Tag: Nuclear weapons
Yes, the time is ripe
Hamid Bayati of the Iran Times published an article yesterday based in part on an interview with me. The article accurately reproduces my views, as you can see from the interview below, but he skipped my important final point about a possible clandestine nuclear program:
Q: Reportedly, US President Barack Obama secretly wrote Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the middle of last month and described a shared interest in fighting ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Can the letter have a positive impact on the nuclear talks between Iran and 5+1 group or help facilitate the diplomatic efforts to reach a nuclear agreement by the Nov. 24 deadline?
A: I haven’t seen the whole text of the letter. What has been reported suggests that the Americans were holding out cooperation against ISIS as a “carrot” to induce Iranian agreement on a nuclear deal. But Iran has good reason to fight ISIS without any inducements, as the US does, and I’m pretty sure there is already some cooperation to try to avoid incidents between American aircraft and forces and the Iranians fighting in Iraq. If Iran signs on to a nuclear deal, it will have much more to do with removing sanctions and military risks than ISIS.
Q: Nuclear negotiators from Iran and the 5+1 group will meet in Muscat, Oman, on November 11 and then will resume talks in Vienna on November 18. So why do the Iranian and 5+1 delegates go to Oman before Vienna?
A: I don’t know why the meeting is in Oman.
Q: Professor Vali Nasr wrote an article recently saying we are in a position that it is the best time to have a nuclear deal with Iran. Or, Saudi Arabia’s intelligence organizations have claimed that Western powers are willing to reach an agreement with Tehran at any price. What is your analysis of the situation? Is it possible that the two sides strike a nuclear deal by November 24?
A: I agree with Vali that the moment is ripe: see No pain, no gain | peacefare.net. But the Saudis are wrong that the Western powers are willing to reach an agreement with Tehran at any price. Any deal that leaves open an option for Iran to get nuclear weapons is going to be unacceptable in the West, especially in Washington DC.
Q: There have been reports that Obama seeks to lift sanctions on Iran without Congressional permission. Are these reports true?
A: That would not be his preferred option, but I am sure he is considering the proposition.
Q: Can the mid-term Congressional election, in which the Republicans won the majority in the Senate as well, affect the nuclear talks in case Iran and the 5+1 group fail to reach an agreement by November 24?
A: Yes, the election outcome will have an impact. The President will have to convince the Congress that the United States is significantly better off in terms of blocking any route to nuclear weapons with the agreement reached than without it. I anticipate the constraints on enrichment and reprocessing will be clear and compelling enough. The big problem will be whether Iran can convince the world that it has no longer has a clandestine nuclear weapons program, see Aye, there’s the rub | peacefare.net.
Q: Some experts argue that it is not possible to reach a comprehensive deal by the November 24 deadline and therefore is it better that Iran and 5+1 group sign a “partial agreement.” How can a partial agreement work?
A: I don’t really know. It will be hard to get more sanctions relief from Washington without a complete agreement that clearly and unequivocally blocks all paths to nuclear weapons. It might be possible to extend the Joint Plan of Action for a few weeks. But the inclination in Congress will be to tighten sanctions if there is no agreement that satisfies the majority there by the deadline.
The problem right now is that Tehran is only slowly answering questions about its past activities with “possible military dimensions,” which are discussed between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency. That hesitation raises serious question about a possible clandestine nuclear weapons program.
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Aye, there’s the rub
A nuclear deal with Iran is looking more likely than ever before. The P5+1 or EU3+3 (either way it is the US, Russia, UK, France, China and Germany) are making progress on issues related to enrichment and plutonium production and reprocessing. Verifying that fissile material, which can be used in an atomic bomb, is not diverted from those processes is a routine responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). If Iran will agree to limits on the number of its centrifuges, the degree of enrichment and the quantity of plutonium produced as well as fulfill its Safeguards commitments, the IAEA can verify that the limits are not exceeded and material is not diverted to a weapons program. If Iran were nevertheless to decide to “break out,” it would require six months to a year for it to do so, leaving time for both diplomatic and military efforts to prevent it from doing so.
The crunch issues lie in a different direction: undeclared nuclear material and the related question of possible military dimensions (PMDs) of Iran’s past nuclear activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been making little progress getting from Tehran clarification of past activities that appear to have aimed at design of high explosives and other research on initiation of a nuclear explosion. Nor has it been able to ascertain that there are no nuclear materials lying outside its purview. The IAEA concluded in September (and repeated Friday, despite recent meetings at which PMDs were discussed):
the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
In other words, a nuclear deal–even one with tight constraints on known facilities–could leave material and activities unaccounted for that are directed specifically at building a nuclear weapon in secret. Construction activity at a suspected site of clandestine nuclear activities (Parchin) has raised suspicions that Tehran is covering up past nuclear weapons research.
Some would like to forget about Iran’s past misbehavior, which reportedly stopped in 2003 in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq (when at least some in Tehran thought the Americans might come their way next). Ignoring past behavior and the possible existence of undeclared nuclear material would be unwise. Judging from past performance in other countries, development of nuclear weapons is far more likely to take place in parallel, secret efforts than in nuclear plants and activities under IAEA surveillance. If Iran wants the rest of the world to believe that it has seriously and permanently foresworn nuclear weapons, it needs to convince everyone that it either never did have a clandestine program or had one and gave it up.
This is difficult for Iran because of its government structure. President Rouhani is responsible for the nuclear negotiations. But the most likely sponsor of a clandestine nuclear program (past, present or future) is Supreme Leader Khamenei, who controls ample resources for such a purpose, including the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). That’s why President Obama writes Khamenei secret letters. The Supreme Leader has reportedly forsworn nuclear weapons in a fatwa:
the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons.
The trouble is Islamic jurisprudence allows a fatwa, which generally has no official written form, to be changed or reinterpreted. This one was published in an official government press release in 2005 that has evaporated from the worldwide web. That does not inspire confidence. So one well-connected Iranian commentator living in the US suggests it be “secularized” as a criminal statute. Of course that could be changed as well, but the notion of getting Iran to pledge formally that it will not seek nuclear weapons could certainly be part of a nuclear deal.
It would not substitute for what some might regard as impossible: proving the negative proposition that Iran does not have clandestine nuclear materials or a clandestine nuclear research program. “Coming clean” about past nuclear activities would certainly help. Continuing to stiff the IAEA on PMDs and the construction (now stopped) at Parchin does not. President Obama is presumably ready to justify to Congress and the American people a nuclear deal with Iran that allows it to continue peaceful activities (including enrichment) under tight IAEA surveillance, but he won’t get far unless he can also persuade them that there are no clandestine nuclear activities in progress. That’s what will give him pause.
PS: Tony Cordesman discusses in detail the difficult issues associated with clandestine research and development for nuclear weapons here.
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What they don’t say matters
I am reminded this fine DC morning that what politicians and officials don’t say in politics and diplomacy matters. Russian President Putin let loose yesterday a tirade against the US, but
when one British newspaper reporter asked him specifically about the repeated reports of Russian army troops operating in east Ukraine, Putin chose to ignore the question completely.
He has to. Despite his high standing in opinion polls, Russians overwhelmingly oppose direct military involvement in Ukraine. While his tirade will get lots of ink (and electrons) in the Western media, it may betray Putin’s weakness more than his strength. He would like to do more in Ukraine than the current surreptitious presence of a limited number of Russian army troops, which Russians refuse to acknowledge even if the documentation in the West is ample. He would have liked, among other things, to halt the Ukrainian parliamentary elections that will take place tomorrow. They will likely reduce pro-Russian representation in the Rada, if only because voting won’t be possible in separatist-controlled territory (or Crimea, which Moscow has annexed). Putin’s silence on Russian army troops in Ukraine betrays political weakness, not strength.
Wendy Sherman last week gave a talk on the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. While eminently clear on the US objective of preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, she ignored what has become a serious problem plaguing the negotiations: the possible military dimensions (PMDs they are called in the business) of past Iranian nuclear activities. To make a long story short, there is ample evidence that Iran in the past (prior to 2003) did conduct research connected exclusively to nuclear weapons. Tehran has not yet satisfied the International Atomic Energy Agency on this point. Tough-minded Americans want Iran to “come clean,” by giving a full explanation of these activities and providing ample assurances that they will not be renewed, including tight verification. This is difficult for the Iranians, not only because of the loss of face but likely also because these activities were conducted in secret by people and institutions not fully under the control of President Rouhani, who is leading the nuclear negotiations for Iran. This is not the first time Wendy has skimmed over the PMD issue. If an agreement is reached by the November 24 deadline, she’ll need to address it far more directly.
There are many other examples of how silence speaks louder than words in the diplomatic and political worlds. Think President Obama’s silence on how Syria is to be governed if the coalition war against the Islamic State is successful. Think Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi’s silence lately on concrete steps to form the provincially-based National Guard or prospects for resolving financial and other issues with the Kurdistan Regional Government. Politicians and diplomats will often say nothing on key issues because they have nothing to say that is acceptable, either to themselves or to their antagonists.
Those silences matter. We should listen to them attentively.
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Condemned to cooperate
Laurentina Cizza, a former Middle East Institute intern, writes:
Thursday’s event at the Stimson Center on “Iran and the World After the Nuclear Deal: Possible Scenarios” produced two main conclusions: the US and Iran will inevitably reach a deal, and the war against ISIS represents an area of competition, and possible cooperation, between Tehran and Washington. Presenters were
- Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Professor and Chair, Political Science, Syracuse University;
- Abbas Kadhim, Senior Foreign Policy Fellow, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Geneive Abdo, Fellow, Middle East Program, the Stimson Center, moderated.
A poverty of options on the nuclear issue
According to Boroujerdi of Syracuse University, both the US and Iran face a “poverty of options” when it comes to the nuclear deal. They have little choice but to continue talking. A nuclear deal is inevitable.
Despite coming to power on a wave of popular support, Iranian President Rouhani has struggled to push meaningful reforms past conservative elements of the establishment that have obstructed or criticized his policies. His honeymoon is effectively over. As a result, he has focused the momentum from his electoral victory on ending the nuclear deadlock and reviving the Iranian economy. A foreign policy victory in the form of a nuclear deal would strengthen Rouhani domestically, giving him greater political capital to negotiate with rival conservative elements on other hotly contested issues.
Western observers should view the nuclear negotiations within the context of vicious factional domestic Iranian politics. Rouhani cannot overhaul Iranian foreign policy by signing an unpopular nuclear deal. But failure to sign a nuclear deal would: a) waste the best opportunity for progress on the nuclear issue in at least a decade, and b) paralyze the Rouhani administration along a conservative-reformist divide. Boroujerdi argued that given the political costs of failure Iran and the US will eventually reach a resolution—even if not necessarily by the November 24 deadline.
The Obama administration’s dearth of foreign policy success heightens the need to reach a resolution to the Iran nuclear issue. Despite the administration’s claims that “all options are on the table,” Boroujerdi argues that the administration would never risk giving the Middle East another failed state by bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The race against ISIS
Irrespective of the outcome of the current nuclear talks, ISIS provides a palatable second option for agreement between the US and Iran. The two powers are likely to pursue their mutual goals on separate tracks while competing for regional recognition of their efforts.
Boroujerdi argued that since the ISIS capture of Mosul in July, Iran has demonstrated remarkable flexibility and pragmatism. The Iranians blessed Iraq Prime Minister Maliki’s removal, refrained from criticizing the US-led air campaign against ISIS, and began supplying weapons to the Lebanese army—not just Hezbollah. Boroujerdi suggests this new pragmatism extends to Syria as well: the Iranians would be willing to throw Assad under the bus so long as their greater strategic interests could survive without him. In Iraq, Maliki’s departure did not weaken Iran’s unfaltering influence in the country, which is concentrated in Karbala.
In the fight against ISIS, Iran has taken care to jump ahead and take credit for being the first to act. When the militants overran Mosul, Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa provided the Iraqi army with the boost of morale and reserves necessary to face ISIS. The US stood idle on the sidelines. When the US finally announced its intention to arm the Kurds, pictures emerged of Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleymani training Kurdish peshmerga forces.
Kadhim argued that members’ conflicting priorities will doom the US-led coalition to failure. Although the US wants to tackle ISIS first and Assad second, coalition members such as Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia would rather see events occur in the reverse order. Kadhim likened inviting Saudi Arabia to join an anti-terror coalition to inviting Al Capone to a coalition against organized crime. The presence of pro-ISIS members, he argued, is bound to doom the coalition. Boroujerdi echoed this concern: the US strategy of fighting ISIS and Assad simultaneously is “unrealistic.” The US—he suggested—could learn a thing or two from Iranian pragmatism.
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Regional ripples from a nuclear deal
As gradual progress is made towards a potential nuclear deal with Iran, many question the implications that this agreement would have for the surrounding region. On Monday, the Woodrow Wilson Center hosted “The Iranian Nuclear Deal and the Impact on its Neighbors” to analyze the regional repercussions of a possible bargain. Abdullah Baabood, Director of the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University, and David and Marina Ottaway, Senior Scholars at the Woodrow Wilson Center, discussed relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and neighboring Iraq, while Bijan Khajehpour, Managing Partner of Atieh International, analyzed the regional economic aspects of a nuclear deal.
The prospect of a nuclear bargain with Iran poses a great challenge for the GCC. According to Abdullah Baabood, each of the six GCC countries has a great stake in the Iranian nuclear deal and has many concerns regarding regional security, the economy, and the environment.
However, negotiations have been taking place secretly between Iran and the US, much to the dismay of the GCC. This is particularly insulting as the US is an important ally to the region, and a deal with Iran would be a major foreign policy issue with implications far beyond simply arms control. There is fear that Iran and the US will strike a grand bargain, resulting in the US leaving the region and Iran coming to dominate it.
The GCC fears this deal because it does not know how to interpret Iran’s status and whether or not it will strictly abide by the rules of the nuclear agreement. There is a great deal of unease about Iran spreading its wings throughout the Gulf and expanding its influence without restriction.
David Ottaway further analyzed the tumultuous relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the past several decades. The two countries have a history of intense rivalry for regional dominance that is currently at its peak. However, there have been attempts recently to initiate dialogue between the foreign ministers. The main issue in these upcoming conversations will be determining the true meaning of détente for both the Iranians and the Saudis and exactly how to handle the challenge of energy and oil, as well as sectarian divides.
With the current situation in Iraq, Marina Ottaway highlighted the need to consider how the instability will affect a nuclear deal with Iran. The current sectarian division in Iraq could pose a threat to Iran, which has continued to back Prime Minister Maliki and ultimately has more influence than the US, due to its location. However, volatility is highly unfavorable for Iran and is not ideal for contracting a regional settlement in regards to its nuclear program.
Bijan Khajehpour then discussed the economic implications within the region, assuming there will be a comprehensive nuclear bargain with Iran. There are four areas of either convergence or divergence between Iran and its neighbors. This includes:
- The energy sector
- Regional trade and cross-border investment activity
- Competition for economic and technological dominance
- International investment
The energy sector is a fundamental concern because of the growing demand for oil and gas reserves within the region. While the Persian Gulf holds nearly half of the world’s oil reserves, most states lack natural gas resources, with the exception of Iran and Qatar. Other countries will need to import gas in the near future. “Keeping pressure on Iran’s natural gas sector is to the detriment of the whole region,” Khajehpour concluded, highlighting why energy efficiency will be a point of contention with the progress of an Iranian nuclear bargain.
There is still fierce ideological and strategic competition between Iran and the surrounding region over a possible nuclear deal. It has never been clearer to Iran’s neighbors that they must get involved in this bargain to have their vital interests addressed.
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Deal or no deal?
Einstein quipped, “politics is more difficult than physics.” As the deadline for a nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 approaches with a host of issues unresolved, this observation seems especially prophetic. The Wilson Center Tuesday assembled a panel to disentangle some of these questions: Jon Wolfsthal of the Monterey Institute; Robert Litwak of the Wilson Center; Daryl Kimball, of the Arms Control Association; and Stephen Hadley of USIP, who moderated.
There are many reasons to be skeptical that such a deal can be successfully concluded: Iran has a long history of noncompliance, and there is considerable opposition among hardliners in both countries. Furthermore, America’s track record for negotiating similar deals has not been stellar: in 2003, for instance, the six-party talks with North Korea broke down. Nonetheless, the panelists agreed that the circumstances surrounding the current round of negotiations warrant a measure of cautious optimism.
With regards to a timeline, Wolfsthal contended that only a long-term deal should be on the table. This would reduce Iran’s break-out capability, as well as provide space for confidence building measures that could further dissuade Tehran from seeking the bomb. Nonetheless, the US must remember that, unlike Iraq, Iran is not a vanquished state: negotiators therefore cannot impose permanent limits on the Iranian nuclear program. Even the Iraqi sanctions regime lasted seventeen years—that is, it was time-bound.
Kimball pointed out that Russia’s cooperation is crucial to the long-term success of any accord. They have agreed to supply Iran’s Bushehr reactor with fissile material until 2021; if the agreement is not renewed, Iran could be justified in their demands for expanding the number of centrifuges. In the longer run, if Iran can demonstrate a need for indigenously produced nuclear power, there might be an opening to phase out first generation centrifuges and replace them with a smaller number of more efficient IR-2M centrifuges.
Litwak noted that the challenges underlying the nuclear agreement speak to larger questions facing Iran. As Kissinger once asked, “Does Iran want to be a nation or a cause?” Hardliners in both countries remain one of the primary obstacles to the success of negotiations. Conservatives in Tehran want to develop Iran’s nuclear capacity in order to solidify their country’s standing as a regional power and ensure regime survival. By disarming, Iran might leave itself vulnerable to regime change.
It remains to be seen if President Rouhani is able to sell a deal to Tehran, as ultimately it is up to the Supreme Leader to weigh the cost of alienating hardliners in Tehran against the economic pain caused by sanctions. President Obama’s two-track strategy, combining pressure and outreach, only sharpens the choice. The cycle of reformist and reactionary presidents who have come to power over the years may reflect shifts in Khameini’s willingness to oppose hardliners in Tehran. Tellingly, in last few weeks, Khameini has openly tried to quell dissent over the nuclear deal.
There is also considerable opposition to a deal in the United States. Democrats and Republicans alike are demanding that sanctions relief be conditioned on Iran’s compliance on issues like human rights. The president must find leaders on both sides of the aisle who are willing to sell the deal to their respective parties. Negotiators, and Congress, must disentangle successive tranches of sanctions. Human rights issues will not go away even if nuclear issue is resolved.
Litwak emphasized that the Iranian nuclear program was not designed in response to a perceived existential threat, as is the case with Pakistan and Israel. Ultimately, Iran is not intent on building a nuclear weapon; they only want to demonstrate the ability to create a nuclear weapon. They are well aware that any move towards actual weaponization could lead to a regional and international conflagration.
Any agreement with broad international support will be distasteful to Israel, which will press its US ally for vigorous verification of compliance and other assurances. There must be mechanisms embedded within any agreement to ensure compliance, including snapback sanctions and even authorization of force if Iran does break-out.
The US doesn’t trust Iran or Russia, but is nonetheless able to conclude deals with them. In order for these negotiations to succeed, they must be based on verification, not trust. It is important to keep in mind what will happen in the absence of any deal at all: we will be unable to verify Iran’s enrichment capacity; enrichment could continue; and without additional inspections, Iran could expand its capacity in secret.
There is a crucial difference between the failed talks with North Korea and current negotiations: a large portion of Iranian society wants to rejoin the international community. This desire provides negotiators with levers that were unavailable with North Korea. Arriving at an agreement will not be easy. It will have to be flexible enough to allow for Iran’s growing energy needs and satisfy the country’s hardliners, yet tough enough to persuade a skeptical Congress that Iran’s break-out capacity has been eliminated.
Nonetheless, the panelists agreed, the best time for a nuclear deal is now. Rouhani’s election was a clear signal that Iranians are prepared to negotiate.
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