roll-back of their program and a 15-year freeze on many of its efforts should. Iran was severely punished with sanctions for its nuclear ambitions. I doubt any Gulf state would want to run a comparable risk, especially now that Iran is losing much of what it had gained.
5. The lifting of sanctions is a necessary part of the agreement, but I agree with you that it will provide Tehran with ample resources to make more trouble in the region. That was going to happen anyway, as the multilateral sanctions were slowly decaying and would likely have evaporated if an agreement had not been reached.
President Obama has made it clear he is not relying on moderation of Iranian behavior on non-nuclear issues and is prepared to counter them when and where he can. Those in the Gulf concerned about Iranian behavior might worry more about how to do that more effectively and less about their past disappointments. Some specific proposals are in order.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks August 24-28
1. Promoting Nuclear Safety Cooperation in Northeast Asia | Tuesday, August 25th | 12:00-1:30 | East-West Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | China, Japan, and South Korea all have deep experience with nuclear energy and large commercial nuclear power sectors, and the use of nuclear power is expected to continue to expand, mostly driven by growth in China. There have been calls over the years to increase regional nuclear safety cooperation, and the need for such cooperation has been highlighted by the Fukushima accident in Japan, the fake parts’ certificates scandal in South Korea, and rapid reactor construction in China. The most recent proposal for strengthening regional nuclear safety cooperation came in South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI). NAPCI envisions addressing “soft” issues, including nuclear safety, in order to build deeper regional cooperation on “hard” security issues, similar to the integration process in Europe, and Park has specifically cited the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) as a model for Northeast Asia. Yet, is EURATOM an appropriate model for Northeast Asia? Can NAPCI’s call for regional nuclear safety cooperation actually be realized, and what would effective cooperation look like? Strong, enduring commitment to nuclear safety cooperation by all regional actors will be necessary for NAPCI or any other initiative to succeed. This seminar will examine the current state of nuclear safety cooperation in Northeast Asia and offer a view to the future. Speaker: Dr. James E. Platte, Non-Resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow, Pacific Forum, CSIS.
2. Peace, Conflict, and the Scale of the Climate Risk Landscape | Tuesday, August 25th | 1:15-2:45 | Webinar Sponsored by the Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Climate risks have the potential to affect every natural and social system, to harm populations, disrupt economic systems, and contribute directly or indirectly to conflicts within and across jurisdictional borders. The Global Climate Security webinar series convenes global thought leaders to seek pathways to improve responses to destabilizing climate risks. The opening webinar will examine the security implications of climate risk and will provide a context for the subsequent place-based and sector-based webinars. This session will address climate risk and security on all fronts from the risk assessment perspective (impacts on governance, economic vitality, national, regional and international security) to potential solutions (risk management, policy, and technical). Participants will hear from experts from the national intelligence and climate impact communities who will address the scale of the risks. The first webinar will set up the remaining webinars, which in turn will address how to respond in four sectors (national & subnational, industry, defense and global policy) based on risk assessment and responses commensurate with the risk. The intent is to examine steps to bridge the risk – policy analysis gap. Speakers include: Joshua Busby, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin Marc Levy, Deputy Director, Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Earth Institute, Columbia University, Mathew J. Burrows, Director, Strategic Foresight Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, and Nadya T. Bliss, Director, Global Security Initiative, Arizona State University.
3. Iran: What Next After the Nuclear Deal? | Tuesday, August 25th | 6:30-8:30 | Located at OpenGov Hub and sponsored by PS21 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After last month’s Iran nuclear deal, what next for the Islamic Republic? Will the easing of sanctions bring it more into the diplomatic and international mainstream? Or will the new economic growth create a more assertive Iran that further antagonizes the rest of the region? What will the domestic consequences be of Tehran’s new openness to the outside world? And what, if anything, will happen to the nuclear program? Panelists include: Ariane Tabatabai, Visiting Assistant Professor, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association, Reza Akbari, Senior Program Officer, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, and Sam Cutler, Policy Advisor, Ferrari & Associates, P.C. Moderator: Negar Razavi, PhD candidate, University of Pennsylvania and Global Fellow, PS21.
4. International Youth Month Breakfast Briefing: “Young Democracy: Engagement as a Deterrent to Radicalization” | Wednesday, August 26th | 9:30 – 11:00 | Located at the Rayburn House Office Building and hosted by IFES | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join IFES for a breakfast briefing on how involving young people in constructive democratic processes can serve as a potential deterrent to radicalization. This panel will discuss engagement both before and after the age of enfranchisement, with a special emphasis on the political participation of young women and girls. Discussants will offer examples of programmatic work from multiple regions and countries, including Bangladesh, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Libya, Nepal, Syria and Yemen. This event will be co-hosted by the office of Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee (TX-18). Speakers include: Matthew Cohen, Program Officer, Africa, IFES, Jessica Huber, Senior Gender Specialist, IFES, Juliette Schmidt, Deputy Regional Director, Asia and the Pacific, IFES, and Ambar Zobairi, Deputy Regional Director, Middle East and North Africa. Moderated by Augusta Featherston, Youth Adviser, IFES.
5. The Economic Impact of Lifting Sanctions on Iran | Thursday, August 27th | 10:00-11:00 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A new World Bank report assesses that the removal of economic sanctions against Iran could significantly boost economic growth in Iran—including $15 billion in annual oil revenue—while potentially reducing global oil prices as much as 14 percent in the short run, depending on OPEC’s response, and opening up a significant market for exports. Drawing from the report’s systematic and comprehensive analysis, Shantayanan Devarajan will discuss the economic and geopolitical implications of Iran’s potential reentry into the global economy. Carnegie’s Uri Dadush will discuss the economic consequences and Karim Sadjadpour will moderate. Speakers include: Shantayanan Devarajan, chief economist, MENA region, World Bank and Uri Dadush, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment. Moderator, Karim Sadjadpour, senior associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment.
PC: Eddie Grove
6. The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s Strategic Reach to the Arctic | Thursday, August 27th | 10:00 – 11:30 | CSIS | REGISTRATION CLOSED- WATCH ONLINE | Please join us for the release and discussion of a new CSIS Europe Program report, The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s Strategic Reach to the Arctic, which examines Russia’s economic, energy, and security strategies and aspirations in the Arctic, and the evolution of the Kremlin’s Arctic policies over the past decade. On the eve of President Obama’s and Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Anchorage, Alaska where they will convene Arctic and non-Arctic leaders to discuss climate impact and resilience, and global leadership in the Arctic, it is a timely moment to better understand the
largest and most dynamic Arctic actor and to assess whether the Arctic will remain a cooperative region or succumb to geopolitical tensions. Report author Heather A. Conley and project consultant Dr. Marlène Laruelle will examine the significant changes in Russia’s Arctic policies and rhetoric – particularly since President Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012 – and offer their insights on Russia’s military posturing in the region, as well as how to develop new collaborative thinking to preserve and protect international Arctic cooperation. New York Times correspondent Steven Lee Myers, who has written about and traveled frequently to the Russian Arctic, will offer his reflections on the report and assess whether the
development of a 21st century “ice curtain” is realistic. The panelists will also preview the upcoming August 31st meeting in Alaska and assess the impact of the potential attendance of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Arctic. Speakers include: Dr. Marlène Laruelle, Research Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University and Steven Lee Myers, Correspondent, The New York Times. Introduced and moderated by Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia and the Arctic, CSIS Europe Program.
7. A Normal Nuclear Pakistan | Thursday, August 27th | 12:30-2:00 | Stimson | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A commercial pathway for Pakistan to join the mainstream in the global nuclear order is highly unlikely. Pakistan’s leaders must therefore consider nuclear weapon-related initiatives that could facilitate mainstreaming, while also strengthening nonproliferation norms, bolstering global disarmament hopes, and setting the bar higher for new entrants into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This presentation will discuss a new report by the Stimson Center and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “A Normal Nuclear Pakistan,” co-written by Toby Dalton (Co-Founder and Senior Associate, Stimson) and Michael Krepon (Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). The report takes a hard look at Pakistan’s nuclear weapon-related programs and its ambitions to be viewed as a normal state possessing advanced nuclear technologies.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The Iran deal’s regional impact
On Monday, an all-MEI panel discussed After the Iran Deal: Regional Repercussions and Dynamics. Panelists included Robert S. Ford, senior fellow and former US Ambassador to Syria, Thomas W. Lippman, scholar, Gönül Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies, and Alex Vatanka, senior fellow. Paul Salem, vice president for policy and research moderated.
Vatanka stated that reformists, moderates, the Iranian public and most of the Iranian media are in favor of the deal. Some hardliners criticize the deal, but they’ve opened a previously taboo debate about the pros and cons of Iran’s nuclear program.
Khamenei has been vague, but this shouldn’t be taken as opposition; Khamenei rarely unequivocally supports anything. Those close to Khamenei are defending the deal. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hasn’t come out against it but they and their subsidiaries worry that the deal will hurt them financially. Rouhani needs to reassure them that they won’t lose out as foreign firms enter the market.
The Rouhani Administration is a Western-educated team with cohesive thinking on the country’s direction. Like China, they may try to open up economically and deal with political reform later. Zarif believes that Western companies must invest in Iran to render the deal more stable. Khamenei appears to accept economic reform but has made the resistance economy part of his legacy. It is unclear what he wants from the deal. Is he looking to prevent the possibility of war, eliminate sanctions, or make new friends? If many reformists lose their seats in the next Majlis elections, it means that Khamenei is unwilling to let a reform agenda go farther. If the Majlis accepts the deal and Congress rejects it, Iran can portray themselves as the good guys.
There are contradictions regarding Iran’s regional relations. The deputy foreign minister recently stated that Iran wanted to talk with the Saudis about Yemen and Bahrain, but then an ayatollah at a Friday sermon put Saudi Arabia, Israel and ISIS in the same category. If the reformists reconcile too much with the Saudis, the hardliners will brand them as pro-Saudi agents.
Lippman said that despite US declarations of an unshakeable commitment to the Gulf, Gulf Arabs were publicly skeptical until recently. Now the GCC countries publicly (if not privately) believe the US commitment. Beginning at Camp David, they decided that the Iran deal was done and that they weren’t going to do “a full Bibi.” They will work with the US and each other to confront regional problems.
The Saudis won’t race to a bomb; they care about self-preservation, which includes full integration into the world economy. The Saudis can’t afford to become nuclear outlaws.
Tol stated that understanding Turkish fear of the Kurds is key to grasping Turkish politics. It also plays a role in Turkey’s stance vis-a-vis Iran. Turkey shares the West’s objectives regarding Iran’s nuclear program but has promoted engagement rather than isolation, voting against UN sanctions in 2010. Iran is a large market for Turkish goods and the two countries have close energy ties. However, Turkey worries that a nuclear Iran could change the regional balance of power. All political parties in Turkey welcomed the deal and the sanctions relief.
Turkey has three main concerns about Iran:
- Iran is a destabilizing force in Iraq and opposes Turkey in Syria.
- Closer ties between Washington and Tehran could come at Turkey’s expense, focusing too much attention on the fight against ISIS and undermining Turkey’s anti-Assad efforts;
- Iran’s support for the PKK and PYD.
Ford asserted that the problems in Iraq and Syria don’t revolve around the US and Iran but around local grievances. The pressures against the Iraqi state are increasing. Low oil prices are contributing to the Kurdish drive for independence. Progress on Sunni-Shia reconciliation is lacking. Iran is partially responsible because of its ties to militias that are considered terrorist organizations by the US. Iran is unlikely to give up these allies, whose political leaders are ruthless and capable. It is unclear if the US and Iran can work together in Iraq. ISIS can recruit as long as the conflict between the Sunnis and the militias continues. If Iran cedes control of the militias to President Abadi, that could help.
Assad is losing and the opposition is advancing on the Alawite homeland. There are diplomatic visits between Syria, Russia, and Iran; Syria’s foreign minister recently visited Tehran and likely
also Oman, which serves as an intermediary with the Saudis. There are also reports that Iran is about to put forward a peace plan with a unity government, constitutional amendments to protect minorities, and future internationally supervised elections. Ford thinks this won’t succeed because the Turks haven’t signed on and their closeness with the armed opposition gives them a veto.
The Russians and Iranians are urging the US to stop pushing against Assad and start working with him, but Assad is about to lose his supply lines. There were recent anti-Assad protests in Alawite-majority Latakia province. Assad doesn’t have the capacity to take on ISIS if it can’t hold the Damascus suburbs. The Iranians have to recognize that Assad is losing but they will almost certainly use at least a small portion of the money from sanctions relief to shore-up Hezbollah and Assad. This will cause a short-term increase in violence.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Strange values and colossal misjudgment
I have to give credit to New York Senator Schumer for laying out his thinking on the Iran nuclear deal. But it is thinking that betrays strange values and in the end a colossal misjudgment.
Schumer looks at three issues:
- nuclear restrictions on Iran in the first ten years,
- nuclear restrictions on Iran after ten years,
- and non-nuclear components and consequences of a deal.
He asks if the United States is better off with or without the agreement.
On the first issue, he faults both the inspection provisions and the snapback of sanctions. He ignores the unprecedented inspections of nuclear facilities and somehow finds that the US unilateral ability to precipitate re-imposition of sanctions on Iran has little value. But in the end he admits we might be a bit better off in the first ten years than without the agreement.
On nuclear restrictions after ten years, Schumer is concerned because lifting of sanctions will greatly enrich Iran and enable it then to pursue an even more robust nuclear program. He simply ignores the agreement’s provisions for permanent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and the permanent commitment by Iran not to seek nuclear weapons. He says
Iran would have a green light to be as close, if not closer to possessing a nuclear weapon than it is today. And the ability to thwart Iran if it is intent on becoming a nuclear power would have less moral and economic force.
It is strange to value a problem that we might (or might not) have 10 years from now as much as you value it today. If nothing else, you’ve had 10 years with a non-nuclear Iran to think and organize what you’ll do next. It is even stranger to suggest that after 10 years of successfully preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon that somehow doing so then would be less compelling rather than more so. If you think war might be necessary to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, you are on a lot firmer ground if Iran violates an agreement than if there are no constraints at all on its nuclear program.
On the non-nuclear issues, Schumer is principally concerned with use of the money Iran will get from sanctions relief for nefarious activities in the region and beyond. I entirely share this concern, which is well-founded in Iran’s need to satisfy its hardliners after what Schumer should admit is a gigantic defeat at the bargaining table.
But then there is the colossal misjudgment: Schumer thinks you have to believe Iran will moderate in the future in order to support the deal. That is wrong. Forget Iran’s political future.
What you have to consider is the reaction of the rest of the world to American rejection of the agreement, which Schumer completely ignores. Instead, he blithely suggests:
Better to keep U.S. sanctions in place, strengthen them, enforce secondary sanctions on other nations, and pursue the hard-trodden path of diplomacy once more, difficult as it may be.
He offers not a word about how America’s European allies, the Russians, the Chinese and the Gulf states would react to this proposition. That is where his arguments go wildly wrong.
First consider what “secondary sanctions” mean. They mean the US will tell other countries’ banks and corporations that they can’t do business with Iran. If they do, they will be excluded from the US market and their assets in the US frozen. There are few things we could do to enrage our closest allies more quickly than that. They would be thrust into the arms of the Russians and Chinese, and together try to work out financing mechanisms that escape US scrutiny and control.
Second, consider whether there would be any diplomacy to pursue. Either the agreement will collapse altogether, in which case you can bet on Iran moving quickly to get nuclear weapons, in order to forestall a US attack. No diplomatic openings there. Or the agreement will remain intact, without US participation. Iran will get sanctions relief from everyone but the US (something it did not expect any time soon anyway). Why would Iran re-engage diplomatically with the US if it can get what it wants from everyone else?
America’s allies would find themselves moving away from their trans-Atlantic connections to much deeper engagement with our adversaries. Support for the US on many issues–especially but not only the Middle East–would wane rapidly. “Secondary sanctions” levied in retaliation against American companies could wreck havoc with the world’s financial and trading systems.
What would the Gulf states do? If the agreement falls apart, they will have no choice but to race for nuclear weapons. If it doesn’t, they still need to consider whether to stick with the isolated and weakening US as a major ally or shift in other directions. I’d bet on a shift in other directions, something that has already started but could accelerate.
The Iran nuclear deal is likely to survive the Congressional challenge next month, as it would require a more than 2/3 majority in both houses to defeat it. But if it fails, we can thank strange values and colossal misjudgment. Senator Schumer is not alone.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks August 10-14
1. After the Iran Deal: Regional Repercussions and Dynamics | Monday, August 10th | 12:00 – 1:30 | MEI | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a discussion of expectations across the region following Iran’s agreement with the P5+1 on its nuclear program. The historic deal may end Iran’s status as a pariah state, particularly in capitals outside the region. How have leaders in Tehran indicated they may proceed? How do the Arab states and Turkey view the implications of an Iran empowered by sanctions relief and diplomatic normalization? How might regional states react if Iran steps up its interventions in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere? And what actions are America’s allies in the region likely to want of the United States in managing Iran? Discussing these and other questions will be MEI senior fellow Robert S. Ford, MEI scholar Thomas W. Lippman, director of the Center for Turkish Studies Gönül Tol, and senior fellow Alex Vatanka. MEI’s vice president for policy & research Paul Salem will moderate the conversation.
2. Naval Aviation | Wednesday, August 12th | 9:00-10:00 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join CSIS and the U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) for a discussion with Lieutenant General Jon Davis, Deputy Commandant for Aviation and Vice Admiral Mike Shoemaker, Commander, Naval Air Forces moderated by Admiral Joseph Pureher, USN, Ret. Vice Admiral Peter H. Daly, USN, Ret., CEO, USNI will provide an introduction. The Maritime Security Dialogue brings together CSIS and USNI, two of the nation’s most respected non-partisan institutions. The series is intended to highlight the particular challenges facing the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, from national level maritime policy to naval concept development and program design. Given budgetary challenges, technological opportunities, and ongoing strategic adjustments, the nature and employment of U.S. maritime forces are likely to undergo significant change over the next ten to fifteen years. The Maritime Security Dialogue provides an unmatched forum for discussion of these issues with the nation’s maritime leaders.
3. Thailand and the Changing Geopolitical Dynamics of Southeast Asia | Wednesday, August 12th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the Asia-Pacific, economic development and interconnectivity is growing alongside increasing tensions between neighbor states. This is no clearer than in the fight for building Thailand’s infrastructure. Nobuhiro Aizawa will discuss how Thailand’s 2014 coup and competing infrastructure bids are altering the geopolitics and international relations of Southeast Asia. Abigail Friedman will offer comment, and Carnegie’s James L. Schoff will moderate. Speakers include: Nobuhiro Aizawa, associate professor, Kyushu University, Abigail Friedman, founder and CEO, The Wisteria Group. Moderator: James L. Schoff, senior associate, Asia Program,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
4. The Threat from Within: Israel’s Extremist Dilemma | Wednesday, August 12th | 11:30 | FPRI (n.b. this event is in Philadephia but FPRI posts video and/or audio of its events) | REGISTER TO ATTEND | “We have been lax in tackling Jewish terrorism,” said Israeli President Reuven Rivlin this week in response to the attacks at the gay pride parade and then the firebombing of a home in the West Bank, resulting in the burning to death of an 18-month-old child. These are not isolated incidents, however, and pose a threat to the Israeli government’s authority, Israeli democracy, and add yet another impediment to peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. We have asked Barak Mendelsohn to explore the rise of Jewish extremism in Israel, the dilemmas it poses for Israel, and what might be done to alleviate it. Barak Mendelsohn is a senior fellow at FPRI and associate professor of political science at Haverford College. This past academic year, he served as a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Security at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He has already written extensively on the Messianic movement inside Israel, in addition to his work on radical Islam and jihadism. He served in the IDF for 5 years and received his Ph.D. in government from Cornell University. His books include Combating Jihadism (University of Chicago Press, 2009) and The Al Qaeda Franchise (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015).
5. From Coalition to Conservative Majority: What’s Next for UK Foreign Policy? |Wednesday, August 12th | 6:30 | British Embassy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | This past May, the United Kingdom took to the voting booths and surprised many pollsters by handing a slim majority to Prime Minister David Cameron’s Conservative Party, thereby electing the UK’s first Conservative majority government in over a decade. Meanwhile, former Tory coalition partners the Liberal Democrats, led by outgoing Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, managed to hold only about 15% of their previous seats, the Labour Party lost seats and the Scottish National Party became the third largest party in the Commons. Since the election, the UK has continued to play a major role in the international foreign policy scene, from announcing its commitment to maintaining NATO’s defense spending target of 2% of GDP to playing a leading role in negotiations on the Iran Nuclear Deal. Young Professionals in Foreign Policy and the British Embassy invite you to join us for a post-election discussion moderated by Deputy Head of Mission to the United States, Patrick Davies. Mr. Davies, joined by a panel of experts from the Embassy, will discuss the new UK government, as the UK and its allies grapple with foreign policy issues such as combating ISIL, nuclear negotiations with Iran and EU reform.
6. Assessing the Iran Nuclear Agreement: Placing Sanctions in Context | Thursday, August 13th | 10:00-11:00 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Sanctions are what convinced Iran to begin negotiations with the United States. However, the mechanics behind lifting sanctions and the differences among international, U.S. and European Union sanctions are complicated. All beg the question of how effective the Iran deal really is. This program will explore the role of sanctions in the Iran Deal. Our panelists will examine the structure of the sanctions regime, debate its various implications, and explore what we can do about it. Among the questions to be addressed are: What sanctions are currently in place on Iran? What is the difference between multi-lateral oil sanctions and unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran? Is it really possible for the sanctions to be “snapped back” if Iran violates the agreement? Would the sanctions regime really disband if there was no agreement? Join us as our panel discusses Iran’s new sanctions regime and what it means for the future. Panelists include: Ilan Berman, Vice President, American Foreign Policy Council, Emanuele Ottolenghi, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation. Hosted by: James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow, Heritage Foundation.
7. The Iran Deal: Key Issues and Controversies | Thursday, August 13th | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for a discussion with Dr. Colin Kahl and other members of the administration on key elements of the Iran nuclear deal and its specific implications for the international community. Speakers include: Dr. Colin Kahl,
Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Adviser to the Vice President, Jon Wolfsthal, Senior Director for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, National Security Council, Chris Backemeyer, Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy, U.S. Department of State. Moderator: Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
A nervous region wary of the nuclear deal
On Wednesday, the Conflict Management Program at SAIS and MEI hosted a talk entitled After the Deal: A Veteran Journalist’s View from Tehran. Speakers included Roy Gutman, McClatchy Middle East bureau chief, and Joyce Karam, Washington bureau chief for Al-Hayat. Daniel Serwer of both SAIS and MEI moderated. Both speakers emphasized the dynamics that caused regional players to be wary of Iran.
Early last Spring, Gutman traveled to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey.
In Israel, he observed that the major national security concern wasn’t the Iranian nuclear program, but rather Iran’s conventional threat through the buildup of Hezbollah forces. Israelis were disappointed that the US was leaving a security vacuum in Syria for Iran to fill. The Israeli position on the Iran deal is difficult to understand; Israeli politicians oppose it, but Israel’s foreign policy elite considers Iranian conventional forces a larger threat.
Jordanian officials also worried about regional chaos and Iranian influence. They were baffled by the half-hearted US response to Assad, as well as its airstrike-only response to ISIS.
Egypt is preoccupied by terrorism and the upheaval in Libya, but Egyptian officials are also concerned about Iran’s growing influence and US inaction.
Officials in every government (aside from Turkey’s) spoke of collusion between Turkey and extremists. The Turks think the Iranians know that the US is not a determined counterpart. They believe the US is appeasing Iran.
Gutman then traveled to Tehran to gauge the mood there. Iran has come in from the cold after 36 years, but Tehran resents the last 36 years of US policy. Change in Iran won’t happen fast. Khamenei has said that Iran’s policy towards the “arrogant” US government won’t change and that Iran will keep supporting its regional allies.
Israel views Hezbollah’s buildup as a direct threat, but Iranian officials told Gutman that the Tehran holds the trigger on Hezbollah’s weapons and won’t pull it unless Israel threatens Lebanon or Iran. However, a former Iranian diplomat admitted that Iran has no vital interest in Lebanon or the Palestinians. Iran also appears to have no vital interest in Yemen, but likes seeing Saudi Arabia embroiled in an unwinnable war. Iran is unalterably opposed to the breakup of Iraq into three states.
Iranian officials don’t think the deal is perfect, but still see it as a win-win for both sides. They view themselves as MENA’s most powerful and stable state. They are glad that US has accepted them as a regional player and negotiating partner.
After the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, Iran filled the vacuum. The Iraqi Army collapsed on Iran’s watch. Iran does not acknowledge its responsibility for this and ascribes the rise of ISIS to others. They also believe that foreign forces fought in Deraa and refused to acknowledge Assad’s role in fomenting terrorism by releasing terrorists from prison. Iranian officials also stated that all sectors of Lebanese society back Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria. Iran needs a reality check.
Iran opposes the creation of a safe zone/no-fly zone in Iraq and has threatened to send basijis into Syria if this happens. Iranians don’t understand the scope of Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe or Iran’s role in it. There are too many disagreements between the US and Iran to form a regional security agreement now. The US needs a policy for Syria; if we don’t have a policy, others will fill the vacuum. The US also needs an official version of what happened in Syria to counter the Iranian invented view of history.
Karam noted that the Arab response to the deal is less monolithic than Israel’s, but the GCC and Israel view Iran’s regional behavior similarly. The UAE, Oman, and Turkey quickly welcomed the deal because they have good trade relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar were more cautious. The Saudis don’t view the deal as US abandonment, but they fear increased Iranian regional meddling. Arab public opinion has shifted drastically since 2008, when 80% of Arabs viewed Iran positively. Now only 12% do. The Arab street is suspicious of the deal. The US explained the deal to Arab governments, but not to their people. The Arab street wonders whether the money Iran will gain from sanctions relief will go to funding Iranian students, or to Qassem Suleimani and more chlorine gas, barrel bombs, and Hezbollah fighters for Assad. Assad is a costly budget item for Iran. When will Iran realize that Assad can’t win? Nevertheless, Hezbollah keeps getting more involved in Syria.
Karam stated that the Gulf countries obtain commitments from the US at talks like Camp David, but then nothing gets done. The US is four years behind on Syria and needs an official policy.
Serwer noted in conclusion that the regional issues would be far worse if Iran had, or were about to get, nuclear weapons.
RSS - Posts
